TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 9, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

For kelease ....,P86,90608,0002,70017.
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Confidential
FBS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
9 APRIL 1975
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coNFIDENTIAI,
The, propaganda analysis report is based exclusiveb, on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
oomponents.
Classified by 000023
Subjut to G?n?ral Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declossifi?d
Two Years Fronl Date of Issue
Notional Security Information
Unauthc.ised disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL Filrs TRENDS
9 APRIL 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM
PLAF Command Communique Lauds Unprecedented Communist Gains 1
PRG, DRV Assail U.S. Role in Evacuation of Refugees 3
Moscow Scores U.S. Aid for Thieu, Presses PRG Stand on Talks 7
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Adds Cautionary Notes to Standard Call for Geneva Talks . . 8
V-E DAY
Soviet Articles on War Anniversary Differ on Detente Issues 12
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
Moscow Tries To Mollify Tito Anger Over Offensive Atticles 15
USSR-HUNGARY
Low-Keyed Anniversary Observance Suggests .Continued Tension. 17
PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Chinese Vice Premiers Lead Delegations to Iran, Mexico 20
CHINA
Chang Warns Party Members To Follow Moderate Economic Line 23
NOTES
Chinese Leadership; Chiang Kai-shek Death; Cambodian
Negotiations Denied 27
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
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9 APRIL 1975
VIETNAM
Hanoi and PRG media maintain that the massi.ve communist gains in
South Vietnam have decisively changed the balance of forces and
laid the groundwork for "greater victouies." However, there have
been no predictions of imminent, total military victory. There has
been nc call for the immediate "liberation" of Saigon as had
accompanied earlier communist z3ssau1ts on Darning and other areas,
but a 4 April appeal called on the people in Saigon to "rise up'
and overthrow Thieu and to "be ready to participate" in the revoluion.
The media continue to advance the January 1973 Paris peace agreemcnt
as the basis for a settlement, but there is no evidence of flexibAity
on terms. Thus, the communists repeat their standard offer to
negotiate with Saigon only after Thieu has been removed from offi,:e.
Neithr the PRG nor Hanoi has acknowledged Western reports thai. FRG
Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh had indicated that France or other
councries might contribute to a settlement.
Vietnamese communist comment on the U.S. position, including propa-
ganda pegged to President Ford's 3 April press conference, claims
Washington is stubbornly clinging to old policies and is confused
and pessimistic over GVN losses. U.S. steps to assist in evacuations
have prompted particularly bitter comment, including a 7 April PRG
statement which denounced efforts to evacuate Vietnamese and labeled
Americans in Vietnam as "disguised" military personnel who must be
immediately withdrawn.
Communist efforts to bring order to newly captured areas were
reflected in a 10-point PRG policy, released on 3 April, which
provided a blueprint for occupation and the establishment of new local
administrations. Liberation Radio has also reported the dispatch of
PRG officials, i!'cluding President Huyen Tan Phat, to visit the new
areas of control. Authoritative PRG and DRV statements have reiterated
appeals for international assistance for these areas, and communist
media have reported the arrival in Danang of the first shipment of aid
from the NFLSV/PRG.
Soviet commentatozs continue to applaud the communist military advances
but stress the desirability of reaching a peaceful solution. Peking
media attention to events in South Vietnam is mostly limited to replays
of Vietnamese Ind other foreign media reports.
PLAF COMMAND COMMUNIQUE LAUDS UNPRECEDENTED COMMUNIST GAINS
The Vietnamese communists officially evaluated the magnitude of their
military achievenents in the fourth in a series uc PLAF Command
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communignes. The latest communique, released on 6 April,
jubilantly cited specific details on the GVN losses of teicitory,
military personnel, and equipment, and it maintained that the
communists have achieved a position of unquestionable military
superiority. Earlier PLA- communiques on 30, 26, and 20 March,
marked the capture of Danang, Hue, and the central highlands,
respectively.*
According to the 6 April communique, "all the manpower, weapons,
technology, and other means of war in the whole of Military
Regions I nd 11 have been annihilated and broken up." The
communique asserted that 2/0,000 troops were put out of action,
six divisions "wipcd out or completely disbanded," and that the
five major cities of Hue, Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Dalat
and 16 provinces have been "liberated." As a result of these
latest gains, the PLAF now claims communist control over 9.3 million
people "from the 17th parallel to the southernmost tip of Ca Mau."
The tremendous military advances detailed in the communique of the
6th give an impression of unbounded optimism for additional PLAF
battlefield successes and the imminent collapse of GVN control over
the rrmaining pertion of the country. In describing the communist
forces' current advantage, the 6 April communique was replete with
such characterizations as the "sure-to-win position," while it
depicted the GVN as being in a position of "irretrievable failure,"
and on the verge of "ignominious defeat." Averring that recent
military gains have brought about "an obvious change in the balance
of forces between us and the enemy," the communique went on to
flatly declare that "we are now stronger than the enemy."
The other three recent PLAF Command communiques had been more
reticent in evaluating the shift in the balance of forces between
the GVN and the communist 7)1.-ces. Only the communique of the 20th--
issued after the fall of the highlands--broa lied the issue, but with
the less categorical claim that "today the strength and position of
our armed forcrs and people are stronger than ever." Past discussions
of the balance of forces in Vietnamese communist propaganda have
ordinarily been couched in phraseology suggesting an ever-increasing
advantage accruing to the communist forces in the South, and have
stopped short of rhe unequivocal assertion of superiority that was
contained in the 6 April communique.
* For a discussion of the communiques of 20 and 26 March see the
TRENDS of 26 March 1975, pages 6-10. The communique of the 30th is
discussed in the TRENDS of 2 April 1975, pages 1-4.
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HANOI COMMENT The 6 April PLAF communique's evaluation of
the balance of forces in South Vietnam has
been echoed in other comment, including editorials in the major
Hanoi papers on 7 April. The North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN claimed that victories in the South had "led to a funda-
mental change in the balance of forces . . . in which the revolu-
tionary position is much superior to that of the enemy." The
party paper NHAN DAN compared the situation in the South to that
at the Lime of the 1945 general uprising that led to the establish-
ment of the DRV.
Hanoi announced on 8 April that the situation in South Vietnam had
been discussed that day at a special session of the DRV National
Assembly S:anding Committee. The meeting was said to have heard
a report on the "offensive and uprising" by DRV Defense Mirister
Vo Nguyen Clap, but no details on his remarks have been reported.
The communique on the session noted that the Standing Committee
had affirmed that the Southern victory had created "new, exr.remely
favorable opportunitiec. . . . to continue to advance toward still
greater victories and to lead the southern revolution to total
victory." It called upon northerners to "do their best to provide
support and assistance" to the South.
PRG, DRV ASSAiL U.S, ROLE IN EVACUATION OF REFUGEES
Hanoi and the PRG have reacted to U.S. evacuation efforts in South
Vietnam with an outpouring of wrathful indignation, culminating in
a government statement from the FRG on 7 April and a DRV Foreign
Ministry statement on the following day. Vietnamese communist
invective or he evacuation issue has been harsher than language
used in recent comment reacting to U.S. officials' statements on
other issues and seems to reflect communist distress at the widely
publicized exodus of the South Vietname,e population in advance
of the communist troops. U.S. actions T.:re also authoritatively
protested in a 3 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement, a PRG
Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 4th, and a NHAN DAN
Commentator article on the 5th.
The 7 April PRG statement recapitulated earlier complaints directed
against the United States for aiding the Saigon government by
transporting refugees fleeing from the war zone. It described the
rescue open-Aim as a "large-scale forcible evacuation" and an
attempt to "rake in manpower and material resources to continue the
war." The statement also accused the United States of "kidnaping"
thousands of South Vietnamese children and assailed Washington for
involving other governments and international organizations in the
operation.
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The 7 April PRG statement also called attention to White House
comment on the poLsibility of employing U.S. troops for the
protection and removal of U,S. personnel in Vietnam, terming
thjs "a new scheme aimed at intervening in South Vietnam." It
cha,:ged, in this connection, that Americdns in Vietnam were
"military personnel disguised as civilians and jAlegally
introduced." When a spokesman of the PRG militzxy delegation
stationed at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase had ')een queried at
a 15 March press conference od the possible capture of Americans
at Ban Me Thuot, he replied: "Foreigners, inc1ud1ng honest
Americans, will be well treated and released if they are
captured, but this treatment will not be given to U.S. military
advisers. They are special cases because they have violated the
Paris agreement.
(Charges that U.S. military personnel w' re being secretly assigned
to South Vietnam have been standard communist fare since almost
immediately after the final 29 March 1973 withdrawal of U.S.
servicemen from South Vietnam under the terms of the Paris agree-
ment. Current communist propaganda claims t112 continued presence
of some 25,000 such individuals.)
The 8 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement reached an even higher
pitch cf stridency than the PRG statement in reiterating charges
of "forcible" evacuation of refugees by the United States,
comparing U.S. actions with "the genocidal crimes perpetrated
by the Hitler fascists." In this same vein, a 9 April NHPN DAN
editorial in support of the DRV Foreign Ministry statement termed
the evacuation operation and removal of South Vietnamese children
to the United States "a major crime of history, a sordA, filthy
maneuver, and a most despicable move." The refugee question was
also discussed at length in a commentary in the army paper on the
7th which flatly denied that the communists had terrorized or
retaliated against people in the captured territory and assailed
the "Ford clique" for raising tbc possibility of "imagit,ary blood
baths." The commentary also charged that U.S. evacuation efforts
were serving as a pretext for thc Administration to get more
military aid for Thieu and as a cover for the mobilization of U.S.
military forces "to serve as deterrent force in South Vietnam,"
"check the advance of the revolution," and save Thieu.
* For a discussion of the possible capture of Americans at Ban
Me Thuot, see the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, pages 8-10.
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FBIS TRENDS
9 APRIL 1975
The 5 April NHAN DAN Commentator article* cited a Western press
agency to make the claim that the United States was studying
plans to move as many as one million people from South Vietnam
and that a U.S. senator had asked President Ford to deploy the
"entire Seventh Fleet" to move two million Vietnamese within
seven days. The Commentator article likewise characterized
the transfer of Vietnamese orphans to the United States and the
children killed in the C-5A crash as "crimes" against the
Vietnamese people. The immediate goal of these moves, according
to Commentator, is to provide evidence alleging that the
Vietnamese people are anticommunist and to give the United States
a "pretext to prolong its involvement." And then without further
elaboration, he cryptically added: "The imperialists' plan to
use force to bring many people away is also designed to implement
their future sinister schemes."
REACTION TO President Ford's 3 April press conference remarks
U.S. STATEMENTS on Vietnam prompted a PRG Foreign Ministry spokes-
man's statement of the 4th that took issue with
the Administration's ordering of U.S. ships to the coastal waters of
Vietnam to help 1.n the refugee evacuation. A 5 April Hanoi radio
eport on a NHAN DAN article of the same date on the President's
press conference said that he had "regretted he could not use the
U.S. Air Force and admitted that he had no intention of sending
American forces back to South Vietnam since that is banned by law."
The article was quick to point out, however, that U.S. contingency
plans exist to protect and evacuate Americans in South Vietnam and
Cambodia, and these could include the use of U.S. troops. The same
article claimed that "Ford blamed the military debacle in South
Vietnam on Thieu's inep- command, but everyone knows that any
military plan applied by Thieu was drawn by his U.S. advisers them-
selves."
Secretary of State Kissinger's 5 April press conference was discussed
by Hanoi radio on the 7th in a broadcast that derided his remarks on
Indochina as revealing the "confusion and embarrassment of the White
House in the face of the irremediable collapse of the Thieu clique
in Saigon and the country-selling clique in Phnom Penh." A NHAN DAN
* Commentator is an authoritative byline which has appeared only
irregularly in NHAN DAN since the signing of the Paris agreement.
For further background on Commentator, see the TRENDS of 29 January
1975, pages 1-4.
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article of the 6th pegged to Thieu's speech two days before was
equally caustic in characterizing Walt Rostow as a "nitwit" for
his recent proposal to land U.S. marines in North Vietnam.
General George Brown's remarks in Indonesia concerning possible
direct U.S. intervention into Vietnam failed to elicit any
significant response from tne PRG or Hanoi. While a spokesman
for the PRG delegation tc., the La Celle-Saint-Cloud consultative
conference released a statement on the 7th denouncing Brown's
speculation as a "serious violation" of the Paris agreement, it
was essentially low-keyed. A Hanoi radio broadcast of the 8th
on Brown's "threats" quoted Western press agency reports that
Congress would "prevent such an intervention at all costs."
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MOSCOW SCORES U,S, AID FOR THIEU, PRESSES PRG STAND ON TALKS
Moscow media have continued to acclaim communist advances in
South Vietnam while stressing that a political settlement should
be reached on the basis of the terms offered by the PRG. The
U.S. role in supporting the Thieu Government was predictably
attacked by Soviet commentators, but criticism was restrained.
Moscow commentators have avoided direct criticism of President
Ford or Secretary Kissinger, instead deploring the desire of
"certain circles" in Washington and the Pentason to continue
or expand U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Moscow's circumspection
regarding the President was strikingly illustrated in the TASS
accounts of official Vietnamese statements: explicit references
to the "Ford Administration," were changed to "U.S. Government."
On the other hand, the President's position has been fully
reflected. For example, TASS and PRAVDA accounts of his 3 April
press conference reported his remarks on continued U.S. support
for Thieu, his appeal for congressional approval of more military
aid, and his announcement of the dispatch of U.S. ships to the
Indochina coast and other steps "under the pretext of a possible
evacuation of retreating Saigon troops."
ZHUKOV IN PRAVDA The most authoritative current Soviet comment
on Vietnam was a 5 April article by PRAVDA
political commentator Yuriy Zhukov. He typically portrayed
current military action as a popular South Vietnamese uprising
against the Thieu government, denying the view of 'some people in
the West" that the GVN was the victim of an offensive launched by
the DRV or that congressional reductions of aid to the GVN had
brought about its present deterioration. Zhukov supported the
Vietnamese communist contention that refugees in South Vietnam
were not fleeing from the advancing communist forces but rather
had been forcibly resettled by the Saigon government, and he
endorsed PRG protests against the movement of U.S. ships to aid in
evacuation.
Rejecting as "false allegations" speculation that the communists
were planning to capture Saigon, Zhukov cited NFLSV-PRG protesta-
tions that they were "only striving for strict fulfillment of the
Paris agreement, which has been and is being violated most
flagrantly by the Thieu clique and its patrons." Like other
Soviet comment, the Zhukov article reiterated the PRG proposal
for resumption of political talks with Saigon after Thieu has been
removed, adding: "The new situation taking shape in South Vietnam
opens up a clear prospect for the establishment of peace."
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW ADDS CAUTIONARY NOTES TO STANDARD CALL FOR GENEVA TALKS
Having for months urged the "immediate" reconvening of the
Geneva talks when this seemed a distant prospect, the Soviet
Union is now advocating the need for adequate advance preparations
to insure the success of the conference.* Predictably, Moscow
has pointed to Israeli 'reservations and conditions" as the chief
complicating factors. But it has also intimated uncertainty
over the attitude of the United States as its fellow conference
cochairman as Washington reappraises its Mideast policy, and
has cited statements by President Ford as indicating U.S. reluctance
to turn to Geneva. By omission, Moscow has underlined the complex
problem of getting the Arab participants into line; comment has
skirted these difficulties, merely sketching a broad picture of
Arab support for resumption of the conference.
PREPARATIONS Cautionary Noscow remarks about the necessity
FOR GENEVA for preliminary preparations began to appear at
the end of Narch. One of the first to indi7ate
such concern was Mich,ast specialist Igor Belyayev, on Moscow
radio's 30 March ascrvers' roundtable. The moderator, noting
that to recoavene thc. conference "say, tomorrow or the next day"
would not assure its success, asked Belyayev what were the
preconditions for a su.-cesslul Geneva conference. Belyayev
answered that its success would depend primarily on a "positive
approach by all sides involved" and noted in this regard that
there was a "broad range of problems" connectA with a Mideast
settlement--such as determination of participants, particularly
Palestinian representiltion-- and that "consequently, it is essential
Ciat much preparatory work be done." He stressed that the Geneva
conference must be resumed, but only after the "necessary
prerequisites" for is success had been created.
Also on the 30th, Kolesnichenko's international review in PRAVPA
implied the need for advance preparations, remarking that a return
to Geneva was the practical path in the quest for a Mideast peace,
but "at the same time farsighted observers stress the importance
* Moscow's initial comment on the breakddwn of Secretary Kissinger's
mission pointed to resumption of the Geneva conference 3S the logical
step, but had made no mention of any necessary prerequisites. See
the FBIS TRENDS of 26 ilarch 1975, pages 1-3.
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of insuriEg that the Geneva conference does not have a dry run."
And an international review by Mikhaylov in the 1 April IZVESTIYA
called it necessary "to prepare and organize the work of the
conference" to insure that the fundamental problems are resolved.
Moscow also gave a notably lukewarm reception to Egypt's official
request to the United States and Soviet Union--announced by
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi on 1 April--that the two cochairmen
undertake to reconvene the conference. The first monitored Soviet
acknowledgment of the Egyptian request came in an unattributed
commentary on Moscow radio's Arabic service on 2 April. Although
describing the request as "the most important element in the current
Mideast situation," the broadcast dwelt at length on the difficulties
involved, emphasizing in particular Israel's "negative attitude"
and alleged U.S.-Israeli "plans to undermine or postpone" the
conference. Moscow apparently did not publicly mention the Egyptian
request again until PRAVDA on the 5th carried a brief Glukhov
dispatch from Cairo reporting without comment that Fahmi had
announced the request. The Glukhov dispatch also noted that Fahmi
had stated Egypt's readiness to send representatives to Geneva
and had expressed Cairo's support of participation in the talks
by Great Britain, France, and one nonalined country.
Scanty Soviet attention to Egyptian activities included a roundup
in ZA RUBEZHOM (No. 15, signed to press on 3 April) of news reports
on the Mideast which cited he Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF to the effect
that Egypt haLl begun "intensive diplomatic contacts to reconvene
the Geneva confecence" and that the Egyptian foreign minister was
currently preparing the necessary documents, including "a joint
working document with Syria on all the questions to be discussed."
TASS on the 7th noted that the Egyptian ambassador to the USSR
had met with Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss "topical problems"
concerning the Middle East, "including resumption of the Geneva
peace conference."
U.S.-SOVIET ROLE Belyayev was th,. first Soviet commentator
to work out the details of the Geneva talks.
Referring in the 30 March roundtable program to the need for
preparatory work, he went on to say: "Incidertally, there is also
a mechanism for this. At one time there were special ambassadors
of the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva and they had
to discuss and resolve the essence of those problems which it was
essential to resolve before the resumption of the work of the
Geneva conference."
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This idea was picked up by PRAVDA's KolesnIchenko In a 1 April
Moscow radio broadcast to North America. Kolesnichenko recalled
that joint U.S.-Soviet efforts had created the Geneva conference
as a mechanism for solving the Mideast crisis and that, under
present circumstances, "Soviet-Amelican contacts in seeking a
Mideast peace settlement should in my opinion be stepped up and
not terminated." And TASS on the 28th, reporting Ftesident Ford's
24 March Hearst interview which was released on the 27th, noted
that the President had expressed the view that U.S. rel3tIons
with the Soviet Union would help avoid an aggravation of the
Mideast situation. TASS quoted him as saying he was of the
opinion that in this situation detente would make things easier.
U.S. POLICY treatment of the President's interview, however,
generally underlined the United States' lack of
enthusiasm lor renewing the conference. The TASS account high-
lighted his statement that with the collapse of the step-by-step
approach the United States "has no other choice" than to return
to the Geneva conference. The President in fact said "I don't
believe we have any other choL'e now other than to go to Geneva.
I regret it but . . . there appears to be no alternative." Also
citirg the remark on "no other choice," TASS director general
Zamyatin observed, on Moscow radio's 29 March "International
Situation" program, that the President's remark was "not very
definite." And Matveyev, on the 6 April Moscow radio roundtable,
pointed to the "hint of regret" with which President Ford seemed
to indicate that the Geneva conference was now inevitable" and
"thcre was no other way out."
Limited an testrained comment on the U.S. Mideast policy review
has in the main suggested Fkepticism about any significant change
in Washington's relations with Tel Aviv. A Yefremov commentary
on Moscow's domestic service on the 28th did claim that with
the failure of the Kissinger mission and the subsequent U.S.
policy reassessment, "a serious obstacle elt the path to resumption
of the Geneva conference has been removed." But TMS director
general Zamyatin, without mentioning the policy review, asserted
on Moscow radio on the 29th that the United States continued to
c',Ade a solution" of the key questions of a settlement, talking
of "the complicated nature of the problem, of Israel being unprepared
for an all-round settlement, and so forth." Kolesnichenko in
the 30 March PRAVDA review declined to specLiate on the outcome
of the policy reassessment, saying that "time will tell" what the
results might be.
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FBIS TRENDS
9 APRIL 19i5
On 1 Apri! a Moscow domestic service commentary said thac the
U.S. polic) review had had no visible effect on Israeli leaders,
who believed that U.S. support would continue as before. PRAVDA
noted on the 5th that, despite "talk in Washington" of a policy
review and a more balanced policy toward the Arabs, the United
States wns continuing to deliver huge supplies of weapons to
Israel and, according lo Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, remained
committed to deliver more. PRAVDA claimed that these considerations
caused the Arab states to ask: "Just what does the reexamination
of Washington's Mideast policy entail?"
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V -E DAY
SOVIET ARTICLES ON WAR ANNIVERSARY DIFFER ON DETENTE ISSUES
The early atiicl2s that hcIde appeared in this year's lengthy
Soviet campain to celebrate the 30th anniversary of victory
In World War If reflact differing viewpoints regarding current
policy issues. Some of the articles take a pro-detente stance,
citing the history of atlied cooperation during the war as a
model for the present. Others clearly intended to stress
the importance of maintaining r strong defen3e posture, and
they cite the alleged primacy of the Soviet Union's contribution
to tne victory as an object lesson in this regard. Other::
take a still more conservative line, stressing the role of
the party as the organizer of victory, or even the role of
Stal-In In this regard. It is still too soon to say whether
these differences reflect a eemergence of internal Soviet
debate over the (12terte-defense issue or merely the normal
range of nuances to he expected in this kind or campaign.
PRO-DETENTE ARTICLES The February CPSD Central Committee
decree announcing the start of the
national celebration of the 30th anniversary signaled no
particular orientation regarding current policy issues. It
omitted any mention of Stalin, which seemed to suggest a
pro-detente orientation, but on the other hand it gave no
more than a perfunctory bow to the role of the allies in the
war. The Moscow domestic radio carried a summary of the decree
on 9 February, and KOMMUNIST carried the text in issue No. 3,
signed to the press on 11 February. The decree's publication
in nAVDA was unaccountably delayed, hovever, until 98 February.*
* Moscow radio this year began to give significant coverage to
the 30th anniversary of V-E Day as early as the second week of
February and has maintained a substantial level of attention to
the suject since. This represents a much earlier and much
heavier stress on the anniversary than obtained for either the
25th cnniversary in 1970 or the 20th in 1965, when the campaigns
began only in April.
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9 APRIL 1975
The pro-detente line of commentary on the anniversary was typified
by a 12 March editorial in IZVESTIYA. it was couched in high-flown
rhetoric about the anti-Hitler coalition and expressed hope that
the memorialtzation of the victory would provide a new stimulus
to detente. More recently, Moscow has sought to link the nnniversary
with its current oolicy of calling for a world disarmament
conference. A TASS commentary on 5 April reporting the conclusion
of the UM committee session on preparing for the conference noted
that the initiative was appropriately timed to coincide with the
30th anniversary.
MILITANT ARTICLES Articles published in the military press or
written by military authors have generally
taken a much harsher line on the lessons to be drman from the
anniversary observances. This can be attributed in part to the
circumstance that the start of the campaign coincided with the
annual celebration of Armed Forces Day (23 February)--an occasion
traditionally marked by bold declarations from military spokesmen.
Yet even allowing for this,such articles as Maj. Gen. S. Baranov's
essay on economic preparedness in RED STA' t on 27 February stand
out as unusually assertive of military interests. Focused largely
on Soviet econom_c policy in the prewar and war years, the article
uses some of the most unqualified formulas from Lenin's writings
to stress the importance of preparin the country foe war. It
puts a fine topical point on the r.,essage, moreover, by pointing
out that the party must take into consideration not only the
present detente situation but other "possible" situations, and by
declaring that "we will continue to be prepared for any change
in the development of events."
CONSERVATIVE ARTICLES A third track taken by some commentators
on the anniversary has been to stress
the rolo_ of the traditional party organs in the achievement of
victory. This is the line taken by chief of the Lenin 'Iilitary
PolLical Academy, Gen. Ye. Ye. :Ialtsev, in a 4 April article in
PRA'.DA. Asserting that "all fundamental questions of conducting
the war were decided by the Central Committee--the Politburo,
Orgburo, and Secretariat," he went on to say that the polcy
of the CPSU and its Leninist leadership has been, is, and will
remain the decisive coadition guaranteeing the invincible defense
capacity of the Soviet state, the military might of the armed
forces."
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9 APRIL 1975
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Thc Maltsey article also Illustrates a fascinating sub-theme which
may become more prominent as the anniversary approaches. This
has to do with the treatment of Stalin--a sub)uct which
Is unsettled in the Soviet Union despite repeated regime efforts
to strike a balanced assessment. Maltsev, by his unusual
recitation of the names of the top party bodies, manoged to
avotd recalling the extraordinary party-str.te-military bodies
with which Stalin was more intimately associated, and indeed
railed to mention Stalin's name at all. Other recent articles,
however, have mentioned Stalin's role, although these articles
appear to be in the minority thus far. Lt. Gen. S. Bobylev,
writing in the l Apr 1.1 WRA. LIFE, referred to "Sect-2tary General
1.V. Stalin" as head of the w,-rtine State Defense Committee,
and Maj. Gen. M. Kir'yan, writing in the 4 April RED STAR, noted
as well that Stalin was head of the Supreme Comman I as well as
of the State nefense Committee.
Even before the current anniversary campaign, pressure to give
Stalin more credit had become apparent from several quarters.
The most blatant example was Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy,
who hailed Stalin's role in an 18 October 1974 speech celebrating
the 30th anniversary of the liberation of the Ukraine. Other
spokesmen in the Ukraine have followed Shcherbitskiy's lead. In
the meantime, the film of Aleksandr Chakovskiy's novel on the
war, which contains extensive descriptions of Stalin's lealership,
is currently running in Moscow and Leningrad theaters, and
installments of the novel have appeared in the last four issues
of the journal ZNAMYA.
Conservatives have :Aso lately been pressuring writers to stress
the victories in the war, rather than the embarrassing initial
defeats. Belorussian First Secretary Iasherov, in a 27 February
speech to writers reported in the March KO:MNIST BELORUSSII,
complained of "one-sided" and "erroneous treatment" of the
initial period of the war and declared it "completely Licolerable"
to undermine the people's pride in their "hecoic victory."
Similarly, at a 14 March Moscow writers union meeting reported
in the 16 March MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, Moscow First Secretary
Grishin complained that some periods of the war have been described
in dozens of books while other periods were being ignored.
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9 APRIL 1975
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USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
MOSCOW TRIES TO MOLLIFY TITO ANGER OVER OFFENSIVE ARTICLES
Yugoslav-Soviet relations were considerably exacerbated in the
week before Premier Bijedic's scheduled 9-15 April visit to the
USSR, as President Tito and Yugoslav media reacted angrily to
newspaper articles by Warsaw Pact commander Yakubovskiy and
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko which, according to Belgrade,
"belittled" the wartime role of Tito's partisan army. Moscow
attempted to improve the atwosphere for Bijedic's visit, but
perhaps insufficiently, with an 8 April TASS interview of a
low-level Soviet official who praised the partisans' contribution
to defeating Nazi Germany and acknowledged that the partisans
deserved the credit for liberating Yugoslavia, but did not
mention the offending articles.
Yakubovskiy's article, in the 25 March CSSR party daily RUDE
PRAVO and aooarently pegged to next month's 30th anniversary of
V-E Day, was sharply criticized by Tito in a 2 April speech in
Skopje, although he eschewed direct reference to Yakubovskiy or
the article. Related media comment on the other hand was both
direct and more vitriolic, denouncing Yakubovskiy as well as
Grechko, whose supposedly similar article appeared in the 3
April issue of the CSSR Defense Ministry's OBRANA LIDU, not yet
available in Washington. Yakubovskiy heaped praise on the Red
Army's ro2_e in liberating East Europe while minimizing the
contribution of other East European forces. Particularly offensive
to Belgrade was his characterization of the various liberation
movements as one individual movement and his implication thi.t all
resistance movements in East Europe owed their success to the
Red Army.
Tito seemed particularly disturbed that Yakubovskiy's generalized
treatment of the liberation movements in effect equated the
Yugoslav partisans' campaign against the Germans with that of the
Bulgarians. Belgrade recently has shown increased sensitivity
to mplicit Soviet support for Sofia's contentions that Bulgarian
troops liberated Macedonia, which Belgrade interprets as a
Bulgarian effort to lay claim to Macedonian territory. Questioning
the policical motivations behind the article, Tito took the occasion
to re.27,11 last year's Corinformist affair in noting that Belgrade
would continue to resist those "mini-groups" and individuals
who "take the same stands as those who assert that they liberated
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9 APRIL 1975
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us . . . ." Tito also seemed to be warninr Moscow that its
"falsifIcation" of history could influence Belgrade's foreign
ties, maintaining that it would be a "disgrace" for the partisans'
wartime record to be recognized by the West but not by their
closest wartime allies.
Yugoslav media were more explicit in presenting Belgrade's fears
regarding the implications of Yakubovskiy's and Crechko's articles.
For example, Zagreb commentator Sundic on the 3d questioned
taetorically whether such articles could be written by officials
who favored good relations with Yugoslavia. And POLITIKA,
as reported by TANJUG on the 5th, argued that conceding that an
outside force had liberated Yugoslavia would mean giving that
force "an opportunity to lay claim on our present and future."
Belgrade comment in an 8 April Russian-language broadcast was
more restrained, referring only to "foreign" attempts to belittle
the partisans' wartime record and to "falsify" history. The same
commentary acknowledged the Soviet Union's contribution to defeating
Nazi Germany but added that Soviet aid to the partisans did not
begin until 1943 and that the partisans liberated Yugoslavia
"mainly with our own forces."
Moscow's efforts to smooth over the trouble caused by t.he two articles
was relegated mainly to Vladimir Zelenin, a historian obviously
lacking the status of the two marshals. Zelenin, identified as
a representative of Moscow's Institute of Slavic and Balkan
Studies, was a former military adviser to the partisans in
1944-46. He was called on during the 1950's to broadcast several
commentaries to Yugoslavia hailing Soviet-Yugoslav wartime
cooperation and wrote a handful of similar articics in the
1960's. Ze-enin's TASS interview was rich in praise of the
partisans; he was also careful to point out that Yugoslav
communists began their operations against Lae Germans in 1941,
thus "earlier than other European peoples." Zelenin also conceded,
in effect, that at least in the early years of the war, the partisans
fought the Germans in Yugoslavia on'their own. In addition to
the Zelenin interview, an IZVESTIYA article, as reported in a Serbo-
Croatian broadcast to Yugoslavia on the 8th, welcomed Bijedic's visit
with a positive assessment of relations between the two countries and
highly praised the "heroic struggle" of the Yugoslav partisans.
'n addition to concern aLout Bijedic's visit, ZIOSCC4IS sensitivity
to Belvade's pique over the two articles may reflect its interest
in creating a harmonious atmosphere for the 30th V-E Day observance
in Moscow next month. The CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet
Presidium have extended an invitation to Tito's number two man, Stane
Dolarc, according to a 17 March TANJUG report.
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USSR-HE1GARY
FBIS TRENDS
9 APRIL 197D
LOW-KEYED ANNIVERSARY OBSERVANCE SUGGESTS CONTINUED TENSIONS
Delivery of the main address at Hungary's 30th liberation anniver-
sary observance on 3 April by the figurehead President Losonczi
and the attendance of only a second-level SovieL figtv_e, CPSU
Secretary Kapitonov, suggest that Moscow-Budapest tensions over
the latter's liberal economic policies iday be persisting, despite
the appear ,lce of cordiality during Brezhnev's attendance at the
recent MSZMP congress.* Brezhnev and Hungarian party First
Secretary Kadar had been the main speakers at the 25th anniversary
festivities in Budapest in 1970, while both countries' presidents,
Mikoyan and Dobi, spoke at the 20th anniversary in 1965.
Losonczi's fig'trehead status is underscored by the fact that he
is the Lily president of an East European Soviet ally who is not at
tl!e same time a member of the party Politburo.
Top leaders of the two countries participated in Hungary's 30th
liberation anniversary only peripherally: An interview with Kad:!r
was carried on Moscow and Budapest TV on the 2d, and Premier Fock
was in Moscow on the 7th, three days after the anniversary date,
for the opening of a Hungarian exhibit, also attended by Kosygin
and Podgornyy. The Soviet leaders' anniversary message to their
Hungarian counterparts appeared to take into account conjectures
regarding Moscow-Budapest tensions when it stressed "the
indestructible unity of views" of the CPSU and MSZMP "on all
fundamental matters in the construction of socialism and communirm."
The Soviet leaders' ataiversary messages to their Polish, Bulgarian,
and East German counterparts had merely underscored bilateral
friendship and solidarity rather than stressing indestructible
ideological unity.
The keynote address by Losonczi at the Budapest meeting on 3 April
paid due tribute to the USSR's liberation of Hungary and subsequent
friendship and support for his country, Among other things,
Losonczi expressed appreciation to the CPSU and the Soviet Government
for their help in shielding the Hungarians from the effects of
* The top three Soviet leaders had attended 30th liberation anniver-
sary observances in other East European countries during the past
year: Brezhnev was in Warsaw in Jul, Kosygin in Bucharest in
August, and Podgornyy in Sofia in September. Brezhnev also attended
the GDR's 25th anniversary observance in October.
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FElS TRENDS
9 APRIL 1975
spiraling world market prices for energy. Endorsing detente,
the Hungarian president declared that the task of Hungarian
foreign policy was to promote the success of "the socialist
coultries' peace policy" and underscored Budapest's contribution
to strengthening the forces of "socialism, national independence,
peace, and detente." Losonczi's speech did not include any
mention of Brezhnev, unlike Kadar's address at the recent party
congress and his anniversary TV interview on 2 April. At the
congress, Kadar had thanked Brezhnev personally for helping
the Hungarians on the oil-price issue, and his TV interview
praised Brezhnev as a world leader in the quest for
peace.
Regarding the 1956 "counterrevolution," the Hungarien president
paid due tribute to "the internationalist aid of the Soviet
Union and the international working class" in saving socialism.
Stressing the Hungarian communists' own role, he recalled that
"we managed to conquer the dark forces of counterrevolution
because .:he party pursued a consistent struggle against both
sectarianism and revisionism, and we reestablished Leninist
norms." While not directly mentioning the controversial new
economic management system, Losonczi was in tune wita Budapest's
current de-emphasis of that syctem in registering the Hungarians'
determination to strengthen the party's leading role, the planned
economy, and "systematic" economic development. Underscoring
Budapest's membership in CEMA, he declared that his country would
utilize "primarily international socialist economic integration."
Losonczi's failure to mention BrezhneN, was made the more obvious
by Kapitonov's twice recalling the Sov:et leader's participation
in the recent Hungarian party ccngress and conveying Brezhnev's
personal greetings, in addition to reading the anniversary
message from the three Soviet leaders. The brief speech, much
shorter than Losonczi's, firmly undersc:7red the primary Soviet
role in detente, pointing to the USSR's implementation of the
peace program of the 24th CPSU Congress and stressing that "the
socialist countries, coordinating their efforts," were jointly
working for this cause.
Putting the best possible face on Moscow-Budapest relations,
Kapitonov acknowledged Losonczi's expression of gratitude for
Soviet liberation of Hungary, voiced sati:faction with the current
state of Soviet-Hungarian ties, ond approvingly noted the MSZMIT
congress' assertion of the party' ;1 leading role--a key feature of
Budapest's current retrcnchm-q-it from its liberal economic manage-
ment system. In contr.3t to Losonczi's failure to mmtion Brezhnev,
Kapitonov included a tribute to "Janos Kadar, loyal son of the
Hungarian people."
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FBIS TRENDS
9 APRIL 1975
KADAR INTERVIEW Kadar's interview with Moscow radio and TV
correspondent Kaverznev, aired in Moscow
and Budapest on the 2d, was notable for his strong praise of
Brezh.tev and for his modest estimate regarding the prospects
for achieving the goal of completing the building of socialism,
set by the MSZMP congress' program declaration published on
9 March. Asked about the program declaration's goal of
completing socialist construction in Hungary in the next
15-20 years, Kadar reulied that "we cannot really say whether
we are two-thirds of the way [in the 1945-1990 time span]
toward building a developed socialist society." To achieve
such a goal, he added, Hungary faces "major tasks" in the form
of two to three-fold increases in sue.' areas as national income
and industrial and agricultural production. He insisted that
the Central Committee and the party congress had made their
estimates "responsibly and, as far as was humanly possible, set
realistic targets."
In praising Brezhnev, Kadar went beyond Brezhnev's contributions
to USSR-Hungarian relations and referred to "that eminent and
outstanding fighter for the cause nf socialism and peace known
throughout the world, Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev." Apparently
attempting to discredit reported Soviet-Hungarian differences,
Kadar added that Brezhnev's speech at the Hungarian party congress
and the welcome given him in Budapest had demonstrated "our
cloudless and unshakable friendship."
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9 APRIL 197',
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PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CHINESE VICE PREMIERS LEAD DELEGATIONS TO IRAN, MEXICO
Peking's increasingly active role in world diplomacy and its
higher international profile were illustrated by recent, unpre-
cedentedly high-level visits by Chinese vice premiers to Iran
and Mexico, the first of a long-overdue series of trips abroad
by ranking Chinese leaders to reciprocate the many visits to
China by foreign leaders in recent years. The Chinese visits
reflect the normalization of Chinese government operations
in January by the National People's Congress, which appointed
10 new vice premiers, thus providing a total of 12 deputies to
assist ailing Premier Chou En-lai and making it possible to
send high-ranking officials on diplomatic missions outside
China. The current visits are in belated response to visits
to China by the Iranian and Mexican heads of government in
1972 and 1973 respectively, and they underscore the importance
Peking attaches to solidifying relations with these influential
Third World states.
LI HSIEN-NIEN Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's current tour of
VISIT TO IRAN Iran was highlighted by a 6 April "cordial and
friendly" talk with the Shah and by a 5 April
banquet hosted by the Iranian prime minister, during which Li
endorsed Iran's policies in several sensitive areas. Offering
Peking's first comment on the recent Iranian-Iraqi agreement
on borders and other issues, Li praised "both parties" for
settling the dispute, and said the accord was "a very good thing"
that showed the underlying unity of Third World states and
enhanced stability and peace in the Persian Gulf. During a
brief visit to Iran in June 1973, then Chinese Foreign !linister
Chi Peng-fei had defended Teheran's heavy defense expenditures
as necessary to counter Baghdad's close ties with the USSR.*
During the latest visi:, Li, following Chi's pattern in 1973,
supported Iran's stand on Persian Gulf countries settling
their own affairs and the establishment of an Indian Ocean
zone of peace. And Li added the highest-level Chinese endorse-
ment to date of Iran's proposal for the establishment of a
nuclear-free-zone in the Middle East. The vice premier Plso
* Chi Peng-fei's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 June
1973, pages 5-7.
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9 APRIL 1975
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used the occasion to voice Peking's first authoritative comment
on last month's OPEC summit conference in Algiers, hailing its
"great achievements" and offering generalized Chinese backing
for the developing countries' rights to control their natural
resources and to demand the establishment of a new international
economic order.
Also following the pattern displayed during Ch.. Peng-fei's 1973
visit, Li warned that superpower contention was the most serious
threat to the Persian Gulf area, while concurrent Chinese comment
has made it clear that Peking sees the Soviet Union as the real
danger in the zrea and the United States as a stabilizing influ-
ence. For example, a 4 April NCNA report, released on the same
day that Li left Peking, favorably replayed remarks by CENTO
military leaders during a recent meeting in Pakistan. It noted
their affirmation that the U.S.-backed alliance continued to
play a "useful role" in the area and that it continued to make
"significant progress in providing an atmosphere of security
and stability in the region." The report underlined Teheran's
role in the alliance by noting that bases in Iran would be used
in upcoming CENTO military exercises.
The first monitored Soviet reaction to Li's visit, an 8 April
Radio Peace and Progress commentary in English to Asia, pointed
to the 4 April NCNA dispatch on CENTO as well as reports of Li's
remarks in Teheran in criticizing the Chinese for preaching
"a sermon of war" and supporting an "imperialist military"
presence in the area, which it said was contrary to the developing
Asian states' alleged desire for a system of "collective security.
CHEN YUNG-KUEI PRC Vice Premier Chen Yang-kuei's 27 March -
VISIT TO MEXICO 7 April visit to exico was hailed by NCNA
as an affirmation of the "time-honored tradition
of amity" existing between the two countries. No communique was
issued and no agreements were announced. But Chen's lengthy visit
and NCNA's extensive coverage may be read as a demonstration of
China's overall interest in expanding relations with Latin America
and its recognition of the Third World role played by Mexico's
President Luis Echeverria, whose 1973 visit to the PRC was the
first such trip by a noncommunist Latin chief of state.*
* Echeverria's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 25 April 1973,
page 15-16. The only previous trip to Peking by a Latin head of
state was the September 1961 visit by Cuban President Osvaldo
Dorticos.
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9 APRIL 1975
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Chen, the highest-ranking Chinese official ever to visit Latin
America, began his stay by reiterating Peking's support for
the Echeverria-initiated Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States (CERDS), which was endorsed at the last UN Genera).
Assembly session and by which Echeverria hopes to enhance
Mexico's status as a Third World leader. As reported by NCNA
on 28 March, Chen characterized the charter as "the just call
of the Third World countries against imperialist plunder and
exploitation" and added that China "firmly supports the just
struggle of the Mexican Government and people." Stressing
the usual Chinese theme of solidarity with developing countries,
Chen said that "in the long struggle against imperialism and
colonialism" Mexico and China "have always sympathized wit'l
and supported each other." Noting that this historical tradition
had been accelerated since President Echeverria's April 1973
visit to China, Chen said that the two nations had "not only
supported each other politically, but have also learned from
and helped each other in the economic field."
Elaborating on the theme of economic cooperation at a FRC-hosted
banquet reported by NCNA on 4 April, Chen indicated what might
be one of the conc.7ete results of the trip when he noted that his
visit to Mexico had shown him many opportunities for cooperation,
"especially in the exchange of agricultural sciences and tech-
nologies." Chen concluded that "our future common struggle to
defend national sovereignty and develop the national economy'
would strengthen the "traditional friendship and relations of
friendly cooperation between the two countries."
The only monitored Moscow mention of Chen's Mexican visit came in
a TASS dispatch from Mexico City on 7 April which reported that
the Mexican socialist party had demanded that the PRC break
diplomatic relations with the "fascist regime" in Chile. This
demand, TASS said, was conveyed "to PRC Deputy Premier Chen lung-
kuei duri.lg his vist to Mexico."
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CHINA
FBIS TRENDS
9 APRIL 1975
CHANG WARNS PARTY MEMBERS TO FOLLOW MODERATE ECONOMIC LINE
A major, authoritative article by CCP Politburo member C;:ang
Chun-chiao in the April RED FLAG underscores Peking's resolve to
use the current ideological campaign to strike a cautious balance
between the pursuit of economic goals and adherence to ideological
principles. Signed press articles by Politburo members have been
extremely rare in recent years, but a new pattern now seems to
have developed, linked to the start three months ago of the
campaign to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Chang's article, entitled "On Exercising All-round Dictatorship
Over the Bourgeosie," follows by only a month another article
in RED FLAG by Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan, who called for
order and discipline to meet China's economic goals set by Chou
En-lai in his report to the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC)
in January.* Chang's article elaborates on this theme, charting
a mo6erate economic course for meeting Chou's ambitious objectives.
He argued that communist ecoaomic reforms must be postponed to
allow sufficient time "to build China into a powerful socialist
country before the end of the century. Indicating that errant
cadres from both the right and the left sould move toward the
center on the issue of economic reform, Caang warned party
members who have joined the party organizationally but not
ideologically that "it is dangerous to stop half-way! The
bourgeoi.45e is beckoning you. Catch up with the ranks and
continue tne advance!"
Much authority is attached to any pronouncement by Chang, who
shares the daily duties of operating China's government with
party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping. At the beginning of the
cultural revolution Chang was a party secretary in Shanghai,
having risen to the post through the municipal literary
bureaucracy in the years since 1949. He supported Chiang Ching's
cultural reforms and played a role in launching the struggle
that produced the cultural revolution. In 1967 the central
authorities entrusted Chang with running Shanghai, and he was
named to the Politburo at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969,
moving up to the standing committee of the Politburo at the 10th
Party Congress in 1973. Chang was named a vice premier at the
* Yao's article is discussed in the TRENpS of 5 March 1975,
pages 15-18.
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9 APRIL 19/5
- 24 -
Fourth NPC, where he delivered the report on the new constttu-
Lion. Shanghai mdta reports on (hang's activftles during ii It;
tenure in the city suggesL he is an f.conomfc moderate who
favors central planning and central allocation of resou:ces,
an Impression strengthened by the current RED FLAG article.
COrMUNIZATION Much of Chang's article seemed to be addressed
to left-leaning cadres holding the mistaken
idea that China should quicken the pace of communization and
thus speed the transition into a communist state. Discrediting
this approach, which was tried during the late 1950's and
resulted In serious economic shortfalls, Chang indicated that
rapid communization was not desired at this time and he
criticized cadres who spread "rumors about a wind of 'communi-
zation' being stirred up." Makihg it clear that the current
stress on meeting production goals in 1975 should not be
misinterpreted by local cadres as a signal for rapid communi-
zation, Chang declared that "the wind of 'communization' as
stirred up by Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta shall never be
allowed to rise again." He ruled out any attempt to rapidly
increase the current level of communization by arguing that
"our country does not yet have a great abundance" of commodities.
Chang developed the thesis that until communes were able to
"offer a great abundance of products for distribution according
to need among our 800 million people, it would be necessary
to take proper measures to "curb the harm caused" by those
remaining capitalist practices affecting the development of a
socialist economy.
While throwing cold water on any plans to quickly expand the
current level of communization, CL'Ing reported approvingly
thrIc there was a gradual trend toward a higher degree of public
ownership in rural areas. Chang used a commune near Shanghai
as an example of this trend, the commune ci?ed apparently
being a model showing how China could eventually realize the
theoretical objective of shifting a higher share of production
to the large commune base, leaving less for the smaller levels
of brigades and production teams. Chang noted that in the year
from 1973 to 1974, the commune-level income share of total income
here rose from 28.1 to 30.5 percent and the brigade-level share
rose from 15.2 to 17.2 percent, while the income share oi the
smaller production teams dropped from 56.7 to 53.3 percent.
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CONFIDENTIAE I RH; POND'.
9 AM!. i9/)
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Scressing the in?ed to increase slowly t 10 oroduct Ion share :it.
Hie commune level, Chang noted Hull In the rural peonle's
communes lust outside ilhanghal, where the economy at the
commune and production brigade levels has developed with
"good speed," the production teams still accounted for ')0.7
percent of thv total fixed assets owned by all three levels.
Putting any ma Ion economic changes far Into the future, Chang
argued that. "It will take a fairly long time to effect the
transition from the team to the brigade an0 then to the commune,
functioning as the basic accounting unit." He explained that
"even when the commune is made the basic accounting unit, it
will still remain under collective ownership," thus necessitat-
ing the "Inevitable" conthluation of "commodity production,
exchange through money, and distribution according to work."
BOURGEOIS Turning his attention to those holding rightist
',TIGHTS views on the (II WSLI on of ec (mom i c re form , Chang
Ind i ea Led t_ in "boti tt I r I gilts" mus t even t ua I I y
be removed, but he made it clear tLey should play a limited role
in strengthening socialist economic development. Chang argued
that the harmful effects of certain "bourgeois rights" should
be to temporarily (hiring the cnirrent socialist stage in
order to help develop the state's economic potential, strengthen
the economic base, and provide the necessary conditions for the
eventual transition into a communist society.
Material incentives do not appear to be among those "bourgeois
rights" which will be allowed to play a role in the current
socialist. economy. Evidence of this was (:hang's at tack on Lin
Piao and Liu Shao-chi for taking "advantage of the inexperionce
of young people" and "peddling among the youth the idea that
material incentive is like fermented bean curd: although it
smells bad, it tastes delicious." Emphasizing the call for
cadres to make greater efforts to substitute ideological pro-
duction incenti1.2s for material ones--a major lteme of the
current dictatorship campaign?Chang quoted a passage from a
previously unpublicized lfl69 lao speech: the passage criticized
party leaders in some factories for "resorting to material
incentives, putting profits in command and, instead of promoting
proletarian politics, handing out bonuses, and so forth."
Spelling out the current dilemma facing party leaders charged
with increasing production levels, Cnang called upon cadres to
learn how to balance the goal of "building a powerful country"
with a concern for maintaining proper ideological objectives.
Illritrating this point, Chang pointed to the "Khrushchev-Brezhnev
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C0i1P10INIIAL FBIN PIMP,
APRIL 19h
-
renegade c I ((pie" as neiyi I I l.10 I.K:11111) It' W:11'lli lig t lint "Al 110
t !HIV N110111(1 WI' nt'f',01 I Il I II I st or exper I iw Iii1.411101
t11( 1:1 t I III ON WeIll t 1110 sky will hr the Red I Iny; le 1 I
I o the ground."
[MORD! R In setting forth N go-slow, middle-of-the-road
approach to r?:torming the economy, Chang's article
appears to reflect Peking's concerti to keep the dictatorship
campaign under tight central control, thus preventing social
disruptions and shortfalls in economic production. Peking's
fears appear to he well-gronnded: recent PofeI broadcasts have
revealed that Anhwei party officials are engaged in struggling
against the actions of "active counterrevolutionaries and bad
elements sabotaging raIl transport." A 7 April Hofei broadcast
reported that the central authorities had Issued instructions
For local. railway workers and armymen living along the railways
"to take prompt action . . . to deal heavy blows at the handful
of class enemies carrying out the criminal activities of
sabotaging rail transport." Arguing that "rail transport is
of utmost importance in the national economy," the broadcast
focused on the need to "maintain order in railway stations and
on trains" in order to "promote stability and unity."
Problems with Anhwei's transportation network appear to date
back at least to 27 March, when the local radio reported that
a rally of 100,000 people had called for "strengthening social
security and maintaining good soci.?1 order for the successful
development of both revolution and production." The rally
concluded that it was "Imperative" to arouse the masses to
struggle against class enemies "who sabotage industi.ial and
agricultural productioo or communications and transport services."
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totalHINIIAL
9 APRIL I?/S
_ 2/ _
OTES
CH1NLSL LLADIRSHIP: The death of CCP Politburo member and former
I( ting Chief of State Tung Pi-wu at the agt of 90, announced by
NCNA on 1 April, leaves Mao Tse-tung as the only living founder
of thv CCP. Neither Mao nor Chou En-lai attended the memoz-lal
meeting fo:- Tung on 7 April In Peking. The memorial was presided
over by Wang Hung-wen, the party's third-ranking leader under
Mao and Chou. Yeh Chien-ying's memorial speech eulogized Tung
as a "great revolutionary fighter" and urged "translating our
grief" over his death to the campaign to strengthen the dictator-
ship of th proletariat and "building China into a strong and
modern socialist country." Mao has been absent from public
view since 16 January, when he received West Cerman CS0 leader
Strauss while the National People's Congress (NPC) was In session
In Peking. Mao has made no reported public appearances In Peking
since May 1974, when he apparently left the capital. Chou En-lai
has not appeared outside the hospital since 15 January when he
attended the funeral for Vice Premier Li Fu-chun, although he
continues to receive a steady flow of toreign guests in the
hospital.
CHIANG KAI-SHEK DEATH: A low-key 6 April NCNA report on Chiang
Kai-shek's death expressed Peking's confidence that Chiang's
demise would enhance movement in Taiwan toward reunIfication
with the mainland. In contrast to Peking's past expressions of
"hope" that people and leaders n Taiwan would work tor reunifica-
tion, NCNA said emphatically that Chiang's passing "will certainly"
encourage "people" in Taiwan to "further efforts" to liberate the
island. NCNA also claimed that "military and administrative
personnel" in Taiwan "will have a clearer view of the situation"
and will actively contribute to Taiwan's reunification. The
report characterized Chiang's named successor, Yen Chia-kan, as
a "puppet president," but avoided all mention of the critical
role now played by Chiang's eldest son, ROC Premier Chiang
Ching-kno, who has been criticized by Peking in the past. The
re!)ort contained only a passing reference to Chiang Kai-shek's
reliance on "U.S. imperialism" while in Taiwan. Moscow has thus
far not commented on Chiang's death, confining its coverage of
the event to a one-sentence 5 April TASS report noting news agency
reports on his passing.
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9 APRIL 19/')
CAMBODIAN NI GOT IAT IONS DENIED: The re ject ion 01 any negot I at ions
it th the Phnom Penh reg line by the Combo(' Ian I nsurgent Front (NUM)
has been real rmed in stat ements by I he Insurgents commander and
by head of state Pr ince Norodom SI hanouk. An 8 April statement by
Front. in I I Itary commonder and RGNII Deput y Pr I me Mini titer 1