SOVIET UNION PUSHES CONSTRUCTION OF SECOND TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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~,IAOBGI ,RP 75-~~ ,1uUyi 74 t= - ,~
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BGI RP 75-1
July 1974
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFCRMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 019641
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11632, exemption category,
? 5E(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declasslfled on,
Date Impossible to Delermins
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The USSR has solicited Japanese assistance
in construction of the eastern part of a second
Trans-Siberian Railroad, Japanese reactions
so far are negative -- reflecting the great cost,
the difficulties and unknowns of construction,
and tho belief that the natural resources offered
in exchange would not be sufficient or timely
enough to warrant the outlay. In addition, the
political/strategic implications of an alternate
trunkline are troublesome. Even so, the Japanese
may be tempted to explore the matter further and
may seriously consider participation in segments
of the project on the chance that the USSR might
want their help badly enough to agree to return
the southern Kuril Islands. Japan would be re-
sponsive to any show of US interest. A second
Trans-Siberian railroad is a longstanding objective
of the Soviet Government, with both economic and
strategic benefits, and over the long haul it will
probably be constructed with or without foreign
assistance in spite of enormous engineering problems
anticipated in the rugged mountainous terrain of
East Siberia.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1.974
SOVIET UNION PUSHES CONSTRUCTION OF
SECOND TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD
1. In March 1974, Leonid Brezhnev proposed a major new
project in the prolonged Soviet effort to induce Japanese
participation in the development of Siberia. At a meeting
with executive members of the Japanese-Soviet Economic
Committee and other Japanese business leaders, he called for
the construction of a railroad to connect the railhead at
Ust'-Kut, on the Lena River, with the Pacific port of Sovetskaya
Gavan'. The new line, traversing underdeveloped and sparsely
settled regions of East Siberia and the Soviet Far East north
of the existing Trans-Siberian Railroad, would be a substitute
for the previously proposed oil pipeline from Irkutsk to
Nakhodka. (See map following text.) Japan's part in the
proposed construction scheme is the provision of 3 billion
dollars, including technological assistance. In return the
Japanese would be assured of 25 million tuns of Tyumen' crude
oil annually after 1985.
2. From the Soviet point of view, a second Trans-Siberian
railroad would fulfill vital economic and strategic goals.
Although the vast new Siberian territories along the route
are not suitable for extensive farming or manufacturing, the
railroad would provide access to huge deposits of coal, iron
ore, natural gas, oil, and timber. The 1iew line would also
provide an alternate east-west route capable of alleviating
the traffic congestion on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. More
important than the economic aspect, however, is its strategic
significance: it would provide the Soviet Union with an
NOTE -- This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Basic
and Geographic Intelligence and coordinated within the
Directorate of Intellig ence. Connnents and questions may
be directed to Code 143, Extension 2706.
25X1A9a
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alternate supply line 150 to 805 kilometers (93-497 miles)
north of the existing railroad in the event of future
hostilities in the Far East. The vulnerability of the
frontier-hugging Trans-Siberian is a longstanding concern
of the Soviet Union.
3. The plani.ing of a second Trans-Siberian railroad
dates from 1930, when the Council of People's Commissars
(Sovnarkom) approved construction of a railroad from Lake
Baykal across the rugged mountainous terrain of East Siberia
to the Amur River. This proposed railroad was known as the
Baykal-Amur Magistral' or BAM. Surveying of the route was
under way in 1934, and actual construction began in 1939.
4. The ambitiuu. project was interrupted by World War II,
when labor -- both forced a!~d free -- was needed for other
purposes. The war, however, renewed Soviet concern about the
vulnerability of the Trans-Sir rian Railroad to enemy attack.
It came as no surprise, therefire, that after the war the
Soviet Union employed Japanese POW's to b'iild the eastern and
western extremities of the Eaykal-Amur railroad. These com-
pleted sections traversed relatively moderate terrain in the
west, from Tayshet to Ust'-Kut, and in the Far East, from
Duki to Komsomol'sk-na-Amure and Sovetskaya-Gavan'. The death
of Stalin, the emergence of a temporarily friendly Communist
China to the south, and the prospect of prohibitive costs in
money, time, and labor, however, brought the BAM project to
a halt in the late 1950's. Emphasis then shifted to the ex-
ploitation of the virgin lands and of Western Siberia's sizable
oil and gas resources.
5. 'Tokyo has reacted with caution to recent Soviet
attempts to involve the Japanese in the development of Siberia,
particularly in the construction of a second Trans-Siberian
railroad. The Japanese question the potential of Siberian oil
and coal resources to repay them for their involvement in the
railrcad project. The Japanese Government is also keenly
aware of the military and political advantages to the USSR of
an alternate rail route to the Far East. This awareness has
been heightened by Chinese concern that the new Trans-Siberian
would serve as a military supply route in the event of China-
USSR hostilities. Japan's reluctance to accept the costly rail
proposal is also influenced by the lack of progress it has made
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in peace negotiations Nith the USSR, including discussion of
the return to Japan of four of the Kuril Islands, and by he
still undetermined position ^f the United States toward m-ijor
joint development projects in Siberia and the Soviet Far East.
6. The railroad currently proposed to the Japanese is
in fact the eastern segment of a project to provide an a'Itr,r-
nate route to the Trans-Siberian all the way from Surgut, in
West Siberia, to the Pacific. Construction of the western
segment probably will not be undertaken until the eastern is
completed. Its lesser priority reflects the existence of an
oil pipelirc! from Surgut to Tayshet, the construction of a
second pipeline, and the relative security of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad, which in that part of the USSR is located far from
the Chinese border.*25X1 C
7. The eastern segment, currently referred to in news
media as the Second Trans-Siberian
Railroad, would probably extend some 2,350 kilometers (1460
miles) to connect the railhead at Ust'-Kut (oil and iron ore)
with Nizhneangarsk, Muya, list'-Nyukzna (copper), Tyndinskiy
(coal), Byssa, Urgal (coal), and NO, railhead of a line
leading to Komsomol'sk-na-Amure and Sovetskaya Gavan'. The
most probable alignment would closely follow the abandoned
BAM project along river valleys and through difficult mountainous
terrain. A less likely alternate would extend northeastward
from Ust'-Kut down the Lena River to Ivanushkova, and then wind
southeastward over extremely difficult mountainous terrain to
Bodaybo, Chara, Ust'-Nyuk7ha, Chul'man, and ultimately to the
Dugda River. The alternate alignment is 117 kilometers (73 miles)
longer than the preferred alignment and crosses much more
difficult terrain. Along either route construction would be
impeded by unstable ground and by extensive area of permafrost.
The projected alignment of the western segment begins in the
Tywnen' oil and gas region. It runs from Surgut, on the Ob'
Diver, for some 2,250 kilometers to the recently completed
Ust'-_Tlimsl< hydroelectric complex on the Angara River. The
railroad would mainly follow the valleys of the Ob', Ket', and
Angara Rivers and would connect with the recently completed
line from Ust'-IZimsk to Khrebtovaya and Ust'-Kut.
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SECRET
8. The alignment of the most probable route can be
divided into seven sections:
a. Unt'-Kiel. -- Ni :hnearularsk (Lake Bailkai)
Sector length: 263 krn (1G3 nri,"les). IP'cltows valleys of the
Lena, Niya, ICirenga, and Kuner'na Rivers. Be twcen t'lc Lcna
and Kircnga I?ivers th line traverses the Leno-Angars/