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April 9, 1975
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For kelease ....,P86,90608,0002,70017. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Confidential FBS TRENDS In Communist Propaganda Confidential 9 APRIL 1975 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R00920017?001M 14) Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 coNFIDENTIAI, The, propaganda analysis report is based exclusiveb, on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government oomponents. Classified by 000023 Subjut to G?n?ral Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declossifi?d Two Years Fronl Date of Issue Notional Security Information Unauthc.ised disclosure subject to criminal sanctions Approved For Release 1999/COW/RMFL'86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL Filrs TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 CONTENTS VIETNAM PLAF Command Communique Lauds Unprecedented Communist Gains 1 PRG, DRV Assail U.S. Role in Evacuation of Refugees 3 Moscow Scores U.S. Aid for Thieu, Presses PRG Stand on Talks 7 MIDDLE EAST Moscow Adds Cautionary Notes to Standard Call for Geneva Talks . . 8 V-E DAY Soviet Articles on War Anniversary Differ on Detente Issues 12 USSR-YUGOSLAVIA Moscow Tries To Mollify Tito Anger Over Offensive Atticles 15 USSR-HUNGARY Low-Keyed Anniversary Observance Suggests .Continued Tension. 17 PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS Chinese Vice Premiers Lead Delegations to Iran, Mexico 20 CHINA Chang Warns Party Members To Follow Moderate Economic Line 23 NOTES Chinese Leadership; Chiang Kai-shek Death; Cambodian Negotiations Denied 27 APPENDIX Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 VIETNAM Hanoi and PRG media maintain that the communist gains in South Vietnam have decisively changed the balance of forces and laid the groundwork for "greater victouies." However, there have been no predictions of imminent, total military victory. There has been nc call for the immediate "liberation" of Saigon as had accompanied earlier communist z3ssau1ts on Darning and other areas, but a 4 April appeal called on the people in Saigon to "rise up' and overthrow Thieu and to "be ready to participate" in the revoluion. The media continue to advance the January 1973 Paris peace agreemcnt as the basis for a settlement, but there is no evidence of flexibAity on terms. Thus, the communists repeat their standard offer to negotiate with Saigon only after Thieu has been removed from offi,:e. Neithr the PRG nor Hanoi has acknowledged Western reports thai. FRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh had indicated that France or other councries might contribute to a settlement. Vietnamese communist comment on the U.S. position, including propa- ganda pegged to President Ford's 3 April press conference, claims Washington is stubbornly clinging to old policies and is confused and pessimistic over GVN losses. U.S. steps to assist in evacuations have prompted particularly bitter comment, including a 7 April PRG statement which denounced efforts to evacuate Vietnamese and labeled Americans in Vietnam as "disguised" military personnel who must be immediately withdrawn. Communist efforts to bring order to newly captured areas were reflected in a 10-point PRG policy, released on 3 April, which provided a blueprint for occupation and the establishment of new local administrations. Liberation Radio has also reported the dispatch of PRG officials, i!'cluding President Huyen Tan Phat, to visit the new areas of control. Authoritative PRG and DRV statements have reiterated appeals for international assistance for these areas, and communist media have reported the arrival in Danang of the first shipment of aid from the NFLSV/PRG. Soviet commentatozs continue to applaud the communist military advances but stress the desirability of reaching a peaceful solution. Peking media attention to events in South Vietnam is mostly limited to replays of Vietnamese Ind other foreign media reports. PLAF COMMAND COMMUNIQUE LAUDS UNPRECEDENTED COMMUNIST GAINS The Vietnamese communists officially evaluated the magnitude of their military achievenents in the fourth in a series uc PLAF Command Approved For Release 1999/09126mOtAADP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FB IES TRENDS 9 A1'R1L 1975 - 2 - communignes. The latest communique, released on 6 April, jubilantly cited specific details on the GVN losses of teicitory, military personnel, and equipment, and it maintained that the communists have achieved a position of unquestionable military superiority. Earlier PLA- communiques on 30, 26, and 20 March, marked the capture of Danang, Hue, and the central highlands, respectively.* According to the 6 April communique, "all the manpower, weapons, technology, and other means of war in the whole of Military Regions I nd 11 have been annihilated and broken up." The communique asserted that 2/0,000 troops were put out of action, six divisions "wipcd out or completely disbanded," and that the five major cities of Hue, Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Dalat and 16 provinces have been "liberated." As a result of these latest gains, the PLAF now claims communist control over 9.3 million people "from the 17th parallel to the southernmost tip of Ca Mau." The tremendous military advances detailed in the communique of the 6th give an impression of unbounded optimism for additional PLAF battlefield successes and the imminent collapse of GVN control over the rrmaining pertion of the country. In describing the communist forces' current advantage, the 6 April communique was replete with such characterizations as the "sure-to-win position," while it depicted the GVN as being in a position of "irretrievable failure," and on the verge of "ignominious defeat." Averring that recent military gains have brought about "an obvious change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy," the communique went on to flatly declare that "we are now stronger than the enemy." The other three recent PLAF Command communiques had been more reticent in evaluating the shift in the balance of forces between the GVN and the communist 7)1.-ces. Only the communique of the 20th-- issued after the fall of the highlands--broa lied the issue, but with the less categorical claim that "today the strength and position of our armed forcrs and people are stronger than ever." Past discussions of the balance of forces in Vietnamese communist propaganda have ordinarily been couched in phraseology suggesting an ever-increasing advantage accruing to the communist forces in the South, and have stopped short of rhe unequivocal assertion of superiority that was contained in the 6 April communique. * For a discussion of the communiques of 20 and 26 March see the TRENDS of 26 March 1975, pages 6-10. The communique of the 30th is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 April 1975, pages 1-4. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 3 - HANOI COMMENT The 6 April PLAF communique's evaluation of the balance of forces in South Vietnam has been echoed in other comment, including editorials in the major Hanoi papers on 7 April. The North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claimed that victories in the South had "led to a funda- mental change in the balance of forces . . . in which the revolu- tionary position is much superior to that of the enemy." The party paper NHAN DAN compared the situation in the South to that at the Lime of the 1945 general uprising that led to the establish- ment of the DRV. Hanoi announced on 8 April that the situation in South Vietnam had been discussed that day at a special session of the DRV National Assembly S:anding Committee. The meeting was said to have heard a report on the "offensive and uprising" by DRV Defense Mirister Vo Nguyen Clap, but no details on his remarks have been reported. The communique on the session noted that the Standing Committee had affirmed that the Southern victory had created "new, exr.remely favorable opportunitiec. . . . to continue to advance toward still greater victories and to lead the southern revolution to total victory." It called upon northerners to "do their best to provide support and assistance" to the South. PRG, DRV ASSAiL U.S, ROLE IN EVACUATION OF REFUGEES Hanoi and the PRG have reacted to U.S. evacuation efforts in South Vietnam with an outpouring of wrathful indignation, culminating in a government statement from the FRG on 7 April and a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the following day. Vietnamese communist invective or he evacuation issue has been harsher than language used in recent comment reacting to U.S. officials' statements on other issues and seems to reflect communist distress at the widely publicized exodus of the South Vietname,e population in advance of the communist troops. U.S. actions T.:re also authoritatively protested in a 3 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement, a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 4th, and a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 5th. The 7 April PRG statement recapitulated earlier complaints directed against the United States for aiding the Saigon government by transporting refugees fleeing from the war zone. It described the rescue open-Aim as a "large-scale forcible evacuation" and an attempt to "rake in manpower and material resources to continue the war." The statement also accused the United States of "kidnaping" thousands of South Vietnamese children and assailed Washington for involving other governments and international organizations in the operation. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 4 - The 7 April PRG statement also called attention to White House comment on the poLsibility of employing U.S. troops for the protection and removal of U,S. personnel in Vietnam, terming thjs "a new scheme aimed at intervening in South Vietnam." It cha,:ged, in this connection, that Americdns in Vietnam were "military personnel disguised as civilians and jAlegally introduced." When a spokesman of the PRG militzxy delegation stationed at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase had ')een queried at a 15 March press conference od the possible capture of Americans at Ban Me Thuot, he replied: "Foreigners, inc1ud1ng honest Americans, will be well treated and released if they are captured, but this treatment will not be given to U.S. military advisers. They are special cases because they have violated the Paris agreement. (Charges that U.S. military personnel w' re being secretly assigned to South Vietnam have been standard communist fare since almost immediately after the final 29 March 1973 withdrawal of U.S. servicemen from South Vietnam under the terms of the Paris agree- ment. Current communist propaganda claims t112 continued presence of some 25,000 such individuals.) The 8 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement reached an even higher pitch cf stridency than the PRG statement in reiterating charges of "forcible" evacuation of refugees by the United States, comparing U.S. actions with "the genocidal crimes perpetrated by the Hitler fascists." In this same vein, a 9 April NHPN DAN editorial in support of the DRV Foreign Ministry statement termed the evacuation operation and removal of South Vietnamese children to the United States "a major crime of history, a sordA, filthy maneuver, and a most despicable move." The refugee question was also discussed at length in a commentary in the army paper on the 7th which flatly denied that the communists had terrorized or retaliated against people in the captured territory and assailed the "Ford clique" for raising tbc possibility of "imagit,ary blood baths." The commentary also charged that U.S. evacuation efforts were serving as a pretext for thc Administration to get more military aid for Thieu and as a cover for the mobilization of U.S. military forces "to serve as deterrent force in South Vietnam," "check the advance of the revolution," and save Thieu. * For a discussion of the possible capture of Americans at Ban Me Thuot, see the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, pages 8-10. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL - 5- FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 The 5 April NHAN DAN Commentator article* cited a Western press agency to make the claim that the United States was studying plans to move as many as one million people from South Vietnam and that a U.S. senator had asked President Ford to deploy the "entire Seventh Fleet" to move two million Vietnamese within seven days. The Commentator article likewise characterized the transfer of Vietnamese orphans to the United States and the children killed in the C-5A crash as "crimes" against the Vietnamese people. The immediate goal of these moves, according to Commentator, is to provide evidence alleging that the Vietnamese people are anticommunist and to give the United States a "pretext to prolong its involvement." And then without further elaboration, he cryptically added: "The imperialists' plan to use force to bring many people away is also designed to implement their future sinister schemes." REACTION TO President Ford's 3 April press conference remarks U.S. STATEMENTS on Vietnam prompted a PRG Foreign Ministry spokes- man's statement of the 4th that took issue with the Administration's ordering of U.S. ships to the coastal waters of Vietnam to help 1.n the refugee evacuation. A 5 April Hanoi radio eport on a NHAN DAN article of the same date on the President's press conference said that he had "regretted he could not use the U.S. Air Force and admitted that he had no intention of sending American forces back to South Vietnam since that is banned by law." The article was quick to point out, however, that U.S. contingency plans exist to protect and evacuate Americans in South Vietnam and Cambodia, and these could include the use of U.S. troops. The same article claimed that "Ford blamed the military debacle in South Vietnam on Thieu's inep- command, but everyone knows that any military plan applied by Thieu was drawn by his U.S. advisers them- selves." Secretary of State Kissinger's 5 April press conference was discussed by Hanoi radio on the 7th in a broadcast that derided his remarks on Indochina as revealing the "confusion and embarrassment of the White House in the face of the irremediable collapse of the Thieu clique in Saigon and the country-selling clique in Phnom Penh." A NHAN DAN * Commentator is an authoritative byline which has appeared only irregularly in NHAN DAN since the signing of the Paris agreement. For further background on Commentator, see the TRENDS of 29 January 1975, pages 1-4. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 -6- article of the 6th pegged to Thieu's speech two days before was equally caustic in characterizing Walt Rostow as a "nitwit" for his recent proposal to land U.S. marines in North Vietnam. General George Brown's remarks in Indonesia concerning possible direct U.S. intervention into Vietnam failed to elicit any significant response from tne PRG or Hanoi. While a spokesman for the PRG delegation tc., the La Celle-Saint-Cloud consultative conference released a statement on the 7th denouncing Brown's speculation as a "serious violation" of the Paris agreement, it was essentially low-keyed. A Hanoi radio broadcast of the 8th on Brown's "threats" quoted Western press agency reports that Congress would "prevent such an intervention at all costs." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBTS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 7 - MOSCOW SCORES U,S, AID FOR THIEU, PRESSES PRG STAND ON TALKS Moscow media have continued to acclaim communist advances in South Vietnam while stressing that a political settlement should be reached on the basis of the terms offered by the PRG. The U.S. role in supporting the Thieu Government was predictably attacked by Soviet commentators, but criticism was restrained. Moscow commentators have avoided direct criticism of President Ford or Secretary Kissinger, instead deploring the desire of "certain circles" in Washington and the Pentason to continue or expand U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Moscow's circumspection regarding the President was strikingly illustrated in the TASS accounts of official Vietnamese statements: explicit references to the "Ford Administration," were changed to "U.S. Government." On the other hand, the President's position has been fully reflected. For example, TASS and PRAVDA accounts of his 3 April press conference reported his remarks on continued U.S. support for Thieu, his appeal for congressional approval of more military aid, and his announcement of the dispatch of U.S. ships to the Indochina coast and other steps "under the pretext of a possible evacuation of retreating Saigon troops." ZHUKOV IN PRAVDA The most authoritative current Soviet comment on Vietnam was a 5 April article by PRAVDA political commentator Yuriy Zhukov. He typically portrayed current military action as a popular South Vietnamese uprising against the Thieu government, denying the view of 'some people in the West" that the GVN was the victim of an offensive launched by the DRV or that congressional reductions of aid to the GVN had brought about its present deterioration. Zhukov supported the Vietnamese communist contention that refugees in South Vietnam were not fleeing from the advancing communist forces but rather had been forcibly resettled by the Saigon government, and he endorsed PRG protests against the movement of U.S. ships to aid in evacuation. Rejecting as "false allegations" speculation that the communists were planning to capture Saigon, Zhukov cited NFLSV-PRG protesta- tions that they were "only striving for strict fulfillment of the Paris agreement, which has been and is being violated most flagrantly by the Thieu clique and its patrons." Like other Soviet comment, the Zhukov article reiterated the PRG proposal for resumption of political talks with Saigon after Thieu has been removed, adding: "The new situation taking shape in South Vietnam opens up a clear prospect for the establishment of peace." CONFIDENTIAL. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 8 -- MIDDLE EAST MOSCOW ADDS CAUTIONARY NOTES TO STANDARD CALL FOR GENEVA TALKS Having for months urged the "immediate" reconvening of the Geneva talks when this seemed a distant prospect, the Soviet Union is now advocating the need for adequate advance preparations to insure the success of the conference.* Predictably, Moscow has pointed to Israeli 'reservations and conditions" as the chief complicating factors. But it has also intimated uncertainty over the attitude of the United States as its fellow conference cochairman as Washington reappraises its Mideast policy, and has cited statements by President Ford as indicating U.S. reluctance to turn to Geneva. By omission, Moscow has underlined the complex problem of getting the Arab participants into line; comment has skirted these difficulties, merely sketching a broad picture of Arab support for resumption of the conference. PREPARATIONS Cautionary Noscow remarks about the necessity FOR GENEVA for preliminary preparations began to appear at the end of Narch. One of the first to indi7ate such concern was Mich,ast specialist Igor Belyayev, on Moscow radio's 30 March ascrvers' roundtable. The moderator, noting that to recoavene thc. conference "say, tomorrow or the next day" would not assure its success, asked Belyayev what were the preconditions for a su.-cesslul Geneva conference. Belyayev answered that its success would depend primarily on a "positive approach by all sides involved" and noted in this regard that there was a "broad range of problems" connectA with a Mideast settlement--such as determination of participants, particularly Palestinian representiltion-- and that "consequently, it is essential Ciat much preparatory work be done." He stressed that the Geneva conference must be resumed, but only after the "necessary prerequisites" for is success had been created. Also on the 30th, Kolesnichenko's international review in PRAVPA implied the need for advance preparations, remarking that a return to Geneva was the practical path in the quest for a Mideast peace, but "at the same time farsighted observers stress the importance * Moscow's initial comment on the breakddwn of Secretary Kissinger's mission pointed to resumption of the Geneva conference 3S the logical step, but had made no mention of any necessary prerequisites. See the FBIS TRENDS of 26 ilarch 1975, pages 1-3. Approved' For Release 1999/09926F!.1dRAIDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 -9 - of insuriEg that the Geneva conference does not have a dry run." And an international review by Mikhaylov in the 1 April IZVESTIYA called it necessary "to prepare and organize the work of the conference" to insure that the fundamental problems are resolved. Moscow also gave a notably lukewarm reception to Egypt's official request to the United States and Soviet Union--announced by Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi on 1 April--that the two cochairmen undertake to reconvene the conference. The first monitored Soviet acknowledgment of the Egyptian request came in an unattributed commentary on Moscow radio's Arabic service on 2 April. Although describing the request as "the most important element in the current Mideast situation," the broadcast dwelt at length on the difficulties involved, emphasizing in particular Israel's "negative attitude" and alleged U.S.-Israeli "plans to undermine or postpone" the conference. Moscow apparently did not publicly mention the Egyptian request again until PRAVDA on the 5th carried a brief Glukhov dispatch from Cairo reporting without comment that Fahmi had announced the request. The Glukhov dispatch also noted that Fahmi had stated Egypt's readiness to send representatives to Geneva and had expressed Cairo's support of participation in the talks by Great Britain, France, and one nonalined country. Scanty Soviet attention to Egyptian activities included a roundup in ZA RUBEZHOM (No. 15, signed to press on 3 April) of news reports on the Mideast which cited he Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF to the effect that Egypt haLl begun "intensive diplomatic contacts to reconvene the Geneva confecence" and that the Egyptian foreign minister was currently preparing the necessary documents, including "a joint working document with Syria on all the questions to be discussed." TASS on the 7th noted that the Egyptian ambassador to the USSR had met with Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss "topical problems" concerning the Middle East, "including resumption of the Geneva peace conference." U.S.-SOVIET ROLE Belyayev was th,. first Soviet commentator to work out the details of the Geneva talks. Referring in the 30 March roundtable program to the need for preparatory work, he went on to say: "Incidertally, there is also a mechanism for this. At one time there were special ambassadors of the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva and they had to discuss and resolve the essence of those problems which it was essential to resolve before the resumption of the work of the Geneva conference." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS .RENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 10 - This idea was picked up by PRAVDA's KolesnIchenko In a 1 April Moscow radio broadcast to North America. Kolesnichenko recalled that joint U.S.-Soviet efforts had created the Geneva conference as a mechanism for solving the Mideast crisis and that, under present circumstances, "Soviet-Amelican contacts in seeking a Mideast peace settlement should in my opinion be stepped up and not terminated." And TASS on the 28th, reporting Ftesident Ford's 24 March Hearst interview which was released on the 27th, noted that the President had expressed the view that U.S. rel3tIons with the Soviet Union would help avoid an aggravation of the Mideast situation. TASS quoted him as saying he was of the opinion that in this situation detente would make things easier. U.S. POLICY treatment of the President's interview, however, generally underlined the United States' lack of enthusiasm lor renewing the conference. The TASS account high- lighted his statement that with the collapse of the step-by-step approach the United States "has no other choice" than to return to the Geneva conference. The President in fact said "I don't believe we have any other choL'e now other than to go to Geneva. I regret it but . . . there appears to be no alternative." Also citirg the remark on "no other choice," TASS director general Zamyatin observed, on Moscow radio's 29 March "International Situation" program, that the President's remark was "not very definite." And Matveyev, on the 6 April Moscow radio roundtable, pointed to the "hint of regret" with which President Ford seemed to indicate that the Geneva conference was now inevitable" and "thcre was no other way out." Limited an testrained comment on the U.S. Mideast policy review has in the main suggested Fkepticism about any significant change in Washington's relations with Tel Aviv. A Yefremov commentary on Moscow's domestic service on the 28th did claim that with the failure of the Kissinger mission and the subsequent U.S. policy reassessment, "a serious obstacle elt the path to resumption of the Geneva conference has been removed." But TMS director general Zamyatin, without mentioning the policy review, asserted on Moscow radio on the 29th that the United States continued to c',Ade a solution" of the key questions of a settlement, talking of "the complicated nature of the problem, of Israel being unprepared for an all-round settlement, and so forth." Kolesnichenko in the 30 March PRAVDA review declined to specLiate on the outcome of the policy reassessment, saying that "time will tell" what the results might be. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDFNTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 19i5 On 1 Apri! a Moscow domestic service commentary said thac the U.S. polic) review had had no visible effect on Israeli leaders, who believed that U.S. support would continue as before. PRAVDA noted on the 5th that, despite "talk in Washington" of a policy review and a more balanced policy toward the Arabs, the United States wns continuing to deliver huge supplies of weapons to Israel and, according lo Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, remained committed to deliver more. PRAVDA claimed that these considerations caused the Arab states to ask: "Just what does the reexamination of Washington's Mideast policy entail?" CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL ERIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 12 - V -E DAY SOVIET ARTICLES ON WAR ANNIVERSARY DIFFER ON DETENTE ISSUES The early atiicl2s that hcIde appeared in this year's lengthy Soviet campain to celebrate the 30th anniversary of victory In World War If reflact differing viewpoints regarding current policy issues. Some of the articles take a pro-detente stance, citing the history of atlied cooperation during the war as a model for the present. Others clearly intended to stress the importance of maintaining r strong defen3e posture, and they cite the alleged primacy of the Soviet Union's contribution to tne victory as an object lesson in this regard. Other:: take a still more conservative line, stressing the role of the party as the organizer of victory, or even the role of Stal-In In this regard. It is still too soon to say whether these differences reflect a eemergence of internal Soviet debate over the (12terte-defense issue or merely the normal range of nuances to he expected in this kind or campaign. PRO-DETENTE ARTICLES The February CPSD Central Committee decree announcing the start of the national celebration of the 30th anniversary signaled no particular orientation regarding current policy issues. It omitted any mention of Stalin, which seemed to suggest a pro-detente orientation, but on the other hand it gave no more than a perfunctory bow to the role of the allies in the war. The Moscow domestic radio carried a summary of the decree on 9 February, and KOMMUNIST carried the text in issue No. 3, signed to the press on 11 February. The decree's publication in nAVDA was unaccountably delayed, hovever, until 98 February.* * Moscow radio this year began to give significant coverage to the 30th anniversary of V-E Day as early as the second week of February and has maintained a substantial level of attention to the suject since. This represents a much earlier and much heavier stress on the anniversary than obtained for either the 25th cnniversary in 1970 or the 20th in 1965, when the campaigns began only in April. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FIliS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 The pro-detente line of commentary on the anniversary was typified by a 12 March editorial in IZVESTIYA. it was couched in high-flown rhetoric about the anti-Hitler coalition and expressed hope that the memorialtzation of the victory would provide a new stimulus to detente. More recently, Moscow has sought to link the nnniversary with its current oolicy of calling for a world disarmament conference. A TASS commentary on 5 April reporting the conclusion of the UM committee session on preparing for the conference noted that the initiative was appropriately timed to coincide with the 30th anniversary. MILITANT ARTICLES Articles published in the military press or written by military authors have generally taken a much harsher line on the lessons to be drman from the anniversary observances. This can be attributed in part to the circumstance that the start of the campaign coincided with the annual celebration of Armed Forces Day (23 February)--an occasion traditionally marked by bold declarations from military spokesmen. Yet even allowing for this,such articles as Maj. Gen. S. Baranov's essay on economic preparedness in RED STA' t on 27 February stand out as unusually assertive of military interests. Focused largely on Soviet econom_c policy in the prewar and war years, the article uses some of the most unqualified formulas from Lenin's writings to stress the importance of preparin the country foe war. It puts a fine topical point on the r.,essage, moreover, by pointing out that the party must take into consideration not only the present detente situation but other "possible" situations, and by declaring that "we will continue to be prepared for any change in the development of events." CONSERVATIVE ARTICLES A third track taken by some commentators on the anniversary has been to stress the rolo_ of the traditional party organs in the achievement of victory. This is the line taken by chief of the Lenin 'Iilitary PolLical Academy, Gen. Ye. Ye. :Ialtsev, in a 4 April article in PRA'.DA. Asserting that "all fundamental questions of conducting the war were decided by the Central Committee--the Politburo, Orgburo, and Secretariat," he went on to say that the polcy of the CPSU and its Leninist leadership has been, is, and will remain the decisive coadition guaranteeing the invincible defense capacity of the Soviet state, the military might of the armed forces." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FIVIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 14 - Thc Maltsey article also Illustrates a fascinating sub-theme which may become more prominent as the anniversary approaches. This has to do with the treatment of Stalin--a sub)uct which Is unsettled in the Soviet Union despite repeated regime efforts to strike a balanced assessment. Maltsev, by his unusual recitation of the names of the top party bodies, manoged to avotd recalling the extraordinary party-str.te-military bodies with which Stalin was more intimately associated, and indeed railed to mention Stalin's name at all. Other recent articles, however, have mentioned Stalin's role, although these articles appear to be in the minority thus far. Lt. Gen. S. Bobylev, writing in the l Apr 1.1 WRA. LIFE, referred to "Sect-2tary General 1.V. Stalin" as head of the w,-rtine State Defense Committee, and Maj. Gen. M. Kir'yan, writing in the 4 April RED STAR, noted as well that Stalin was head of the Supreme Comman I as well as of the State nefense Committee. Even before the current anniversary campaign, pressure to give Stalin more credit had become apparent from several quarters. The most blatant example was Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy, who hailed Stalin's role in an 18 October 1974 speech celebrating the 30th anniversary of the liberation of the Ukraine. Other spokesmen in the Ukraine have followed Shcherbitskiy's lead. In the meantime, the film of Aleksandr Chakovskiy's novel on the war, which contains extensive descriptions of Stalin's lealership, is currently running in Moscow and Leningrad theaters, and installments of the novel have appeared in the last four issues of the journal ZNAMYA. Conservatives have :Aso lately been pressuring writers to stress the victories in the war, rather than the embarrassing initial defeats. Belorussian First Secretary Iasherov, in a 27 February speech to writers reported in the March KO:MNIST BELORUSSII, complained of "one-sided" and "erroneous treatment" of the initial period of the war and declared it "completely Licolerable" to undermine the people's pride in their "hecoic victory." Similarly, at a 14 March Moscow writers union meeting reported in the 16 March MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, Moscow First Secretary Grishin complained that some periods of the war have been described in dozens of books while other periods were being ignored. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 15 - USSR-YUGOSLAVIA MOSCOW TRIES TO MOLLIFY TITO ANGER OVER OFFENSIVE ARTICLES Yugoslav-Soviet relations were considerably exacerbated in the week before Premier Bijedic's scheduled 9-15 April visit to the USSR, as President Tito and Yugoslav media reacted angrily to newspaper articles by Warsaw Pact commander Yakubovskiy and Soviet Defense Minister Grechko which, according to Belgrade, "belittled" the wartime role of Tito's partisan army. Moscow attempted to improve the atwosphere for Bijedic's visit, but perhaps insufficiently, with an 8 April TASS interview of a low-level Soviet official who praised the partisans' contribution to defeating Nazi Germany and acknowledged that the partisans deserved the credit for liberating Yugoslavia, but did not mention the offending articles. Yakubovskiy's article, in the 25 March CSSR party daily RUDE PRAVO and aooarently pegged to next month's 30th anniversary of V-E Day, was sharply criticized by Tito in a 2 April speech in Skopje, although he eschewed direct reference to Yakubovskiy or the article. Related media comment on the other hand was both direct and more vitriolic, denouncing Yakubovskiy as well as Grechko, whose supposedly similar article appeared in the 3 April issue of the CSSR Defense Ministry's OBRANA LIDU, not yet available in Washington. Yakubovskiy heaped praise on the Red Army's ro2_e in liberating East Europe while minimizing the contribution of other East European forces. Particularly offensive to Belgrade was his characterization of the various liberation movements as one individual movement and his implication thi.t all resistance movements in East Europe owed their success to the Red Army. Tito seemed particularly disturbed that Yakubovskiy's generalized treatment of the liberation movements in effect equated the Yugoslav partisans' campaign against the Germans with that of the Bulgarians. Belgrade recently has shown increased sensitivity to mplicit Soviet support for Sofia's contentions that Bulgarian troops liberated Macedonia, which Belgrade interprets as a Bulgarian effort to lay claim to Macedonian territory. Questioning the policical motivations behind the article, Tito took the occasion to re.27,11 last year's Corinformist affair in noting that Belgrade would continue to resist those "mini-groups" and individuals who "take the same stands as those who assert that they liberated CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 16 - us . . . ." Tito also seemed to be warninr Moscow that its "falsifIcation" of history could influence Belgrade's foreign ties, maintaining that it would be a "disgrace" for the partisans' wartime record to be recognized by the West but not by their closest wartime allies. Yugoslav media were more explicit in presenting Belgrade's fears regarding the implications of Yakubovskiy's and Crechko's articles. For example, Zagreb commentator Sundic on the 3d questioned taetorically whether such articles could be written by officials who favored good relations with Yugoslavia. And POLITIKA, as reported by TANJUG on the 5th, argued that conceding that an outside force had liberated Yugoslavia would mean giving that force "an opportunity to lay claim on our present and future." Belgrade comment in an 8 April Russian-language broadcast was more restrained, referring only to "foreign" attempts to belittle the partisans' wartime record and to "falsify" history. The same commentary acknowledged the Soviet Union's contribution to defeating Nazi Germany but added that Soviet aid to the partisans did not begin until 1943 and that the partisans liberated Yugoslavia "mainly with our own forces." Moscow's efforts to smooth over the trouble caused by t.he two articles was relegated mainly to Vladimir Zelenin, a historian obviously lacking the status of the two marshals. Zelenin, identified as a representative of Moscow's Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, was a former military adviser to the partisans in 1944-46. He was called on during the 1950's to broadcast several commentaries to Yugoslavia hailing Soviet-Yugoslav wartime cooperation and wrote a handful of similar articics in the 1960's. Ze-enin's TASS interview was rich in praise of the partisans; he was also careful to point out that Yugoslav communists began their operations against Lae Germans in 1941, thus "earlier than other European peoples." Zelenin also conceded, in effect, that at least in the early years of the war, the partisans fought the Germans in Yugoslavia on'their own. In addition to the Zelenin interview, an IZVESTIYA article, as reported in a Serbo- Croatian broadcast to Yugoslavia on the 8th, welcomed Bijedic's visit with a positive assessment of relations between the two countries and highly praised the "heroic struggle" of the Yugoslav partisans. 'n addition to concern aLout Bijedic's visit, ZIOSCC4IS sensitivity to Belvade's pique over the two articles may reflect its interest in creating a harmonious atmosphere for the 30th V-E Day observance in Moscow next month. The CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet Presidium have extended an invitation to Tito's number two man, Stane Dolarc, according to a 17 March TANJUG report. Approved For Release 1994/N/j2DeTaii-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL -17 - USSR-HE1GARY FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 197D LOW-KEYED ANNIVERSARY OBSERVANCE SUGGESTS CONTINUED TENSIONS Delivery of the main address at Hungary's 30th liberation anniver- sary observance on 3 April by the figurehead President Losonczi and the attendance of only a second-level SovieL figtv_e, CPSU Secretary Kapitonov, suggest that Moscow-Budapest tensions over the latter's liberal economic policies iday be persisting, despite the appear ,lce of cordiality during Brezhnev's attendance at the recent MSZMP congress.* Brezhnev and Hungarian party First Secretary Kadar had been the main speakers at the 25th anniversary festivities in Budapest in 1970, while both countries' presidents, Mikoyan and Dobi, spoke at the 20th anniversary in 1965. Losonczi's fig'trehead status is underscored by the fact that he is the Lily president of an East European Soviet ally who is not at tl!e same time a member of the party Politburo. Top leaders of the two countries participated in Hungary's 30th liberation anniversary only peripherally: An interview with Kad:!r was carried on Moscow and Budapest TV on the 2d, and Premier Fock was in Moscow on the 7th, three days after the anniversary date, for the opening of a Hungarian exhibit, also attended by Kosygin and Podgornyy. The Soviet leaders' anniversary message to their Hungarian counterparts appeared to take into account conjectures regarding Moscow-Budapest tensions when it stressed "the indestructible unity of views" of the CPSU and MSZMP "on all fundamental matters in the construction of socialism and communirm." The Soviet leaders' ataiversary messages to their Polish, Bulgarian, and East German counterparts had merely underscored bilateral friendship and solidarity rather than stressing indestructible ideological unity. The keynote address by Losonczi at the Budapest meeting on 3 April paid due tribute to the USSR's liberation of Hungary and subsequent friendship and support for his country, Among other things, Losonczi expressed appreciation to the CPSU and the Soviet Government for their help in shielding the Hungarians from the effects of * The top three Soviet leaders had attended 30th liberation anniver- sary observances in other East European countries during the past year: Brezhnev was in Warsaw in Jul, Kosygin in Bucharest in August, and Podgornyy in Sofia in September. Brezhnev also attended the GDR's 25th anniversary observance in October. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 WNFIDENTIAL - 18- FElS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 spiraling world market prices for energy. Endorsing detente, the Hungarian president declared that the task of Hungarian foreign policy was to promote the success of "the socialist coultries' peace policy" and underscored Budapest's contribution to strengthening the forces of "socialism, national independence, peace, and detente." Losonczi's speech did not include any mention of Brezhnev, unlike Kadar's address at the recent party congress and his anniversary TV interview on 2 April. At the congress, Kadar had thanked Brezhnev personally for helping the Hungarians on the oil-price issue, and his TV interview praised Brezhnev as a world leader in the quest for peace. Regarding the 1956 "counterrevolution," the Hungarien president paid due tribute to "the internationalist aid of the Soviet Union and the international working class" in saving socialism. Stressing the Hungarian communists' own role, he recalled that "we managed to conquer the dark forces of counterrevolution because .:he party pursued a consistent struggle against both sectarianism and revisionism, and we reestablished Leninist norms." While not directly mentioning the controversial new economic management system, Losonczi was in tune wita Budapest's current de-emphasis of that syctem in registering the Hungarians' determination to strengthen the party's leading role, the planned economy, and "systematic" economic development. Underscoring Budapest's membership in CEMA, he declared that his country would utilize "primarily international socialist economic integration." Losonczi's failure to mention BrezhneN, was made the more obvious by Kapitonov's twice recalling the Sov:et leader's participation in the recent Hungarian party ccngress and conveying Brezhnev's personal greetings, in addition to reading the anniversary message from the three Soviet leaders. The brief speech, much shorter than Losonczi's, firmly undersc:7red the primary Soviet role in detente, pointing to the USSR's implementation of the peace program of the 24th CPSU Congress and stressing that "the socialist countries, coordinating their efforts," were jointly working for this cause. Putting the best possible face on Moscow-Budapest relations, Kapitonov acknowledged Losonczi's expression of gratitude for Soviet liberation of Hungary, voiced sati:faction with the current state of Soviet-Hungarian ties, ond approvingly noted the MSZMIT congress' assertion of the party' ;1 leading role--a key feature of Budapest's current retrcnchm-q-it from its liberal economic manage- ment system. In contr.3t to Losonczi's failure to mmtion Brezhnev, Kapitonov included a tribute to "Janos Kadar, loyal son of the Hungarian people." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL - 19 - FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 KADAR INTERVIEW Kadar's interview with Moscow radio and TV correspondent Kaverznev, aired in Moscow and Budapest on the 2d, was notable for his strong praise of Brezh.tev and for his modest estimate regarding the prospects for achieving the goal of completing the building of socialism, set by the MSZMP congress' program declaration published on 9 March. Asked about the program declaration's goal of completing socialist construction in Hungary in the next 15-20 years, Kadar reulied that "we cannot really say whether we are two-thirds of the way [in the 1945-1990 time span] toward building a developed socialist society." To achieve such a goal, he added, Hungary faces "major tasks" in the form of two to three-fold increases in sue.' areas as national income and industrial and agricultural production. He insisted that the Central Committee and the party congress had made their estimates "responsibly and, as far as was humanly possible, set realistic targets." In praising Brezhnev, Kadar went beyond Brezhnev's contributions to USSR-Hungarian relations and referred to "that eminent and outstanding fighter for the cause nf socialism and peace known throughout the world, Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev." Apparently attempting to discredit reported Soviet-Hungarian differences, Kadar added that Brezhnev's speech at the Hungarian party congress and the welcome given him in Budapest had demonstrated "our cloudless and unshakable friendship." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 197', - 20- PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHINESE VICE PREMIERS LEAD DELEGATIONS TO IRAN, MEXICO Peking's increasingly active role in world diplomacy and its higher international profile were illustrated by recent, unpre- cedentedly high-level visits by Chinese vice premiers to Iran and Mexico, the first of a long-overdue series of trips abroad by ranking Chinese leaders to reciprocate the many visits to China by foreign leaders in recent years. The Chinese visits reflect the normalization of Chinese government operations in January by the National People's Congress, which appointed 10 new vice premiers, thus providing a total of 12 deputies to assist ailing Premier Chou En-lai and making it possible to send high-ranking officials on diplomatic missions outside China. The current visits are in belated response to visits to China by the Iranian and Mexican heads of government in 1972 and 1973 respectively, and they underscore the importance Peking attaches to solidifying relations with these influential Third World states. LI HSIEN-NIEN Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's current tour of VISIT TO IRAN Iran was highlighted by a 6 April "cordial and friendly" talk with the Shah and by a 5 April banquet hosted by the Iranian prime minister, during which Li endorsed Iran's policies in several sensitive areas. Offering Peking's first comment on the recent Iranian-Iraqi agreement on borders and other issues, Li praised "both parties" for settling the dispute, and said the accord was "a very good thing" that showed the underlying unity of Third World states and enhanced stability and peace in the Persian Gulf. During a brief visit to Iran in June 1973, then Chinese Foreign !linister Chi Peng-fei had defended Teheran's heavy defense expenditures as necessary to counter Baghdad's close ties with the USSR.* During the latest visi:, Li, following Chi's pattern in 1973, supported Iran's stand on Persian Gulf countries settling their own affairs and the establishment of an Indian Ocean zone of peace. And Li added the highest-level Chinese endorse- ment to date of Iran's proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free-zone in the Middle East. The vice premier Plso * Chi Peng-fei's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 June 1973, pages 5-7. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL 17/!IS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 - 21- used the occasion to voice Peking's first authoritative comment on last month's OPEC summit conference in Algiers, hailing its "great achievements" and offering generalized Chinese backing for the developing countries' rights to control their natural resources and to demand the establishment of a new international economic order. Also following the pattern displayed during Ch.. Peng-fei's 1973 visit, Li warned that superpower contention was the most serious threat to the Persian Gulf area, while concurrent Chinese comment has made it clear that Peking sees the Soviet Union as the real danger in the zrea and the United States as a stabilizing influ- ence. For example, a 4 April NCNA report, released on the same day that Li left Peking, favorably replayed remarks by CENTO military leaders during a recent meeting in Pakistan. It noted their affirmation that the U.S.-backed alliance continued to play a "useful role" in the area and that it continued to make "significant progress in providing an atmosphere of security and stability in the region." The report underlined Teheran's role in the alliance by noting that bases in Iran would be used in upcoming CENTO military exercises. The first monitored Soviet reaction to Li's visit, an 8 April Radio Peace and Progress commentary in English to Asia, pointed to the 4 April NCNA dispatch on CENTO as well as reports of Li's remarks in Teheran in criticizing the Chinese for preaching "a sermon of war" and supporting an "imperialist military" presence in the area, which it said was contrary to the developing Asian states' alleged desire for a system of "collective security. CHEN YUNG-KUEI PRC Vice Premier Chen Yang-kuei's 27 March - VISIT TO MEXICO 7 April visit to exico was hailed by NCNA as an affirmation of the "time-honored tradition of amity" existing between the two countries. No communique was issued and no agreements were announced. But Chen's lengthy visit and NCNA's extensive coverage may be read as a demonstration of China's overall interest in expanding relations with Latin America and its recognition of the Third World role played by Mexico's President Luis Echeverria, whose 1973 visit to the PRC was the first such trip by a noncommunist Latin chief of state.* * Echeverria's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 25 April 1973, page 15-16. The only previous trip to Peking by a Latin head of state was the September 1961 visit by Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86100608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL TREN93 9 APRIL 1975 - 22 - Chen, the highest-ranking Chinese official ever to visit Latin America, began his stay by reiterating Peking's support for the Echeverria-initiated Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), which was endorsed at the last UN Genera). Assembly session and by which Echeverria hopes to enhance Mexico's status as a Third World leader. As reported by NCNA on 28 March, Chen characterized the charter as "the just call of the Third World countries against imperialist plunder and exploitation" and added that China "firmly supports the just struggle of the Mexican Government and people." Stressing the usual Chinese theme of solidarity with developing countries, Chen said that "in the long struggle against imperialism and colonialism" Mexico and China "have always sympathized wit'l and supported each other." Noting that this historical tradition had been accelerated since President Echeverria's April 1973 visit to China, Chen said that the two nations had "not only supported each other politically, but have also learned from and helped each other in the economic field." Elaborating on the theme of economic cooperation at a FRC-hosted banquet reported by NCNA on 4 April, Chen indicated what might be one of the conc.7ete results of the trip when he noted that his visit to Mexico had shown him many opportunities for cooperation, "especially in the exchange of agricultural sciences and tech- nologies." Chen concluded that "our future common struggle to defend national sovereignty and develop the national economy' would strengthen the "traditional friendship and relations of friendly cooperation between the two countries." The only monitored Moscow mention of Chen's Mexican visit came in a TASS dispatch from Mexico City on 7 April which reported that the Mexican socialist party had demanded that the PRC break diplomatic relations with the "fascist regime" in Chile. This demand, TASS said, was conveyed "to PRC Deputy Premier Chen lung- kuei duri.lg his vist to Mexico." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAL - 23 CHINA FBIS TRENDS 9 APRIL 1975 CHANG WARNS PARTY MEMBERS TO FOLLOW MODERATE ECONOMIC LINE A major, authoritative article by CCP Politburo member C;:ang Chun-chiao in the April RED FLAG underscores Peking's resolve to use the current ideological campaign to strike a cautious balance between the pursuit of economic goals and adherence to ideological principles. Signed press articles by Politburo members have been extremely rare in recent years, but a new pattern now seems to have developed, linked to the start three months ago of the campaign to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. Chang's article, entitled "On Exercising All-round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeosie," follows by only a month another article in RED FLAG by Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan, who called for order and discipline to meet China's economic goals set by Chou En-lai in his report to the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) in January.* Chang's article elaborates on this theme, charting a mo6erate economic course for meeting Chou's ambitious objectives. He argued that communist ecoaomic reforms must be postponed to allow sufficient time "to build China into a powerful socialist country before the end of the century. Indicating that errant cadres from both the right and the left sould move toward the center on the issue of economic reform, Caang warned party members who have joined the party organizationally but not ideologically that "it is dangerous to stop half-way! The bourgeoi.45e is beckoning you. Catch up with the ranks and continue tne advance!" Much authority is attached to any pronouncement by Chang, who shares the daily duties of operating China's government with party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping. At the beginning of the cultural revolution Chang was a party secretary in Shanghai, having risen to the post through the municipal literary bureaucracy in the years since 1949. He supported Chiang Ching's cultural reforms and played a role in launching the struggle that produced the cultural revolution. In 1967 the central authorities entrusted Chang with running Shanghai, and he was named to the Politburo at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, moving up to the standing committee of the Politburo at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. Chang was named a vice premier at the * Yao's article is discussed in the TRENpS of 5 March 1975, pages 15-18. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CoNFI9ENTIAL FBIS TREN9S 9 APRIL 19/5 - 24 - Fourth NPC, where he delivered the report on the new constttu- Lion. Shanghai mdta reports on (hang's activftles during ii It; tenure in the city suggesL he is an f.conomfc moderate who favors central planning and central allocation of resou:ces, an Impression strengthened by the current RED FLAG article. COrMUNIZATION Much of Chang's article seemed to be addressed to left-leaning cadres holding the mistaken idea that China should quicken the pace of communization and thus speed the transition into a communist state. Discrediting this approach, which was tried during the late 1950's and resulted In serious economic shortfalls, Chang indicated that rapid communization was not desired at this time and he criticized cadres who spread "rumors about a wind of 'communi- zation' being stirred up." Makihg it clear that the current stress on meeting production goals in 1975 should not be misinterpreted by local cadres as a signal for rapid communi- zation, Chang declared that "the wind of 'communization' as stirred up by Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta shall never be allowed to rise again." He ruled out any attempt to rapidly increase the current level of communization by arguing that "our country does not yet have a great abundance" of commodities. Chang developed the thesis that until communes were able to "offer a great abundance of products for distribution according to need among our 800 million people, it would be necessary to take proper measures to "curb the harm caused" by those remaining capitalist practices affecting the development of a socialist economy. While throwing cold water on any plans to quickly expand the current level of communization, CL'Ing reported approvingly thrIc there was a gradual trend toward a higher degree of public ownership in rural areas. Chang used a commune near Shanghai as an example of this trend, the commune ci?ed apparently being a model showing how China could eventually realize the theoretical objective of shifting a higher share of production to the large commune base, leaving less for the smaller levels of brigades and production teams. Chang noted that in the year from 1973 to 1974, the commune-level income share of total income here rose from 28.1 to 30.5 percent and the brigade-level share rose from 15.2 to 17.2 percent, while the income share oi the smaller production teams dropped from 56.7 to 53.3 percent. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 CONFIDENTIAE I RH; POND'. 9 AM!. i9/) -- Scressing the in?ed to increase slowly t 10 oroduct Ion share :it. Hie commune level, Chang noted Hull In the rural peonle's communes lust outside ilhanghal, where the economy at the commune and production brigade levels has developed with "good speed," the production teams still accounted for ')0.7 percent of thv total fixed assets owned by all three levels. Putting any ma Ion economic changes far Into the future, Chang argued that. "It will take a fairly long time to effect the transition from the team to the brigade an0 then to the commune, functioning as the basic accounting unit." He explained that "even when the commune is made the basic accounting unit, it will still remain under collective ownership," thus necessitat- ing the "Inevitable" conthluation of "commodity production, exchange through money, and distribution according to work." BOURGEOIS Turning his attention to those holding rightist ',TIGHTS views on the (II WSLI on of ec (mom i c re form , Chang Ind i ea Led t_ in "boti tt I r I gilts" mus t even t ua I I y be removed, but he made it clear tLey should play a limited role in strengthening socialist economic development. Chang argued that the harmful effects of certain "bourgeois rights" should be to temporarily (hiring the cnirrent socialist stage in order to help develop the state's economic potential, strengthen the economic base, and provide the necessary conditions for the eventual transition into a communist society. Material incentives do not appear to be among those "bourgeois rights" which will be allowed to play a role in the current socialist. economy. Evidence of this was (:hang's at tack on Lin Piao and Liu Shao-chi for taking "advantage of the inexperionce of young people" and "peddling among the youth the idea that material incentive is like fermented bean curd: although it smells bad, it tastes delicious." Emphasizing the call for cadres to make greater efforts to substitute ideological pro- duction incenti1.2s for material ones--a major lteme of the current dictatorship campaign?Chang quoted a passage from a previously unpublicized lfl69 lao speech: the passage criticized party leaders in some factories for "resorting to material incentives, putting profits in command and, instead of promoting proletarian politics, handing out bonuses, and so forth." Spelling out the current dilemma facing party leaders charged with increasing production levels, Cnang called upon cadres to learn how to balance the goal of "building a powerful country" with a concern for maintaining proper ideological objectives. Illritrating this point, Chang pointed to the "Khrushchev-Brezhnev Approved For Release 1999/09/2fP!ZIVII1P86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 C0i1P10INIIAL FBIN PIMP, APRIL 19h - renegade c I ((pie" as neiyi I I l.10 I.K:11111) It' W:11'lli lig t lint "Al 110 t !HIV N110111(1 WI' nt'f',01 I Il I II I st or exper I iw Iii1.411101 t11( 1:1 t I III ON WeIll t 1110 sky will hr the Red I Iny; le 1 I I o the ground." [MORD! R In setting forth N go-slow, middle-of-the-road approach to r?:torming the economy, Chang's article appears to reflect Peking's concerti to keep the dictatorship campaign under tight central control, thus preventing social disruptions and shortfalls in economic production. Peking's fears appear to he well-gronnded: recent PofeI broadcasts have revealed that Anhwei party officials are engaged in struggling against the actions of "active counterrevolutionaries and bad elements sabotaging raIl transport." A 7 April Hofei broadcast reported that the central authorities had Issued instructions For local. railway workers and armymen living along the railways "to take prompt action . . . to deal heavy blows at the handful of class enemies carrying out the criminal activities of sabotaging rail transport." Arguing that "rail transport is of utmost importance in the national economy," the broadcast focused on the need to "maintain order in railway stations and on trains" in order to "promote stability and unity." Problems with Anhwei's transportation network appear to date back at least to 27 March, when the local radio reported that a rally of 100,000 people had called for "strengthening social security and maintaining good soci.?1 order for the successful development of both revolution and production." The rally concluded that it was "Imperative" to arouse the masses to struggle against class enemies "who sabotage industi.ial and agricultural productioo or communications and transport services." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 totalHINIIAL 9 APRIL I?/S _ 2/ _ OTES CH1NLSL LLADIRSHIP: The death of CCP Politburo member and former I( ting Chief of State Tung Pi-wu at the agt of 90, announced by NCNA on 1 April, leaves Mao Tse-tung as the only living founder of thv CCP. Neither Mao nor Chou En-lai attended the memoz-lal meeting fo:- Tung on 7 April In Peking. The memorial was presided over by Wang Hung-wen, the party's third-ranking leader under Mao and Chou. Yeh Chien-ying's memorial speech eulogized Tung as a "great revolutionary fighter" and urged "translating our grief" over his death to the campaign to strengthen the dictator- ship of th proletariat and "building China into a strong and modern socialist country." Mao has been absent from public view since 16 January, when he received West Cerman CS0 leader Strauss while the National People's Congress (NPC) was In session In Peking. Mao has made no reported public appearances In Peking since May 1974, when he apparently left the capital. Chou En-lai has not appeared outside the hospital since 15 January when he attended the funeral for Vice Premier Li Fu-chun, although he continues to receive a steady flow of toreign guests in the hospital. CHIANG KAI-SHEK DEATH: A low-key 6 April NCNA report on Chiang Kai-shek's death expressed Peking's confidence that Chiang's demise would enhance movement in Taiwan toward reunIfication with the mainland. In contrast to Peking's past expressions of "hope" that people and leaders n Taiwan would work tor reunifica- tion, NCNA said emphatically that Chiang's passing "will certainly" encourage "people" in Taiwan to "further efforts" to liberate the island. NCNA also claimed that "military and administrative personnel" in Taiwan "will have a clearer view of the situation" and will actively contribute to Taiwan's reunification. The report characterized Chiang's named successor, Yen Chia-kan, as a "puppet president," but avoided all mention of the critical role now played by Chiang's eldest son, ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kno, who has been criticized by Peking in the past. The re!)ort contained only a passing reference to Chiang Kai-shek's reliance on "U.S. imperialism" while in Taiwan. Moscow has thus far not commented on Chiang's death, confining its coverage of the event to a one-sentence 5 April TASS report noting news agency reports on his passing. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170017-5 Approved For Release 1999/019/26zCIA-RDP86TD0608R000200170017-5 9 APRIL 19/') CAMBODIAN NI GOT IAT IONS DENIED: The re ject ion 01 any negot I at ions it th the Phnom Penh reg line by the Combo(' Ian I nsurgent Front (NUM) has been real rmed in stat ements by I he Insurgents commander and by head of state Pr ince Norodom SI hanouk. An 8 April statement by Front. in I I Itary commonder and RGNII Deput y Pr I me Mini titer 1