EAST ASIA BRIEF 141-75-4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010043-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: September 10, 1975
• Content Type: CABLE

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EAST ASIA BRIEF 141-75.Y
CAMBODIA: PHNOM PENH GAVE PRINCE: SIHANOUK AND HIS PARTY A
FESTIVE WELCOME WHEN THEY ARRIVED I;4 THE CAMBODIAN CAPITAL TUESDAY.Y
THE PRINCE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KHIEU
SAMPHAN. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE SON SEN
DELIVERED THE WELCOMING ADDRESS?Y
THE KHMLP COMMUNISTS APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN TRYING FOR SOME
TIME TO ENTICE SIHANOUK TO RETURN. THE INVITATION, TENDERED TO
THE PRINCE WHEN HE WAS IN PYONGYANG IN MID-JULY, EVIDENTLY WAS
NOT THE FIRST ONE OFFERED HIM. ALTHOUGH SIHANOUK HAS DUTIFULLY
SERVED AS A MOUTHPIECE FOR THE COMMUNISTS SINCE THEIR TAKE-OVER
IN MID-APRIL, THE CAMBODIAN LEADERSHIP IS WELL AWARE OF HIS
RECc)RD OF UNPREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR AND PROBABLY WANTS TO HAVE MORE
CONTROL OVER HIS ACTIONS?Y
THE PRINCE'S CURRENT VISIT TO PHNOM PENH WILL BE SHORT.
HE WILL RETURN TO CHINA TO ATTEND THE NATIONAL DAY CELEBI'sATIONS
ON OCTOBER 1, THEN TRAVEL TO NEW YORK TO ADDRESS THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY. FROM NEW YORK, HE WILL GO TO PYONGYANG FOR THE
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ANNIVERSARY OF. THE KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY ON OCTOBER 10, AND FINALLY
RETURN TO PEKING TO COMMEMORATE HIS BIRTHDAY ON OCTOBER 31.
FOLLOWING THIS ROUND OF TRAVEL, SIHANOUK MAY BE RESIGNED TO
SPENDING MOST OF HIS TIME IN PHNOM PENH.Y
THE COMMUNISTS APPEAR TO HAVE ASSUAGED THE PRINCE'S EARLIER
FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY. NEVERTHELESS, HE KNOWS THAT, ONCE
BACK IN PHNOM PENH, HIS FUTURE ROLE AND LIFE STYLE WILL BE
DETERMINED BY THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP.M.
SIHANOUK'S DECISION TO RETURN TO THE INHOSPITABLE POLITICAL
CONDITIONS IN PHNOM PENH WAS A DIFFICULT ONE, BUT HE APPARENTLY
DECIDED THAT THE TRAPPINGS OF HIGH OFFICE, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE,
ARE BETTER THAN OBSCURE RETIREMENT ABROAD. HE HAS, IN FACT,
LITTLE LEVERAGE IN DEALING WITH THE KHMER COMMUNISTS-4'
THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA MAY HAVE BEEN ABOARD
THE AIRCRAFT CARRYING SIHANOUK TO PHNOM PENH. A PRESS REPORT
QUOTING DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN PEKING SAID HE WOULD BE, BUT PHNOU
PENH DID NOT ANNOUNCE THE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. IF THE CHINESE
ENVOY DID COME, HE WOULD BE THE FIRST FOREIGN AMBASSADOR TO BE
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ALLOWED BACK IN PHNOM PENH SINCE THE COMMUNIST TA(E-OVER.
AT ANY RATE, PEKING APPEAF,... Tv HAVE CEMENTED ITS:; TIES WITH THE
KHMER COMMUNISTS.Y
THE CHINESE HAVE CONTINUALLY ACCORDED SIH/l7lIOUK CORRECT
AND SOMETIMES EVEN LAVISH TREATMENT. AT A FAREJ:!ELL DANc UET ON
SEPTEMBER 6, VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING EXPRESSED HIS "SINCERE
DISH" THAT SIHANOUK AND PRIME MINISTER PENN NOUTH WOULD CONTINUE
THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL UNITY AND DEVELOPMENT. THE
C;IINES'E ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE NOT PUSHE? HARD FOR A SIGNIFICANT
POLITICAL ROLE FOR SIHANOUK, HOWEVER, OUT OF FEAR OF
ANTAGONIZING THEIR KHMER COMMUNIST FRIENDS. INDEED, THEY
PROBABLY REGARDED HIS CONTINUED RESIDENCE IN CHINA AS AN
EMBARRASSMENT. {SECRET} E-2 IMPDET.d
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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 11471-75.Y
1. LEBANON: CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE IN THE FIGHTING
BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE IN BOTH TRIPOLI
AND ZAGHARTA, AND THE 2,000-3,000 MILITIAMEN ON EACH SIDE
HAVE NOW ABANDONED COMBAT AT CLOSE QUARTERS AND RETURNED TO
THEIR USUAL TACTIC OF SHELLING FROM FIXED POSITIONS.Y
THE MILITIA OF THE RIGHT-WING PHALANGES PARTY, WHICH
PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE VIOLENCE IN BEIRUT EARLIER THIS
YEAR, HAS NOT BECOME DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE LATEST FIGHTING.
THE PARTY, LEBANON'S LARGEST CHRISTIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION,
IS NOT STRONG IN THE AREA WHERE THE FIGHTING IS TAKING PLACE.'
THE MAJOR FEDAYEEN GROUPS ARE ALSO STAYING ON THE
SIDELINES, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF SOME 16,000 PALESTINIANS
IN TWO REFUGEE CAMPS NEAR.TRIPOLI.Y
ALTHOUGH THE LEBANESE SECURITY SERVICE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED
ITS INABILITY TO STOP THE FIGHTING, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES
TO RESIST CALLING IN THE ARMY. KAMAL JUMBLATT, LEADER OF THE
PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY, HAS WARNED PRT11E MINISTER KARAMI
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AGAINST USING THE ARMY, AND LEADERS OF BEIRUT'S MUSLIM
COMMUNITY HAVE PREDICTED CIVIL WAR IF THE ARMY BECOMES
INVOLVED .4'
THE CABINET MET FOR THE SECOND TIME IN TWO DAYS TUESDAY.
FOLLOWING THE MEETING, KARAMI SAID "MEASURES" HAD BEEN
DECIDED UPON AND WOULD BE ANNOUNCED WEDNESDAY. NEWSPAPERS IN BEIRUT
REPOKTED MORNING THAT THE ARMY WOULD I3E ORDERED T.&li'A=ir` TO
INTERVENE IN THE FIGHTING. THEY SAID THAT THE CABINET ON
TUESDAY HAD AGREED TO GIVE ARMY COMMANDER ISKANDAR GHANIM A
SIX-MONTH LEAVE OF ABSENCE.Y
G!IANIM 'WZFMIGHT BE REPLACED BY ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF NASRALLAH,
A DRUZE, WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES IN THE PRESENT
DISPUTE. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS ARMY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JULES
BUSTANI, WHO HAS IN THE PAST SERVED IN A LIAISON CAPACITY
BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN. HE IS A CHRISTIAN,
BUT HE WOULD BE MUCH LESS OBJECTIONABLE TO MUSLIMS THAN
GHANI . {SECRET}Y
2. ANGOLA: THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA
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HAS FORCED THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION 0)'F ANGOLA FROM
ITS STRONGHOLD AT CAXITO, SOME 40 MILES NORTHEAST OF LUANDA.'
THE FALL OF CAXITO IS A SERIOUS MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEFEAT
FOR THE NATIONAL FRONT AND MAY BE THE PRELUDE TO A, MAJOR OFFENSIVE
BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT TO PUSH THE FRONT OUT OF ANGOLA ENTIRELY-Y
UNTIL NOW THE FRONT HAS CAPITALIZED ON ITS PRESENCE IN
CAXITO IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY CREDIBILITY AFTER BEING
FORCED OUT OF LUANDA IN JULY AND TO DISCREDIT THE POPULAR
MOVEMENT'S CLAIMS THAT 'T IS THE ONLY LIBERATION CROUP CAPABLE
OF ASSUMING POWER ON INDEPENDENCE DAY, NOVEMBER 11. THE TWO
GROUPS HAVE BEEN SKIRMISHING SPORADICALLY BETWEEN LUANDA AND
CAXITO FOR SOME TIME, AND THE FRONT LAST WEEK CLAIMED TO HAVE
ADVANCED TO WITHIN TEN MILES OF THE CAPITAL.Y
UNLESS THE FRONT CAN STAGE A DRAMATIC COMEBACK IN THE VERY
NEAR FUTURE, IT RUNS THE RISK OF BEING ENTIRELY DISCREDITED AND
LOSING ANY CHANCE OF BEING CONSIDERED A POTENTIAL PARTICIPANT
IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT. {SECRET} E-2 If1PDET.d
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EUROPEAN BRIEF 141-75.Y
1. PORTUGAL: PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS AFPEAR TO BE TAKING
FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE COMMUNISTS' RECENT SETBACKS, ALTHOUGH THEY
REMAIN CONCERNED THAT THEIR GAINS COULD BE WIPED OUT BY AN ATTEMPT
TO SEIZE POWER FROM EITHER THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT.Y
FIAT PRIME MINISTER - DESIGNATE
AZEVEDO HAS AGREED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE SOCIALIST
PROGRAM AND THAT THE NEW CABINET C^LILD BE ANNOUNCED AS 25X1X
EARLY AS TODAY. IIAEY
TURNED DOWN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FORM A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT GECAUSE THEY
DID NOT WANT THE OTHER PARTIES CRITICIZING ON THE SIDELINES AT A TIME
WHEN TOUGH DECISIONS ARE NECESSARY.Y
THE SOCIALISTS CLAIM THAT THEY WILL BE GIVEN AT LEAST FIVE OF THE
APPROXIMATELY 15 CABINET POSTS, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE REACHED THIS
NUMBER BY INCLUDING INDEPENDENTS SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR CAUSE. ACCORDING
TO THE SOCIALISTS' VERSION OF THE NEW CABINET, THE POPULAR
DEMOCRATS-WHO FINISHED A RESPECTABLE SECOND TO TILE SOCIALISTS IN THE
ELECTIONS LAST APRIL-WILL RECEIVE TWO POSTS, AND TIME COMMUNISTS WILL
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BE GIVEN AT LEAST ONE AND PvSSIBLY TWO. THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT STILL
REJECT SUCH A REDUCTION IN THEIR OWN ROLE UNLESS PRO-COMMUNIST
MILITARY OFFICERS ARE ALSO PRESENT IN THE NEW LINEUP .Y
THE SOCIALIST PARTY REPORTEDLY HOPES TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
WHILE THINGS ARE GOING ITS WAY SO AS TO GAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE
GOVERNMENT. THE SOCIALISTS' STRATEGY INCLUDES AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE
THE MILITARY TO RETURN TO THE BARRACKS AND AN ATTEMPT TO DISARM THE
VARIOUS REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS, INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS' PARAMILITARY
APPARATUS-WHICH THEY CLAIM NUMBERS APPROXIMATELY 6,000 IN THE
LISBON AREA. {SECRET}Y
2. USSR: MOSCOW IS MISSING NO OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE
REGISTERING ITS DISAPPROVAL OF THE SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.Y
ACCORDING TO WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, SOVIET OFFICIALS PLAN TO
BOYCOTT THE WORKING SESSIONS OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY
GROUP IN GEOEVA, WHICH ARE TO WORK :OUT DETAILS FOR THE ACCORD'S
IMPLEMENTATION. THIS WOULD BE FURTHER EVIDENCE Or THE SOVIETS'
DISPLEASURE, FOLLOWING THEIR FAILURE TO ATTEND LAST WEEK'S
SIGNING CEREMONIES. 4'
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MOSCOW'S NEWS MEDIA ARE STRESSING THAT THE AGREEMENT FAILED TO
RESOLVE BASIC MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS AND HAS SERVED TO HEIGHTEN
RATTIER THAN REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE AREA. THE PRESS ON SEPTEMBER 7
FOR THE FIRST TIME CARRIED AN ARTICLE THAT CHARGES THAT THE ACCORD
WAS REACHED OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE.
IN AN APPARENT ATTEIIPT TO ATTACK THE CONFERENCE'S LEGITIMACY,
PRAVDA NOTED THAT THE "NEGOTIATIONS HAD AM OBVIOUSLY SEPARATE
CHARACTER," DESPITE EFFORTS TO GIVE IT THE "OUTWARD APPEARANCE"
OF BEING WITHIN THE GENEVA CONTEXT. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY
RESTATING MOSCOIJ'S STANDARD FORMULA FOR ACHIEVING A
SETTLEMENT-MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING ALL INTERESTED
PARTIES--BUT DID NOT SPECIFY T E GENEVA CONFERENCE?5'
ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET COMMUNITY IN CAIRO
HAS INITIATED A WORD-OF-MOUTH CAMPAIGN CRITICAL OF TILE ACCORD.
-THAT EGYPTIAN COMMUNISTS REPORTEDLY HAVE JOINED IN
THIS EFFORT AND ARE SAID TO HAVE BEGUN SPREADING CRITICISM
AMONG THE PEOPLE.
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ITS OPPOSITION ACTIVITY./{SECRE'f}Y
3. ROMANIA-CI-TINA: /ROMANIA IS DEMONSTRATING ITS CONTINUING
CLOSE TIES WITH PEKING, PERHAPS IN REACTION TO FRESH ASSAI_ILTS ON
THE CHINESE BY THE KREMLIN.Y
ILIE VERDET, A MEMBER OF THE R011ANIAN POLITBURO AND PARTY
SECRETARY FOR CADRE AFFAIRS, ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY IN PEKING ON
FPIDAY AT THE HEAD OF THE HIGHEST LEVEL ROMANIAN DELEGATION THAT
HAS VISITED CHINA SINCE PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU WAS THERE IN inl?],. THE
ROMANIANS ARE EN ROUTE HONE FROM NORTH VIETNAM'S JOTH ANNIVERSARY
CELEBRATIONS- Y
IN PEKING, VERDET SPECIFICALLY PRAISED THE LEADERSHIP OF MAO
TSE-TUNG AND EMPHASIZED THE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROMANIAN AND
CHINESE PARTIES; BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO EXPAND THEIR TIES. ON SUNDAY,
VERDET MET WITH CHOU EN-LAI TO CONVEY CEAUSESCU'S PERSONAL GREETINGS.
AND BEST WISHES TO THE CHINESE LEADERSHIr'.Y
THE TIMING OF THE VISIT SUGGESTS THAT IT BIAS A CALCULATED ACT
OF DEFIANCE OF MOSCOW. IT COMES ON THE HEELS OF AN AUTHORITATIVE,
VERY HARSH ATTACK ON CHINA AND ITS SUPPORTERS PUBLISHED IN THE
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SOVIET PARTY'S THEORETICAL JOURNAL, KOMMUNIST. INDEED,
KOMMUNIST WARNED THAT THOSE WHO ARE NEUTRAL OR CONCILIATORY TOLIARD
MAO AND HIS POLICIES "OBJECTIVELY PROMOTE THE ANTI-MARXIST, ANTI-
SOCIALIST AIMS OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP.n.y
VERDET'S PRESENCE IN CHINA PUTS MOSCOW ON NOTICE THAT ROMANIA
CLEARLY INTENDS TO OPPOSE ANY CRITICISM OF THE CHINESE-OR ANY
ATTEMPT T. READ THEM OUT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COrII1UNIST MOVEMENT-AT
THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE 01-' EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES.Y
IN THE PAST, CEAUSESCU HAS DEMONSTRATED A REMARKABLE ABILITY TO
GAUGE THE LIMITS OF SOVIET TOLERANCE TO HIS DISPLAYS OF INDEPENDENCE.
AFTER THE VERDET TRIP, HE MAY NOW PULL IN HIS HOFiJS AND, AT LEAST
OVER THE SHORT RUN, BECOME MORE ACCOMMODATING TOWARD MOSCOW-BUT
WITHOUT COMPROMISING WHAT HE REGARDS AS THE PRIIJt.IPLES OF ROMANIA'S
INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT. {CO?NFIDEHTIAL}' E-2 IIIPDET.rd
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1975
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 1691-75
1? COLOMBIA: THE ASSASSINATION ON SLPTE`:'3E' 5 OF IflSPECTOR
GENERAL Of THE ARMED FORCES RINCON WAS APPARENTL V THE WORK OF THE
PRO-HAVANA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY. ALTHOUGH RINCON WAS A STAI'F
OFFICER, HE PREVIOUSLY HEADED THE BRIGADE MOST INVOLVED IN CONTAIN-
ING THE GROUP'S RURAL GUERRILLAS. {UNCLASSIFIED}Y
?. ARGENTINA: RESPONDING TO AN UNPRECEDENTED UPSURGE I1'4 LEFT-
WING VIOLENCE AND KIDNAPINGS, PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA PERON HAS
FORMALLY OUTLAWED THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AS THE FIRST
STEP IN WHAT MAY BECOME A MAJCR OFFENSIVE AGAINST ALL ARRGENTINE
TERRORISTS?Y
'rH# MONTONEROS SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF JUAN ?ERON &ROM EXILE IN
1973. BJT DECLARED "WAR" AGAINST HI WIDOW IN SLRTEMBER 1974? THE
GOVERNMENT HAD AVOIDED TAKING OFFICIAL ACTION AGAINST THEN FOR FEAR
OF ANTAGONIZING THOSE PERONISTS WHO HAVE BEEN ALIENATED BY THE CON-
SERVATIVE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION. THE IIONTONEROS
HAVE PLAYED AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ROLE THROUGH AGITATIOni WITHIN THE
PERONIST LABOR MOVEMENT AND EVEN FIELDED CANDIDATES UNDER THE BANNER
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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEf
OF THE AUTHENTIC PARTY IN A RECENT PROVINCIAL ELECTION?Y
THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOY GIVEN SECURITY FORCES CONSIDERABLE
LATITUDE IN CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS- UNTIL NOW1
SYMPATHETIC NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS COULD FORCE THE RELEASC OF
MONTONEROS HELD WITHOUT CHARGE BY PUBLICIZING THEIR NAMES- SUCH
ACTIONS IN BEHALF OF OUTLAWED GROUPS ARE NOU FORBIDDEN-V
ADDITIONAL MEASURES ARE LIKELY TO BE ANNOUNCED SOON. THE NEW
ARMY COfIMANDERN GENERAL JORGE WIDELA, HAS TOLD NEWS"EN THAT THE
ARMY'S ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN TUCUMAN PROVINCE, LARGELY AGAINST
THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARf4Y, COULD BE EXTENDED THROUGHOUT THE
COUNTRY "IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTED-" HE ADDED THAT A FEDERAL
ORGANIZATION MAY BE FORMED TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS OP ALL SECURITY
FORCES-V
THE MONTONEROS AND THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY MOULD LIKE
TO GOAD THE ARMED FORCES LEADERS INTO OUSTING THE GOVERRPIENT, WHICH
THEY REGARD AS INSUFFICIENTLY RADICAL. THEY EXPECT THAT SUCH A MOVE,
WOULD PRODUCE POPULAR REVULSION AGAINST THE MILITARY AND ASSURE AU
EVENTUAL LEFT- MING VICTORY. IN PURSUIT OF THIS LONG-RANGE GOAL % THE
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010043-2
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSECT
GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN FOROSING THEIR TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ALL BRANCHES
OF THE ARMED FORCES.Y
ARGENTINE SOCIETY IS BEING BATTERED UY THE TWIN ASSAULTS OF
ECONOMIC DETERIORATION AND MOUNTING VIOLENCE, WHICH FEED ON EACH
OTHER AND COULD OVER TIME BRING ABOUT THE POLITICAL POLARIZATION
THE EXTREMISTS SEEK. {UNCLASSIFIED} E-2 IMPDET?d
DO/DDO-
SEPTEMBER 101 19?5
OCI/VHD
1027
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