NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARTIC OCEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Interests and Sovereignty
In the Arctic Ocean
wwurrlcrw~
No Foreign Dlssem
BGI RP 75.8
October 1974
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e h
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 019641
Exempt from General Declossification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption calsgoryi
? 5B(1)) (4), and (9)
Automatically declassified on:
date Impossible to determine
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Sovereignty issues in the Arctic Ocean mirror to a
certain extent those found elsewhere, with significant
additional complications. Perhaps the most important of
these is the contention by the USSR and Canada that they
have extraordinary jurisdiction over activities in the
ice-covered waters between their coasts and the North Pole.
Another complication relates to the Svalbard Archipelago,
where Norway's sovereignty is circumscribed by an inter-
national treaty that fails to resolve the question of who
has rights to the surrounding continental shelf. (OUO)
Each of the five countries adjoining the Arctic has
developed its own peculiar mix of activities and policies
in the region because of different economic, military,
and political interests. In the United States and Canada,
the main focus of Arctic interest is on petroleum develop-
ment and associated environmental matters. Military and
security interests have received less attention, and both
countries, together with Norway and Denmark, have been
receptive to cooperative programs. In con'crast, the USSR's
Arctic Ocean policy is dominated by the military, which
is apprehensive about foreign activity on the Soviet side
of the A-ctic and resists any special consideration of
the Arctic in international political forums. (C)
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sovereignty Issues 2
USSR. 3
Canada 5
Norway 7
Denmark . . . . 9
Petroleum Resources and Development . . . . . . . 9
USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Canada . . . . . . . 14
. . . . . . . . . . .
Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Denmark . . 16
Alaska . 17
Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Fisheries 21
Scientific Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Military and Strategic Interests . . . . . . . . . 26
Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Arctic Seabed Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
M A P S
A: Arctic Basin: Petroleum Resources . . . . . . 11
B'. Arctic Basin: Military and
Transportation Activities . . . . . . . . 19
C: Arctic Basin: Research Activity . . . . . . . 23
Fold-out Map: Arctic Basin: Established
and Theoretical Jurisdiction Limits . . . following text
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
October 19711
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGNTY
IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN
%C The Arctic Ocean is arbitrarily defined for purposes of
this paper as the ocean area and the connecting seas lying
north of the Arctic Circle. Most of the North Atlantic
region between Greenland and Norway is not truly Arctic
in a physical sense.
NOTE -- This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Basic
and Geographic Intelligence and coordinated within the
Directorate of Intelli ence. Comments and questions may
be directed to Code 143, Extension 3508.
25X1A9a
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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The Arctic has taken on a new importance in recent
years, follouiing a long period when it was out of the
mainstream of world economic and strategic affairs.
The decreasing supply of easily available minerals --
particularly fuels -- in the rest of the, world, together
with improved technology, has made the mineral wealth
of this remote region increasingly attractive. Its ex-
ploitation, however, will not be without obstacles.
Among the major problems are some unique Arctic Ocean*
jurisdictional questions and disagreement about the envi-
ronmental fragility of the region. All this is further
complicated by Soviet and Western military sensitivities
and by competing as well as cooperative scientific activ-
ities in the area. (OUO)
During the last decade the United States has made
several attempts to bring some order to international
Arctic matters through multilateral agreements with other
Arctic powers on economic development, scientific research,
and protection of the environment. Progress has been
delayed and sometimes blocked by the Soviet Union, whose
military services view such agreements dimly 25X6A
25X6A Now, pressures from the UN
Law of, the Sea (LOS) negotiations are stimulating new
interest in international relationships in the Arctic
Basin. LOS issues such as jurisdiction over marine re-
sources, navigation through international straits, control
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over pollution, and freedom of marine scientific research
pose some particularly thorny questions. Should seaward
limits of national jurisdiction agreed upon at a Law of
the Sea Conference be made applicable to the Arctic? Will
Arctic straits be considered international straits and
included in a regime of unimpeded navigation? Is the Arctic
Ocean, in essence a semienclosed sea bounded by only five
countries, subject to the deep seabed common heritage con-
cept? Can Arctic nations unilaterally extend pollution
controls over these waters without regard to internationally
accepted mechanisms? (OUO)
This study provides a factual background for consid-
eration of questions such as these. It examines Arctic
sovereignty, resources, transportation, and scientific
and military interests and attempts to put them in perspec-
SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES
Five countries border the Arctic Ocean -- the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the USSR. The entire
Arctic Ocean shoreline is crossed by only two international
land boundaries, U.S. (Alaska)-Canada and USSR-Norway (fold-
out map). The most recent land boundary change in the
Arctic occurred in 1944 when Finland ceded the Pechenga
area to the USSR, thereby giving the USSR and Norway a
common boundary to tha Arctic coast. This boundary was
delimited through the territorial sea in the Varangerfjord
area in 1957. (U)
The only offshore boundaries in addition to the Varan-
gerfjord line are: (1) the U.S.-Russia Convention Line
of 1867 through the Bering Strait and extending northward
to the "Frozen Ocean"; (2) the boundary delimiting the
continental shelf between Greenland and Canada, agreed
to in 1973; and (3) the Spitsbergen Treaty Line of 1920,
which encloses the islands of the Svalbard Archipelago.*
None of these boundaries is now in dispute. (U)
* The names Spitsbergen and Svalbard are sometimes used
inter-changeably. The name Spitsbergen applies only to
the largest island in the archipelago, and Svalbard is
the collective name for all islands within the Treaty
area. (U)
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Disagreement remains however, on jurisdiction over
the seas and seabeds offshore. The USSR has advanced
a so-called sector claim to all lands between Its coast
and the North Pole, and both Canada and the USSR take
the position that they have special rights in adjoining
Arctic seas. The problem is compounded by the presence
of landfast and drifting ice, making unclear the distinc-
tion between "Arctic territories" and "Arctic waters"
and the applicability of the concept of "open sea" to
the Arctic Ocean. (U)
Like the Czarist regime before it, i;he Soviet Gov-
ernment has advanced several claims to sovereignty in
the Arctic. In 1926 the USSR asserted ownership of all
lands and islands within the triangular area, or sector,
bounded by the mainland coast on the south and the merid-
ians 32?04'34"E and 168149'30"W. On Soviet maps the western
sector line is drawn to exclude the Spitsbergen treaif
area; the eastern line is drawn from the North Pole ')
the Arctic Circle, ending in the Bering Strait slightly
east of the longitude of the U.S.-Russia Convention Line
of 1867 (fold-out map). (U)
In subsequent writings, Soviet jurists and Arctic
authorities have often claimed that the sector includes
the open seas, drift ice, and superjacent air space.
The Soviet Government has not followed up these assertions
by formal decree but is of the view that the Arctic Ocean
has unique characteristics of both land and sea and thus
requires special adaptations of the law to deal with
its problems. It continues to keep the sector concept
alive by delimiting the sector on Soviet maps as "Polar
Domains (Polyarniye Vladenii) of the USSR." Also, during
recent Norwegian-USSR continental shelf boundary discus-
sions, the USSR pressed for acceptance of a line following
its sector claim.* On other occasions, Soviet spokesmen.
have taken the position that Arctic problems should be
resolved bilaterally and have shown great apprehension
about any international cooperative arrangements or inter-
national regime for the entire Arctic. (C)
': Soviet-Norwegian continental shelf and Svalbard boundary
problems are discussed further under Norway.
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The USSR claims a 12-mile zone bordering the entire
USSR coast as territorial waters.** Apart from the lack
of universal acceptance of this or any other width, the
definition of such waters in the Arctic poses the problem
of fixing the shoreline in areas where permanent or tem-
porary ice projects into the sea. Application of the
12-mile zone in the Soviet Arctic has so far caused inter-
national dispute only in respect to the straits at the
east and west ends of the Kara Sea, both less than 211 miles
wide. (OUO)
The terms "internal waters," "historic waters,"
and "closed seas" have also been applied by many author-
itative Soviet writers to numerous Arctic coastal water
areas. Internal water status, implying complete sovereignty,
has at times been claimed for the Kara, Laptev, White, East
Siberian, and parts of the Barents and Chukchi Seas on the
basis of historic factors or because the Arctic ice cover
is a "land-like" entity which encloses them on the seaward
side. Recent Soviet publications list only the White
Sea and a few bays in this category. (U)
The activities of U.S. icebreakers, aircraft, submarines,
and drift stations have put Soviet attitudes and intentions
regarding the polar sector to a practical test. In response,
the Soviet Union has shown some flexibility in regard to
its broach quasi-official sector and internal seas claims,
but it has been resolute in maintaining authority in and
over coastal waters. The USSR has shown little sensitivity
to U.S. drift stations and civil aircraft in the northern
part of its sector and has conducted similar operations
in all other Arctic sectors. At the same time, it has
made clear that it would not welcome a U.S. visit to Soviet
drift stations in the area. (C)
During sel,eral summers in the 19601s, U.S. Coast Guard
icebreakers conducting oceanographic surveys in the Arctic
attempted unsuccessfully to transit the USSR's Northern
Sea Route, Soviet authorities maintained close surveillance
of the ships, and although they did not physically block
the vessels, they did strongly reaffirm Soviet authority
in these waters by diplomatic note. The United States
rejected the Soviet claims but turned back rather than
attempt to pass through the 22-mile-wide Vil'kitskiy Strait.
'`* All distances and areas throughout this study are in
nautical miles unless specified otherwise.
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The USSR denies the U.S. contention that its Arctic
straits are international straits with rights of inno-
cent passage.* Significantly, in 1972 the USSR sent
one of its own research vessels as far east as Prudhoe
Buy, on the north coast of Alaska, suggesting Soviet
acceptance of the concept of free international passage
through the open parts of the Arctic Ocean. (C)
In Law of the Sea negotiations the USSR has pro-
posed coastal state rights over the continental shelf
to the 500-meter isobath or 100 miles, whichever is far-
ther seaward. This formulation benefits the USSR in the
Arctic because the 500-meter isobath closely defines its
very broad continental shelf and encloses a substantial
area beyond the customary 200-meter shelf limit. In pri-
vate talks with the United States the Soviet Union has
noted that its 500-meter/100-mile proposal is a tentative
negotiating position, urged that the Arctic should not
be specifically addressed in Law of the Sea negotiations,
and again stressed the land-like character of the Arctic
ocean. In the face of growing international sentiment
for a 200-mile coastal economic zone, the USSR at the
Caracas LOS Conference indicated willingness to accept
conditionally a 200-mile economic zone if coupled with
continental shelf rights to depths of 500 meters. (C)
Canada
Canada's sovereignty problems and policies in the
Arctic generally parallel those of the USSR, and each
country has cited actions of the other to justify its
* 7wo Soviet Navy Law of the Sea specialists recently
summarized this USSR position as follows:
"The discovery and the opening up of the Arctic seas,
chiefly by the littoral states, and the colossal
economic expenditures for the development of productive
forces and safe navigational systems led to the recogni-
tion, in their wake, of special interests and rights in
the polar regions. . . . Legal stanr?,drds governing the
regime of the high seas cannot be f';ily applied to the
Arctic seas inasmuch as this area is covered by icefields
almost the whole year round, is located away from the
principal sea routes, and has i_ever been used for inter-
national shipping. Navigation in the usual sense of the
word is simply impossible." Ovanesov, M.; Sorokin, R.,
"The International Legal Regime of the Arctic," Morskoy
Sbornik, No. 6, 1973, pp. 92-96. (U)
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policies. Although Canada has never formally made a sec-
tor claim, many government officials have publicly supported
the concept since 1907 or earlier. In 19)16 the Cana.(::ian
Ambassador to the United States went so far as to state
that Canada's sovereignty in its sector extended to
the frozen sea as well as to all islands north to the
Pole. The present interpretation seems to be that there
is no challenge to Canadian sovereignty over any land
area in the "sector" and that a decision regarding the
water and ice areas beyond land is being reserved for
the future. (OUO)
Recent statements by the Government and by leading
Canadian polar authorities assert that the distinctive
character of Arctic ice and waters implies special rights
for the coastal states. This principle has been specif-
ically applied to the waters of the Arctic Archipelago,
which the Government has repeatedly claimed to be "Canadian
waters." In 1970, following penetration of the Northwest
Passage by the U.S. icebreaker-tanker Manhattan, legislation
was enacted asserting Canadian jurisdiction for pollutiin
control in a zone extending 100 miles seaward of all
land north of 60?. Official commentary on this legislation
noted that it was not an assertion of sovereignty but rather
an exercise of specific jurisdiction to preserve the envi-
ronment. At the same time, the Government reiterated
its position that the Northwest Passage, through the Archi-
pelago, is neither an international strait nor a part
of the high seas, but rather an internal water route. (U)
In LOS negotiations Canada has supported broad coastal
state jurisdiction over fisheries, shelf resources, and
pollution control. Canada claims rights to mineral re-
sources on the continental shelf and beyond it to the
continental slope and rise. These positions were not
based on Canada's situation in the Arctic because the
shelf everywhere lies within 100 miles of the coast.
Canada claimed a 12-mile territorial sea in 1970 and favors
straight baselines to the extent "sanctioned" by the Inter-
national Cour: of Justice in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case. Use of straight baselines connecting
the outer points of the outermost Arctic islands would
effectively enclose the waters of the Arctic Archipelago.
At the Caracas LOS Conference Canada maintained that the
concept of a special LOS archipelago legal regime, under
consideration for archipelago countries such as Indonesia,
should be extended to include coastal archipelagoes such
as its own in the Arctic.COUO)
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Norway
Norway has not only the usual interests that might be
expected of an Arctic state but also special interests
related to its administration of Svalbard. Norway has made
no sectcr claim and has specifically rejected the official
and quasi-official sector claims of the USSR and Canada.
Since the 1920's Norway has abandoned its claims to Franz
Josef Land and the Sverdrup Islands in the USSR and Canadian
"sectors" respectively. Full sovereignty is exercised over
Jan Mayen Island in the Gri~nland Sea. (U)
At present, jurisdiction is claimed over a 4-mile terri-
torial sea and a 12-mile exclusive fisheries zone, both
measured from straight baselines connecting the outermost
points of its mainland and island coasts. The 1951 decision
of the International Court of Justice established the validity
of this baseline and ruled that the sea route through Norway's
coastal islands is in Norwegian internal waters. The Norwe-
gians have indicated that they do not intend to extend their
territorial sea claim but are considering extension of the
fishing zone to 50 or, more likely, 200 miles. This action
would affect mainly the fishing fleets of the USSR, the
United Kingdom, and West Germany. In addition, Norway has
delimited the 24-mile near shore portion of its sea boundary
with the USSR, which ends in a water depth of nearly 300
meters.(U)
The 1920 Treaty on the Status of Spitsbergen, between
Norway and 14 other nations, reo36riized Norway's sovereignty
over Svalbard subject to rights specifically reserved to
the other signatories.* Foremost among these rights was
the guarantee of access to the Archipelago, on a basis of
full equality with Norway, for maritime, industrial, mining,
and commercial operations. The USSR has actively sought
to expand its rights in Svalbard by challenging and demanding
participation in certain No?^wegian activities and by maintaining
The United States, Canada, and Denmark were among the
original 15 signatories; the USSR is one of 26 countries
that subsequently acceded to the Treaty. (U)
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a permanent mining population about twice the size of
Norway's,* CC)
All parties to the Treaty accept its application to
all land areas within the specified boundaries (fold-out
map) and to the surrounding S!-mile territorial sea that
has been established by Norway. The treaty makers did not
anticipate interest in the oil and gas potential of the
continental shelf, however, and the Treaty does not state
whether it applies to activities there. The Norwegians
take the position that it does not, since the shelf sur-
rounding Svalbard is an e:'tensiori of Norway's continental
margin. They interpret the Treaty as limiting the mineral
exploitation rights of the other contracting parties to
the land area and 4-mile territorial waters of the islands.
The USSR has directly questioned Norway's jurisdiction over
the Svalbard shelf. Apart from its interest in the poten-
tial offshore resources, the USSR is believed to want some
formal control, or veto power, over installations that may
be built airess the strategic entrance to the Barents Sea. (C)
Mainly because of this sovereignty question, in LOS
negotiations Norway has favored coastal state right, over
exploitation of the continental shelf to 200 miles or 600
meters of water depth, whichever is farther seaward. The
adoption of su'h a regime would unite Norway's and Sval-
bard's shelves and would strengthen Norway's claim that
the entire area is an extension of the mainland continental
margin and outside the provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty. (C)
If it were eventually to be decided that the Spitsber-
gen Treaty applies to the shelf around the Archipelago,
the bounc.ary line between the Norwegian and Svalbard shelves
drawn under any usual formula would operate to Norway's
Several events illustrate the Soviet attitude toward
its rights on Svalbard. Norway's sole sovereignty over
the islands was questioned in 1944, when the USSR suggested
joint Norwegian-Soviet control, and outright cession of
Bear Island to the USSR. In 1965 the Soviet Government
protested construction of a European Space Research Organi-
zation (ESRO) telemetry station on the grounds that it had
a military function. For many years the USSR also objected
to Norway's plans to build an airfield at Longyearbyen, but
finally relented in 1971 on the condition they be allowed to
participate in its operation. In negotiations leading to a
final airfield agreement, reached in March 1971$., the USSR
pressed for joint jurisdiction over airfield operations. (C)
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disadvantage. By either the equidistance or deepest-water
principle it would lie within 150 miles of the Norwegian
coast and would place a large area of potential oil and
gas resources under the Treaty provisions. (OUO)
Norway's remaining Arctic jurisdiction protlem is with
the USSR over their unsettled continental shelf boundr..r-y
in the Barents Sea. Aft:,r several years of Norwegian o,.rer-
tures, the USSR has finally agreed to a Norwegian request
for formal negotiations, which will begin in the fall of
197)1. Preliminary discussions between the parties have
revealed basic disagreement over the method of delimiting
the boundary. Norway has proposed an equidistant line
measured from adjacent land areas. The USSR has countered
that delimitation should be based on the sector principle,
citing "special circumstances" -- geological, demographic,
and historical. A sector boundary would give the USSR con-
trol over a larger territory (fold-out map). (C)
Denmark
Denmark does not have, nor is it likely to have, any
major sovereignty dispi'`es with other Arctic countries.
The continental shelf _,oundary with Canada was settled in
'.973. A sector claim for Greenland has never stirred any
apparent interest in Denmark, nor have factors related to
Greenland or the Arctic had a prominent effect on Denmark's
LOS positions. At present Denmark has a 3-mile territorial
sea limit and with some exceptions an additional 9-mile
fisheries zone. A demand by Greenlanders for a 50-mile
fisheries zone is offset by broader Danish interests, Den-
mark has not taken a firm position on the delimitation of
the outer edge of the continental shelf but would pwcoably
accept a 200-mile or a combined depth/distance criterion. (OUO)
PETROLEUM RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT
The Arctic Ocean basin, particularly the-huge conti-
nental shelf of the USSR, is believed to contain some of
the largest, and generally least exploitable, petroleum
deposits in the world. Optimistic but highly speculative
estimates of potential reserves are based largely on ex-
trapolation from onshore geology combined with limited geo-
physical data derived from scient?,fic surveys. Assessments
will gradually become more realistic as a result of oil
exploration now underway in several areas (Map A). (U)
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The economic importance of future petroleum discoveries
rray depend as much on the environmental conditions at the
site as on the size of the deposit. The severe climate
alone causes petroleum extraction in he Arctic to be more
difficult and costly than in more teL._. ;rate regions. Off-
shore, the problem is greatly exacerbated by landfast ice
along the coasts and the drifting icepack in the central
basin. The icepack thickness averages 2 to 3 meters (6
to 10 feet), and drift rates are up to several miles or
more per day throughout the year. Except in those parts
of the Barents and Norwegian Seas which are permanently
free of ice, offshore drilling from ships or floating, plat-
forms is feasible only during the short summer, and drilling
from landfast ice is restricted to the winter season. Per-
manent drilling platforms would be subject to massive forces
from moving
ice. Underwater drilling and completion tech-
niques offer some promise but would be endangered in much
of the area by bottom scouring from ice ridges and icebergs
which have drafts of as much as 50 meters and more than
100 meters, respectively. (U)
Several of the possibly oil-bearing geological structures
are located in areas where national boundaries have not
yet been delimited over the continental shelf. Jurisdiction
over other. potential deposits could be affected by a new
continental shelf treaty establishing new distance and/or
depth criteria for coastal state jurisdiction. Any conceivable
outcome of future negotiations, however, will leave the
USSR with jurisdiction over by far the largest share of
the potential petroleum-bearing areas of the Arctic continental
shelf. (Table and Map A). (OUO)
USSR
The USSR continental shelf in the Arcti.c, which is
approximately bounded by the 500-meter isobath, covers
more than one million square miles. This area accounts
for two-thirds of all the USSR shelf area and is nearly
twice the size of the total U.S. continental shelf, Soviet
specialists have estimated that about 80 percent of the
Soviet Aicti,c shelf has oil and gas potential and that this
area contains two-thirds. of all USSR offshore petroleum
reserves. (U)
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STOCKHOLM ' The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Names and some other
boundaries are not necessarily authoritative.
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ARCTIC SEABED AREAS
(1,000-S NM 2)*
METERS
MILES
0-200
200-500
500-3,000
3,000
TOTAL
0-200
USSR
925 (6(zm
220 (36%)
295 (2
265 (36%)
1,705 (437.)
1,280 (42%)
CANADA
305 (?o%)
125 (21%)
310 1987.)
180 124%(
920 (23%)
-670 (22%)
NORWAY
100 (7x)
140 (9371
235 (9(%)
130 i
605 (15%)
520 ii
GREENLAND
90 (07)
105 ui71
165 11571
100 11471
460 1127.)
390 (137.)
ALASKA
85 '071
10 (97)
75 (77(
60 ie71
230 (671
145 i571
ICELAND
5 1071
7 1171
35 (37,1
3 (071
50 1171
50 (1%)
TOTAL
1,510 10071
605 110071
1,115 10071
740 noo71
3,970 noo71
3,055
'Includes area of Arctic Ocean and connecting seas southward to the Arctic Circle; allocated
between individual countries to equidistant lines shown on fold-out map.
Soviet capabilities for offshore Arctic exploration
range from exceptionally good to inferior. The importance
of the Arctic land area to the USSR economy has resulted
in substantial transportation and scientific activities
in the area and has led to the develooment of a large cadre
of skilled personnel. The USSR, however, lacks sophisti-
cated marine exploration technology and has only a primitive
offshore drilling capability. At present only about 2 per-
cent of USSR oil production is obtained from offshore deposits,
all from areas where water depths are less than 60 meters. (U)
These weaknesses are being overcome by a greater com-
mitment of resources and by infusion of Western technology.
The 800-man Scie.ntifi^ Research Institute of Arctic Geology
CNIIGA) has long carried out geological surveys of the Arctic
mainland and islands, and since the early 1960's it has
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collected extensive aerial and surface geomagnetic data
offshore. In 1967 the All-Union Scientific Research Insti-
tute for Marine Geology and Geophysics (VNIlmorgeo) was
organized to map and evaluate the resources of the entire
USSR littoral area. (U)
Offshore mineral exploration was made a priority goal
of the current rive-Year Plan (1971-75) . This commitment
was followed by the formation of new exploration organiza-
tions and acceleration of exploration activity. Within
the Arctic, the Barents Sea was listed as a primary target.
Administratively, the Arctic program was strengthened in
1972 by establishment o' a new organization -- Sevmorgeo
(Northern Marine Geological-Geophysical Association) --
that absorbed NIIGA and several regional geological units.
Sevmorgeo's assignment is to study the geological structure
and mineral resources of the seabed along the entire USSR
Arctic coast. (U)
Although accounts cite favorable structures in all
of the USSR's Arctic Seas, the Barents and Kara Seas are
generally believed to contain the best petroleum basins.
The Barents Sea is the most accessible for study, being
the most Ice-free, and Sevmorgeo has focused its efforts
here thus far, particularly around Svalbard where three
exploration ships were reported work!.ng in 1973. Aerial
magnetic and reconnaissance seismic and hydromagnetic sur-
veys in the southeastern Barents Sea have established the
continuation of petroleum-bearing continental structures.
Some seismic surveying has also been done around the Yamal
Peninsula in the Kara Sea. Only small-scale geological
and geophysical surveys (mainly aerial magnetic) have been
conducted in the other seas, determining the depth of base-
ment rock and locating the major sedimentary basins. (OUO)
Notwithstanding the increasing pace of Arctic explo-
ration, the USSR is not likely to move quickly toward ex-
ploitation -- mainly because there are vast reserves in
more accessible regions. The Soviet Minister of Geology
recently noted that "this is our future." Any commercial
development would probably require Western assistance.
Some preliminary discussions have already been held with
Western firms regarding exploration in the southeastern
Barents Sea and the Kara Sea, (C)
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Canada
Most of Canada's relatively small continental shelf
in the Arc-tic Ocean proper (much of the offshore area iden-
tified in tree Table lies, within the Arctic At chipelago)
i,i believed to have good petroleum potential. Almost all
of the Arctic continental shelf, delimited ',% the 500-meter
isobath, lies within 100 miles of the Canadian coast. The
petroleum potential of the seabed beyond the 500-meter iso-
bath has not been examined and is of no practical interest
since ice cover arid water depth prohibit exploitation in
the foreseeable future. (U)
The Arctic Archipelago and the Mackenzie Delta have
been the scene of extensive and rewarding exploration activities
since 1968. In both areas oil and gas discoveries are on
the verge of being large enough to justify construction
of pipelines to markets in the south. To date some 70 explora-
tory wells have been drilled in the Archipelago and J,1ore
than 50 in the Delta. Several offshore wells have confirmed
the continuation of onshore deposits. Drilling off the Delta
has been from man-made islands in less than 3 meters of
water and within 8 miles of shore. An exploratory well
off Melville Island was recently drilled from the landfast
ice in more than 120 meters of water. Plans are also being
made to drill farther off the Delta from an ice-strengthened
ship during summer, when the Beaufort Sea is partly ice-
free. (U)
The Canadian shelf to 200 meters has been fully leased
for exploration, and some lease blocks extend offshore to
depths of more than 1,000 meters. Extensive seismic and
gravity surveys have been conducted over much of this area.
A seismic profile extending 135 miles offshore from one
of the Arctic islands revealed good ser.imentary rock thickness
to the continental slope. Surveys around the Mackenzie
Delta show-that thick sediments and many apparent salt domes --
often associated with oil -- occur on the continental shelf
up to 100 miles from shore. (U)
The total recoverable petroleum reserves of Canada
north of the 60th parallel has been estimated, based on
the limited data available, at 70 to 120 billion barrels
of oil and 9.3 to 15 trillion cubic meters (330 to 530
trillion cubic feet) of gas.- About half of this potential
For comparison, 1973 U.S. consumption was about 6.3
billion barrels of oil and 0.65 trillion cubic meters
(23 trillion cubic feet) of gas.
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is believed to be located offshore. Excluding the channels
between Canada's Arctic. islands, the most promising offshore
area is north of the Mackenzie, Delta, extending to about
100 miles from shore and into waters as deep as 200 meters.
This prospective basin may continue offshore to the Prudhoe
Bay deposits in Alaska. Canada and the United States have
not yet delimited their offshore boundary through this area. (U)
Norway
Norway is currently concentrating its petroleum explora-
tion and development efforts in the North Sea, where several
large oil. and gas fields have been discovered during the
last few years. Production from these new discoveries is
expected to exceed Norwegian consumption by 1975. Norway
has granted offshore concessions only as far north as 62?
in an attempt to postpone the disruptive effect that petroleum
development will bring to the existing economic and social
order of more northern areas. Privately, the Norwegian
Government has also expressed concern about possible Soviet
reactions to offshore activity in this strategic submarine
passage. The complete results of extensive government-sponsored
seismic and gravity surveys to the north of 62? have not
been made public but are reported to have revealed large
and promising sedimentary structures; the area will probably
be opened to limited concessions by 1975 or 1976. (C)
Under Norway's interpretation of the Spitsbergen Treaty,
the present prohibition on commercial exploration in the
north also applies to Svalbard's continental shelf beyond
the 4-mile territorial sea. Petroleum exploration concessions
have been granted on Svalbard itself since 1960 and now
cover much of its land area and portions of its territorial
waters. Exploratory drilling has already been carried out
on several of the islands by U.S. and West European firms,
with Norwegian participation. Some of the petroleum concession
areas are held by Arktikugol, the Soviet coal mining trust
on Svalbard, which is drilling on the main island in 1974.
Generally, the drilling results have not been released,
but continued high interest and -chat is known of geological
structures indicate a potential for important discoveries
in the relatively ice-free and shallow seas to the southeast
of the main islands. (U)
In February 1974 the USSR proposed to Norway a draft
agreement for scientific cooperation in the-area covered
by the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty (fold-out map). The agreement
proposes joint research in a broad spectrum of scientific
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fields and notes that the Soviet agencies implementing the
agreement would be Sevmargeo and Arktikugol, developmental
arms of the Soviet Ministry of Geology. This choice of
organizations reveals the practical thrust of Soviet intentions:
from a purely scientific standpoint the Arctic and Antarctic
Scientific Research Institute (AANII) would have been the
more appropriate organization to conduct many of these research
programs. (C)
The fact that the USSR-proposed agreement includes
references to oceanographic and seabed research and would
apply to the entire area covered by the Spitsbergen Treaty
suggests a Soviet attempt to associate the Treaty with activi-
ties on and above the continental shelf. Under its interpreta-
tion of the Treaty, the USSR has felt no obligation to request
Norwegian approval for the extensive geophysical research
which it has carried out over the Svalbard shelf during
the last several years. Norway considers these Soviet actions
to be a violation of her sovereignty but apparently has
not made an official protest. (C)
Although the USSR rejects Norway's claim that the Svalbard
shelf comes under the sole jurisdiction of Norway, Soviet
authorities seem reluctant to accept the full implications
of the reverse position -- that all Treaty signatories have
equal rights to petroleum exploitation on the shelf. In
recent negotiations with Norway, Premier Kosygin expressed
veluctance to see "foreign" involvement in oil development
in the Barents Sea and suggested that Norway and the USSR
might cooperate in the oil operatio:is. This attitude is
consistent with other indications that the USSR is concerned
about future U.S. installations astride the strategic Barents
Sea waterway. (C)
Denmark
Oil discoveries in Arctic North America and northern
Siberia have stimulated Danish interest in the possibility
of similar finds in Greenland and the surrounding offshore
areas. Areas of favorable geo logical. structure have been
identified along portions of both the western and eastern
coasts, probably extending seaward to the 500-meter isobath,
which marks the edge of the continental shelf. From 1969
to 1972, when all permits expired, the Danish Government
granted petroleum exploration licenses covering all the
favorable areas of the continental shelf to more than a
dozen Danish and foreign firms. Prospecting was of a general
exploratory nature, but included geological, seismic, and
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magnetic surveys. Survey results have not been reported,
but continued interest on the part of the exploration firms
suggests that they were encouraging. Denmark is now preparing
to lease F,.reas off the west coast to the south of 72? and
will soon begin negotiations with the companies that have
already done survey work. The first actual drilling on
the leases will probably not begin before 1976. (OUO)
Alaska's North Slope petroleum province is believed
to extend out from the coast to the edge of the continental
shelf. Within this belt the giant Prudhoe Bay field, which
has been drilled only on land, is estimated to have recoverable
reserves of more than 10 billion barrels of oil and 850
billion cubic meters (30 trillion cubic feet) of gas.
Speculative estimates of the oil and gas potential for all
of Arctic Alaska are 40 to 120 billion barrels and 6 to
16 trillion cubic meters (200 to 550 trillion cubic fee),
respectively. Some specialists estimate even larger deposits
and have speculated that half of the potential may be offshore
in the continental shelf. Oil production from Prudhoe Bay
is expected to begin moving to markets through the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline in 1977 or 1978; gas deliveries will probably
begin a few years later via a pipeline through Canada. Com-
pletion of these and other pipelines will stimulate production
from other fields on the North Slope. (U)
Alaska's Arctic Ocean continental shelf covers about
100,000 square miles to the 500-meter isobath and extends
from 15 to 300 miles offshore. Reconnaissance geophysical
surveys have been carried out over a large part of the area,
and extensive detailed surveys are being planned. No explora-
tion drilling has taken place offshore. A 1969-70 reconnais-
sance survey in the Chukchi Sea traced promising sedimentary
structures over an area of 65,000 square miles to a distance
of more than 200 miles west and northwest of the mainland. (U)
Transportation is a basic and often the most expensive
factor in any Arctic activity. Capabilities for both air
and sea transportation in the Arctic have reached the stage
where all points on the Arctic Ocean are accessible by ice-
breaker or aircraft. New super icebreakers on the drawing
boards will have a theoretical capability to move across
the very center of the ocean. (U)
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Both sea and air routes have developed almost exclusively
within national, rather than international, frameworks to
support specific projects and regional economic needs (Map
B). Even international air routes tend to skirt the central
Arctic, mainly because significant traffic flows have not
developed between points on opposite sides of this large
region. (U)
The most important Arctic transportation service is
the Northern Sea Route (NSR) system of the USSR, an enterprise
that has received large capital investments since the 1930's.
The NSR stretches some 3,1100 miles from Murmansk to the
Bering Sea, linking about 20 ports with the outside world
during a 3- to 4-month summer navigation season. Several
hundred ships use the route annually, but relatively few
make the complete transit. Nearly half of the total three
million tons of cargo consists of exports of ores from Norilsk
and timber from Igarka. (The much larger volumes handled
by ports on the Barents and White Seas and the 350,000 tons
of. coal annually shipped by the USSR from Svalbard are not
included in the NSR total.) In recent years, a growing
share of the USSR's Arctic transportation requirements have
been served by the river routes that connect the Arctic
Ocean with railroad routes farther south. (U)
Icebreaking capability on the NSR is provided by a
fleet of some 15 icebreakers, including the 40,000-horsepower
nuclear-powered Lenin. This fleet is supplemented by at
least 12 ice-strengthened transports that have a limited
capability to clear channels for other ships. The Yermak,
the first of three new 36,000-horsepower, deisel-powered
icebreakers, entered service this year. Next year. the
Arktika, the first of a new series of two 60,000-horsepower
nuclear-powered icebreakers, will become operational.
These ships, larger than any icebreakers operated by other
countries, are apparently designed to extend the shipping
season in the western Soviet Arctic to 6 to 9 months. (U)
Operation of the NSR requires a huge investment in
ancillary services and has provided part of the economic
justification for the USSR's impressive research effort
in the Arctic Ocean. In 1967 the USSR "offered" use of
the NSR to foreign commercial vessels, but no foreign ship-
owners accepted, and the offer was withdrawn in 1968. (U)
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In Canada, marine transportation to Arctic ports is
provided by the Canadian Coast Guard and several private
shipping companies. The operations consist entirely of
resupply of northern settlements in the Arctic Islands and
the Mackenzie'Delta. There is no cargo service through
the Northwest Passage between eastern and western Canada
and no shipment of mineral resources or heav;i industrial
products out of ports north of the Arctic Circle. Total
shipments into ports in the A.;'ctic Islands amount to a few
tens of thousands of tons annually. A somewhat larger
amount of traffic is carried into the Mackenzie Delta by
barges down the river and by ocean freighters around Alaska.
To service these routes and to conduct Arctic research Canada
has six icebreakers -?- ranging from 6,500 to 24,000 horsepower
as well as several specialized northern supply vessels. (U)
The development of oil and gas fields in the northern
Canadian Arctic is causing an increase in cargo shipments,
but plans call for the petroleum output to be moved south
by pipeline. In 1969 the U.S. icebreaker/tanker Manhattan
traveled through the Northwest Passage to the Beaufort Sea,
demonstrating the feasibility, if not the economic practi-
cability, of using tankers to ship oil from the high Arctic.
Interest in transporting oil through the Arctic Ocean by
tankers has since waned because the Manhattan test showed
only that the route could be used during summer and because
subsequent stringent Canadian pollution legislation would
raise tanker construction and operating costs. (U)
Of the other countries that border the Arctic Ocean
only the United States carries out regular ship operations
in ice-covered waters north of the Arctic Circle. Norway
operates a regular shuttle service without icebreaker support
to Svalbard during the summer season. Denmark's Ministry
of Trade and Shipping controls one medium and one small
icebreaker that are used to assist shipping, primarily around
southern Greenland. A commercial Danish firm also owns
a small fleet of ice-strengthened merchant ships that are
used in Greenland waters and are chartered by other nations
for use in Arctic as well as Antarctic waters. (U)
United States ship activity in the Arctic Ocean primarily
serves scientific and surveying purposes rather than commercial.
needs. The only cargo service to the northern coast of Alaska,
to Point Barrow and Prudhoe Bay, amounted to less than 200,000
tons in 1972. Further development of marine transportation
to northern Alaska is impeded by the lack of a deepwater port.
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The United States presently has seven icebreakers available
for Arctic and Antarctic duties. During the next 2 years
two very large (60,000 horsepower) new icebreakers will
provide a substantially increased capability for Arctic
operations. (U)
FISHERIES
Fisheries north of the Arctic Circle are most highly
developed in the relatively ice-free waters of the Barents
and Norwegian Seas. Locally important fishing activities
off Greenland are carried out primarily to the south of
the Arctic Circle along the western and southern coasts.
The more extensive ice cover in the remainder of the Arctic
Ocean not only impedes development of fish stocks by reducing
phytoplankton production but also hampers the operation
of trawler fleets. In recent years the gradual cooling
of Arctic waters and consequent southward migration of the
icepack have pushed fisheries farther to the south; Soviet
fishing officials have attempted to compensate for this
situation by improving ice forecasting procedures and by
constructing special trawlers to operate along the ice margin. (U)
The total annual catch in the Barents and Norwegian
Seas averages around 3 million tons, nearly 5 percent of
the total world catch. B y far the greater part of this
catch is taken in waters to the north of the Arctic Ciro;le.
The most productive grounds are over the shallow parts of
the continental shelf around Norway, Svalbard, and the Kola
Peninsula of the USSR. (U)
The Soviet Northern Fisheries Fleet, based in Murmansk,
has an annual catch of more than 1 million tons. The Barents
and Norwegian Seas each provide about 300,000 tons of this
total; the remainder comes from more distant grounds in
the Atlantic. Within the Barents Sea the Soviet Fleet has
gradually assumed an increasing share of the catch and now
has a near monopoly in the eastern part adjoining the USSR
coast. Agreements with the United Kingdom and Norway to
allow fishing within specified portions of Soviet territorial
waters in the Arctic were terminated in 1962 and 1970, respec-
tively. (U) -
Norway is Western Europe's most important fishing nation,
with an annual catch of nearly 3 million tons. In contrast
to the large distant-water trawi.er fleets operated by the
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USSR, the Norwegian fleet has traditionally consisted mainly
of small and medium-sized vessels that operate out of settle-
ments along the central and northern coasts. Overfishing
and strong foreign competition in traditional fishing areas
have in recent years forced Norway to turn increasingly
to distant-water fishing, which now nearly equals coastal
fishing in total catch. The competition from Soviet, Brit_sh,
and ;lest German fishermen has also resulted in vigorous
political agitation for government protection of domestic
fishing interests. Consequently, in Law of the Sea negotia-
tions Norway supports a coastal state exclusive fishing
zone of 50 to 200 miles. (U)
SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMS
Scientific activities in and over the Arctic Ocean
include the normal spectrum of r-;nvironme ntal data gathering
and research that are commo,ily performed in other ocean
areas. In addition, a significant portion of the total
scientific effort is related to the ocean's ice cover and
to geophysical phenomena associated with its polar location.
The latter category includes research on the effect of the
earth's magnetic field on atmospheric events, and measure-
ments of aurora, radio propagation, and energy particles. (U)
The USSR's scientific effort in the Arctic greatly
exceeds the combined efforts of all other nations. More
than 100 scientific stations on land, many research and
merchant ships, and specially equipped aircraft collect
data that are used chiefly to support shipping along the
Northern Sea Route. Of the research centers north of the
Arctic Circl3, Murmansk has been visited occasionally by
U.S. scientists, and the Krenkel Observatory on Franz Josef
Land has periodically. been used as a site for a cooperative
space program with France. The other research stations
are off limits to foreigners (Map C) . ( C)
Since 1937, the USSR has established 22 manned scientific
research stations on the drifting Arctic icepack. In recent
years two or three of these drift stations have been operated
year-round as research bases; they also function in the
spring as aircraft support bases for a wide-ranging oceanog-
raphic research program over the entire Arctic basin. To
date, thousands of sites on the icepack have been visited
by Soviet aircraft operating from stations on the ice and
from shore bases. Both aircraft and ships are also used
 ~?ir t MYf MpA~?I~~t ~ '~M'. n~ l:r'f'", ~... i-~ ,,, 1~ '~,;_ ..t _ .vi r 1:~ 1, ah..- n ':1}Nrr -4 7a1 a -
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Some other boundar es are not neeesaarly authoritative. KINGDQiM DENMARK 1'f .l ll. '
u ',.C/i:! COPENHAGEN
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 - f DP86T00608R000200230004-2
to coordinate and expand several agencies' research in marine
sciences, ice phenomena, geophysics, and environmental impact
assessments, and to interpret the data for practical use. (U)
Aside from limited participation in international projects
such as AIDJEX and POLEX, the other Arctic nations lack
the means to perform a significant amount of research much
beyond their Arctic littoral. Canada's Arctic research
is cond'ieted by several ministries and a number of universities
from a sparse network of permanent research stations and
a larger number of field research camps. Additionally,
extensive survey work has been conducted on and around the
northern islands by mineral and petroleum firms. In the
Arctic Ocean, Canada is working with the United States
on the AIDJEX program and has also done some work at temporary
ice stations in the nearshore zone. From March to October
systematic aerial surveys of sea ice are carried out over
the main waterways between the Arctic islands and over the
Beaufort Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The Department of Energy,
Mines, and Resources coordinates Arctic research through
its Polar Continental Shelf Project, begun in 1959 to study
the continental shelf, the waters, and the Arctic islands.
Research encompassed by the Project includes any activity
judged to be in the national interest that could not be
carried out ?;ithout its support. (U)
Norway's Polar Institute in Oslo has long been an inter-
national leader in polar exploration and is a leading national
center in geological and terrestrial geophysical studies.
It is concerned mainly with research in Svalbard, where
studies are carried out each sumner, usually together with
research parties from several other nations. Much of Norway's
work is carried out in conjunction with the USSR: coordinated
fisheries expeditions are annually conducted in the Barents
Sea, and the USSR has proposed a comprehensive agreement
to provide for joint research and exploration on and around
Svalbard. (C)
Research on Greenland also has a strong international
flavor. 3esides the large U.S. participation in geophysical
and weather studies at Thule and glaciological studies on
the ice cap, Soviet, French, and UK parties have conducted
geological and biological research on the island. (U)
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 Approved For Release 1999fQj CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230004-2
Until well after World War 11 the only parts 6f Lhe
Arctic Ocean -t-hat had military significance were the Norc,egian
and Barents Seas, where naval vessels are able to operate
in the relatively ice-free waters. In the mid-19501s the
development of long,-range aviation and the respective military
postures of the USSR and the United States gave new significance
to the Arctic's location beneath the shortest air routes
between the two countries. On the North American side the
United States, in cooperation with Denmark and Canada, built
about 50 Distant Early Warning (DEW Line) installations
strung across northern Alaska, Canada, and Greenland (Map
B). Major airbases were also constructed by the U.S. in
Alaska and at Thule, Greenland, and by the USSR in the Soviet
North. In the 1960's, as missiles became the primary threat,
many DEW Line sites were abandoned or replaced by larger
radars built to detect missiles launched across the Arctic. (C)
The potential for offensive military operations on
or beneath the ice cover of the Arctic Ocean is not well
defined nor understood. Nevertheless, both the USSR and
the West show a high degree of interest in maintaining their
options and are sensitive to military activities of the
other in the region. The principal Soviet and U.S. military
interests in the ice-covered part of the Arctic Ocean are
in under-ice submarine reconnaissance and transit, and in
scientific and surveillance programs. There is no evidence
of an intention to develop submarine ballistic missile launch
capabilities from under the ice. On the other hand, the
marginal ice zone may be a favorable operating environment
for submarines attempting to avoid detection. (S)
A new element has been introduced during the last year
as the USSR began introducing the new SS-N-8 submarine missile
into its operational fleet. This missile's range of more
than 4,000 miles enables it to reach U.S. targets from the
ice-free portion of the Barents Sea, near Soviet territory,
USSR military facilities in the Arctic are more extensive
than those of any other nation and include elements of naval,
air, ground, and rocket force units. By far the most important
operational facilities are located on the Kola Peninsula
around Murmansk, base of the Northern Fleet. Naval missile
test ranges are located in the White and Barents Seas, away
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from foreign ship lanes. One of the two main Soviet nuclear
test sites and a naval base are on Novaya Zemlya. Military
aircraft use about 10 airfields on the Arctic coast and
offshore islands, and long-ra;tge bombers routinely fly mis-
sions over the central Arctic. Aircraft and ballistic
missile early warning radars are concentrated around the
Barents and White Seas, which the USSR believes to be a
probable corridor of foreign attack. (S)
The Northern Fleet, the largest of the four Soviet
fleets, is concentrated around Murmansk because this is
the only port complex in the western USSR that is both on
the open sea and free of ice all year. All naval units
operating in the Atlantic and more than half of the USSR's
nuclear submarines are controlled by 'the Northern Fleet.
Navy exercises are regularly conducted within about 30
miles of the Kola Peninsula. In general, advanced submarine
operations are increasingly being carried out in the Norwegian
rather than in the Barents Sea because of the Fleet's growing
capability for distant operations. (S)
Soviet submarine under-ice operations are not numerous
but are approximately twice the level of U.S. activities.
An under-ice probe, apparently in conjunction with hydro-
acoustic experiments at drifting ice stations, is conducted
about once a year. Complete cross-polar transits were a
significant activity between 1963 and 1968, when as many
as eight crossings were made.
Soviet defense forces vigorously enforce their control
over the USSR's 12-mile territorial sea to minimize Western
surveillance of Soviet Navy exercises and missile ranges.
Apparently because of the widespread presence of military
installations throughout the Arctic, the entire region is,
de facto, closed to foreigners with. the exception of occa-
sional carefully controlled visits to Murmansk. Submarine-
related areas and topics are especially sensitive. Soviet
authorities continue to be security conscious about 'transfers
of naval vessels along the NSR and about under-ice operations.
In 1974 the Soviet Navy began to acquire new armed icebreakers,
suggesting a continuing interest in controlling ice-infested
waters. (S)
Norway, a member of NATO, considers its principal military
objectives to be the defense of its northern border with
the USSR and surveillance of the Arctic Ocean. Most active
troops are stationed in northern Norway, an area vulnerable
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to Soviet subversion or expansionist aims.
The small Norwegian
Navy is designed primarily for coastal defense and protection
of shipping. (S)
The Norwegian Air Force operates from five joint military/
civil airfields north of the Arctic'Circle, but it has only
minimal air defense, tactical air, and transport capabilities.
A new airfield being constructed on Svalbard cannot be used
by the Air Force because of the non-militarization provisions
of the Spitsbergen Treaty. Norway also operates key early-
warning radar sites that monitor Soviet air traffic over
the Arctic. (S)
During the last year or so tLe Norwegian Defense Ministry
has stated its intention to bolster defense forces to meet
the increasing need to protect Norway's coastal fisheries
and the potential need to guard oil installations on the
northern continental shelf. The latter c.ncern stems from
an awareness of the possibility of conflict with the USSR
over allocation of the seabed as well. as a belief that the
Soviet Union will demand some control over structures on
the Norwegian portion of the shelf. (C)
The Arctic military interests of Canada and Denmark
are closely interwoven with U.S. plans for defense of North
America. Their primary role has been to provide sites for
U.S.-operated airbases and aircraft and missile w
systems.
The five countries bordering the Arctic Ocean have
many common Arctic problems but diverse national interests.
There is little prospect that growing awareness of their
common concerns will persuade them to agree on a special
international legal regime for tie Arctic. Mutual interests
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in science, pollution control, and economic development --
which might lead to some form of Arctic agreement or compact --
are outweighed by the USSR's interest in maintaining its
absolute sovereignty and freedom of action in its sector
of the basin. (C)
Economic development in Arctic Ocean coastal and off-
shore areas is certain to accelerate. Petroleum prospecting
will gradually be extended farther to the north in several
areas where government policies have postponed development,
and production from offshore deposits in the Arctic Ocean
will begin by the 1980's. (U)
Improvements in transportation capabilities will keep
pace with economic growth. Air transportation development
requires a relatively short leadtime and thus responds quickly
to requirements. An improvement in shipping capabilities,
on the other hand, requires a long period for vessel and
port cor,at.ruction, but it will be necessary for large-scale
petroleum exploitation. New icebreakers being acquired
by the USSR and the United States promise to substantially
Pxtend the length of the operating season and to expand
the areas opa'a to shipping. (U)
Fishing will continue to be an important activity,
but only in the Barents and Norwegian Seas. Already the
USSR has a near monopoly on fishing in its sector, and Norway
is determined to broaden its exclusive fisheries zone along
its mainland coast. There is no indication that Norway
will attempt to claim an exclusive fisheries zone around
Svalbard's territorial sec. (U)
Impetus for Arctic cooperation has come primarily frcm
scientists. Some cooperative research and data exchange
will continue to take place among all of the countries in
recognition of cost-sharing efficiencies and because many
problems can be solved only by data collection over the
entire region. The USSR is less in need of cooperation
than are the other nations because of its superior data-
collection capability and the liberal data-release policies
of the other countries. (OUO)
Except for the USSR, the Arctic Ocean is of marginal
military interest to the bordering countries. The Soviet
interest derives mainly from the location of important
military facilitier.! along the ice-free coast of the Barents
Sea. Strict security policies will remain in force throughout
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the USSR Arctic because military installations are located
in nearly every Arctic coastal settlement and sensitive
military research takes place at the drifting ice stations. (S)
Arctic sovereignty issues are not likely to be settled
soon unless there is a compelling need. Ambiguities in
Soviet and Canadian intentions regarding their sector claims
for example may not be clarified unless forced by some new
development in the area. The USSR seems determined that
future sessions of the LOS Conference will not become a
forum for such discussions, claiming that any Arctic problems
can be solved bilaterally. Continental shelf boundaries
are largely undelimited buy should not become particularly
contentious except for the USSR-Norway boundary in the Barents
Sea. Promising oil and gas prospects in that area and sharp
differences over the proposed method of delimitation are
likely to lead to hard bargaining and some deviations from
the equidistant line in favor of the USSR. The USSR is
also expected to demand some restrictions on Western military
activities on Norway's Arctin continental shelf. Furthermore,
both the USSR and Canada are determined to maintain control
over their Arctic water routes, contending that Arctic
straits are not international waterways. (C)
Probably the most important and potentially contentious
sovereignty issue in the Arctic concerns jurisdiction over
the continental shelf around Svalbard. Norway has no pressing
economic need to exploit the mineral resources of the Svalbard
shelf. If exploration rights are eventually granted, they
will probably be given to the State-owned company. Statoil.
Western firms will probably be reluctant to invest heavily
in exploration beyond Svalbard's territorial sea without
Norwegian approval. The USSR will probably continue to
seek a preferred relationship vis-a-vis Norway, with the
hope of eventually establishing Svalbard as a condominium.
The USSR is not expected to accept any settlement of the
Svalbard issue that would give Western countries unrestricted
control over offshore structures in the Barents Sea. (C)
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OOUNOARY REPRESENTATION 11
NOT NECENNARILY AUTHONITATIVE
490
Nautical Mlles
400