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December 9, 2016
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May 17, 2001
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August 12, 1974
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-FIX k-- ~e~ IAN .,; / MO . prouec~F R. ~IEOg04 -RDP86T00608R00020019000i8 / N r ~1 I of =~A.n.ti,-,J unta ~Artivit C~u~tside of C:hil~~ ~ ~`~ ~~~.~Au ` N'Ln ,~1 ~7bb.=1`4~ Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R0002001ON No Foreign Dissim Co-girolled Uissem Intelligence Memorandum Anti Junta Activity Outside of Chile Secret DCI/NIO 1766.74 12 August 1974 Copy 63 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions cle.dlled by 014802 I...ipl from e.n.Mi d.iI.ulrle.iI.i uk.dul. d Lo. 116!7, ?n.apll.w .?N4wyyi 0 31(t)) 17 , .sd (3) D.1. Imp.u.Yl. to D.lamlec Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 SECRET Approved For Release 2W1RWR#1 T00608R000200190003-8 CONTROLLED DISSEM I. STRONG INITIAL INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE 2 II. EFFORTS OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LEFTIST ALLIES TO ORGANIZE AN INTERNATIONAL OFFENSIVE .............. 4 The World Peace Council 4 Other Soviet-Controlled Organizations ........... 5 Cuban Effort .................................... 6 The Role of the French Left ..................... 7 Activities in Other Western European Countries .. 8 III. EFFORTS OF EUROPEAN TROTSKYIST AND OTHER GROUPS OF THE RADICAL LEFT .............................. 9 Arab Terrorist Support of the Chilean Cause ..... 10 IV. CHILEAN EXILE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA .. 11 V. CHILEAN RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA ..... 13 Argentina ...................................... 13 25X6A Peru ............................................ 14 is y sew ere in Latin America 15 mofffmm VI. EXILE PROBLEMS ................................... 16 The Communist Party ............................. 16 The Socialist Party ............................. 17 The MIR ......................................... 18 General Problems ................................ 18 VII. FINANCES ......................................... 19 NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001/0~P6'.J&fA-fDP86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FOREIGN DISSLM CONTROLLED DISSEM 12 August 1974 ANTI-.JUNTA ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF CHILE*. A variety of elements opposed to the Chilean military regime have found wide sympathy and support abroad. This sup;~ort has been the most extensive in Western Europe, where the fervor of popular reaction to the violent overthrow of Allende's government was particularly strong. Refr 'ees from Chile were., welcomed by a number of European and Western Hemisphere countries, and solidarity committees sprang up, deriving ma?timum publicity value from stories, many exaggerated, of tortures and executions by the military government. The whole spectrum of the Left joined in sponsoring rallies and fund-raising activities to support this new-found popular cause. The orthodox Communist parties were joined by various Trotskyist groups in urging resistance to the Chilean Government. Moscow and Havana have played both direct and indirect roles in encouraging such activity, and official support has been forthcoming from such governments as the Swedish, Finnish, and British. The efforts of the various groups have caused problems for Chile in international forums. Deliveries and servicing of military equipment from Britain have been suspended, and Chile hris had serious difficulty in securing arms. The resistance groups have the capacity to cause the Chilean government considerable diffi- culty and embarrassment, but until they develop an intornal capa- bility in Chile, they will pose no real threat to the stabilit.y of the regime. T hi0 memorandum wao prepared by and coordinated within CIA. SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 SECRET Approved For Release 200419 ;l {W 00608R000200190003-8 I. STRONG INITIAL INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE 1. The coup d'etat in Chile on 11 September 1973 came as a shock to the Left throughout the world, particularly in Europe. The Marxist and social democratic camps believed, or wanted to believe, that the Allende government provided proof that there was a peaceful road to socialism. To the European Socialists and Communists in power or nudging toward it, the leftist government in Chile was confirmation that their course was cor- rect and that violent revolution was unnecessary. They chose to ignore the economic mismanagement and the resulting political polarization that was tearing Chile apart. Three years of Allende' s propaganda had left them unprepared for his sudden downfall and the paucity of resistance by his supporters. 2. A wave of anger and indignation swept over the continent, nourished by factual and exaggerated reports of brutal treatment and executions by the military. Tales of thousands killed and more thousands imprisoned gained wide acceptance. Although the Military Junta gradually began to exert control over too zealous troop commanders, a drum beat campaign had already begun in favor of Allende supporters who had fled the country, been taken prisoner or were being sought by the new governmei t. Three days of ter the coup the first solidarity committee was meeting in Liege, Belgium, and before the end of the month the World Peace Council (WPC) held a conference in Helsinki, Finland. Chile replaced Vietnam as the burning issue for leftist idealists and propagandists. There were demonstrations in Paris and Vienna, Chilean diplomatic mis- sions were attacked in Paris and Bonn, and solidarity committees sprang up all over Europe. Swedish organizations of all kinds became involved in whipping up sentiment and raising money for Chilean resistance, and the doors were opened for refugees from Chile. 3. The coup also produced internal repercussions within the organized Left in Europe. In Italy it shook delicate political balances and relations among the Italian political parties, forcing some to examine basic premises, raising doubts about long-range plans, and arousing fears of internal divisions. The Ztal ian Communist Party (PCI) found itself caught between its political NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001 /09SC ig P86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED Dt SSEM commitment to the center-left government and its ideological com- mitment to the extreme Left, which accused the PCI of being Fiof t or, the Chilean military. 25X1X6 4. The Soviets and Cubans were extremely disappointed and perturbed by Allendale overthrow. the Russians had felt a clash was inevitable, but they were sa - greeebly surprised that only isolated groups and individuals ac- tually fought against the military coup. The Soviets criticized the Chilean Communists for failing to meet violence with violence. They had expected a leftist uprising of major proportions to re- sist a military takeover. The USSR immediately embarked on the task of harnessing the forces under its control throughout the world in order to oust the Junta and restore the Left to power. The Cubans also reacted vigorously to the coup, which they saw as closing opportunities for them in South America. Cuba wel.- corned refugees, started organizing a resistance movement, and centered a propaganda campaign on appearances of Allende's widow and daughter. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001/0gft.ft fDP86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM II. EFFORTS OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LEFTIST ALLIES TO ORGANIZE AN INTERNATIONAL OFFENSIVE 5. The Soviet-controlled international organizations in the fields of peace, labor, youth, students, women, and others have been in the vanguard of the effort by the Soviet Bloc countries to make Chile a central issue and keep it indefinitely before world attention. The objectives are to turn public opinion against the Junta, isolate it in world forums, and eventually bring about its overthrow. Corollary objectives are to create vehicles for unified action around a "just cause" by which diverse national and international organizations and individuals work under Communist aegis, and to promote the Communist cause at the expense of the West in general. The October war in the Mideast put a temporary brake on activity, but after the first of the year full fo-us was again turned toward Chile. The World Peace Council 6. Foremost of the Soviet-managed international organizations engaged in the Chile campaign is the WPC. Less than three weeks after the coup the WPC sponsored the International Conference of Solidarity with Chi.Le in Helsinki which set the tone for subsequent efforts throughout the world. Plans were made to organize a Popular Unity (UP; apparatus with headquarters in Rome under the control of the communist Party of Chile (PCCh). The Soviets wanted Helsinki, not Rome, but were outvoted. They had control of finances, however, and insisted on retaining Helsinki as the source of funds. The Finnish CP was named fund custodian, with the WPC acting as intermediary.* The Soviets, who provide the bulk of WPC funds, have not been profligate. They withhold funds when they are displeased at the effic~enev of the Finnish coordina- ting committee, which was established at the Helsinki conference. The Soviets want a liaison committee with a broader international base, but so far they have been unsuccessful in achieving this goal. -4- NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001/6 XRDP86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM 7. The Helsinki conference was followed in October by a conference in Moscow, completely dominated by the CPSU, which con- trolle&l, the list of speakers. The organizers expressed satis- faction with the results at the meeting, and felt that the mili- tary coup, while dealing a setback in Chile itself, had provided the Communist camp with a slogan, "Solidarity with Chile" around which social Democratic and Christian parties could be rallied. 8. In December the WPC was seeking prominent world figures to serve as jo.lnt sponsors of a Black Book on Chile, and ill February a meeting was called to set up solidarity conferences in tt;e Western Hemisphere and Europe for 1974. The WPC also began plan- ning for an International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Chilean Military Junta. The Soviets hoped that the Com- mission and the Black Book would help focus world attention on Chile and generate support for an International Liaison Com- mittee for International Solidarity with Chile. Once these ob- jectives were attained, the WPC expected the Soviets to begin funding resistance activities in Europe. 9. The preparatory meeting for the Commission ol Inquiry held in Helsinki in late March, was completely dominated by the Soviets. Taking a detente line, they insisted that Chile was a strictly internal matter, not like Vietnam, and refused to allow the proceedings to take an anti-US tone. Nikolay Voschinin, WPC secretary, was pessimistic over prospects for aiding the resistance because the Junta appeared to be entrenched. Never- theless, they said aid to the WPC and the opposition movement would continue. The conference was a disappointment to WPC offi- cials and the Soviets alike because little was accomplished. The Commission of Inquiry itself met in Last Berlin in April. A secretariat was set up and a committee established in Buenos Aires to provide for contact with Chile. Other Soviet-Controlled Organizations 10. The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Wom- en's International Democratic: Federation (WIDF), and the Inter- national Union of Students (IUS), sent investigators to Chile NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 SECRET Approved For Release 200/89j"fij ?PW0608R000200190003-8 CONTROLLED DISSEM in the months following N 1lende's overthrow to report on the human rights issue and arranged programs throughout'the world to call attention to the Chile story. The WIDF arranged for the appearance of Allende' s widow at the UN early in 1974. At the World Trade Union Congress in Bulgaria in October, the Soviets proposed and achieved the formation of a broadly based trade union committee of solidarity with Chile. The WFDY was charged with keeping the issue alive during the first part of 1974 until other international events could be organized. Cuban Effort 11. Perhaps surpassing the Soviets in zeal and in the inter- national scope of their activities against the Chilean Government are the Cubans, who consider the Chilean Government a prime target, The coup was a severe setback for the Cubans and closed off oppor- tunities that had opened up for them in South America. The Cuban propaganda machine went into high gear immediately after the coup. On 14 September Cuba was taking soundings at the UN on a possible Security Council condemnation of the Chilean military, and later that month the beginnings of a resistance movement were taking shape in Havana. Refugees arriving in Cuba formed the nucleus of a solidarity committee, and the Cubans began to sponsor appearances of the widow and daughters of Allende at events all over the world 12. Cuban intelligence officers play a leading role in the 25X9A1 various support activities for Chilean resistance. General ly the Cubans work closely with the Soviets in organizing and carryir?'j out internatic'.... conferences and organizing propaganda work. Propaganda spec4alists from both countries met in Havana in May 1974, to map out a year-round campaign against Chile. The Cubans, like the Soviets, feel they must keep the "-buses" of the Chilean Junta before world opinion. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001/09/?#'QIDP86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM 13. Despite this cooperation, there are considerable dif- ferences of view between the Cubafls and the Soviets on the means of returning Marxists to power in Chile. The Soviets believe in relatively peaceful moans -- political manipulation, control of laboz and other economic forces, infiltration of security forces, and pressure tactics in international organizations, while the Cubans are more action-minded and feel force will ke needed to unseat the Junta. Cuban officials give the definite impression that they favor revolution, but they are cautious about the time and place. They feel tho Chilean people must first tire of the Junta and its policies. The Cubans are not sanguine about the prospects of converting the Chilean exiles into guerrilla fighters, but they have tried to induce a combative spirit in them. Some exiles have been provided training for eventual infiltration into Chile. 14. In recent months, the upwards of 1,000 Chilean refugees in Cuba have caused problems for the government. They are divided along party and ideological lines much as they were in Chile, with the Communists disputing with the moderate Socialists and neither talking to the extremist elements. Most are generally unhappy about their lot in Cuba. Although they are provided with housing and some have work, they feel isolated and cut off from meaningful political activity. (Something similar has occurred in the large Chilean contingent in East Germany.) The Role of the French Left 15. In the spring of 1974, the French Communist Party (PCF), at the urging of the CPSU, took charge of accelerating joint Com- munist-Socialist actions in solidarity with the Chilean leftists. The PCF convoked a meeting of seven French leftist organizations in March 1974, and about the same time learned from the French Socialist Party (PSF) that nearly all the European Social Demo- cratic parties were prepared to participate with the Communists in a unified campaign to promote resistance to the Junta. The PCF leaders recognized at once that this meant a single, joint front could be organized which in their view would have great historical significance. It would not only damage the Chilean Junta, but promote Communist-Socialist cooperation in Europe. - 7 - NO FOREIGN DISSEA! SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001 /094 , FDP86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM 16. The PCF, the PSF, and the other French leftist organizations called a European Solidarity Conference in Paris fir 6 and 7 July with an agenda limited to four issues: illegality of the Junta, an end to the state, of war, an end to oppression, and restoration of full civil rights in Chile. The strict agenda reflected a decision to avoid contentious debate. Three hundred delegates from East European Communist Parties and Western European Communist, i ng. Socialist, and Social Democratic parties attended the meet Francois Mitterand of the PSF was the principal driving force be- hind the meeting and probably the one most responsible for over- coming Socialist and Social Democratic resistance to meeting with the Communists. Italian Social Democrats and the British Labour Party were represented, along with Socialist parties from Belgium, Danmark, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and osed o tl d d pp y aman a 1. The German and Austrian Socialists ha pleased with the resu s nference and soon afterward be- gan searching for ways to rally the Left around another issue and thus solidify the broad front that had been brought together on the popular Chile theme. 1.7. The speed with which the leftwin7 organizations in Europe reacted to the Chile coup is exemplified by the Paris based Curial Apparatus, a support group for national liberation move- ments, with suspected Soviet backing, with headquarters in Paris. Before the end of September Henri Curial had begun to formulate a clandestine program to oppose the Military Junta. Curiel is involved iii collecting funds, setting up support committees, dispatching agents to Chile, and training a few selected individuals in guerrilla warfare. The Curiel program calls for recruiting activists for training in France, providing exiled activists living near Chile's borders with the major portion of their funds, and organizing an international committee to plan clandestine actions. Some of the funds Curiel has collected came from the World Council of Churches. Activities in Other Western European Countries 18. In June 1974 the peace forces in Belgium were engaged in making preparations for a week of solidarity with Chile scheduled for September. In Portugal, plans were being formed during July for a world solidarity conference of workers to be held in Lisbon in September. - 8 - NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001/091Fo++DP86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FOREIGN DISSEM III., EFFORTS OF EUROPEAN TROTSKYIST AND OTHER GROUPS OF THE RADICAL LEFT 19., The various groups making up the radical European Left have their on Chile solidarity programs which both complement and compete with the Soviet and Cuban-sponsored programs. The most, important and active groups are the Trotskyist Fourth Inter- national (FI) and the Continuous Struggle (Lotta Continua -- LC) of Italy. 20. The Trotskyist movement is involved with Chilean re- sistance in several countries. Trotskyist organizations, like the Communist League, dominate the French Committee of Support for the Revolutionary Struggle of the Chilean People, formed shortly after 11 September. The League's objectives are to de- velop and popularize aid to the resistance and prolong the debate on the Allende experience. It organizes material and financial support, arranges pamphleteering, and conduct rallies. There are two funds, one for aiding refugees, the other for the pur- chase of arms and supplies. The committee has Cuban support and is partial to the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). It has clashed with the Democratic Chile Committee in Rome over the latter's preference for dividing funds according to the Chilean parties' importance -- i.e., their electoral showing. 21. The FI, headquartered in Brussels, sent an agent to Argentina in February 1974 with the ambitious mission of or- ganizing "support commandos" for the Chilean resistance and coordinating the efforts of the Peronist and Marxist left. The FT has connections with the Argentine Trotskyist terrorist groups but is enmeshed in intrigues against one of them, the Santucho faction of the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP).. The Chilean section of the FI apparently suffered heavy losses during the military coup, but other Trotskyists, not affiliated with the FI, are free inside Chile and cooperating with the MIR. 22,. The Trotskyist effort in Italy is aided by the LC and is centered in the Committee for Support of Chilean Resistance, with offices in Rome and Milan. Danilo Trelles Fernandez, an NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 200%A 6lA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FOREIGN DISSEM. Uruguayan motion picture producer,, is the Rome coordiratnr. The principal objective is to raise support for the MIR, under the slogan of "Arms for the MIR." The LC collected $115,000 after the coup and sent it to Cuba. The Cubans a,'t as distributing agents. The LC helped organize a conference of Chilean support committees in Frankfurt from 24-to 27 April, under the auspices of the Trotskyist controlled European Coordinating Committee for Com- mittees of Support for the Struggle of the Chilean People. Chilean, Italian, Spanish, Irish, Danish and German groups par- ticipated. A good many groups, but not all, were in favor of col- lecting money to buy weapons; for the MIR. Some 3,000 people demonstrated at the close of the conference. The Spanish dele- gates represented Trotskyist-controlled committees in Madrid and Barcelona. Arab Terrorist Support of The Chilean Cause 23. In July the Chilean Ambassador to Lebanon, General Al- fredo Canales, was gunned down in his Beirut apartment house in an attempted assassination by Lebanese terrorists sympathetic to the exile cause. The perpetrators announced that the objective of the attack was to emphasize the struggle of the third world arainst American "imperialism." NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001/09'/04'-..?try(-1DP86T00608R000200190003-8 NO FO11EI(N IJISSE f CONTROLLED DI68EM IV. CHILEAN EXILE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND NORTH A1'RICA 24. The Popular Unity forces in exile have been in agree- ment from the beginning that their primary objective in to over- throw the Military Junta and rdturn to power. Their ideas on how to achieve this objective and on the kind of society and government they want vary, but they have no disagreement on the primary task. To this and they have sot up centers for resist- ance in several world capitals. 25. Rome is the headquarters for UP activities in curope and Havana handles North and South America. The Rome offices or Rome Committee, as it is sometimes called, combines two organizations, Democratic Chile (DC) and the Salvador Allende Association (SAA). The DC, a so-called information and press agency, represents the UP in Europe and has the backing of the Soviets, the Cubans, the major Italian leftist parties, includ- ing t;ie PCI and the PSI, and most Chilean refugees. It promoter resistance to the Chilean government, raises funds, aids refugees, and pressures the Italian Government to withhold recognition of the Chilean Government. It has also attempted to form an interriationnl brigade to fight in Chile, but without success. The DC is headed by Jorge Arrate, the former head of the Chilean Copper Corporation. Arrate spent several months in Argentina before going to Italy. The Cuban Embassy takes a close interest in the DC and has almost daily contact with it. 26. The SAA, located at the same address, is composed of Italian leftists and run principally by the PCI. It has the task of coordinating Chilean-oriented activities of the Italian left and aiding refugees. The PCI and the PSI are satisfied with the work of the Association., which they believe is the best of its kind in Europe. However, the PCI feels the PSI should contri- bute more. The Italian Government, the Christian Democratic Party, and Olivetti enterprises have provided support to the Association. 27. The Chilean Communist leaders in Moscow, led by Volodia Teltelboirn and Manuel Cantero, head the Moscow office of the UP which is supported by the Soviet Solidarity Committee under Stepan Shalayev, secretary of the Soviet Central Council of NO FOREIGN DISSEIIf SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 2001/I*i64RR(b)4-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 ,`f) rr-lnr.i(; .' lll5'qr':o CouTpot,.1.,m) U1(8i" Trade tiniona. Little in known of the artivi.ticsa of thin .itnup. but thcsy t114 rpccivo a placlgo or nutipott from cvrai 1 4L14'ret in Harsh 29. The Algiori Committop has an offk o -'lth rlr>aa to t%g;' dozen People, and pn )oyrs the aup1x)rt of 'tho Algor inn i oovetn-- ment. It to Chiefly intoroatod in prorrotinq rovoltItlon in Chile and in engaged in tha pr.cctiro$ont or voa;:rrlt,a in Yugonlavin and C choglovakin. Tb@ comriti.ttap, bnvcvor, conning' Primarily of intollpet.ua1 a and is not fit for quorr i l la war - faro.. The Algeri_+nn rinnatpd at laant (UJ) S',O,OOO to thin group and may have donated a50,000 more. The hand of tho eu-m is I4uarclo flalum, forror Chilean Ambaaaador to Alt7oria. vb() fa repttionaibl2 for all of ;ioYth Africa, anti ha maintains rnntaCt vi:h tho dome Committee. !1u hap Claimg(I that tharp va? a phiI-urpnt of t*tfoll arms in t3aplep (Pource unknnwn a;xi probably dpat ino+i for th.' H112 or 5ocialiut Pxtraminta), but atoragp and franc;?nrt. pre- gented problemp and the Pxi.laa warp lookinn to 1-he Cubans anri ,;-)vi?t $ for help. - 12 - NO FONElC.V p/SSEM SECREl' Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 &. J Approved For Release 2Qp,1/ycI T00608R000200190003-8 X e'iw V. t`til).r i PJ rISTA!iCt> ACTIVITY 19 t. TIti AD4iitiICA 2_l, With the excoptlon of Argohtina, and pnaalhly t4ox$Co, t'hi ).can reaiatance activity throughout tha. 1 ataro Honinphorn hac been Pr,:atte.-Ar1 and inoffcctive. Tho prgvalenca of military and q t. ron j`*an rerl $Poq t.)ortivgt )sit Latin Air ica cnntt ibUten markof)y tr) that rirfirnilt_iat4 of tha raaiatafC_p t4r)ver~ent. In dpvoIopinrl nuplx)rt aetlvit,y and operational Momentum in the ticr~inphar~. I;frnrta to orianire a hets~laphatQ viclo aoAitlartt-y e(mraranca have split t ararl, and the floviatg c;tvr'i(jw1 in June to 9attla For rg7.ior-al crahf ar4nCaft. They are al#r) puohinrj lot a remat. inr.J of ).at_ in Ater ican Coty- nunist Part ien in Havana at the end of 1174 to (1a.a1 with Chile and other topic_P, htit_ the, Cuhanp have Pl)rme p i p'J i v i h'1,e a l w) s i t the idea. 1ttt. ina 1tt. Atr3antina'a 'JO-r raphir proximity and un? II recantly+. )oititiral racpt)ti;+ity ha:>o provided a good bane for oxilo oparat_Ionp.,z.irjl) tha Anrloe large;ant a formidable h.4rricr try en s:nicat_i n, tharc arc many' ien)ai-ad haaccec w;-Nicy can t u,acl n1i!"4:apKflilly by c.--'tiricre and infi ltratorn aloe{.I t)ta long int_etnat_ir~tial t n~inrlary t twee ArrJant ina and Chile. Probably the Pont fn -nrablo factor for the Chilean ex i l Ag hap tin the Pi)ccegp of the Arn Ant ina ext.roml nt orr.]anizat i-np in cL trying ki(Inap-ranar';-i olycrat it nR, which ha?.c ?yipldcrl oxpr t l nca, cki11, and )na largo a"?~tintn of ,>l% t'. 11 U. sherd are t hn ;Lgn4a of Chi li ana in At{sprit ina, Pfv, - ept r:~at_ac Put the n1;rbar At* high an 14,000. They are rsrn)ip-4 principally in ituar,r,e Airep. hendo7a, talta, and around tlariloche. In tl.e waekc the coup they orhaniged tha:~+celvan into two rival rtroupp, or,- rodarat?, one radical. The are the Patr in', ie - >. .. t ~ ? e r res. I 1 t ear-~r_~ rr~Cis *.s r 1. as.~.. a~ 1 / i T+ a`_. 27 . WL3'-.i ~ i A {. i;c?cial iptn. Aadicalp. and memborp of the modaratc fart ion of tl e llnit.acl i'ol-Ail ar Ac t I i )4c-vo nt (t4APll) : and the Chilean Pevol~st i unary Pec ietance {RA-C). Cr:-11r?Pad of the h IA and the radical winrlP of the nclniiPt Party and ?!Mii. (It is not aurpriping that t he UP Ir. exile hap continu l Shp traditional c:ivipion tatwpan ~nc' and oxtrcv';iptq that exiPtc4 in Chile.) 32. In late 1'! 1, the rrPC watt rot rteJ to ponPePC Pcima '~O r if ten, plenty of orgy, and contacts with the Soviet and Cuban hita9tiieP. Titre APC t'.an received money and ar-ma from the Argent inn extremist organizations. The Santucho faction of the IPP is allied tit- FoRR#../C.r4 DINSFM SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 Approved For Release 20014d09f@#ItaI*-F "R8&T00608R000200190003-8 CntiTho1A T) 1)1 f;Tm4 with the 14th and tPCent_ly provided 1-0, with tJi; $3 mitt ion from the tane'nm of a US oil Company official.. It ban furni.rahPt1 other support services, ouch an documentation for H114 p"rRonnel, and hall agreed to turn over its weaponts Cacheq in Chile. 33, The r:DI' l q the anct>nr ortiani ration of the ft e(1g1 inrl but pot.ent_ially dan'jprouq Latin American Pevalutionary Coor.dinat_ing Croup, which includoq the Chilean 1,41k, the Uruguayan Tvpatnaroq (Mt,.*), the Dtolivian National t,iheratinn Army ttt.,!t), and 1.1Aaihly one or ttOte Peruvian '4tOupa. The Cubans are behind thie inter- national effort, and In Mario 4anturho, they have a gicrrilla fighter of Intel 1 igence and energy, wtxo probably env i e ions himppl f an the auccPapnr to Che Guevara. 34. The PCCh d-cirded shout the beginning of 1974 that much of the work of rer;ruankxinq it# comr+Inn1onp and military apparatus could be done mote efficiently and securely outside the country. It therefore bbQgan pendinq selected meshes to Argentina and Peru to meet and make pl ana, and then retur,i home to impl eii nt. thorn. Ono of the l.argant concentrat iont3 of PCCh tnc'ml *re ip in Mendota, where 300 youn-I party mat%berp are living and wxirkinfi. There are MIA an3 ;-ocial int. exiled in Menl,loxa alno, but they are largely inaCtivp. 3 '). The t.tincolent political conditions in ArgPntina ha.'- probably spry-Prl t n d ,c*tract governnpnt attention away from t.hp Chilean exiled, hut this situation may not last ton long1. Pefugeee in ttuenoc Aires. who number about 1.800, recently protepted a winigtry of Interior order designed to force tl;pt~ out of the capital into the provinces. Many plan to leave, Ar- q nt.Ina. Although the order wars ieaued prior to 4`eron'e death, there a t evi.te.."'^ to date that the ne resvirv p1a- a to reverna the trend toward t , rhten inq retatr is t ions on Chi lean exiles. Peru 36. tlwin-ri to It proximity to Chile, Peru preaento a natural haven for r'aiistance fightora. 14owevnr, tennion be- tween the two gw.'Prnr entn has actually prevented the Left from exploitinr2 i`eru'R gPortraphical position and leftist leanings. SO FOREIGN DISSEM S- CRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190003-8 tiI (AtF'I Approved For Release 200114499i9i 1:l. ~00608R000200190003-8 i)It> ;r 1 C'O)21TROLLr1) oncaunp of Peru' A concern over Chi lean intent ions, the gOVerr.- ment watches the Chi leann in If -m miclnt rlocely and han tak_on atni-n to novorely limit the number of r.efugn'n permit_tnd to stay. Thus, exi-1on must op rate clandintinely to avoid amhar- ranRinq and antnurini?inq the Peruvian authoritios. Tiere are irnlicat_ionn thct they have hoqun to do thin althouch on a l imit_nd Acale, Peru In the Alen of the International .,ol idarity+ (ommippion, through which tinancinl aid to the PCI h in funne1Acl. Act ivit'* l:lu h~r~ in Latin America .19 . There have been attacks on Chilean dilplomatic tnicuinnn in 1:1 i-alvador and Peru. The t=or.r3nint Youth of Colombia in plannin