POSSIBLE PARTITION LINES FOR CYPRUS

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1
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RIPPUB
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U
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23
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November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 7, 1999
Sequence Number: 
5
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Publication Date: 
December 1, 1974
Content Type: 
REPORT
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. , ,' zu.l2elea5~ 9 9 9 510 9/2 ; G#A-RDP8&T006081~b002U0230005-1.. ; ' " ~ ' ' s ~ - , : i., ~4pproYed- C I AC~B ! R P 7 l OU 1 f:1 O P yprus"' ~D"~c 74~ o bl~~a t.it r ~ on nes.. ~~~~I R R~ '75-~12 os r i ,TO Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 For Official Use Only Possible Partition Lines For Cyprus BGI RP 75-12 Decewdbeo 1974 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USI ONLY ^ 25X1A9a In the event of negotiations to attempt to settle the Cyprus problem by partition, delimitation of partition lines will be a major issue. This paper assesses the impact of partition on the economy and population of Cyprus, first under the de facto partition resulting from the Turkish invasion, and then under nine alternative partition lines. These lines are representative of innumerable possible partition lines: some have been selected because they reflect positions taken by Greek Cypriot or Turkish officials, and others are variants of these lines that trade off agricultural, mineral resource, industrial, or tourist areas vital to the economic well-being of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The text should be read in conjunction with the two summary tables and the map at the and of the report. A historical summary of Turkish and Greek involvement in Cyprus is also appended. NOTE -- This Research Paper was produced by the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence. For comments or adnitional information, contact Code 143, Extension 2706. Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 IN Z M Turkish armed forces have captured approximately 40 percent of Cyprus and have gained control of most of the island's key agricultural, mining, manufacturing, tourist, and transportation facilities. The line of Turkish advance extends from a point east of Kokkina., on the southwest coast of Morphou Bay, through the capital city of Nicosia, south- eastward to positions less than ten miles north and northwest of Larnaca, along the British sovereign base of Dhekalia, to a point south of Cyprus's major port, Famagusta. The following key economic areas are within Turkey's zone of occupation. Loss of control over them jeopardizes Greek Cypriot economic survival. More than half of the best cropland -- including all of the highly developed Morphou Bay area; most of the irrigate`. plain of Eastern Messaoria; the island's most productive citrus groves, west of Famagusta and near Karavas and Lapithos in Kyrenia's Serrakhis Valley; and the second best potato growing region on Cyprus, along the Nicosia-Morphou road. Cultivated areas include more than half of the island's acreage in wheat, barley, potatoes, citrus, carrots, and olives. A Major copper mining region south of Lefka that includes operations of the largest copper company, the U.S.-.owned Cyprus Mines Corporation (CMC) . Open pit operations at Apliki and Skouriotissa and the Mavrovouni underground mine produce more than 18,000 tons of copper annually. The popular Kyrenia and Famagusta tourist areas, depriving Greek Cypriots of a flourishing, Greek-owned hotel business. State and privately owned forests that produce roughly one-third of the island's timber.' Major areas include the Korno-Kyparissovouno, -2- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Buffavento, I-felevga, Koronia, Akradhes, Apostoles Andreas, Salamis, Kormakiti-Ayia Irini, and parts of the Patho forest. Light industries in the Nicosia and Famagusta areas that process local products for both home consumption and export -- such as wineries, carob-processing plants, metal works, and timber mills. All of the perennial springs in the Kyrenia mountain range -- three of which, located near Kythrea and Lathos, are according to Greek claims the best on the island. The effects of this partition are potentially disastrous to the Greek Cypriot cont.unity. Most of the area remaining under Greek control is moun- tainous terrain (Troodos Mountains and foothills), where grazing, viticulture, olive growing, mining (copper, iron pyrites, and chromite), lumbering, and tourism are the chief occupations. Prime agricultural land left to the Greek Cypriots -- the fertile lowland areas of the eastern Messaorian Plain and narrow coastal strips -- includes less than half of the island's acreage in wheat, barley, potatoes, and citrus crops. It is unlikely that food grown in the Greek zone could support a popu- lation of 356,000 indigenous Greek Cypriots boosted by some 147,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from the Turkish zone who might have to be resettled there. Continued Turkish occupation of most of Cyprus's prime agricultural lands -- as well as its industrial parks, highways, and tourist facilities -- would leave the Greek Cypriot population in a state of severe economic crisis, with reduced production, underemployment, sharply curtailed foreign. trade, food shortages, and a general decline in the standard of living. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The first eight lines (A-I-I) are in order of increasing advantage for the Greek Cypriots. Lines A through D fall reasonably close to Turkish claims based on the Attila Line. Lines G and I-I probably go beyond the limits of Turkish acceptance. Line I illustrates a Turkish proposal made in Geneva during the cease-fire period following Phase One of the invasion of Cyprus. It would create Turkish coastal enclaves. Line A is the only partition of the nine in which Turkish Cypriots would receive a greater share of the island than that originally claimed by Turkey in August 1974. Line B divides the island alqng the Attila Line, as proposed by Turkey in 1964 and again in early August 1974. Line F reflects in part proposals made by the Greek Cypriots. Line H illustrates a partition in which the size of the Turkish zone would correspond roughly to the proportion of the Turkish Cypriot population (18 percent). Lines C. D, E, and G are intermediate amines based on key economic factors that would probably be raised in negotiations for Turkish withdrawal from their line of farthest advance. Line A Line A is between the line of the farthest advance of the Turkish armed forces and the Attila Line. Its adoption would return to Greek Cypriot control 167 square miles of land, much of it under irrigation,, as well as the important Kouklia and Ayios Nikolaos reservoirs, the southern portion of the city of Famagusta with its nearby beach resorts, and the key roads connecting Nicosia with Famagusta and Larnaca. East of Nicosia, Turkey would retain control over 67 square miles of the Messaorian Plain south of the Attila Line, bounded -4- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY by the Nicosia-Fanagusta highway through Asha and Vatili to Lysi. and by a. secondary road connecting Lysi with Prastio. From Prastio, Line A follows the highway Lo Famagusta and divides the port city, leaving the old (Turkish) part of town and the harbor under Turkish control. Although the return of 121 square miles of good arable land, plus two important reservoirs in the Famagusta area, would significantly benefit Greek Cypriots, partition along Line A would leave the Greek Cypriot population in an only slightly better eco,Lomic situation than partition along the line of farthest Turkish advance. Farm pro- duction and employment would still fall far short of meeting the requirements of some 503,000 people, and Greek Cypriots would bitterly oppose such a settlement. Line B Line B is the so-called Attila Line, a division of the island proposed by Turkey in Geneva in early August 1974, which generally coincides with the 1964 proposal of the Turkish Communal Chamber. It runs from Kokkina to the Nicosia-T roodos Mountains highway south of the Skouriotissa copper mine and follows this highway to Nicosia, passing just north of the international airport. In Nicosia, the Attila line will probably be defined as the line dividing Turkish- and Greek-settled portions of the city. East of Nicosia, the line probably runs along the road leading northeastward from Nicosia to Palekythro and Exometokhi. Near Exometokhi it joins the old Nicosia-Famagusta highway and proceeds eastward to Famagusta via Angastina, Prastio, and Gaidhouras. The significant difference from Line A is the return to Greek control. of 67 square miles of the Messaorian Plain, most of it irrigated fields under wheat and barley cultivation. Economic survival for Greek and Turkish Cypriots will depend to a large degree on how much of the fertile Messaorian Plain each controls. Line B would partition that area as follows: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE. ONLY Greek Control Turkish Control* Cropland 692 sq. mi. (57'0) 456 sq. mi.. (3810) Irrigated Cropland 168 sq. mi. (460) 184 sq. mi. (500) Barley Cultivation 88 sq. mi. (4410) 90 sq. mi. (450) Wheat Cultivation 36 sq. mi. (33%) 67 sq. mi. (6210) * Remainder is under British control. Although Line B provides the Greek Cypriot population of some 503,000 persons with more than two-thirds of the island's croplands and nearly half of its irrigated lands, the Greek majority would still face a difficult economic situation. Much of their land would still be in the rugged Troodos Mountains. Food production by Greek Cypriots would be insufficient, and they would depend heavily on imports and foreign aid. Greek population density would increase from a pre-invasion level of 181 to some 219 persons per square mile. Weighing these factors against the possibility that Turkey may be persuaded to moderate its _'Attila Line claims somewhat, Greek Cypriots would probably consider Linu B negotiable and seek a more favorable partition of the island. The Turkish Cypriot population of some 116,000, on the other hand, would profit handsomely. Much more land would be gained in the north than would be given up in the south. The average population density in the Turkish-held area would drop from a pre-invasion level of 185 to 99 per square mile. In addition, Turkish Cypriots would retain almost all of the key economic centers. Having proposed the Attila Line originally, Turkey would probably accept a partition settlement along Line B. Line C Line C incorporates a trade-off of territory north and south of the Attila Line (Line B) as a result of which Greek Cypriots would gain a net 51 square miles of intensively cultivated irrigated farmland. Compared with Line B, Turkey would lose -6- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY some 32 square miles of coastal land in the Morphou Bay region and some 45 square miles of farmland west and northeast of Nicosia. In turn, it would gain control over some 26 square miles of irrigated Messaorian cropland south of the Attila Line some 9 miles east of Nicosia. The westernmost section of Line C begins at Petra Tou Limniti, rocky islands in Morphou Bay, and follows secondary roads southward through the villages of Limnitis, Loutros, and Galini to the mountain peak Moutti Tis Pallouras (2,377 ft) . It then turns east and winds along the foothills of the Troodos Mountains to the village of Evrykhou on the main Nicosia-Troodos-Limassol Highway. Along this segment of the boundary, Greek Cypriots would regain the settlement of Kokkina and 14 other villages. Between Evrykhou and Nicosia, the parti- tion line follows the Attila line to the village of Astromeritis, then swings north to Kato Kopia, from where it follows a secondary road to Nicosia via Yero-Lakhos. This northward detour of the line returns to Greek control some 38 square miles of an intensely cultivated citrus region along the Serrakhis River. East of Nicosia, the partition line follows the old Famagusta road via Trakhon, Palekythro, Asha, Mousoulita, and Prastio. Along this stretch, Turkey would lose 7 square miles of land extending northeastward from Nicosia, including the industrial park near Mia Milea, but would gain a 26-square-mile bulge of irrigated Messaorian farmland between Trakhoni and the town of Asha. Partition along Line C obtains for Greek Cypriots a slightly better terrain and economic posture than that offered by Turkey under the Attila Line proposal. With minor territorial gains, including the return of some light industry, the economic condition of Greek Cypriots would improve somewhat from that under Line B but would remain basically untenable. Greek Cypriots would most likely bargain for a larger slice of arable land. from the Messaorian Plain. Turkey, on the other hand, may consider the net loss from the Attila Line as minimal and may be willing to settle the Cyprus issue along Line C. -7- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Line D Adoption of Line D would return to Greek Cypriot control the Lefka copper mining region and the western half of the Morphou Bay area in exchange for the Messaorian Plain area south of the Attila Line and east of Nicosia described under Line A. Ankara has already indicated its willingness to consider the return of the Lefka copper mining region to Greek Cypriots. The trade would net the Greeks 25 square miles of land over partition by Line B. The Greek area under Line D would be 26 square miles less than under Line C, but Greeks would gain valuable economic resources. The Lefka region includes not only the copper mines of the U.S.-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation (at Apliki, Skouriotissa, and Mavrovouni) and its flotatio.: and leaching plant at Xeros, but also a conveyor- belt loading installation for iron pyrite ore owned by the Hellenic Mining Co. at Karavostasi on Morphou Bay. The latter has a ship loading capacity of 1000 tons of ore per hour. The Lefka mining region accounts for approximately two-thirds of Cypriot mineral production and mineral export earnings. Partition Line D begins some 4 miles northeast of Lefka and follows a single-lane hard surfaced road through the villages Elea, Petra, and Angolemi, to Kato Koutraphas on the Nicosia-Troodos-Limassol highway. From here it follows Line A via Nicosia, Asha, Lysi., and Prastio to Famagusta. Settlement under Line D would give Greek Cypriots control of all the known mineral resources on the island. This factor coupled with a fairly reasonable division of arable land might induce Greek Cypriot negotiators to accept Partition Line D. Turks on the other hand would still retain a large portion of the Messaorian Plain, including some fertile lands south of th,s Attila Line. Line E Line E further reduces Turkish-controlled territory by returning to Greek Cypriots the south- western part of the Morphou region, including the town of Morphou. In the west Line E would be some 8 miles to the north of Line D. It would -8- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY run along the hard-surfaced roads connecting the coastline with the town of Morphou and with the villages of Kato Zodhia and Astromeritis. From Astromeri.tis it would follow Lines A and D through Nicosia, Asha, Lysi, and Prastio to Famagusta. Partition Line E would most likely be acceptable to Greek Cypriots because of the return of 41 square miles of highly prized cropland in the Morphou area, one of the richest agricultural areas in Cyprus, and the town of Morphou, with a pre-invasion population of nearly 7,000 Greek inhabitants. Well provided with water from the Troodos hills, the area produces a multitude of crops and contains large orange and grapefruit groves. The area is also well known for its strawberries, an important export to Europe. Turkish agreement to this partition scheme, however, will depend largely on the value Turkish Cypriots place on the 67 square miles of irrigated agricultural land they would retain in the area east of Nicosia south of the Attila Line. A strong possibility exists that in spite of pre- viously announced willingness to consider giving up the Morphou area, Line E would encounter Turkish objections. Line F This partition would return the entire Morphou Bay area and the Serrakhis Valley, with its extensive citrus orchards, to Greek Cypriot control. It would also boost the Greek Cypriot economy by re- turning sizable timber operations in the Kormakiti- Ayia Irini forest, north of Morphou. The Greek- occupied zone would increase by 177 square miles over that of Line E. Agricultural holdings would offer adequate means of Greek economic survival on the island. Partition Line F reflects in part a Greek Cypriot proposal. However, that proposal included an additional 76 square miles of land east of Tymbcu on the Messaorian Plain. Turkish acceptance of this line is uncertain. Although the Turkish zone contains much of the prime farmland of the Messaorian Plain, it covers only 27 percent of the island -- short of the minimum 30 percent demanded earlier. Under -9- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY this partition only half of the Turkish-controlled area of 924 square miles would be useable for agri- culture or lumbering. The most stre..ious Greek objection to Partition Lines A through F would probably be based on the fact that in all cases the partition line between Prastio and Famagusta virtually isolates the south- eastern tip of Cyprus, a Greek-inhabited triangular area of some 90 square miles. This situation arises because the Nicosia-Famagusta road, which the Turks will probably demand, provides the only good road access to the southern portion of Famagusta and the southeastern tip of Cyprus. This area is bounded on the west by the UK Dhekelia base, and all other roads to it pass through British-controlled territory. It includes a hotel strip south of Famagusta as well as several large settlements -- the most promi- nent of which are Dherinia and Paralimni, Line G offers an alternative that avoids this problem by giving the Greek Cypriots 106 square miles of scenic mountains, forested foothills, and productive farmlands in the province of Kyrenia in exchange for the isolated southeast, which would come unde>i- Turkish Cypriot control. Although the Greek Cypriots would lose the port of Famagusta and its coastal resort strip as well as some productive farmland, they would gain some scenic West Kyrenian tourist areas, including the historic settlements of Lapithos, Lambousa, and Myrtou. The trade-off in territory would result in a net gain of 15 square miles for the Greeks. The partition line starts 3 miles west of the port of Kyrenia and runs south across the Kyrenian mountain range, passing west of the famous Byzantine castle of St. Hilarion (which would remain in Turkish hands), and then skirts the main highway from Kyreniu to Nicosia. From Nicosia it follows Lhe Famagusta road south of Mia Milea, Trakhoni, and Mousoulita to Famagusta. Some 2 miles northwest of Famagusta it swings south to the Ayios Nikoleos Reservoir and then follows the eastern boundary of the UK base territory of Dhekelia to the sea. -10- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Greek acceptance of Partition Line G would depend on their ultimate willingness to give up the port of Famagusta and nearby sea resorts for other major gains (tourist areas and citrus groves) that would generate quick revenue with which to pay for food products they would have to import. Turkish interest in this partition may be aroused by some of its strategic, economic, and political benefits. The line places under Turkish control most of the northern and all of the eastern coastline of the island, the port of Famagusta, and the best sea resorts of the island along Famagusta Bay. In addition, it offers undisputed control over large fresh water lakes west and south of Famagusta which feed irrigation projects. Although the Turkish zone would be slightly smaller than one-fourth of the island (23.5%) , it would still allow the Turkish population more than adequate living space. Line G would give the Turks a common boundary with the UK sovereign base territory of Dhekelia. This could provide Turkish Cypriot farmers the opportunity to cultivate some of the British territory. It could also lead to future Turkish Cypriot acquisitions should the British decide to leave the island. Despite the advantages Partition Line G offers the Turks, their agreement to this solution would depend on the difficulty of reaching an agreement under any of the other partition plans and on their reluctance to settle for so much less territory than was originally demanded. Line H This line illustrates a partition in which the size of the Turkish zone would correspond roughly to the 18 percent of tho Turkish Cypriot minority on the island. It is based on the proclaimed Greek willingness to divide the island according to the size of the ethnic population. The Turkish zone would cover 744 square miles, approximately 21 percent of the island. The partition line generally follows the Kyrenia-Nicosia and the Nicosia-Famagusta highways. It encloses into the Turkish zone the Karpas Peninsula, most of the Kyrenia mountain range, and the city of Kyreni a, the Turkish sector of Nicosia, and the old city of Famagusta. -11- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOR OFFICIAL USL ONLY Partition along this line would return to Greek Cypriot control much more territory than the Turks are currently willing to consider. It would amount to surrender of approximately half of the territory they now hold -- including all of the Lefka copper mining area, the Morphou citrus region, and the intensively farmed irrigated area south of the Attila Line. Clearly favoring Greek Cypriots, this settlement plan would probably be rejected by the Turks. Line I This set of lines presents a cantonal approach to partition of the island and illustrates the alternative Turkish proposal made at Geneva during the cease fire period following the first phase of the invasion. In this scheme, five autonomous Turkish Cypriot cantons would be carved out of the island. The main canton would consist of the northeastern portion of the island, and the others would be la..?ge enclaves near Larnaca, Paphos, Polis, and Lefka. Built-in weaknesses in this partition adversely affect both Turkish and Greek interests in the long run. The ports of Famagusta, Kyrenia, and possibly Paphos would be controlled by Turks. A Turkish enclave would probably include part of the port of Larna.-a. Greeks would control most of the island's arable lands and mining areas, but Turks would control the sources of much of the water supply and most of the coastal tourist attractions. The four Turkish enclaves would be isolated far from the main Turkish canton. Sur- rounded by Greek territory and a hostile Greek Cypriot majority population, the Turkish inhabitants would find themselves in a difficult economic and military position. Turkey now considers Line I impractical and would probably reject it. President Makarios, however, recognized its advantages for the Greek Cypriots and recently stated that it would be his first choice in dividing the island. Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 FOIL OFFICIAL USL ONLY Appendix HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Turkish claims to Cyprus, particularly those to the northern region of Kyrenia, reach as far back as the 16th century. The Greek-inhabited island of Cyprus was conquered in 1571 by the Turks, who ruled the island until 1878 when it came under British occupation and administration. The island remained nominally Turkish territory, however, and it was not until after the outbreak of war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1914 that it was annexed to the British Crown. Following World War I, the Turkish Republic renounced all rights to Cyprus, and it became a British Crown Colony in 1925. Turkey renewed its historic claim to the island after World War IT when it became increasingly concerned over the status of some 104,000 Turkish Cypriots sprinkled. throughout the island. Agitation for union with Greece (enosis), violence and guerilla warfare against the British in 1955, intercommunal strife and bloodshed between 1958 and 1960, and finally the establishment of a Greek-oriented independent republic under Arch- bishop Makarios in August 1960 have heightened Ankara's desire for a presence on the island. The unequal distribution of wealth and real estate )etween Turkish and Greek Cypriots -- with Greeks enjoying a better standard of living and controlling mo,.-t of the choice farmland, businesses, and administrative positions -- has long been a source of irritation on the Turkish. mainland. Turkey's role in Cypriot affairs increased signif- icantly in the wake of blood, intercommunal strife in the early Makarios years. The subsequent estab- lishment of Turkish Cypriot enclaves for better protection against overwhelming Greek odds has led to Turkish Cypriot economic dependence on Turkey in the form of a substantial annual subsidy in support of the enclaves. The long awaited justification for a Turkish invasion of the island was finally provided by Athens in July 1974 when the Greek Junta inspires' a coup tha'.t overthrew the Makarios regime and established a pro-enosis government on the island. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 F01t OFPICIAh USE ONLY Estimated Population Density in a Divided Cyprus* (per square mile) Greek-Cypriot Turkish-Cypriot Zone Zone Farthest 243 83 Advance A 225 B 219 ?? Based on 1972 data: Overall population of Cyprus -- 645,000; Greeks -- 503,000; Turks -- 116,000; others -- 26,000. (Estimated population for January 1975 is 670,000.) 214 104 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 PRODUCTIVE LAND AVAILABILITY IN A DIVIDED CYPRUS* (In Square Miles) Lino GREEK ZONE TURKISH ZONE inrthost advance 2067 (60%) 1404 (40?0) A 2234 (64?0) 1237 (360/0) B 2301, (66?0) 1170 (34?,0) C 2352 (68%) 1119 (32?,0) D 2326 (67?0) 1145 (33%) E 2370 (68?,0) 1101 (32%) F 2547 (73?,0) 924 (27%) G 2636 (760/0) 835 (24%) H 2727 (7~1%) 744 (21%) I 2445 (700/0) 1026 (30'0) Line GREEK ZONE TURKISH ZONE Farthest advance 891 (580/0) 641 (42?,0) A 1012 (66%) 520 (340/0) B 1062 (69%) 470 (31%) C 1080 (70%) 452 (30%) D 1070 (70%) 462 (300/'0) E 11.11 (730/0) 421 (27%) F 1172 (770/0) 360 (23%) G 1189 (78%) 343 (22%) H 1232 (80%) 300 (20%) I 1135 (740/o) 397 (26%) Lino GREEK ZONE TURKISH ZONE Farthest ndvanco 365 (71%) 148 (29%) A 370 (72%) 143 (28%) B 370 (720/0) 143 (289'0) C 389 (760/0) 124 (240/0) D 400 (760,0) 113 (2200) E 400 (780/0) 113 (22%) F 425 (83?0) 88 (170/0) G 434 (85%) 79 (150/0) H 434 (85%) 79 (15%) 368 (72%) 145 (28%) Line GREEK ZONE TURKISH ZONE Fart hoot advance 174 (320/0) 364 (680/0) A 229 (43?o) 309 (570/'0) B 275 (51%) 263 (490/0) C 267 (50%) 271 (50?0) D 242 (450/0) 296 (550/0) E 258 (48%) 280 (520/0) F 299 (56%) 239 (440,,0) G 360 (67%) 178 (330/0) H 388 (720//0) 150 (280/0) 308 (57%) 230 (43%) *Excludes British Sovereign Base Territories of Dhekelia and Akrotiri: Total area 101 square miles-includes 35 square miles of cropland, 25 square miles irrigated land, and 12 square miles of forest. A-RDP__86T00608R000200230005-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Possible Partition Lines for Cyprus rr~r~ yy L- in - -^~ Proposed Partition Tine Atilla line -- -- Line of farthest Turkish advance Regional boundary U.K. sovereign base boundary Sparse forest and brush; grazing and Mediterranean-type agriculture with grain, M A Asbestos Ch Chromate Cu Copper FeS Pyrites A Petroleum refinery ' Nyrtvi;a /may J .~--~ RENIA Ncrns~~~ Nicest as F 0 14 k.~?r Cu r ~aln or?~y~ ~~~qqq CU Ch A Fa J Panu All; b)IlydQ!? OS.'r'MTS .cuIFOS t Nalavasos' L;. n & e t 1.1, raphos 11~k/' Bulgaria 1999/09/27 : Cl1 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Line "IE" c U,' Line "H" roved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-R DP86T00608R000200230005-1 L'ftie I" Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Lii r . ' "C", 33 30' Ch j~~ `,AniI,)ndas' - larnj CC~ '~/~~// lmiassol Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0002002300 ',_aniarusla Gree t Turkish Other IN. Klima 11.000 Bulgaria Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 opulation and Major Ethnic Groups llmaasol 48.000 M Turkish enclave Area of Greek control ? Village with both Turks and Greeks -District boundary ? District administrative seat e National capital Districts have the same names as their administrative scats, with the exception of Paphos District and its conic,, Klima. /'.,Cape Arnaud I Khrysokhou Buy Lnchip1??Olis Dhroushar ':~;~ urkish Enclaves Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Turkey SCALC; I NOR Kilo Porno, Point Syria SCALE 1:14,200,000 100 700 300 400 )L) r,, 9 100 200 300 _400 P Sna "\ Kilomulera - Petra Too Llmnnl kkinn (Cope) mule -~. ^ y - L,iutr a? `'\_ KAGwnslnsi Galini X 7s Morphou Bay AISiIOTIRI r UK'soverelgp ~ofk0 -1PUlf4 ~Ap. Skouriotlsmu SCI i c CO1S, i ( ~Dhnli Mitsoro t Pyln CuriuAu (Ruins) Cepe- Zevgnri N'anokhr/ ~ -Morpfiou 1 `- .. Kato'Zodhml' ?. ~/ , Argaki II~nto +.' , \\ Kbpin Aslronloril? Salt Lake, ...~:w~-.~.. .-,..,. :1.:....... -. Kormakilir.f - ': .-... Knrnvtin l -TQ-- npithos 0, J3G0. Myrtou~ La(.nnka' .'J St. Hilurlonf Kato 3151?. /.J :;Y ros ~.~ /Y h Trakhonl " a m a ? ? omot Mip Miloa?, , Pntuky okhi t / _-_? 1 r) r Orin Kouy Yotolakkos ini onja `.\i ~~~ Ashri`\ Al6~nssn r~ Vnlili Tymbo A '"s Lys, h "VW Kato Koutrnphos / / arnac '2258 ?Pano Lulkarn-,_, Approved For Relggs8ff1RA96qP/87ly CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 S'!' ( r. k . Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Ri;oknrpnuo t .,; :. Yinlnunn, ~lrc~`,t+~,.h r ? Dhnvlo5 P?':r Ahaaetinn ~~",r sir \ I akn/ f' r1ag11SIi1 B a y Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 t ( ~r^s IJ ~Kv hrnn~ -*;Lolkoniko- Trakhotl F a m a g u s t a ? 9 ?~ omclokhi arnac Scale 1:500,000 10 Stalolo M,Iox 5 10 15 Kilo molore Spot alevatlons In feet Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230005-1 Pyla Atilla line Line of farthest Turkish advance --- - -- District boundary Limassoi District administ,ative seat Mine railroad (narrow gauge) Surfaced road Secondary road + Airfield Major port J, Minor Port it Major tourist center Light Industry concentration Populated places O Over 20,000 0 5,000 to 20,000 ? Under 5,000 raslio ? / ?Gititl Kai ~rrd Kdritar,n Salamis (Ruins) iA .- Hr::rnou ~ Larnaca say Mediterranean Sea