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March 19, 1975
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d Par 1,,elese 19.09. C1,121,1-0060,0.001706,9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Confidential FBIS TRENDS In Communist Propaganda Confidential 19 MARCH 1975 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R006B01f6\51/3t-tS? 11) Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL, This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. [ Classified by 000073 Sui.sct to General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declassified Two Years from Date of Issue National Security Information Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions Approved For Release 199990kfil?)1P1kbP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL EMS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 C ONTENTS EAST-WEST RELATIONS Brezhnev Stresses Detente Themes, Sees CSCE Summit 1 COMMUNIST RELATIONS Kadar Renews Call or World CP Conference, Attacks Maoism 3 MIDDLE EAST USSR Disparages "Shuttle Diplomacy," Brezhnev Urges Geneva Talks. . 5 INDOCHINA PRG Claims Ban Me Thuot Takeover; Fate o( Americans Discussed ? ? ? 8 HOC TAP Claims Saigon Army Weak, Urban Struggle Crowing 10 Hanoi Offers Cordial Welcome to PRC Military Delegation 13 Cambodian Front Sees Victory Near; Sihanouk Claims Support 15 CYPRUS USSR Sees UN Resolution as Offering Little Prospect for Talks . . . 17 WI.SIERN EUROPE PRC Denounces Soviet Economic Penetration of West Europe 19 Moscow Radio Suggests U.S. Hand In Abortive Portuguese Cour 20 CUBA Castro in IZVESTIYA Rejects Concessions for Lifting Blockade 22 USSR Police Official Asserts All Peasants To Receive Internal Passpots. . 25 PRC-TAIWAN China Frees KMT "War Criminals," Permits Return to Taiwan 27 NORTH KOREA Kim Il-Song Urges Expanded Trade Ties with Capitalist States 29 NOTE Titu Visit to Poland 31 APPENDIX Aaft54itd ile,:iti-iReVe2f1419,399109t26i:celk-RDP86T00608R001320017001.3-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL 1 - EAST-WEST RELATIONS BREZHNEV STRESSES DETENTE THEMES, SEES CSCE SUMMIT FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 General Secretary Brezhnev presented a generally positive assessment of conditions in the socialist countries and of the prospects for East-West relations in his 18 March speech to the lith congress of the Hungarian communist party in Budapest. Clearly aiming at putting the best possible face on current Soviet policies, Brezhnev stressed Lhe prospects for the continuing progress of detente in Europe. He asserted that a "malority" of states participating in the CSCE were now willing to hold the concluding session at the summit level, and he interpreted this as signifying that the relations of the Soviet Union and the majority of the socialist countries with the major capitalist counties were entering a "more or less normal channel." Although Brezhnev dwelt mainly on European issues, in keeping with the occasiAl, he referred briefly to unresolved issues in other parts of the world and stressed the importance in this connection of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, "which have such important significance for the cause of general peace." Brezhnev acknowledged routinely the need for continued ideological struggle with the West within the framework of peaceful coexistence and, echoing his major "victory of communism" speech in Alma-Ata of August 1973, he stressed the "special importance" of efforts to disseminate "the truth about socialism and of the struggle against all kinds of ideology alien to socialism." He criticized "opponents of detente," whom he said were becoming more active with the "acute crisis in the capitalist system." Urging all those "fighting for peace" to retain their vigilance, Brezhnev noted that there were still "hotbeds of dangerous tension, conflicts, and potential military flareups, both in the Near East, in Southeast Asia, and in other areas of the World."* Brezhnev then went on to say that "peace" must be extended to other continents of the world, not just Europe, and he singled out "the serious attention" that Moscow is giving "to the strengthening of relations of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States." * See the Middle East section of this TRENDS for a discussion of Brezhnev's remarks on the Middle East. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/MpNi,cliA-RDP86T096s9,59p9200170013-9 19 MARCH 1975 - 2 - CSCE, MBFR In his remarks on the CSCE, Brezhnev did not reL'er to his recent personal letters to Western leaders proposing 30 June as the date for convelng a 35-nation summit conference in Helsinki--letters which were publicized in the Western media the day before his speech. But Brezhnev assessed as "a gratlfyiag move" the fact that one "can now apparently say that a majority of the other conference partici- pants are inclined to conclude its work during the next few months, and at the summit level at that." indirectly acknow- ledging that outstanding CSCE problems could further delay the final summit, Brezhnev added that "those who persistently attempt to hinder the speediest conclusion of the all-European conference take upon themselves all the greater responsibility." Once the "political foundation" of the European scene has been established by the CSCE, Brezhnev said, the "foremost" task will be "practical implementation of military detente." In this regard, Brezhnev said that what he had in mind for the Vienna force reduction talks was "not only limitation but also a gradual reduction of the size" of the various armed forces and armaments, quickly adding that "of course, this is not the kind of question that can be solved overnight" but that such efforts were being made both in the Geneva strategic arms talks and at Vienna. Brezhnev's Budapest speech eschewed the strong criticism of the Western negotiators at Vienna contained in his last previous speech on 14 February--during Prime Minister Wilson's visit--when he had accused the West of trying to gain "unilateral advantages" at the force reduction talks. At the commentary level, Moscow and its allies have continued to criticize the lack of Western "initiatives" at the MBFR talks, with comment in the past two weeks stressing the "new," "compromise" amendments which the Warsaw Pact states had offered on 6 March to revise their basic November 1973 proposal and claiming as before that the new move took into consideration certain aspects of Western criticism of the East's position. ECONOMIC CRISIS In discussing the current "deep economic crisis," Brezhnev at first suggested that only the capitalist word was affected, but went on to acknowledge that "it goes without saying that the state of affairs un the world market cannot fail to have a certain effect on our economic affairs"--a ohich Hungarian party leader Kadar in his keynote address to the congress on the 17th had stressed, in unusually frank terms for an East European communist leader. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FB IS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 3 - COMMUNIST RELATIONS KADAR RENEWS CALL FOR WORLD CP CONFERENCE, ATTACKS MAOISM In his 17 March speech at Hungary's 11th party congress, First Secretary Kadar reconfirmed the credentials of his party as a staunch ally of Moscow on questions of international communism by issuing another call for a world conference of communist parties and denouncing Peking's brand of communism. Brezhnev responded the following day with praise For the Hungarian party's "steadfast" Marxist-Leninist line and its "high prestiage" within the communist movement, as well as personal recognition of Kadar as a "convinced internationalist." Mc.nwhile, Brezhnev continued to refrain from directl; endorsing a world meeting and also avoided condemning the Chinese Communist Party. He did, however, deem to hint at the desirability of a world gathering in noting the likely contribution of the impending European communist party conference and then adding that "of course, comrades, o.e must not rest on one's laurels." And although Brezhnev withheld criticism of Peking, he noted that in the past the fraternal parties had succesFiully united to protect "correct" Marxism-Leninism against devAtionist parties of both the right and the left. Kadar strongly reasserted his party's dogged allegiance to the CPSU on international issues and contended that the standard for measuring each communist party's international outlook was the strength of its ties to "Lenin's party." However, as he had done at the 19-21 December Budapest preparatory meeting for the European CP conference attended by both orthodox and inde- pendent parties, Kadar acknowledged that "no organizational center" exists within the communist movement. On the other hand, he reiterated his position that the European conference should aim at working out a "joint line" and a "concrete program" to be adhered to by all parties. Contending that the value of joint guidelines was proven by the success of the 1969 ',.)scow world conference, Kadar--who in December 1973 became one of the initial proponents of a world gathering--called for a "new, great interna- tional conference of communist and workers parties." He went on to condemn deviationism of whatever form, especially "nation- alism" and "anti-Sovietism," and put his party on record as waging a "principled fight against Maoism." A TASS account of Kadcr's remarks reported his call for a world conference as well as his denunciation of the Chinese. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 4 Recognition of the Hungarian party's orthodox position by the maverick Romanian and independent Yugoslav parties was under- scored when those parties sent second-level delegations to the congress. While Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were all represented by their party chiefs, Romania dispatched Political Executive Committee member 'lie Verdet, and Yugoslavia a Presidium member, Jure Bilic. Belgrade, moreover, sent its spokesman at international party meetings, AleksEndar Grlickov, to the Italian party congress which opened on the 18th. During the previous round of communist party congresses in 1971, Tito had also sent lower level officials in his stead, while Ceausescu attended only the Soviet and Pi7lish congresses. CONFIDENTIAL A roved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 IIDDLE EAST USSR DISPARAGES "SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY," BREZHNEV URGES GENEVA TALKS As during Secretary Kissinger's previous negotiating efforts in the Mideast, Moscow continues to give his current mission only scanty attention. Domestic service newscasts are not known to have mentioned the Secretary's activities since his visit to Ankara on 10-11 March; however, limited comment for the Soviet as well as foreign audiences has been more outspokenly skeptical of the Secretary's "shuttle diplomacy" than was the case during the disengagement negotiations last year. Brezhnev, in his 8 March address to the Hungarian party congress, did not take the occasion to repeat the criticism in his 14 February speech at a luncheon for visiting British Prime Minister Wilson of "partial steps" toward a Mideast settlement. Instead, he confined himself to reiterating the need for "speediest resumption" of the Geneva conference. Comment on partial steps has adhered to Brezhnev's February formula that such measures are useful, but--with stress on the "but"--only if they lead to a real settlement and do not "freeze" the situation. This stress on an overall settlement is in line with Soviet treatment of the initial Suez and Golan accords last year, which were described as "positive" if they were followed by a "radical" settlement. By not dismissing the "step-by-step" approach outright Moscow may be preparing to claim some share of the credit, as Gromyko did in January last year in depicting the Suez disengagement as a result of the Geneva talks. At the same time, Moscow commentators have continued to convey some annoyance at being left out of the action: TASS director general Zamyatin observed that no information on the "essence" of the talks was available other than from American press reports. MOSCOW COMMENT ON Of the limited comment dealing specificall with KISSINGER TRAVELS Kissinger's negotiations, the most authoritative spokesman was Zamyatin in the 15 March "International Situation" domestic radio feature. Told by the moderator that listeners were asking about the aims and implication of Kissinger's "so-called shuttle diplomacy," Zamyatin responded that "so far we do not have any official statements about these shuttle operations"--"Kissinger is in Cairo one day, in Tel Aviv the next, and then returns to Cairo again." Attributing his information to "the American press," Zamyatin said the talks concerned "some kind of agreement on a partial withdrawal of Israeli forc2s in exchange for some kind of assurance from the other side." He contrasted this American "partial step" approach with the Soviet view that negotiations should be conducted not from the standpoint CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/091281:1)01AADP86T00608R000200170013-9 19 MARCH 1975 "of some concessions from one side or the other, but from that of their detailed productivity." Reiterating Brezhnev's qualified February statement on the usefulness of partial oeasures, Zamyatin asserted that partial steps which are not linked with a general settlement of the Middle East problem "can hardly speed up the solution." Similarly, a panelist on the weekly Moscow domestic service observers roundtable program on the 16th declared that partial withdrawal "can only be one step" leading to a genuine settlement, and "nothing of the kind can be said" of the first troop disengagement last year. Somewhat more detailed accounts of the issues in the negotiations were provided in a Losev foreign-language commentary on the 13th which noted from "press reports" that Egypt was calling for return of the Sinai passes and oilfields while Israel was demanding an Egyptian pledge not to resume military operations against Israel for several years, and also to open the Suez Canal to ships carrying Israeli cargo. Losev additionally reported Israeli demands for demilitarization and UN control of evacuated territory. Citing the Paris L'ECHO as wondering to what extent Egypt would agree to a separate settlement, Losev pointedly went on to mention Syria's "resolute" opposition to such an agreement. For Arab audiences, a commentary on the 13th, noting Kissinger's talks in pursuit of "the so-called step-by-step solution," said that the first Israeli demand was, "as usual," an Egyptian promise to end the state of war with Israel "regardless of whether or not the other issues" pertaining to a settlement would be solved. The commentary recalled that before the current talks started President as-Sadat had said Egypt reject2d such an "individual agreement," and cited Syrian, Palestinian and Libyan leaders as voicing "apprehension" over the idea of partial agreements. Two brief Moscow radio news items on the 18th--one broadcast in Arabic and the other in English to Great Britain--conveyed the idea that Secretary Kissinger was making little progress. The items dealt with different aspects of the Kissinger/as-Sadat press conference in Aswan following their latest round of talks. As-Sadat was reported, in the Arabic-language item, as saying that no agreement on Israeli withdrawal had yet been reached. The English-language account cited "reports from the Middle East" to the effect that Kissinger's efforts "have so far come to nothing," and that the Secretary "admitted the difference" in the sides' views. President as-Sadat was reported as saying that no agreement had been reached so far on the principles of a new disengagement, and as stressing the importance of the Palestinians' rights in a Mideast settlement. ' CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 COvriDENT1AL FB Is TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 7 - BREZHNEV SPEECH Brezhnev's Hungarian party congress speech on the 18th was notable more for the omission of any critical remarks on "partial steps" toward a Mideast settlement than for what he did say. Presumably, his avoidance of any implicit criticism of U.S. diplomatic methods related more to the nature of the occasion than to any show of restraint in connection with Secretary Kissinger's current negotiations. His most forceful criticism of partial measures--in his 14 February speech at a luncheon for the British Prime Minister--came as Kissinger was in the midst of a Mideast tour. Carping by Soviet leaders over the U.S. approach began shortly after the first Israeli-Egyptian disengagement accord in Janua-...-y last year: Late that same month, Brezhnev warned in a speech in Havana against the substitution of "partial accords" for an overall settlement. In April last year, at a dinner for visiting Syrian President al-Asad, he referred to "ersatz plans" for a settlement in effect replacing a general solucion with "partial agreements of different kinds." And in May, while Kissinger was in the Middle East holding talks on the Israeli-Syrian disengagement, Kosygin complained, at a dinner for visiting Libyan Prime Minister Jallud, thaL "the aggressor and its patrons want to substitute some half measures, which only create a semblance of detente," for an overall settlement. Now, in his Budapest speech, Brezhnev merely repeated the standard Soviet position that the Geneva conference was the proper forum for the solution of the main problems. These he again defined as liberation of all Arab lands occupied in 1967, satisfaction of the Palestinians' lawful rights including creation of their "own statehood," and the "effective guarantee" of secure, independent, and free existence for all states of the Middle East. Soviet commentators have been following the same script in outlining the chief problems: TASS commentator Krasnikov on the 13th and TASS director general Zamyatin two days later, in the Moscow radio "International Situation" program, listed the same elements, both insisting that these provisions muct be "parts of a single whole." Moscow has for years insisted on a "package deal" approach to a settlement; for instance, a TASS account in February 1970 of Kosygin letters to the United States, Britain and France on a Mideast solution stated Soviet support for "interconnected fulfillment" of all provisions of Security Council Resolution 242, and Mideast specialist Belyayev in an April 1970 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article called such a package approach "reasonable." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -8 INDOCHINA PRG CLAIMS BAN ME THUOT TAKEOVER; FATE OF AMERICANS DISCUSSED Vietnamese communists have announced that they have "seized complete control" of the Darlac provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot as well as a number of district capitals in South Vietnam. According to a 14 March Liberation Radio broadcast, the city was captured on the afternoon of the 11th as a result of "attacks and uprisings" launched by the "Darlac armed forces and people" the previous morning. While the nine Americans reportedly in the city when the fighting erupted have not been specifically accounted for in the communist media, a spokesman of the PRG military delegation stationed at Tan Son Nhut airbase outside Saigon has indicated at a press conference that those who are U.S. "miliEary advisers" would not be released. fn commenting on events elsewhere in the highlands, the media have only indirectly mentioned Western press reports that President Thieu was planning to pull his forces out of the three provinces of Pleiku, Kontum, and DarhIc. AMERICANS IN Communist propaganda has only alluded to the BAN ME THUOT Americans who were reportedly in Ban Me Thuot. A 16 March Liberation Radio broadcast discussing the removal of the ARVN Second Military Region headquarters from Pleiku to Nha Trang claimed this was done to "escape danger and especially to spare the U.S. advisers in Pleiku the fate of the nine Americans in Ban Me Thuot, who were described by a U.S. Embassy spokesman as being boxed in." The same broadcast quoted the deputy chief of the PRG military delegation at a 15 March press conference at Tan Son Nhut as ominously declaring: "Foreigners, including honest Americans, will be well treated and released if they are captured, but this treatment will not be given to U.S. military advisers. They are special cases because they have violated the Paris agreement." Monitored Vietnamese communist propaganda is not known to have made any other mention of U.S. personnel who might have been captured in the recent fighting. 'LIBERATION' OF DRV and PRG propaganda following the takeover BAN ME THUOT of Ban Me Thuot and a number of district capitals throughout the South has justified the communist military action as punishment for the United States and Thieu because they were "continuing" the war and "sabotaging" the Paris agreement. General Westmoreland's recent public statement deploring the President's current lack of authority to use U.S. aircraft to bomb communist supply lines and mine Haiphong harbor was offered as evidence of U.S. Approved For Release 19gffir:181rA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 ;f? Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CL FiDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -9 - culpability in this respect. The media have also attempted to portray the local populace of Ban Me Thuot, especially the ethnic minorities, as having now been rescued from the "opprssion" and "exploitation" they allegedly suffered under the GVN administration. In defending the latest communist military gains in the South, Hanoi and PRG comment has echoed the line taken after the fall of Phuoc Binh city in early January.* According to media commentaries at the time, Phuoc Binh had been used as a GVN "staging area" for launching attacks on PM-controlled territory, and its takeover by the communists was therefore in compliance TALI the calls to "counterattack" such areas, contained in earlier PLAF orders. Likewise, a 15 March Liberation Radio commeutary claimed that Ban Me Thuot and "adjacent military subsetors" have been used by the ARVN as the "staging bases for thousands of operations to terrorize and massacre the people." An earlier Liberation Radio commentary on the initial fighting in the area--broadcast on the 12th--predictably evoked the 15 October 1973 PLAF Command order as authority for "counterattacking," claiming that it "clearly pointed out that the PLAF has the right to counterattack the U.S.-Thieu clique's acts of war anywhere. . . to compel. . . implementation of the Paris agreement."** NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentaries of 14 and 15 March, respectively, were particularly vehement in castigating the ARVN 23d infantry division and "diehard cruel ranger units" for committing "untold crimes" against ethnic minority peoples in Darlac. Media comment has also depicted social and economic conditions in Ban Me Thuot as deplorable under the GVN, characterizing the fall of the city as an "inevitabl2 outcome of struggle against the U.S.-Thieu fascist regime." Saigon denials that the city was under the total control of communist forces were scornfully rejected by the media as a "Goebbels-like propaganda trick that can deceive no one." In an apparent attempt to demonstrate popular support for the communists, Liberation Radio claimed that rallies were held in Ban Me Thuot on the 12th, 13th, and 14th, to "acclaim the victory of the people throughout Darlac Province and the complete liberation of Ban Me Thuot." * The capture of Phuoc Binh is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 10-12. ** See the TRENDS of 17 October 1973, pages 7-9, for a discussion of the 15 October 1973 PLAF order. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/0M.paRDP86T0016018R9M00170013-9 19 MARCH 1975 - 10 - HIGHLANDS Western press reports of Nguyen Van Tnieu's alleged EVACUATION intention to abandon the highland provinces of Pleiku, Kontum, rnd Darlac have not been directly acknowledged in Vietnamese communist media. While Hanoi and Liberatlon radio broadcasts cited earlier Western reports on the evacuation of the ARVN regional headquarters in Pleiku city, more recent Liberation Radio broadcasts on the withdrawal from the area are vague abo,.t indicating its extent--mentioninl, only Pleiku and "other localities in the Central Highlands," but without specifying whether this meant Pleiku city or the province. These broadcasts are focused instead on the supposed misery of the people involved in the "so-called evacuation campaign." For example, a 19 March Liberation Radio report charged that the people were being forced against their will to flee, and in areas where Thieu has been unable to "herd and remove them, he has sent aizcraft and troop' to barbarously bomb, strafe, and massacre them." The broadcast of the 19th concluded with an appeal for these people to "rise up, oppose, and punish" the troops who were "forcing them to leave their homes" and urged them to "coordinof.e their activities with those of the PLAF and be determined to stay close to their land. . . ." HOC TAP CLAIMS SAIGON ARMY WEAK, URBAN STRUGGLE GROWING An unusually optimistic assessment of the communist military position in South Vietnam was offered in an article published in the January issue of the North Vietnamese party theoretical journal HOC TAP. The article--attributed to Truong Chi Cuong, a byline not seen previJusly--echoed other Hanoi comment at the turn of the year in its basic appraisal that the communists in 1974 successfully countered the South Vietnamese.: Government's "nibbling" operations and pacification.* In two respects, however, HOC TAP went further than other comment--in its detailed analysis of what it portrayed as Saigon's deteriorating military position and in its stress on the role of the urban struggle in the future. Some passages of the article appeared to reflect Hanoi's evaluation of the results of the first phase of the communist dry season offensive in December and early January, and that appraisal may have been the source of its r-Jre optimistic tone. It cannot be determined when the article was written, since it was not broadcast and HOC TAP does not publish a signed-to-press date. * Vietnamese communist media comment at the end of December and early January on the military situation in South Vietnam is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 January 1975, pages 9-10. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1.975 In the course of analyzing alleged ARVN weaknesses, the HOC TAP article cited n. specific engagements. It claimed that "in recent battles" in uistrict military sectors and district capitals the GVN resistance was "very weak" and that troops in "many stronghold complexes" could not "resist more than one day." It maintained that some posts were being abandoned without being attacked and, in this context, claimed that a "very high" number of ARVN officers and troops had been captured and that the number of deserters was the highest since 1965. The article also dwelt upon ARVN materiel shortages, maintaining that there had been a decrease in Its firepower and the amount of its mobile equipment in the third quarter of the year and citing specific figures to demonstrate reduced ARVN capabilities. HOC TAP portrayed the GVN political and economic siLuation in equally bleak terms, claiming that the economy is stagnating, "70 percent of the population have not had enough food to eat September 1974," and that Thieu is increasingly isolated with mi political base and deserted by former supporters. The article maintained that another factor in the GVN's worsening situation WAS the decEning U.S. ability or willingness to support Saigon. It noted, among other things, that Congress had reduced by one-half the military aid requested for the current fiscal year. URBAN STRUGGLE The HOC TAP article gave notable prominence to the antigovernment movement in southern cities, even claiming that the development of the favorable situation for the revolution in the South would "lead to disturbances in the southern cities . . and in areas that reflect the present acute contradictions in the Saigon administration in a concrete manner." It also seemed to reflect a communist commitment to become directly involved in the urban opposition to the Thieu government. It claimed that "new opposition forces" had appeared in most provinces in the South "down to the basic level" and quoted First Secretary Le Duan's advice on the importance of the organization of such forces: ". . Once the mass movement has taken shape, leading the masses in submitting to the established order of organization is a key problem of decisive significance." HOC TAP does not cite the source of the Le Duan quotation, but it is similar to passages in his lengthy February 1970 article, written on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party. In analyzing revolutionary methods, the 1970 article had stressed that "prior to the seizure of power, and to seize power, the sole weapon of the revolution and the masses is organization." More CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 AII?1111?111=1MMEMMAIK Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 12 - More recently, the first secretary's 3 February speech on the occasion of the party's 45th anniversary did not discuss the problems of organization, but was notable for its detailed recounting of the importance of political struggle in the Vietnamese revolution.* * The 3 Febrtary 1975 article is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 February 1975, pages 9-11. CONFTDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 13 - HANOI OFFEI;S CORDIAL WELCOME TO PRO MILITARY DFLEGATION Hanoi's desire to treat equally its two major communist allies was reflected in DRV handling of a Chinese military delegation's visit to North Vietnam from 28 February to 14 March. Hanoi's treatment closely followed the pattern set in its welcome last December for a high-level Soviet military delegation headed by Chief of the General Staff V. G. Kulikov, the few differences reflecting the differing protocol requirements for visitors of unequal rank.* The latest Chinese delegation visit was the first of a purely military nature known to be acknowledged by Hanoi and Peking since 1961, when a PRC military delegation led by CCP Politburo member Yeh Chien-ying visited Hanoi. A PRC aid delegation headed by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien,which visited Hanoi in September 1971,was the last PRC mission to the DRV acknowledged by either Hanoi or Peking to have included high- level PRC military officers. The PRC delegation, led by Sinkiang Military Region commander Yang Yung, was net on arrival by Vice Minister of Defense and VPA Deputy chief of the General Staff Hoang Van Thai, who acted as host during the visit and led the Vietnamese side in working-level talks with the Chinese. Reflecting the higher rank of the Soviet delegation, Kulikcv hod b2en greeted on arrival by his counterpart, Chief the VPA General Staff Van Tien Dung, who also led the Vietnamese in discussions with the Soviet visitors. The other high-level Vietnamese military officers who attended the negotiating sessions with the Chinese-- Lieutenant Generals Tran Sam, Trah Quy Hai, Le Trong Tan and Le Quang Hoa and Major General Vu Xuan Chiem--had also attended talks with the Soviet delegation in December. The PRC delegation's schedule of activi.cies also closely paralleled that for the Soviet delegation: the Chinese were welf.omed at a reception on the evening of 28 February attended by Defense Minister Giap and addressed by Hoang Van Thai. (Giap had attended and spoken at the 21 December 1974 welcoming reception for Kulikov.) The Chinese also duplicated the !'oviet itinerary in meeting with DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and in visiting DRV military sites and points of interest. * The visit of the Kulikov delegation on 21-27 December is discussed in the TRENDS of 31 December 1974, page 11. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 14 - Testimonials to Sino-Vietnamese friendship made by North Vietnamese speakers and media during the Chinese visit virtually duplicated expressions of Hanoi's praise for Soviet-Vietnamese ties during Kulikov's visit. Clap, speaking at the welcoming reception for the Soviet group on 21 December, had characterized the visit as "a brilliant manifestation of militant solidarity and close friendship," while Hoang Van Thai's welcoming speech for the Chinese on 28 February said the PRC visit was "a brilliant. manifestation of militant solidarity and wart friendship." Giap on 21 December had noted that the Soviet Union and DRV were bound by "ties of great friendship and militunt solidarity based on the principles of Marxism-LerCnism add proletarian internation- alism," and Hoang Van Thai hailed the "great friendship and close militant solidarity built upon the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism" between. the PRC and DRV in his 28 February speech. Similarly, Giap had characterized Soviet aid to Hanoi as "strong support and great, effective, precious assistance," while Hoang Van Thai expressed DRV gratitude for "the great, precious, effective, and all-sided assistance" of the PRC. Hanoi media described Pham Van Dong's reception of both the Soviet and PRC delegations as being conducted in an atmosphere of "friendship and fraternal militant solidarity," and characterized the premier's talks with both delegations as "cordial." Both delegations' visits also occasioned similarly warm QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials. NCNA, whose reportage of the Yang delegation closely followed that of Hanoi, reported the delegation's departure from Hanoi on 14 March and its arrival in Peking on the 17th, but it provided no details on the delegation's itinerary during the intervening three days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -15- CAMBODIAN FRONT SEES VICTORY NEAR; SIHANOUK CLAIMS SUPPORT A growing confidence of the Cambodian insurgent Front (NUFC) that It will attoio a total military victory in the very near future was reflected in a 15 March appeal by Khieu Samphan, insurgent military chief and RGNU deputy prime minister. Almost simultan- eously, Prince Sihanouk issued a statement on the fifth anniversary of his own overthragon 18 March 1.970 in which he zlaimed continued insurgent support for his role as Cambodian head of state and reaffirmed the Front's uncompromising position on a Cambodian settlement. Hanoi media have been treating Cambodian developments over the past week with restraint, at a time when Peking has stepped up its own attention, including a lengthy NCNA rebuke to President Ford's support of Lon Nol and a sharp warning in PEOPLE'S DAILY against Soviet policy towaru Cambodia. FRONT POSITION The 15 March appeal from Khieu Samphan to citizens under Phnom Penh's control, broadc&st by the insrrgents' recently inaugurated radio station targeted specifically at Phnom Penh listeners,* combined calls for antiregime actions with optimistic appraisals of the Front's current strength and position, but avoided any specific prediction as to when the Front might gain victory. The appeal directly compared the Front's presently rosy prospects with its less favorable position prior to the start of the dry season offensive in early January. Pointing out that "the situation has increasingly altered and been extremely favorable to us in all fields," the deputy prime minister stressed that the Front's current relative strength vis-a-vis Lon Nol "is far differeat from the situation in January," as Phnom Penh is now confronted with "general collapse." He flatly predicted that Phnom Penh "has no hope" of reopenirg the Mekong River supply route, and that the Lon Nol leadership, the U.S. "imperialists," and the rest of the world were now aware that the Phnom Penh administration's fate "has come to its end." The appeal called for an upsurge in anti-Lon Nol mass demonstrations inside Phnom Penh and warned the citizens of the capital that "the time has come for us to put an end to the existence of the traitors." The appeal took note of last week's resignation of Phnom Penh Defense Minister Sosthene Fernandez, depicting this as evidence of the Lon Nol administration's internal squabbling as it approached its end, but it continued to identify Fernandez as one of the seven top enemies of the Front in Phnom Penh. * Called "The Voice of the NUFC of Phnom Penh," the new station was first monitored by FBIS on 24 January 1975. For background, see the TRENDS of 29 January 1975, page 9. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL YBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -16 - Sihanouk's 18 March statement, thus far available only in summary from Peking's NCNA, highlighted as proof that he remains the "only legal head of state of Cambodia" the fact that the 26 February communique on the Front's second National Congress in Cambodia had referred to him as head of state and chairman of the NUFC. The prince ciaimed that nil Cambodian patriots have come to accept his March 1970 five-point position on Cambodia, swore to remain true to the Front's po1itical program and to the Cambodian people-- whom he characterized as "the sovereign holder of legislative, exe'llitive, judicial and military power" in Cambodia?and pledged to continue uncompromising fighting until complete liberation is achieved. PEKING ON A 16 March NCNA commentary departed from customary FORD POLICY Peking restraint and avoidance of direct criticism of U.S. leaders, assailiag the President by name for attempting to shore up Lon Nol, achieve a compromise settlement, and prevent a total Front victory. Like other recent Peking comment on the Cambodian issue, NCNA dwelt upon the futility of U.S. efforts in Cambodia and adopted a tone more of regret than anger. The NCNA article also replayed statements by Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan supporting the argument that U.S. withdrawal of support was the key to solving the Cambodian question. Earlier, a 27 February NCNA article had noted efforts by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to gain Congressional support for the Phnom Penh regime but had conveyed PRC disapproval only indirectly, by citing criticisms from U.S. Congressmen of the Administration's policy. PEKING ON A 19 March PEOPLE'S DAILY artic.e under the byline SOVIET POLICY Tung Fang offered Peking's first comprehensive indictment of Soviet policy 11 Cambodia in over a year. It portrayed recent comment by PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA in support of the Front as evidence of Soviet "opportunism" designed to win favor with the insurgents when they were near victory. It charged that the USSR has continued aid and diplomatic contact with Lon Nol for the past five years and that the Soviet "gamblers" have now been constrained to switch their policy because their "bets" on Lon Nol "are all going up in smoke." Peking concluded with a warning Liat Moscow hopes to use its enhanced support for the Front in order to pave the way for future intervention ir Cambodian internal affairs. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 17- CYPRUS USSR SEES UN RESOLUTION AS OFFERING LITTLE PROSPECT FOR TALKS Moscow has shown little enthusiasm for the three-week Security Council discussion of the Cypru,: problem, convened in the wake of the 13 February Turkish Cypriot proclamation of a "federated Turkish Cypriot state." Soviet comment since the )roclamation has been based largely on the 16 February TASS statement which called the action a "new aggravation" of the situation.* Soviet media have continued to avoid criticism of the Turkish role in the Cyr us issue, but on at least one occasion Moscow strongly implied criticism of the Turkish Cypriots: A 21 February TASS report on the opening of the Security Council debate dismissed the speech of Turkish Cypriot representative Celik as nothing more than a "biased representation of the history of the conflict." Comment during the council session has continued to promote the Sovie proposal for an international conference on Cyprus, with Soviet ITN representative Malik asserting in the counril that this was the "only" way of achieving a settlement. Ccmment on the council resolution, adopted by consensus on 12 March, pointed out some positive elements but saw the resolution as not improving the prospects for intercommunal talks. INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, The council debate was summed up on the SOVIET PROPOSAL 13th in similar terms by TASS commentator Romantsov and by Igor Penchenko in a foreign-language commentary. Both indicated dissatisfaction with the resolution, Romantsov citing Greek Cypriot delegate Kliridhis as calling it "less effective" than his delegation had thought necessary, while Pachenko said it "unfortunately" had not removed anxieties about Cyprus' independence and sovereignty. But both singled out positive aspect,--mentioning elements which, according to TASS on the 3d, President Makarios had also commented on favorably. Thus they cited the fact that the resolution "condemned" the TtIrkish community's "separatist action" as "undermining" the intercommunal talks. (The resolution in fact "regrets" the 13 February decision as "tending to compromise" the continuation of the negotiations.) Both Romantsov and Penchenko complained that the council, in recommending a resumption of the intercommunal talks, left the procedure unchanged, a procedure which "has had no result." And * The TASS statement is discussed in the 20 February TRENDS, pages 5-7. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 18- both seemed to sidestep the matter of the vague role assigned in the resolution to UN Secretary General Waldheim to convene the intercommunal talks "under new agreed procedures" and "under his personal auspices and with his direction as appro- priate." The commentators merely noted that the resolution authorized Waldheim to play an "important" or "active" role in the talks "when they resume." With Lhe venue and participants of the intercommunal talks still unresolved, Moscow is unlikely to offer any observations on their prospects, hut will continue t) espouse the idea of an international conference under UN auspices. Romantsov cited Soviet UN representative Malik as emphasizing that "only" at such a widely-representative international forum could a settle- ment be achieved. Malik "regretted" that the Soviet proposal had encountered "obstinate resistance" from NATO countries and China. The comment again routinely charged "NATO quarters" with trying to impose their own plan on Cyprus, and lamented that the attitude of NATO circles interfered with the endorse- ment of a resolution proposed by the Cyprus delegation which would have served as the basis for a prompt and just settlement. KISSINGER TALKS Moscow offered no comment of its own on Secretary Kissinger's meetings with the Greek foreign minister and Turkish leaders during the final days of the Security Council debate, but replayed critical Greek Cypriot assertions that the Secretary was seeking to block a greater UN role in the crisis. Prior to the Secretary's 7 March meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios in Brussels, a Drobkov article in PRAVDA on Coe 4th had attributed to the London DAILY TELEGRAPH the observation that Kissinger's "tactics in settling the conflict" were motivated by Pentagon interest in securing monitoring facilities on Cyprus. Moscow briefly noted Kissinger's 10-11 March visit to Ankara, and PRAVDA on the 13th reported Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel as commenting, with regard to favoring resumption of the intercommunal talks, that the Secretary and Ankara were in accord on the prospects for a Cyprus settlement. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -19 - WESTERN EUROPE PRC DENOUNCES SOVIET ECONOMIC PENETRATION OF WEST EUROPE Peking has extended its recent attacks concerning an alleged Soviet strat gic threat to West Europe to warnings against Soviet attempts to enlarge its economic influence in the area, in a 15 March PEOPLE'S DAILY signed article by Cheng Wei-ming.* Although in the past Peking has occasionally criticized Soviet attempts to "beg for loans" from West European and other capitalist states, the Cheng article represents Peking's first comprehensive attack on Soviet efforts to exploit the deepening economic crisis in West Europe and its first denunciation of Brezhnev's efforts to accelerate bilateral economic cooperation in his recent talks with leaders of the new governments in West Germany, France and Great Britain. NCNA had confined itself to factual reportage, without comment, on Brezhnev's talks with French President Giscard in December 1974 and British Prime Minister Wilson in February 1975, and is not known to have reported the October 1974 talks between Brezhnev and FRG Chancellor Schmidt. The main thrust of the Cheng article portrays Moscow as intent upon using its markets and raw materials to lure West European states into the Soviet orbit, characterizing West Europe as a "key point" in Soviet-U.S. rivalry in both economic and strategic fields and enumerating Soviet attempts at economic penetration there. The article underscored Peking's confidence that Western efforts, led by the United States, would successfully check the Soviet efforts. It critically cited as examples of these Brezhnev's moves since last October to borrow 5 billion dollars from France, West Germany and Great Britain, as well as Soviet efforts to exploit West European technology in enterprises such as the Volga and Kama auto plants, and the expansion of Moscow's banking network in West European cities. The article argued that Moscow was attempting to exploit "the West European countries' hank-ring after Soviet energy" to increase Soviet energy exports to West Europe and thereby make states there economically dependent on the USSR. Moscow is trying to use the economic lever, the article charged, in order to break up the Common Market, edge out the United States, and pave the way for further Soviet expansion in Europe. * Peking's latest treatment of Soviet strategic aims in Europe is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 March, pages 18-19. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -20- The article confidently predicted, however, that the USSR would continue to run up against firm resistance from the Uaited States and West Europe. It claimed that the United states already has "counterattacked" Moscow by attempting to exploit Soviet bloc dissatisfaction with Moscow's economic dominance in East Europe, and by Washington's efforts to prevent West European countries from exporting advanced technology and granting low-interest loans to the USSR. The article saw a further check on Moscow's attempts to gaia access to West European capital, technology and markets io LIie. fact that these countries were becoming increasingly aware of Soviet designs and were determined--particularly in the current period of high inflation in the West--to obtain high prices for their equipment and loans. These developments, the article concluded, were "a blow" to Soviet "craving" for inexpensive machinery and low interest investments. MOSCOW RADIO SUGGESTS U.S. HAND IN ABORTIVE PORTUGUESE COUP Moscow comment has reflected obvious satisfaction over the failure of the 11 March coup attempt and subsequent events in Portugal. Initially, Moscow maintained a cautious silence with regard to the implication by a Lisbon official that the United States, and specifically Ambassador Carlucci, may have been involved in the abortive coup. But subsequent comment has intimated that there might be evidence to support such a conclusion. Such a suggestion has appeared at least twice in Moscow radio programs, although it has not as yet appeared in the central press. Press comment, at first guarded with repact to the possibility of involvement by "external forces" in the attempted coup, has now made generalized charges of outside interference. Thus V. Osipov claimed in IZVESTIYA on the 15th that NATO, unnamed Western powers, and West European Social Democrats were attempting to influence political life in Portugal. This and other comment reviewing the alleged interference of external forces leading up to the abortive coup has closely followed the substance of the authoritative PRAVDA editorial article of 22 February, the only such Soviet comment on Portugal since the overthrow of the Caetano government last April.* The first intimation on Moscow radio of possible U.S. involve- ment came in a broadcast in English to North America on the evening of 13 March, with commentator Viktor Moskvin reporting that the * See the TRENDS of 26 February 1975, pages 8-10, for a discussion of this article. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -21- military governor of Lisbon, after the failure of the coup, had "advised" the United States to "recall its ambassador for security reasons." While acknowledging that the State Department had "rushed to dispel rumors that the United States might be involved in the coup," Moskvin said that the Lisbon government's inquiry into the abortive coup would shed light on whether or not the "rightwing factions acted on their own or received some prodding from the outside." Moskvin went on to ask rhetorically "why of all people" the U.S. ambassador had been "denied guarantees of physical security." He then recalled allegations that the U.S, ambassador in Santiago and the CIA had "destabilized" the Chilean situation prior to the overthrow of the Allende government, and pointed out that similar charges had been made about CIA activities in Portugal. A second and more direct suggestion was made on the 16th in Moscow radio's international observers roundtnble program, broad- cast both to the domestic audience and in the international Russian service. Radio commentator Vladimir Dunayev cited Western press reports to the effect that not only some military units but also civilians from the Portuguese banking and industrial sectors and "a number of Western diplomats" were involved in the conspiracy. Again noting that the military governor of Lisbon "came right out and named" Ambassador Carlucci and "stated that he would have a hard time trying to stay in the country after these events," Dunayev declared that "evidently the allusion is based upon certain evidence." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 22- CUBA CASTRO IN IZVESTIYA REJECTS CONCESSIONS FOR LIFTING BLOCKADE Moscow has publicized a wide-ranging IZVESTIYA interview with Castro in which the Cuban prime minister predicted that the United States "sooner or later" would have to alter its policy toward Cuba. Castro made no reference to Ser-etary Kissinger's 1 March Houston policy speech on Latin America, and there was no indication when the interview, conducted by "special corres- pondents" Bovin and Vernikov and pablIshed on 6 March, took place. Castro's remarks in the interview were consonant iih Havana?and also Moscow?cumment over the past year which aas maintained that "U.S. imperialist circles" have failed in their attempt to "suffocate" the Cuban revolution with a diplomatic and economic boycott, and that Cuba's isolation from its neighbors was coming to an end, with or without U.S. compliance. The IZVEST1YA interview was loosely pegged to the "approaching" first congress of the Cuban Communist Party (FCC), and the correspondents said they asked Castro to describe "pre-congress Cuba and the problems disturbing the country's communists." Castro, however, "took the initiative" to discdss the situations in Chile, Brazil and other Latin American countries before coming round to the correspondents' questions on Cuban domestic affairs. ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. The IZVESTIYA correspondents, who remarked that "the conversation did not take place quite as we supposed," managed to interject a question on U.S. adherence to the "bankrupt doctrine" of isolation of Cuba. Castro agreed with the journalists that Americans were "pragmatic," but he speculated that it was hard for them to "admit defeat"; possibly, he said. the United States was clinging to its policy in hopes of exacting concessions in return for lifting the blockade. He insisted that "we do not intend to make political concessions," while conceding tKat Havana was interested in liquidation of the blockade because ":t is causing us harm"--an admission he had earlier made in a L'HUMANITE interview last September. Claiming that the U.S. Government had "long ago realized that the blockade could not break the revolution," Castro asserted that regardless of U.S. policy, Cuba would continue to "achieve considerable successes in social and economic fields." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -23- Castro's attitude toward the United States was mirrored in Cuban comment on Secretary Kissinger's I March speech in Houston on U.S.-Latin relations.* A 5 March Our America commentary on Havana's international service portrayed the speech as a rehash of the untenable policy of urging dialogue while simultaneously threatening Latin governments that have adopted a "policy of defense of natural resources." The Our America feature?which strives to build an image of Cuban solidarity with Latin America-- indicated that Kissinger's suggestion of dialogue was a hollow one after the United States had "trampled on the rights of the ations of our America." Noting that "it is not the first time that Kissinger has said that the United States seeks a new dialogue," the commentary concluded that the time of the "absolute omnipotence of the United States" had passed, and that the veF,tion of dialogue no longer depended "on the will of the imperialists." The Our America commentator did not mention Secretary Kissinger's reference to Cuba, which was taken up by a more outspoken "Letter from Freddy," broaCcast in Guido Garcia Inclan's domestic service feature on 5 March. "Freddy" seemingly attributed the Secretary's Cuba remarks to inconsistencies in U.S. policy and to congressional pressures on the White House, noting that Ford administration officials were "frequently correcting themselves because they have to face a powerful Senate." In the most rer.ent of several Cuban allusions to senatorial attempts to change the administration's Cuba policy, "Freddy" asserted that "the Senate now has realized that the sanctions imposed against Cuba are useless," and added that "maw Senators want to put an end" to the problem of sanctions. Hailiu Haw?lals growing wealth and prestige in the Americas, "Freddy" claimed that Cuba's "white gold"--sugar--was in great demand and said that "today Cuba can demand and command." CUBAN-COLOMBIAN RELATIONS Castro in the IZVESTIYA interview remarked that the United States understood that maintenance of the blockade was complicating its relations with other Latin countries, many of which, "despite U.S. pressure," have diplomatic relations with Cuba. He noted that * Initial communist media reaction to Kissinger's speech, which foresaw a thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations once OAS sanctions against Cuba were lifted, is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 March 1975, pages 25-26. Havana and Moscow comment on the most recent attempt to remove the OAS sanctions is discussed in the TRENDS of 27 November 1974, pages 20-22. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 19 A9Wpg6 ? 1A-RDP86Tp69ThNDS8R000200170013-9 ri9 1.!9 S 19 MARCH 1975 -24- this process was continuing, rind said relations with Colombia "will possibly be resumed in the near future." Restoration of relations was in fact announced on 6 March, the day the INESTIYA interview was published. Havana is not known to have commented on the renewal of ties, although the action was promptly reported by Havana radio's international and domestic services. Moscow welcomed Bogota's move, PRAVDA 'ailing it a "telling blow" aimed at the "decrepit wall of the blockade" which was expected to "collapse finally in a not so distant future." Thc PRAVDA article, reported by TASS on the 13th, repeated Soviet encouragement to the Latins to establish ties with Cuba in order to demonstrate their independence from the United States. PRAVDA asserted that "Cuba's heroic struggle" had aroused "deep fellow- feeling" among Latin Americans who no Longer chose "to reconcile themselves to dictates in any form whatsoever." Similarly, a Moscow radio Spanish-language broadcast on 7 March said that Colombia's step would "undoubtedly have great impact" not only in Latin America "but all over the world." The broadcast praised Bogota's independence and saw the resumption of relations as evidence of the "irreversible and total rupture" of the blockade against Cuba. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/WI ppkgpp86Too6qggpopgpi 70013-9 I MARCH 1975 - 25 - USSR POLICE OFFICIAL ASSERTS ALL PEASANTS TO RECEIVE INTERNAL PASSPORTS An Azerbaydzhani police official, interviewed In the 15 January Azerbaydzhan paper BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, has provided the first clear indication that the new Soviet internal passport system may provide such passports for all Soviet peasants. The new passport law adopted last August, as well as subsequent commentary, have treated ambiguously the touchy question of whether thc millions of Soviet peasants currently without passports would Leceive them under the new system. Such a change, if true, would have far-reaching con- sequences, since the withholding of Internal passports has long been used as a repressive measure to keep peasants from leaving the farms and has recently come under fire from economists and sociologists.* Azerbavdzhani Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs T. A. Aliyev toucb,,.d on the extension of internal passports in the context of indicating the huge amount of work the police face in introducing the new system. He stated that "for the first time the whole rural population will also be provided with passports," a process that won't be completed until December 1981. He added that those who leave their villag-2s for over 45 days and those reaching their 16th birthday would be among the first receiving passports, while rural residents presently without one would receive them only later. According to other press articles, a majority of kolkhozniks still have no passports, although the practice of issuing passports varies "'rom oblast to oblast. The original 28 August statute setting forth the details of the new passport system had declared that all citizens reaching age 16 would have passports, but said nothing about peasants who currently lack passports. However, the USSR Council of Ministers decree adopted along with the statute ad-2,7.11 a special excer.'ion for rural residents, indicating that such peasants would receive passporis if they left *heir homes for over 45 days--seemingly implying that they might not receive them otherwise and leaving open the possibility that local authorities might not permit them to leave their farms. * For background, see the TRENDS of 31 December 1974, pages 19-22. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 ; CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONVIDENTIAL EMS TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 - 26 - But an explanation by the Agriculture Ministry's le!;a1 department in the 10 December RURAL LIFE declared that the new statute stipulated that all citizens over t() must possess a passport, including those rural citizens who orcvionsly had not been issued passportc. This appeared to overstate the new law, since this latter clause in fact appears nowhere in the published statute. The 10 December explanation also included the decree's special. 45-day exception for rural residents, which appeared to contradict the assertion that all rural citizens would receive passports. On 25 December the press announced decisions by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers to alter the passport system, and in the next few days various Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) officials commented on the new system in the press. However, while the announcement and the commentary indicated that henceforth all citizens would receive passports at age 16 and that a uniform system for issuing passports was being established for both city and village, they all avoided the question of whether the huge number of rural citizens without passports would now receive them. The ambiguity has persisted, since following the initial MVD commentaries there have been no articles on the new system in the Moscow press, nor has the subject been raised in letters on legal questions published regularly in journals anti papers. The new statement removes this ambiguity by indicating that local officials understand the law to apply to the older generation of peasants which has never had passports, as well as to the younger generation as they reach the age of 16. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/2(CP IQ likrgP,P86T006081R00f490 70013-9 19 MARCH 1975 - 27 - PRC-TAIWAN CHINA FREES MT "WAR CRIMINALS," PERMITS RETURN TO TAIWAN Peking has added a new amnesty twist to it:: ongoing efforts to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, announcing that all Kuomintang and other "war criminals" now under PRC custody will be released and that those desiring to return to Taiwan will be allowed to do so, with travel expenses paid by Peking. NCNA reported on the 18th the 17 March decision by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress(NPC), which held its second session in Peking on 17 and 18 March. The NCNA account disclosed that Premier Chou En-lai had submitted the proposal for amnesty, "acting on instructions from Chairman Mao Lnd the Central Committee of the CCP," and that the NPC body had "unanimously approved." On 19 March Peking radio broadcast the complete NCNA reports on the amnesty decision in its service for Taiwan listeners. According to a statement at the NPC session by Vice Premier and Minister of Public Security Hua Kuo-feng, the Chinese decision involves the release of 293 war criminals, most of whom were formerly attached to the "Chiang Kai-shek clique." He said that Peking's gesture reflects the "greater stability and unity" in China today and is of "major significance for developing the revolutionary united front" and for "promoting the patriotic struggle of the people in Taiwan against the Chiang Kai-shek clique." Hua pointed out that those wishing "to return to Taiwan may do so," adding that "whoever wishes to come back after going there will be welcome." He indicated that the former prisoners would be received in Peking by party and state leaders upon their release. The new Chinese move complements longstanding efforts by Peking to promote greater interchange with the people on Taiwan and thus put on the defensive the Chiang government in Taipei, which has consistently opposed interaction between the two sides. NCNA did not mention a PRC pardon for those "war criminals" who reside in or hold government posts in Taiwan, but NPC Standing Committee Member Liu Fen pointed to the amnesty decision as evidence that Kuomintang officials on Taiwan should "repent as soon as possible" and take the "sole correct way out" to atone for their crimes by contributing to the liberation of Taiwan and national reunification. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 CONFIDENTIAL mils TRENDS 19 MARCH 1975 -28 - BACKGROUND Peking in the past has used the release of captives to signal its goodwill to a former adversary, notably releasing detained U.S. fliers in mid-1955 at the start of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial discussions in Geneva, and freeing several U.S. prisoners during the recent years of Sino-U.S. rapprochement. A more comparable example to the current PRC move waL the decision of the Standing Committee of the NPC in April 1956 to release 335 Japanese war criminals, a forthcoming gesture underlining extensive PRC effeLts at the time to normalize relations with Tokyo. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/28N:FpWRDp86T00608W99g170013-9 19 MARCH 1975 - 29 - NORTH KOREA KIM IL-SONG URGES EXPANDED TRADE TIES WITH CAPITALIST STATES A Kim 11-song speech, broadcast by Pyongyang's domestic radio on 4 March, has acknowledged with striking forthrightness that North Korea "must actively go out to the capitalist markets to purchase materials and machinery we need." Kim's speech to a meeting of industrial activitists was the first explicit admission of the North's need to trade outside the socialist market to be publicized for the domestic audience. Although the North's trade with the West has been growing fo._ several years, Kim's previous discussions on the need for trade ties with the West had always been confined to interviews with foreign media that were not publicized by Pyongyang. Kim noted that trade confined to the socialist countries was no longer sufficient for the North's Ceveloping economy. He argued that foreign trade provided the means to "enhance our country's external standing and dignity" and to develop "favorable relations" with other countries. The decision to publicize Kim's speech stressing the importance of foreign trade and calling upon those in export industries to improve their work may have been prompted by the difficulties Pyongyang's foreign trade program has encountered securing foreign exchange and overcoming a reputation for inferior merchandise. One year ago, for example, in a speech to an industrial congress, Kim had touched indirectly on the foreign exchange problem, urging the production of more goods for export in order to earn "precious foreign currency." In his current speech, however, Kim did not raise the foreign exchange issue, conc2ntrating instead on the need for high quality exports in order to earn the "confidence of the international market." While products for dcmestic consumption must be "neat and useful," Kim noted, export goods must be of "better quality" and be "neatly" packed. As part of the program to "conduct foreign trade well" and help justify the "confidence placed in us," Kim urged that enterprises fulfill export plans "ahead of schedule-- at the beginning of each month." Lest the North's current shortage of sea transport stand in the way of expanding foreign trade ties, Kim instructed the foreign trade ministry to make greater use of 'chartered ships." A major element of Kim's philosophy of nation-building, and a frequently repeated theme in DPRK media, has been the insistence on economic independence based on substantial--but not total-- economic self-sufficiency. Kim's forthright admission now that CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 199200/36;rFAIIA-RDP8671031!s951CNV200170013-9 19 MARCH 1975 - 30 - the DPRK must trade with capitalist countries, particularly in a speech publicized for his domestic audience, thus suggests a break with past dogma. There was an attempt by Kim to rationalize this ideological shift: he asserted that the need for such trade sprang from the DPRK's economic success, and that the North's heavy industry was so developed that the country only imported equipment for which it had "no great need." Furthermore, Kim was careful to note that the North, aware of the "intrthsic defects" of a capitalist economy, would not become dependent on the capitalist market for raw materials. This point was reiterated in a 17 March KCNA report which asserted that the North meets domestically more than 70 percent of its demand for industrial raw materials, and relies on the socialist countries for the rest, thereby safely insulating the North from the "worldwide crisis of the capitalist economy." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09t261tICIN-RDP86T00601ftrpm,T0013-9 - 31- NOTE TITO VISIT TO POLAND: The communique on Tito's 10-13 April "friendly" visit to Poland followed tte pattern used on his previous visits to bloc ountries by stressing that continuing differences in domestic; and international policies did not hinder the development of bilateral relations. Tito professed to be "very satisfied" with his talks with Gierek and described the relations between the two countries ? as "very good." Tito, as well as Gierek, also indicated a proximity of views on internatioaal affairs in general; however, the communique-- like that following Cierek's May 1973 visit to Yugoslavia--omitted any formulation indicating a resolution of standing differences. Belgrade's continued reluctance to commit itself to attending a European conference of communist parties was indicated by the fact that neither the communique nor Tito in his public remarks mentioned the subject. Warsaw media, on the other hand, reported that the two leaders did take up the subject in their talks; and Gierek, in a 10 March dinner toast, made a pointed effort to identify Yugoslavia with the conference by hailing the "essential contribu- tion" being made to its preparation by both Yugoslavia and Poland. On the prospects for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the communic.ue said Tito agreed with Gierek that realistic conditions e..cist for its "quick," summit-level conclusion. However, in his dinner toast, Tito expressed his reservations about the conference in pointing out that it will not be a panacea for Europe's problems pnd reiterating his standard position that Europe's security is dependent on security in the Mideast and Mediterranean. ? CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T0060811.9p92pM0013-9 19 MARCH 1975 APPENDIX MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTIC Moscow (2541 items) Upcoming V-E Day 30th (8%) Anniversary China (6%) Supreme Soviet Dee- (--) gation in Jordan Finland President (--) Kekkonen in USSR S 10 - 16 MARC11 1975 Peking (1030 items) 11% Guyana Prime Minister Burnham in PRC 5% Cambodia 3% UN Industrial Develop- ment Organization 3% Meeting, Lima OPEC Summit Meeting, Algiers Zambia Foreign Minister Mwaanga in PRC These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items extensive reportage are counted as commentaries, Figures in prentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in pi ior issues; in other case'. the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9