WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 131-75.4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 22, 1975
• Content Type: CABLE

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Z- BOLIVIA-- IiU BANZER HAS BEEN PRESIDEN7 OF BOLIVIA FOR
FOUR YEARS, A 'JOTABLE ACHIEVE.-SE T IN ONE OF THE MOST POLITICALLY
TURBULENT COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS LONG TENURE IS THE MORE
REMARKABLE BECAUSE AA!ZER IS (JOT PZRSO3ALLY POPULAR AND HAS LOST
MOST Of THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL SUPPORT HE STARTED UITH.'1
4!E HAS PROVED ADEPY AT THWARTING ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW HIM
AND SKILLFUL IN COLTIVATING THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. FURTHERMORE,
THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC POSITION HAS IMPROVED DURING HIS TENURE,
LARGELY BECAUSE Of THE DEVELOPMENT OF OIL AND NAUTRAL GAS RESOURCES
AND THE RISE IN WORLD PETROLEUM PRICES.Y
VITH POLITICAL ACTIVITY ALMOST NONEXISTENT AND NO IMPORTANT
PRESSURE GROUPS LEANING ON HIM, BAWZER HAS RECENTLY BEEN STRESSING
BROAD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IH MOTH FIELDS HE
HAS SOUGHT TO BUILD UP PUBLIC CONFIDENCE BY MAKING PROMISES ACID
OPTIMISTIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. TO DATE THERE HAVE BEEN FEV REAL RESULTS.
THE ECONOMY HAS BENEFITED FROM FOUR YEARS OF RELATIVE TRANOUILLITY
AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTINUITY- DET!ITE THESE FACTORS AND AN
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ABUNDAI"CE Of NATURAL RESOURCES, BOLIVIA REMAINS THE POOREST COUNTRY
IN SOUTH AMERICA?Y
IT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO EXPLOIT ITS II I1E 4SE HYDROELECTRIC POTENTIAL
AND IRON ORE DEPOSITS OR TO 1AKE FULL USE Of ITS PETR_ ='.EUN AND
NATURAL GAS SUPPLIES. THE FAI:J8E IS TRACEABLE TO THE COUNTRY'S
LACK OF SKI-.LED MANPOWER, RUGGED TERRAIN. A,'aD INEPT AND CORRUPT
GOVERNNENTS?Y
A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY 60AL HAS BEEN TO RE6IAN THE SEACOAST
BOLIVIA LOST IN THE 14TH CENTURY WAR PITH CHILE. BANI#R TOOK A
SHORT STEP TOWARD THIS GOAL WHEN HE RECENTLY REOPENED RELATIONS
%ITH SANTIAGO AFTER A 13-YEAR HIATUS. STILL, BANZER'S CHANCES OF
REGAINING BOLIVIA'S SEACOAST ARE REMOTE?Y
HE KNOVS THAT THE MOST BOLIVIA CAN HOPE POR IS BETTER ACCESS
TO CHILEAN PORTS, AND, AFTER WHIPPING UP NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENT FOR
A "RETURN TO THE SEA," HE NOW SAYS BOLIVIA NHHOUL D BE ABLE "00 OBTAIN
A RESOLUTION" Of ITS LANDLOKCD STATUS BY 1960. THIS DISTANT DATE
DOES NOT SIT WELL KITH ULTRA-NATIONALISTS IN THE ARMED FORCES.Y
AT PRESENT BAMZER APPEARS ECURE? MOST Of HIS ENEMIES ARE
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EITHER IN EXILE OF TOO DISORGANIZED TO NOUMT A SERIOUS HOVE AGAINST
HIf?Y
SECURITY IS NOT ABSOLUTE IN BOLIVIA. SOIE CIVILIAN POLITICIANS
HAVE BEGUN TO URGE A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNSIEt4T? SOME
ARMY OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY YOUNGER ONES WHO HAVE SEEN IN ON COUP
PLOTTIUG IN THE PAST+ REPORTEDLY ARE UPSET BY BANZER' S REPEATED
POSTPONEMENT OF A NATIONAL ELECTION OR BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY-
CONTROLLED GOVER4f1ENT SHOULD BE CODIFIED TO INCLUDE CIVILIAUS.Y
TO STAVE OFF ANOTHER ROUND OF COUP ATTEMPTS. BANZER f1AY SOON
ACCEPT A FEN CIVILIANS IN HIS GOVERbNMENT. EVENTUALLY., HO;.EVER.
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THE CHANCES ARC GOOD THAT ONE OF HIS OFFICERS WYIO FEELS THAT IT IS
HAS TURN TO BE PRESIDENT WILL f10VE A~,AINST HIM.
2. CUBA: THE CUBAN ECONOMY IS UNLIKELY TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY
AFFECTED BY THE PARTIAL LIFTING Or THE US EMBARGO, ANNOUNCED Ott
AUGUST 21. TO ALLOW US SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD TO TRADE WITH CU A?Y
YHE$E BILL SE A SHARP JURP IN CUBAN PURCHASES FROM US SU8-
SIDIARIES% f1AINLY IN WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA, ARGENTINA, AND MEXICO,
BUT 110!T Of THE PURCHASES WILL BE DIVERTED FROf1 OTHER FOREIGN
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SUPPLIERS. OVE~,:ALL CUBAN IMPORTS PROBABLY MILL RISE OULY SLIGHTLY-
CUBAN IMPORT C 4."ACITY WILL RE'AIN BASICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE LEVEL OF
SUGAR EXPORTS 4
TmE IMPA,,f."r ON CUBAN ECONOMIC GROWTH IS ALSO EXPECTED TO BE
MARGINAL. V AE PARTS Of THE ECONOMY WILL BENEFIT PROF AN INFLUX
OF US SPARE f.GAXTS, EAUIPMENT, AND ,TECHNOLOGY, BUT OVERALL GROWTH
WILL STILL CXNGE ON CUBA'S ABILITY TO FINANCE INCREASED IMPORTS,
ON SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION Of ECONOMIC REFORMS, AND ON INCREASED
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT; ALL Of THESE ARE ONLY MINIMALLY AFFECTED BY
THE US EMBARGO-Y
IN HAVANA, REACTION WAS IWIFT- ACCORDING TO A REUTERS PRESS
REPORT. PRIME MINISTER CASTRO TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT THE US
DECISION IS A "POSITIVE GESTURE" RECEIVED WITH SATISFACTION BY HIS
GOVERNMENT- HE ADDER. HOWEVER, THAT HE CANNOT BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS
WITH TIE US ON NORMALIZING RELATIONS UNTIL THE MAIN PROVISIONS
OP THE TRADE EMBARGO OF 1962 ARE LIFTED- PRESUMABLY. CASTRO MEANT
THOSE PROVISIONS AFFECTING BILATERAL TRADE- CASTRO SAID THIS DOES
NOT RULE OUT THE CONTINUATION OF PRESENT CONTACTS WITH WASHINGTON,
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AND HE ADDED THAT THERE CAN BE "NEGOTIATIONS ON HOW TO NEGOTIATE."
CASTRO APPEARS CONFIDENT THAT HE ROES NOT HAVE TO RAKE ANY
SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS. HE APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT WASHINGTON
IS UNDER MORE PRESSURE THAN HE IS TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE, ALT30UGH
HE IS OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM TOWARD RECONCILIATION- Y
WHILE THE INITIAL REACTION FROM HAVANA WAS FAVORABLE. SOt1
TW THE LEADERSHIP WILL VIEW THE MOVE AS PRIMARILY AN EF7ORT BY THE
US TO END ITS PROBLEMS WITH GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE URGED HASHIttGTON
TO ALLOY LOCAL SUBSIDIARIES Of US COMPuaIES TO TRADE WITH CUBA.
AS A CONSEQUENCE THE MOST HAVANA IS LIKELY TO DO--IF THAT--IS TO
RELEASE A FEW US POLITICAL PRISONERS.
3W
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i . THAILAND: THE RIOTING IN BANGKOK HAS SUBSIDED, BUT THE
UNDERLYING ISSUES THAT SPARKED WEDNESDAY'S VIOLENCE REMAIN
UNRESOLVED.'
fHE THAI CABINET HAS
AGREED TO REINSTITUTE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST STUDENT AND
FARMER ACTIVISTS ARRESTED LAST WEEK. IT WAS THE GOVE RNMENT'S
DROPPING OF THE CHARGES THAT PROMPTED THE WAVE OF POLICE
PROTESTS.//V
IN REOPENING ITS INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES OF KIDNAP:CNG
AND ARSON AGAINST THE ACTIVISTS, THE GOVERNMENT IS RISKING
A NEW ROUND OF DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE STUDENT COMMUNITY.
IT WAS STUDENT PROTESTS AGAINST THE ARRESTS THAT DROUGHT
ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT DILEMMA.
KHUKRIT NEVER EXPLAINED WHY THE GOVERNMENT DROPPED THE
CHARGES IN THE FIRST PLACE, WHICH GIVES HIM SOME FLE;I3ILITY
IN PLACATING THOSE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE. FOR TKAMPLE,
THE CHARGES COULD AGAIN BE DROPPED IF THE GOVERNMENT
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DETERMINES THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO"PROSECUTE.Y
WHATEVER MEASURES THE GOVERNMENT TAKES TO MEET THE
CURRENT PROBLEM, DISTRUST BETWEEN CONSERVATIVES AND
LEFTISTS IS NOT LIKELY TO EASE- THE CONSERVATIVES MILL SC=E
ANY MOVE BY THE KHUKRIT GOVERNMENT TO AVOID PPOSECIJ PING THE
ACTIVISTS AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS
TO PLACATE DEMONSTRATORS AT THE EXPENSE OF LAW AND ORDER.
LEFTISTS ARE LIKELY TO SEE REOPENING OF THE CASE AS A SHAi~P
MOVE TOWARD THE NIGHT BY THE:' GOVERNMENT AND WILL MOVE QHICKLY TO
OPPOSE IT?Y
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FONM 1 J~
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ORGANIZATION HAVE AGREED TO HOLD A COUNCIL MEETING IN NEW YORK
ON SEPTEMBER 24 AT WHICH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION ?.S
EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSED. THAI FOREIGN MINISTER CHATCHAT.
CHUNHA'.JAIl (JILL CHAIR T-ice CO 1~ "_i:..'!CE !.iNIDICATI)iNS ARE THE S . C
WILL BE GRADUALLY PHASED OUT OVER A TWO- OR THREE-YEAR PERIOD,
ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SOME PRESSURE TO DISSOLVE THE OR(:.`.`.IiATTON
SOONER. THE MANILA TREATY UILL PROBABLY BE RETAINED AND THE
NONMILITARY SEATO FUNC T IOr+; TRA`,SFERRED TO OTHER ORGANIZATION:.
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1. ISRAEL-SYRIA: THE ISRAELI PRESS IS SPECULATING ABOUT
THE POSSIBILITY THAT TEL AVIV MAY MAKE LIMITED CONCESSIONS TO
DAMASCUS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ISSUE IF ANOTHER INTERIM AGREENE NT
WITH EGYPT IS CONCLUDED. PRESS COMMENTATORS SUGGEST THAT THE
ISRAELI GESTURE WOULD BE INTENDED TO MEET US DESIRES TO HAVE
SOMETHING FOR PRESIDENT ASAD TO GO WITH AN ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN
ACCORD.V
THE PRESS GIVES NO INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS
PREPARED TO ALTER ITS BASIC NEGOTIATING POSITION THAT NO MAJOR
ISRAELI PULLBACK IS POSSIBLE ON THE GOLAN IN THE Anna OF A FINAL
PEACE TREATY WITH SYRIA.V
THE COLUMNISTS INDICATE THAT TEL AVIV HAS IN MIND ONLY
"COSMETIC" CHANGES ON THE GOLAN, EITHER AS A UNILATERAL GESTURE IN
CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION O" A NF 9 SINAI AG3EEt1ENT OR :'.S
THE RESULT OF NFGO T IA 7IO''JS UI T H ;:,YRIA. THE CHANGES QOUQ TAKE THE
FORM OF SOME MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TN THE PRESENT DI ZEN 16Er NT L.'. AE,
FOR I.NS T ANCE, TO EIIAHLE THE SYRIANS TO REPOPULATE MORE EASILY SO!1E
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.^, baoDnni:,^?in?. ,v (1TIHIR Tl..\V T.1c l ,SUING OFHIC?_ !S
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OF THE VILLAGES IN THE AREA.Y
RECENT STATEMENTS BY DEFENSE MINISTER PERES THAT THE GOV.R?JMENT
IS READY TO RENEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA FOR AN INTERIM AGi';E MEN f
PROVIDED THIS DID NOT LEAD TO THE R :MOV,1L OF A Sll'J'I_F 1.)'=!.JTSH
SETTLEMENT ON THE GOLAN, SUPPORT THIS VIEW. SOME OF THE- SE-i'TI-L"PIENTS
ARE VERY CLOSE TO THE DISENGAGEMENT LINE.Y
PERES' CONDITION HOLDS OUT LITTLE HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR
AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL- PRIME MINISTER RABINJ, FOR
THIS VERY REASON, IS KNOWN TO FAVOR NEGOTIATIONS ONLY FOR A FINAL
PEACE TREATY.Y
THE INCREASED PRESS ATTENTION NOW GIVEN THE. GO)-AN T SIJE IN
ISRAEL SUGGESTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE BECOMING NO;-\1E AWARE
THAT SYRIAN DEMANDS MUST SOi1EHOW BE CONSIDERED IN Y 'HE PRESENT
NEGOTIATING PROCESS. MANY ISRAELIS WILL, IN FACT, SUSPECT THAT P:RES'
STATEMENTS AND THE GRO:IJING MEDIA COVERAGE ARE PART OF A C04' Ei'~IP1r ;JT
CAMPAIGN TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC FOR AN EARLY I:ESUMPTION OF T;iLKS DN
X1 THIS ISSUE.
2. INDIA: A MEMBER OF PRIME MINISTER GANDHI'S LEGAL D`F!:NSE
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STAFF SAYS HER GOVERNMENT IS FORMULATING PLANS TO I EDU(E SIGNIFICANTLY
THE POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY. THE POWER OF JUDICIIAL 1;EVI~_W REPOR'T'EDLY
WILL BE FURTHER CURTAILED, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS ON THE F'ENCii
MODEL EST .48L ISHr D TO HANIDLE ECONOMIC AND C.
CONSTITUTE THE BULK OF 1HE JLIDICIARY'S BUSINESS.''
THE REVISIONS ARE EXPECTED SOMETIME AFTER THE SUPREME (:OURT
DECIDES ON THE VALIDITY OF THE RECENTLY ENACTED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT THAT RETROACTIVELY PLACES A PRIME MINISTCR'S FLECTION
TO PARLIAMENT OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS. ON A1.IGUST
25, FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREI'IE COURT, INCLUDING THE CHIEF JUS'TICr
WILL BEGIN HEARINGS ON THE AMENDMENT- GANDHI MAINTAINS THAT THE
AMENDMENT DOES NOT ALTER THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF 'I'H.:- CONSTITUTION AND
THEREFORE IS VALID. IF THE COURT CONCURS, THE CASE AGAINST GANDHI
FOR ELECTION VIOLATIONS IN 1971 WILL ALI1OST CERTAINLY BE VOIDED
IMMEDIATELY.'
ALTHOUGH FOUIR OF THE FIVE JUSTICES WHO WILL RULE. ON Tii-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DISPUTED AMENDMENT APPEAR TO FAV'>' (ANDHI,
THE COURT IS SENSITIVE A30UT ITS INDEPENDENCE AND MAY PROI_O`1G THE
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HEARINGS BEYOND THE ANTICIPATED TWO WEEKS OR EVEN RULE AG,AImST
HER. IN THE EVENT OF AN ADVERSE RULING, GANDHI MAY ONCE AGAIN TURN
TO PARLIAMENT, WHICH IS SUBSERVIENT TO HER, TO SECURE i HEI
POSITION. SHE MIGHT-, F f):\' EXAl"'.1PLE, CONVE~;T IT INTO CONSTI1!J`I; T
ASSEMBLY THAT WOULD MAKE ft JO' CHANGES IN THE G^VER-NMENTAL STF'UCTU E,
INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LESS POWERFUL JUDICIARY. GANDHI
INSISTS THAT PARLIAMENT SHOULD HAVE SUPREMACY OVER THE COURTS,
ARGUING THAT LEGISLATORS
A MAJORI
TY OF THE PEOPLE, UHILE
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THE JUDICIARY SPEAKS ONLY FCF
PRIVILEGED
MINORITY.
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1. PORTUGAL: U112i 11111aAN APPARENT LAST-MINUTE EFFORT BY
CONTENDERS IN THE PORTUGUESE POWER STRUGGLE TO LINE UP MILITARY
SUPPORT HAS SET OFF A WAVE OF RUMORS IN LISBON THAT A COUP
IS IMMINENT. THE POWER STRUGGLE COULD JUST AS WELL DEGENERATE
INTO CLASHES BETWEEN MILITARY UNITS BACKING RIVAL IDEOLOGICAL
APPROACHES-9
THERE WERE REPORTS THURSDAY NIGHT THAT A MILITARY ALERT HAS
BEEN DECLARED IN COIMBRA,.HEADQUARTERS OF THE CENTRAL MILIT.?\RY
REGION. SOME HIGH-RANKING MILITARY LEADERS, INCLUDING GENERAL
OTELO DE CARVALHO AND ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FABIAOi MET IN
COII'IBRA THURSDAY IN WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN A STRATEGY SESSION.
THE COMMUNIST PARTY, WHICH MAY HAVE GOTTEN WIND OF THESE OR
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MILITARY, CHAK:-ED LAST NIGHT THAT
THE CHANCE OF A RIGHT-WING MILITARY COUP HAS INCREASED."
ON THURSDAY, PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES REPORTEDLY MET AGAIN WITH
MELO ANTUNES, LEADER OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST FACTION IN THE
MILITARY, APPARENTLY TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE ULTIMATUM ANTUNES
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AND CARVALHO PRESENTED THE PRESIDENT FOR THE "
REMOVAL OF PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS,
ANTUNES TOLD COSTA GOMES THAT ANY MILITARY MOVE TO KEEP GONCALVES
IN POWER COULD BE DEFEATED IN A MATTER OF HOURS. SO FAR?, COSTA
GOMES HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION OF HOW HE WILL RESPOND.Y
THE PRIME MINISTER VOWED AGAIN ON THURSDAY THAT HE WOULD
FIGHT TO THE END TO RETAIN POWER. IN FACT, HE SEEMS TO HAVE
PICKED UP SOME SUPPORT WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. THE NAVY
REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY VOTEDI ITO CONTINUE BACKING ILLCLIb
THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.-IT COUPLED THIS ACTION WITH A STATEMENT
OF SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL ACTION PLAN DRAWN UP BY OFFICERS
ASSOCIATED WITH CARVALHO.Y
PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES' ARDENT SUPPORTERS IN THE
COMMUNIST PARTY ARE BACKING AWAY. ON TUESDAY, PORTUGUESE
COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER ALVARO CUNHAL CONCEDED AT A PRESS
CONFERENCE THAT THE GONCALVES GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE
NECESSARY SUPPORT AND SAID THE COMMUNISTS ARE PREPARED TO
CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES.Y
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GONCALVES' OUSTER WOULD BE THE MOST SERIOUS OF MANY FLOWS
FOR THE COMMUNISTS IN RECENT WEEKS. CUNHAL SAID HE BELIEVES
MILITARY OFFICERS FAVORING THE COMMUNISTS WILL NOW BE
PURGED, A PROCESS THAT HAS ALREADY BEGUN, AND THAT THE ARMED
FORCES MOVEMENT, WHICH THE COMMUNISTS HAVE EXPLOITED SO
EFFECTIVELY, MAY NO LONGER HOLD THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL
POWER. CUNHAL ADDED THAT THE ARMED FORCES COULD "QUICKLY
BECOME AN INSTRUMENT OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION." HE IMPLIED THAT
THEY COULD TURN THEIR GUNS AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS-Y
2. ITALY: ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEADERS ARE STILL.
GRAPPLING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S
UNPRECEDENTED GAINS IN THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IN
JUNE. THE MAIN CONTROVERSY CENTERS' ON THE CONTINUING TRE13ND
TOWARD CLOSER {RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS AND THE
SOCIALIST PARTY, WHICH IS PLEDGED TO SUPPORT THE MORO
GOVERNMENT IN PARLIAMENT.Y
SINCE THE ELECTIONS, THE SOCIALISTS HAVE SHOWN A CLEAR
PREFERENCE FOR ALLIANCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS IN THE NEW REGIONAL
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AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THE SOCIALISTS, WHO GAINED MODERATELY
IN THE ELECTIONS, NOW SHARE POWER WITH THE COMMUNISTS IN MOST
MAJOR ITALIAN CITIES, 5 OF THE 20 REGIONS, AND NEARLY A THU>
OF THE 94 PROVINCES.'
SOCIALIST LEADER DE MARTINO HAS REBUTTED CRITICISM FROM
THE OTHER PARTIES THAT PARTICIPATE IN OR SUPPORT THE MORO
GOVERNMENT--THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, Ai'ID
REPUBLICANS--B3Y MAINTAINING THAT HE IS AGAINST A
SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST COALITION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. SUCH AN
ALLIANCE WOULD NOT CONTROL A MAJORITY IN THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT,
BUT THAT COULD CHANGE AFTER THE NEXT NATIONAL ELECTION, WHICH
MUST BE HELD NO LATER THAN 1977.'
DE MARTINO DREW ADDITIONAL FIRE FROM THE OTHER PARTIES
LAST WEEK BY SIGNING A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH COMMUNIST CHIEF
BERLINGUER ON THE SITUATION IN PROTGUAL. THE COMMUNIQUE CALLED
FOR A POLITICAL AGREEMENT IN PORTUGAL BETWEEN THE "DEMOCRATIC"
PARTIES-INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS-AND THE AIRMED FORCES MOVE1ENT.Y
THE FACT THAT DE MARTINO ASSOCIATED HIMSELF IN A JOINT
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L.
STATEMENT WITH BERLINGUER DREW MORE CRITICISM THAN THE DOCUMENT
ITSELF. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS HAVE CONSULTED
DISCREETLY ON POLICY MATTERS IN RECENT YEARS, THEY HAVE NOT
ISSUED JOINT COMMUNIQUES SINCE THE DISSOLUTION OF THEIR COMMON
"FRONT" IN 195?.Y
BERLINGUER, FOR HIS PART-1 SCORED A MAJOR GAIN BY SIGNING
A JOINT DOCUMENT ON A FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE WITH A PARTY THAT
HAS PARTICIPATED IN MORE ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS FOR MORE THAN A
DECADE. THAT WILL HELP HIM DEFLECT THE RENEWED CRITICISM HE HAS
COME UNDER AS A RESULT OF HIS PARTY'S RECENT SIGNING OF A JOINT
COMMUNIQUE ON PORTUGAL AWITH THE SOVIETS THAT SEEMED TO GIVE
STRONGER SUPPORT TO THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS THAN BERLINGUER
HAS IN THEPAST. ON MANY OCCASIONS, HE HAS PUBLICLY STATED HIS
DISAPPROVAL OF PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY.Y
DE MARTINO, ON THE OTHER HAND, WILL BE ABLE TO POINT TO
THE LESS-THAN-REVOLUTIONARY LANGUAGE IN THE DOCUMENT HE SIGNED
WITH 3ERLINGUER TO SUPPORT HIS ARGUMENT THAT ITALY'S COMMUNISTS
ARE DEVELOPING INTO A LEGITIMATE NATIONAL PARTY. THE SOCIALISTS
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HAVE USED THIS LINE TO HELP JUSTIFY GROWING COLLABORATION WITH
THE COMMUNISTS.Y
THE SOCIALISTS, MEANWHILE, HAVE SPELLED OUT WHAT THEY REGARD
AS A SUITABLE SUCCESSOR TO THE MORO GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS ALMOST
CERTAIN TO BE REPLACED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH STILL
OPPOSED TO GIVING THE COMMUNISTS ANY CABINET POSITIONS, THE
SOCIALISTS DESIRE AN ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW THE COMMUNISTS
TO PARTICIPATE INDIRECTLY.Y
LAST WEEK, THE SOCIALISTS POINTED TO THE REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATIONS IN LOMBARDY AND CAMPANNIA AS MODELS FOR THE NEXT
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNISTS ARE EXCLUDED FROM
DEMOCRATS AND SOCIALISTS IN THOSE AREAS, THE TWO PARTIES HAVE AGREED
TO NEGOTIATE FORMALLY WITH THE COMMUNISTS ON THE REGIONAL LEGISLATIVE
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3. SPAIN: THE MEETINGS GENERAL FRANCO IS HOLDING THIS WEEK
WITH HIS DESIGNATED SUCCESSOR, PRINCE JUAN CARLOS, HAVE SPARKED
SPECULATION THAT AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL ANNOUNCEMENT MAY BE '.MADE
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REL FA91NG OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTNf.NTICAT-I. OYFICE R
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xi
FRANCO HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT HE IS READY TO TURN OVER
HIS POWERS TO THE PRINCE, THOUGH RUMORS OF SUCH A MOVE CROP UP
PERIODICALLY. THERE IS A UIDE R;9ANGE OF OTHER POSSIBLE TOP:IC:S.
FOR THE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO, INCLUDING:
--POSSIBLE CABINET CHANGES; RIGHT31ISTS REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN
PRESSING FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER ARIAS, WHO WAS
DAMAGED POLITICALLY BY FRANCO'S RECENT APPOINTMENT OF JOSE
SOLIS RUTZ AS MINISTER SEC_RE.. T ARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL MOVEI'1EN T ? Y
--COUNTERTERRORIST. MEASURES; TOUGH NEW REGULATIONS ARE
PLANNED THAT ARE LIKELY TO DRAW A HOSTILE REACTION FROM SPAIN'S
EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS.Y
--RECENT MILITARY ARRESTS; SOME OF THOSE ARRESTED REPORTEDLY
WERE UCLASSMATES OF THE PRINCE AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY.
4. USSR CSCE: THE SOVIETS HAVE ISSUED AN AU T HORITATI.'VE
INTERPRETATION OF CSCE THAT, NOT SURPi'ISINGLY, R'_ASSERTS CONCEPTS
THEY STRESSED IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.Y
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE !S PPOhfl iiEED
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IN A PRAVDA ARTICLE ON AUGUST 20, THE SOVTETS ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT THE TEN AGREED PRINCIPLES OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS ARE EQUAL,
BUT THEY PUT SPECIAL STRESS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOLABILITY OF
FRONTIERS. PRAVDA DISPUTES CLAIMS THAT THE PRINCIPLE, WHICH
WAS A CENTRAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, BENEFITS
THE EAST MORE THAN THE WEST, ARGUING THAT IT IS VITAL FOR ALL THE
NATIONS OF EUROPE.Y
THE ARTICLE GIVES LOW PRIORITY TO CONFERENCE PROVISIONS
CONCERNING HUMAN CONTACTS. IT SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN
THESE AREAS WILL RESULT -FROM., RATHER THAN ADVANCE, DETENTE. DURING
THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIETS WERE UNABLE TO GET WORDING TO THIS
EFFECT INCORPORATED IN THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENT. THE ARTICLE ALSO
OBSERVES THAT COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN CONTACTS MUST BE
SUBJECT TO THE "LAWS AND TRADITIONS OF EACH STATE"-ANOTHER
FORMULATION THE SOVIETS TRIED, BUT FAILED, 10 HAVE INSERTED IN
THE FINAL TEXT.Y
A MAJOR PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE SEEMS TO BE TO DISABUSE THE
SOVIETS' DOMESTIC AUDIENCE OF ANY NOTION THAT PUBLICATION OF THE:
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FULL TEXT OF THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENT IN PRAVDA AND ASSERTIONS
BY BREZHNEV AND OTHERS THAT MOSCOW WOULD FULFILL ITS CONFERENCE
OBLIGATIONS MEANS THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL LEAD TO MEANINGFUL.
CHANGE IN THEIR DAILY LIVES.
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