WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0
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RIPPUB
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S
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24
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December 22, 2016
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March 1, 2011
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26
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Publication Date: 
June 6, 1975
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SUMMARY
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Secret Weekly Summary Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 : Secret No. 0023/75 June 6, 1975 copy N2 54 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Theo WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued ovory Friday morning by tho Offlco of Currant Intolligonco, roports and analyzes significant dovolopnaonts: of "ho %voak through noon on Thursday. It fre- quontly Includes malarial coordinotud with or Iaroparecl by the Officr ni E:.:con~aniic: Ree:'search, the Olfico of r:itratoglc Ett search, the; Clffico of Geoelr;:Erhie and Cartographic Hosearch. amid the Director rrite of Science and Technology. topics requiring naoru i;c raprehorasivo troaUnent ;:Ind thuroforc: published srparotc:aly ac Special Report;; are listod ill life f.;Ont!'rlls. CONTENTS (Jwrc r, 197.5) EAST ASIA PACIFIC 25X1 25X6 1 Middle East: Around the Canal 3 Laos: Redefining US Relations EUROPE 8 Portugal: Political Tensions Poland: Administrative ReformsEnacte 9 Greece-Turkey: Leaders Meet 10 NATO: Reaction to the Summit 11 Italy: Regional Election Campaign 12 CSCE: Soviet Concessions 13 Western Europe: Aircraft Trouble MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 14 Syria-Iraq: Water Dispu te A bates 14 Spain: Saharan Initiativ e 16 FTAI: Pressures for Cha nge 17 Angola: Conflict Spread ing 18 Lebanon: Still No Gove rnm ent WESTERN HEMISPHERE 19 Panama: Government C rack s Down 19 Regionalism Rises in La tin America 20 Argentina: New Econo my M inister Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Last trapped ship to exit Middle East: Around the Canal With much ceremony, Egypt reopened the Suez Canal on June 5, after eight years of idle- ness, two wars fought on its banks, and an intensive year-long effort to clear it of accumu- lated war debris. The long-awaited opening, intended by President Sadat as a signal of his desire for peace, was somewhat overshadowed, however, by Israel's sudden announcement that it vas reducing its forces near the canal. The two events came as Sadat concluded a meeting in Salzburg with President Ford and as Prime Minister Rabin prepared for a similar summit in Washington next week. Under the terms of the Israeli move, announced by Rabin on June 2 and completcrI two days later: position no missiles-except anti-tank mis- siles-within 40 kilometers of the UN buffer zone. ? Israeli troop strength in the limited armaments area will be kept below half that permitted by the Egyptian-Israeli disengage- ment accord. The move was primarily a political gesture intended to show that Israel was willing to co- operate in moves toward a Middle East settle- ment. Militarily the steps are of little signifi- cance, given the limited force that Israel had been maintaining in the area. ? Israel reduced by half the number of tanks located within 30 kilometers of the Suez Canal. ? The Israelis will maintain no artillery within 32 kilometers of the canal and will Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Egypt's reaction to the Israeli move has been highly favorable. President Sadat, while Gulf of Suer SINAI ,rrta!u+Ni;s .i!! cmi P83 Presidents Ford and Sadat still in Salzburg, hailed the action as a step in the right direction that indicates Israel "has started to reciprocate" in moves toward peace. In the first public Egyptian acknowledgement that Israel might be permitted to use the canal in some way, Sadat said passage of Israeli cargoes on ships of other nations will be no problem "if the conduct of Israel is like it is today." The Egyptians will not permit transit by Israeli flag vessels, however, until the concl?ision of a final peace settlement. Although the Israeli move does nothing substantive to advance negotiations, it does improve the atmosphere for talks and encour- ages Sadat to continue his moderate course for a time. His meeting with President Ford also seems to have raised Sadat's hopes that the US will continue its diplomatic efforts. Sadat told one American television interviewer that "Presi- dent Ford has proved to me that he is with us in this peace" and that the peace process will begin to pick up momentum. Some of Sadat's other public comments have been more reserved, and the usually voluble Cairo media have refrained from editorializing on the results of the meeting. But Sadat seems at least to be content to wait a while longer for the definitive US policy state- ment he has been seeking. SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Laos: Redefining US Relations Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his Pathet Lao deputy, Phoumi Vongvichit, met with visiting Assistant Secretary of State Habib early this week to discuss the future course of Lao-US relations. They broke no new ground. Both Lao leaders reaffirmed in positive terms the communist-dominated coalition govern- ment's desire to maintain "good" relations with the US. They also made a strong pitch for con- tinued US assistance, but with the standard Pathet Lao caveat that such aid must be uncon- ditional and given directly to the Lao gove+ nment. In their conversations with Habib, neither Souvanna nor Phoumi was willing to come to grips with the sharp differences between the US position and Lao expectations regarding future aid. Despite the reassurances of good will by both Lao leaders, this question clearly will re- main a fundamental and perhaps insurmount- able obstacle in working out a new modus vivendi between Vientiane and Washington. Hanoi appears to share this view. A North Vietnamese commentary on June 3 stated that Habib's Asian trip "cannot reverse the course of events in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." In his discussion with Habib, Phoumi es- sentially reiterated a line he had taken earlier with the US charge and acting USAID director. He said that Laos was about to embark on a long-range economic development program, and that US assistance would be welcome-particu- larly during a two-year "healing the wounds of war" phase. Phoumi previously talked about American aid in terms of war reparations. Phoumi obviously prefers Vientiane as a negotiating venue because of the proven ability of the Pathet Lao to marshal large numbers of students and other activists to demonstrate at a moment's notice in support of the government's bargaining position. In any case, before bilateral talks on a new assistance agreement can begin, the current round of negotiations on the dissolution of AID and the turnover of all of its equipment and facilities to the Lao government must be con- cluded. Both US and Lao officials have agreed to June 30 a-; the cut-off date for these negotia- tions, but the talks-which began earlier this week-already appear hopelessly bogged down. Meanwhile, Souvanna's lack of touch with reality and his acquiescence to Pathet Lao view- points were evident in his discussion with Habib. He repeatr:dly emphasized that, in his view, "nothing had changed" in the Lao-American relationship. He blamed "excited young people" for the recent "spontaneous" anti-American demonstrations in Vientiane, and argued that AID-not the US-was the prime target. Souvanna also maintained that there had been no real change in Laos, merely an "evolu- tion of attitudes." He said that in light of the "new situation," he had "ordered" the two sides to collaborate, "ordered" Phoumi and acting Pathet Lao Defense Minister Khammouane Boupha to purge the Royal Lao Army of "unde- sirables" and integrate the communist and non- communist armies, and "asked" Phoumi to staff the coalition administration with civilian offi- cials from Sam Neua. Phoumi said he would personally supervise negotiations on a new assistance agreement, which, he hoped, would get under way as soon as possible. He also indicated that he did not "think" there would be any more "disorders" directed against Americans in Vientiane, where- for "convenience"-negotiations should be held. Souvanna, however, indicated that either Vien- tiane or Washington would be acceptable as a site for talks. The Pathet Lao, according to Souvanna, have no intention of taking over Laos-at least not for another "five or six years." The Lao communists, he insisted, are "reasonable na- tionalists"-not dictators-who respected the monarchy and who had never formed a separate government during their long years of isolation in Sam Neua. SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 M Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET CHINA: PRO-US COMMENTARY Senior Chinese officials are stressing that despite the outcome in Indochina, the US is still the most important strategic counterweight to Soviet power in Asia and Europe. Both Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua have recently observed that the US was overextended in Indochina; it can now concentrate on more fundamr;ntal commitments in Europe and Japan. During his trip to France last month, Teng stressed the importance of the US-European partnership in countering Moscow's strategic aims in Europe. In public he called for increased European economic and political unity To i;lustrate the impor- tance Peking attaches to US strength as protec- tion against Moscow, Teng commented that in China's eyes, Washington's relations with Japan are much more important than Peking's. The Chinese press gave unusually positive treatment to the NATO summit and President Ford's European trip. Peking's media stressed statements that underline the US commitment to NATO, the determination of the alliance to remain militarily strong and politically cohesive, and US assurances that detente with Moscow would not detract from US interests elsewhere. Prior to the President's trip, the Chinese press had focused on recent statements by US leaders warning Moscow not to test US resolve in the immediate post-Indochina period. the US military presence in Thailand-and the Philippines as well. The Chinese seem genuinely concerned about the possibility that Moscow will in fact be in a position to exploit the post-Vietnam situa- tion in Asia; it is this concern that motivates Chinese desires that the military balance in the region not change rapidly or decisively. Peking's anxieties on this score have been fueled recently by the continuing deadlock in Sino-Japanese negotiations over a peace treaty, a deadlock which resulted in part from Soviet pressure on Tokyo-and by what the Chinese believe to be Moscow's overly close friendship with Hanoi. In attempting to secure their northeastern flank against putative Soviet machinations, the Chinese, in the wake of Kim II-song's visit to Peking, have been strongly insisting on the with- drawal of US forces from Korea, but they have been careful not to set a deadline for it. After repeating to the French the standard Chinese formulation on this issue, Teng Hsiao-ping remarked that he expects no change in the Korean situation-a tacit acknowledgement that China does not foresee early US disengagement from the peninsula. Peking has made it clear that it does not desire a blowup in the Korean situation, and it probably continues to believe that US forces provide an element of stability there. Although they have concentrated par- ticularly on the US role in Europe, the Chinese have also made it clear that they do not expect, or desire, Washington's withdrawal from Asia in the wake of the Indochina debacle. The French received the impression from Teng that China was concerned that any further US drawback in the region would result in a Soviet advance to fill the vacuum. In particular, the French noted that Teng passed up opportunities to denounce In some respects the Chinese have been quite forthright in setting forth their position. Within days of the fall of Saigon, Chiao Kuan- hua implied to a group of British journalists that Peking hopes Washington will play a more active role in East Asia as a counter to the Soviets. Moreover, a Japan Socialist Party delega- tion recently in Peking was "astonished" by China's openly benign attitude toward the US. Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET The communique did include an attack on the issue of US forces in Korea, but the embassy in Tokyo reports that the Japanese believe the US was mentioned only as a conces- sion-apparently in order to get the Socialists to agree to anti-Soviet language regarding foreign hegemony in Asia. The Mayaguez affair provided another clue regarding Chinese attitudes with respect to the US position in Asia. As in the case of Korea, Peking has an obvious interest in keeping rela- tions with Phnom Penh warm. Nevertheless, the Chinese reaction to the US rescue of the ship and crew, despite an unusual reference to the US as a "paper tiger," was low-keyed, relatively restrained, and almost entirely ex post facto, indicating that Peking wished to isolate the affair. This suggests that China wants to minimize most areas of friction with Washing- ton, even in situations where the use of American power tends to conflict with other Chinese interests. SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 North Korea COURTING THE NONALIGNED President Kim II-song's current tour of African and East European capitals is the most ambitious diplomatic swing ever made by the North Korean leader. Kim's trip has had a distinct nonaligned, Third World orientation. Saice May 22, he has been warmly welcomed in Romania, Algeria, Mauritania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. In his speeches and press interviews, Kim strongly emphasized nonz.ligned themes-the inde- pendence, sovereignty, and common interests of the smaller countries-and he roundly attacked the US and UN presence in South Korea. On several occasions, Kim repeated the line that a war provoked by the US and south Korea would result in reunification of Korea under communism. He took pains, however, to project a moderate image for North Korea, insisting that Pyongyang's policy calls for peaceful reunifi- cation and that he is prepared to move in gradual steps toward that end. Kim's immediate objective is to strengthen political support for North Korea's participation in the nonaligned conference of foreign minis- ters in Lima this summer and for a pro- Pyongyang resolution at the UN General Assem- bly this fall. In both forums N;,:-+h Korea in- tends to press for the removal of US forces and the UN command from South Korea. In Romania, Kim and Ceausescu signed a "treaty of friendship and collaboration" be- tween the communist parties of the two coun- tries. Both leaders pursue an independent for- eign policy and have developed a close personal rapport. Algeria and Mauritania provided Kim with a good platform for appealing for UN votes from Middle Eastern and African states. The stop in Yugoslavia is intended to enhance North Korea's standing in nonaligned circles. In Bul- garia, Moscow's closest ally in Eastern Europe, nonaligned themes were muted, but Kim and Zhivkov found common ground in "socialist in- ternationalism." A Soviet Foreign Ministry official told a US diplomat on May 27 that Kim will not be coming to Moscow "at this time." He said noth- ing about a future visit, but a Soviet official in Western Europe has said that planning is under way fora visit by the North Korean leader Ia hi ts month or earl next. SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET PORTUGAL: POLITICAL TENSIONS Socialist leaders have ag' eed to end their boycott of cabinet meetings and to resume par- ticipation in the four-party coalition govern- ment, provided that the dispute with Commu- nist printers over the Socialist party newspaper is resolved by June 7. The solution is a tempo- rary one at best, even if the military meets the Socialists' deadline. The Socialists managed to back down gracefully from their challenge to the Armed Forces Movement's political authority after mili- tary leaders promised to convince the Commu- nist printers to accept the reopening of the Socialist newspaper Republica. Information Minister Jesuino has said the government will reopen the newspaper at any time the Socialist management requests, but editor Raul Rego has hesitated, fearing renewed opposition from the printers. Press reports indicate that the Socialists are pressing the Movement to resolve the problem by setting June 7 as the deadline for the reopen- ing of the paper. The US embassy believes the government is embarrassed by unfavorable re- action abroad and is anxious to bring the dis- pute to an early end. The Movement managed to assuage the So- cialists without taking concrete action on their other demands-curtailment of Communist in- fluence in the trade unions, mass media, and local governments. T1%, Movement did state its recognition of "disproportions" in the political structure and promised to correct them. Military leaders also vowed to safeguard the activities of the constituent assembly, which opened on June 2. The Movement's assurance dispelled last-minute fears that the assembly, Information Minister Jesuino (I) and Prime Minister Goncalves Page Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET which is dominated by moderate political parties, would not be allowed to meet. The Socialists hope to use the assembly as a public forum for expounding moderate ideas. They should have little trouble dominating it since they hold 116 of the 249 seats and their candidate has been elected assembly president. In contrast, the Communists and their sister organization, the Portuguese Democratic Move- ment, together hold only 35 seats. A substantial portion of the constitution that the assembly will draft has already been dictated by the Movement and accepted by the major parties. The military has made certain it will remain the dominant political power for at least the next three years. The Socialists, how- ever, believe there are several important deci- sions left for the assembly and plan to concen- trate on the areas of human rights, justice, and municipal governments. The assembly will de, cide the date of elections for a legislative assem bly and also for new municipal councils. There is speculation that moderates might attempt to reserve part of the assembly sessions for free debate on national problems. If the moderates attempt to exceed the strict mandate the Movement has given them, the papered-over differences between the military and the parties will resurface, possibly forcing the Movement to renew its threat to do away with the parties. Poland ADMINIST-h,-'iTIVE REFORMS ENACTED Parliament last week enacted party leader Gierek's plans for a massive restructuring of the territorial and administrative bureaucracy. Im- plementation began on June 1. The principal feature of the reorganization is the division of 17 provinces into 49 smaller units. Prime Minister Jaroszewicz justified these changes by saying that the old system had be- come outmoded and bogged down in red tape. He added that Warsaw wants to bring the gov- ernment close to the people and to tailor ad- ministration to recent social and economic changes. The official explanations failed to mention that the reforms will also enable Gierek to break up some of the powerful provincial fiefdoms and to bring the local government and party bureaucracies under greater central control than at any time since the Communists came to power. 25X1 Jaroszewicz recently estimated that the reforms will affect 250,000 people, including 110,000 party workers. Of the latter, 50,000 are slated for retirement. Six provincial party first secretaries have already been removed-three of whom re- ceived important jobs in Warsaw-and new prov- ince governors have been announced. There are rumors in Warsaw that the powerful party first secretary in Katowice, Zdzislaw Grudzien, will move up to the party Secretariat and Politburo. Although no organized opposition to the reforms has emerged, there is considerable dis- satisfaction among officials who stand to lose their posts or find their powers reduced. One bureaucrat recently told a US diplomat that the best officials in the old administrations will re- sist being relocated, and that less qualified peo- ple will come into many of the new local posi- tions. He also said that local facilities were inadequate for the new governmental units, and that it might take two years before "some semblance of order" could be restored. 25X1 Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 GREECE-TURKEY: LEADERS MEET The Greek and Turkish prime ministers met at the NATO summit in Brussels last week- end for their first talks since the Cyprus crisis last summer. Nothing concrete was decided upon during the three-hour meeting, but the atmospherics were favorable, producing some improvement in the troubled relations between the two countries. Each side publicly declared itself pleased with the outcome. During the foreign ministers' meetings in Rome last week, the Turks appeared to back away from referring the Aegean dispute to the World Court, but the prime ministe,-s have now agreed to this step. In the final communique, both sides pledged to resolve their differences peacefully through negotiations and to support the Cypriot intercommunal negotiations in Vienna, which resumed on June 5. Some mem- bers of the Greek delegation, who had come to the Brussels summit genuinely concerned trial the Turks had war on their minds, were particu- larly relieved at the outcome. The Turks have been emphasizing that Prime Minister Demirel 'is in too weak a position Prime ministers of Greece and Turkey Aaramanlis and Dennircl to make concessions because of the fragile nature of the coalition he heads. They have been insisting that Athens make the first move by stating specifically that it will accept a bizonal solution in exchange for return of a certain percentage of Greek Cypriot territory held by the Turks. The Greeks have been unwilling to commit themselves until they have a better idea of Turkish views on the final shape of a settle- ment. Other problems between Greece and Tur- key are just as complicated as the Cyprus issue and, initially at least, will be dealt with sepa- rately. Experts from the two countries will meet to discuss their differences over control of air- space in the Aegean. They will also examine a Turkish proposal for joint exploitation of the resources of the Aegean and a compromise text on the Aegean dispute to be forwarded to the World Court. The experts will probably make some progress on the airspace dispute, but the bargaining on other issues will be long and hard. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 positively on the summit and on the private meeting they held to discuss bilateral problems. Both men described the latter meeting as useful and indicated that their dialogue will continue. French officials have not commented in much detail. They probably would prefer not to arouse new debate in France over whether Paris is moving closer to or divorcing itself further from the Alliance. Foreign Minister Sauvag- nargues has tried to reassure the public that President Ford's comment regarding the need for no partial memberships in NATO was not directed at France. Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET West European leaders who attended last week's NATO summit meeting have generally been satisfied. Most were gratified with Presi- dent Ford's assurance that the US will continue to fulfill all its commitments to NATO. Press reaction to the summit has been mixed, but many European papers complained that the heads of government only discussed problems and did not arrive at solutions. Positive public comments have been made by several leaders. Luxembourg Prime Minister Thorn commented that President Ford has calmed European fears that US reverses in In- dochina would lead to a disengagement from Western Europe. Turkish Prime Minister Demirel made similar remarks. West German Foreign Minister Genscher said the summit was an impressive confirmation of the resoluteness of the NATO allies. Danish Prime Minister Jor- gensen played down the summit as "un- dramatic," but said he was satisfied with it, and Italian President Leone privately stated that he was satisfied with the outcome. Portuguese Prime Minister Goncalves used the summit and several press conferences to stress that Portugal will remain in the alliance and is determined to meet its obligations. Re- acting to expressions of concern about the leftist tendencies of the rulers in Lisbon, Gon- calves asked the allies for more "comprehension and less apprehension" ahout Portugal. He also stressed several tii,ies that Lisbon will not be a "Trojan horse" within the alliance. Goncalves, treated to a hero's welcome on his return from Brussels, said that the Portuguese delegation had scored an important victory in a "veritable in- formation battle." Admiral Coutinho, however, who accompanied Goncalves to Brussels, was said to be disappointed with the results or the summit. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Turk- ish Prime Minister Demirel also commented Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 0 SECRET ITALY: REGIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN After two full weeks of campaigning for the regional and local elections to be held on June 15, debate remains focused on the implica- tions of the vote for the naticnal political situa- tion. All parties view the elections as a crucial test, since they will be the first definitive meas- ure of popular sentiment since the 1972 parlia- mentary race; more than 95 percent of the elec- torate will go to the polls to choost, new offi- cials in 15 of the 20 regions, 86 of the 94 provinces, and 6,345 of the 8,000-odd munici- palities. The Christian Democrats, who have domi- nated postwar politics with an average 38-40 percent of the vote, are struggling to avoid a repeat of the sharp losses they suffered to the left last year in Sardinia and scattered local contests. The Christian Democrats' prospects appear to have improved lately, but the party is sti': in danger of dropping to 35 percent or less ,or the first time in the postwar period. The campaign is dominated by discussions of how power should be distributed in the next national government, what the future role of the Communist opposition should be, and who is best qualified to stop the dramatic increase in crime and political violence. With the exception of the law and order issue, these are essentially the same questions that divided the center-left governing parties last October and November during Italy's longest postwar government crisis. The imminence of the elections was the main reason political leaders were reluctant to come to terms then. Instead, they set up the Moro government, a Christian Democratic - Republican coalition dependent on Socialist and Social Democratic parliamentary support, as an interim solution that would at least keep the four parties work- ing together. With so much at stake, the campaign has turned into a free-for-all. The center-left parties for the most part are running against each other, despite the fact that cooperation among them remains the only workable alternative to Com- munist participation in the government. Re- storing such cooperation after the elections will be made more difficult by the harsh exchange now taking place between the two key parties- the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. The Socialists, who generally get around 10 percent of the vote, have been running on the theme that the only way the voteis can guaran- tee social and economic progress is to give more support to them and less to the Christian Demo- crats. That, the Socialists argue, would allow them to force new policies on the Christian Democrats, who have set the terms for every Communist leader Berlinguer An eye toward government Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET coalition in which the two parties have partici. pated since the Socialists joined the government in 1963. Christian Democratic leader Fanfani coun- terattacked this week by criticizing the Social- ists for running on joint tickets with the Com- munists in several hundred small towns. Fanfani pointed to this as evidence that the Socialists are trying to prepare the way for Communist entry into the national government. For the first time he explicitl% urged the voters not to support the Socialists; Fanfarii previously had told his audi- ences to vote for at least one of the Christian Democrats' potential allies if they could not support the Christian Democrats themselves. The Socialists, in fact, are walking a tight- rope on the Communist issue. Local conditions make it difficult for them to avoid allying with the Communists in certain areas, but the Social- ist campaign stresses that the time is not ripe for a deal with the Communists at the national level. The Socialists' advertising, fc.; example, advises the electorate that a vote for their party is a "vote without compromises"-a thinly veiled jab at Communist chief Berlinguer's de- sign for an "historic compromise" that would eventually bring his party into the government. Fanfani, meanwhile, is highlighting his party's leading role in pushing tougher law and order measures through parliament last month. The Socialists and Cori m-anists are trying to make the same issue work for them by charging that it is the Christian Democrats who are re- sponsible for the deteriorating situation, since they have controlled the Interior Ministry's law- enforcement apparatus for most of the past 30 years. Berlinguer's campaign is built around the theme he has stressed since launching the "his- toric compromise" proposal in late 1973: that Italy's problems cannot be solved until his party, the country's second largest, is granted more influence. Berlinguer is emphasizing in par- ticular the Communists' reputation for efficient administration in the three north-central regions where they hold the balance of power. It is obvious, however, that Berlinguer feels vulnerable on foreign policy issues: Fanfani con- tinues to cite the Portuguese situation to bolster his arguments against concessions to Italy's Communists. Berlinguer took advantage of an interview this week to re-emphasize his claim that the Italian Communists are "inspired by a different vision" than their counterparts in Lisbon. 25X1 CSCE: SOVIET CONCESSIONS After weeks in which seemingly inevitable Soviet concessions were repeatedly deferred, the European security conference is moving closer to resolution. On May 28, the Soviets offered to modify their position on certain humanitarian issues, part or the subject matter of so-called "Basket III" that had kept the conference stale- mated. The Soviets moved closer to accepting Western texts facilitating international travel and restricting the expulsion of journalists en- gaged in legitimate professional activity. They also agreed to drop a statement on national responsibility for international radio and tele- vision broadcasts. The Soviet moves came in response to a Western "global initiative" intended to reduce the number of disputed issues to manageable proportions and to identify the significant ones. The initial Soviet reaction to the Western pro- posal had been chilly, but the Soviets suddenly changed their tactics when it became clear that more stonewalling would probably kill the chances for an early windup of the conference. The Sovot shift was probably timed to influence the NATO summit meeting at Brus- sels. NATO members, while anxious to conclude the conference, have been put off by the Soviet's rigidity on Basket III and are reluctant to face public opinion with so little to show for their efforts. Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Moscow's concessions have kept alive the possibility that the third and final stage of the conference can be held this summer. The Soviets have not pressed for--and have no chance of getting-the June 30 date proposed by General Secretary Brezhnev earlier this year, but they appear anxious to wrap up the conference be- fore the August vacation season in Europe. The Finns are prepared to play host to the final stage on four weeks' notice. Despite the progress last week, significant obstacles to a rapid conclusion remain. There are still many differences-some minor, some substantial--on humanitarian issues. In addition, r.ompromises must still be reached on military- related "confidence-building measures," such as how much advance notice must be given prior to military maneuvers, what size of maneuvers require advance notification, and what geo- graphic area is covered by these provisions. If the Soviets follow past practice, they will hold out until the last minute on the re- maining issues and then make only minimal con- cessions. In fact, there is already evidence that the Soviet representatives have gone back to their tough bargaining tactics. The differences could be resolved in time to organize a summit session in July, but if this were to happen the , 25X1 scenai io would be straight out of "Perils of at the continuing del;,ys. The German air force WESTERN EUROPE: AIRCRAFT TROUBLE The West German - British - Italian project to develop a European Multirole Combat Air- craft (MRCA) is still encountering seriou? dif- ficulties. Although the British claim that widely publicized engine problems are being solved the West Germans apparently are deeply concerned the Rolls Royce RB-199 engine and has ex- pressed interest in General Electric's F404-400 engine, which will power the US navy F-18. He tinuing design and production problems with SECRET says the Ministry of Defense is under growing pressure to get the MRCA into the air, but it must have a proven engine soon in order to meet parliamentary requirements concerning costs and deadlines. The engine problem may also have influ- enced the decision riot to show the new fighter- bomber at the Paris air show this week. The official explanation is that the appearance would take too much time away from prototype testing, already several months behind schedule. After the first two prototype aircraft flew in 1974, all three nations agreed to continue development work for 18 months and to make a final decision in early 1976 whether to go into full production. Because of rising costs, how- ever, all three nations have since considered either cutting back their purchases or opting out of the program. After an extensive review of its defense needs and obligations, the UK decided to go ahead with the purchase of all 385 MRCAs it has on order. The proposed production and de- livery schedule is being extended, however, to help relieve British funding problems. Mean- while, the Bundestag has appropriated money for the project, but only if the plane will not cost more than $9 million each. Most estimates indicate this ceiling will be exceeded, but the potential setback to Germany's aircraft industry rnd the amount of money already invested may weigh heavily against a decision to abandon the project. As for the Italians, Rome his generally followed the lead of the other two partners and probably will continue to do so. Although the project is still shaky, it ap- pears to have a better than even chance to succeed. If it fails, the UK and Italy, both eco- nomically hard pressed, may decide not to buy any new aircraft--a move that would seriously weaken NATO tactical air capabilities by the 1980s. The West Germans probably would pur- chase some other, less expensive aircraft tailored for s ecific missions, such as the US F-16. SECRET Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET Damascus' announcement early this week that it would release more Euphrates River water to Iraq as a gesture of good will should help ease the tension that has developed over the past three months between the two coun- tries' rival Baath regimes. It will not, however, end either Iraqi political intrigue in Syria or President Asad's antipathy for the men who rule in Baghdad. A Syrian government spokesman, portray- ing the gesture as a product of the mediation of Saudi Oil Minister Yamani, indicated that Damascus now hopes a permanent agreement on sharing the water can be reached. Until the announcement, Damascus press and radio had kept up a daily propaganda barrage against the "fascist Iraqi right." Last week the Asad govern- ment closed Iraq's consulate in the commercial center of Aleppo, and Baghdad claimed that the Syrians had placed a ban on the movement of Iraqi goods through the Mediterranean port of Latakia. Iraq will be relieved if the Syrians do re- lease significant quantities of water; the cutback had threatened the livelihood of thousands of Iraqi farmers. Baghdad had reacted with re- straint to Syrian harassment and propaganda charges, apparently believing that Asad would drop his campaign against Iraq once it had served his purposes. It is not clear why Syria decided l.o open the sluices at the dam. Asad may ha /e con- cluded he had amply demonstrated that Syria can exert severe economic pressure on Baghdad any time the Iraqis try to meddle in Syrian internal affairs. Irrigation canals fed by the Euphrates Madrid's announcement on May 23 that it is prepared to speed up the transfer of sover- eignty over Spanish Sahara if the process of self-determination in the territory is delayed introduces flexibility into its policy. Only three weeks earlier, Foreign Minister Cortina had stated publicly that the only solution to the problem of Spanish Sahara was a UN-supervised referendum to let the people there determine their political future. The new approach, with its reference to Madrid's wish to take into ac- count the legitimate aspirations of "interested countries" in the Sahara, appears to signal a willingness to negotiate. Preliminary contacts may already be under way. The government statement aroused the concern of Morocco and Mauritania by noting the possibility of a Unilateral Spanish with- drawal if the situation in the territory deteri- orates. The announcement was expressed in terms which make it unlikely, however, that Madrid contemplates immediate withdrawal. In a letter to the UN Secretary General, the For- eign Ministry stated that: ? Spain wishes to end its presence with- out creating a vacuum; Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMAPY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET ? All parties to the process should be invited to work for a smooth transition under the auspices of a UN-sponsored con- ference, but if this fails Madrid will sot a deadline for withdrawal; ? Spain requests the UN to dispatch observers to follow developments in the Sahara; and ? Madrid reserves the right to report to the Security Council if peace is threatened. Several developments probably contributed to Madrid's abrupt shift away from insistence on a referendum, which it was convinced would result in a vote for an "inJependent" state that Spain could continue to control. Recently there has been growing concern in Madrid about its ability to handle the situation. A militant anti- Spanish organization has emerged as the dominant political force in the territory, insurgent attacks on Spanish forces have oc- curred recently, and the civil population and even the Saharan armed forces and police have shown a lack of sympathy for Spain. Moroccan and Algerian Positions Morocco last week expressed surprise at the Spanish statement, accused Madrid of creating a "climate of confusion," and con- cluded with a veiled warniiq that Rabat would use force if necessary to uphold Its claim to Spanish Sahara. The Moroccans have also charged that Spain is trying to bypass considera- tion of the dispute by the International Court of Justice and to undercut the mission of a UN investigating team now in Mauritania on the final leg of its visit to the area. The Moroccans fear Spain may grant the territory independence before a political settle- ment acceptable to Rabat can be negotiated, and they suspect collusion between Madrid and Algiers to block Moroccan annexation of the territory. Algeria's open support of a pro- independence party in the Sahara has further antagonized Moroccan officials. As a result, King Hassan has intensified diplomatic efforts in Madrid and Algiers to head off rapid moves toward independence lest he is forced to take a stand that might lead to a confrontation with Algeria. Mauritania welcomed Madrid's willingness to hasten the decolonization process, provided it is carried out in close consultation with the interested parties. In a recent interview, Presi- dent Moktar Ould Daddah chided Spain for threatening to hand over sovereignty of the region to an entity unilaterally chosen by Madrid. Ould Daddah asserted that Spain has a moral obligation to maintain political stability in the territory and should remain until the ICJ has rendered a decision. Mauritania seeks a partitioning of Spanish Sahara and claims to have reached agreement with Morocco. It accepts Algeria as an interested party but places it in a special category because Algiers has made no territorial claims. Although lacking the military and political clout of neighboring states, Mauritania can be expected to step up its diplomatic cam ai n in pursuit of partition. 25X1 Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET FTAI: PRESSURES FOR CHANGE The somnolence that has long enveloped the French Territory of Afars and Issas--one of the last colonial remnants in Africa-has boon disturbed in recent weeks by internal and ox- ternal developments. Many me:nbers of the Afar tribe, which composes about half the total population and dominates the local scene, are demanding im- provements in economic conditions and the in- clusion of younger, better educated Afars in politics and administration. Much of their crit- icism is directed at the French-installed regime headed by Afar leader All Aref, who is president of the territorial council. Popular pressure for the removal of Aref and his conservative, tradi- tional Afar advisers is mounting. The regime's opponents do not yet form a united front, and most are probably undecided about long-range goals. Some would be satisfied with increased economic benefits within a French administration, while others want in- dependence. The leaders of the predominantly Afar African Peoples Independence League re- cently visited Paris to press for independence. The league will seek recognition by the UN Decolonization Committee, and the leader of the league is seeking Arab support. French officials note that they may even have to reckon with Ali Aref, once considered their pawn. The French are worried that, in an attempt to steal his opponents' thunder, Aref may make a sudden call for independence in the local assembly, where he controls the vote. Last week, bloody clashes between Afar and Issa tribesmen erupted. Sixteen persons were killed and some 250 injured, including 12 French gendarmes, in several days of rioting. Some opponents of French rule probably tried to keep the riots going as a means of gaining publicity and embarrassing France. The French are also feeling heat from Somalia, which claims the territory on the basis of ethnic ties to the Issas. In recent months, President Siad has increased his polemics against the French presence and has received a sympa- thetic hearing in Arab and African circles. In April, the Arab League Council passed a resolu- tion urging independence for the territory and formed a ministerial committee to make con- tacts with Franco. The Organization of African Unity has voiced support for the territory's lib- eration, and African leaders are expected to reiterate their call for independence at the OAU summit in July. Ethiopia has played down its claims, recog- nizing that French withdrawal might make the territory a battleground between Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio. The Ethiopians are satisfied at present with the arrangement allowing them to use the port of Djibouti, the terminus of Ethio- pia's only railroad. The beginning on June 1 of what may be a full-scale revolt by Afar tribesmen in Ethiopia against the ruling military council in Addis Ababa poses a new threat to stability in the French territory. Sultan Ali Mirah, leader of all the Afars and All Aref's tribal overlord, has left his capital in Ethiopia and taken refuge tempo- rarily in the territory. The French almost cer- tainly will not allow him to use the territory as a sanctuary or as a base for dissident activity against the Ethiopian government, but France could face problems with its Afar if it tries to prevent them from aidin their tribal brothers in Ethiopia. 25X1 Y1 French rerr tl ory 1 of the Afars and Issas/,jibputl .kAddis Ababa SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 ANGOLA: CONFLICT SPREADING Forces of the Popular Movement for tho Liberation of Angola clashed during the week with troops of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola. The clashes occurred in a number of towns north and east of Luanda, where both groups have been rapidly building up their military forces, and in the exclave of Cabinda. It was the third round of major fight- ing in two months between the two principal nationalist groups in Angola's transitional gov- er-iment and the first outside Luanda, the capital. The clashes in Angora proper apparently resulted from a coordinated offensive by the Popular Movement aimed at driving the National Front out of areas where the Mo' ement's ethnic support predominates and at disrupting the Front's supply routes from northern Angola into Luanda. The Front is setting up a major base in northwestern Angola in an area where it has strong tribal support. The base is to replace the extensive training and support facilities long maintained by the Front in neighboring Zaire. The fighting in Cabinda was apparently restricted to the capital of the exclave, which is administered as a province of Angola. The operations of Gulf Oil, which produced 150,006 barrels a day from Cabinda last year, were apparently not affected. The company has evacuated dependents and support personnel. At present, the Front continues to rely heavily on Zairian President Mobutu; he has long supported the Front but recently has had to cut back because of his government's pressing financial difficulties.. China also provides im- portant assistance, but not enough to meet the Front's goal of training and ui in a force of at least 10,000 troops. The Popular Movement, which last winter appeared militarily weaker than the Front, ap- pears to have scored significant gains in the latest fighting, as it did in the clashes that oc- curred in Luanda in late April. It is now well supplied with arms by the Soviet Union, its principal foreign patron. In Luanda, large num- bers of well-armed civilians can be mobilized to support the Movement's regular forces; in the countryside, its troops seem better armed and more experienced than those of the National Front. The Front has not been intimidated by its recent setbacks, however; it is trying to even the score in areas where it has strong tribal support. In the political arena, both groups have been courting the National Unior for the Total Independence of Angola, the smallest of the three liberation groups in the transitional gov- ernment. Union president Jonas Savimbi has refused to be drawn into the conflict, seeking instead to convene a meeting with the leaders of the two groups to discuss their political differ- ences. So far he has not succeeded. Clearly, neither Holden Roberto nor Pop- ular Movement leader Agostinho Neto is willing to share political power. Any compromise they might agree to in the near future is likely to be only for the purpose of buying time in prepara- tion for a final showdown. The 24,000 Portu- guese troops-most of whom are stationed in and around Luanda-are spread thin in the coun- tryside and may not be able or willing to inter- vene between the two groups in the event the fighting continues to spread. Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 .ooking for snipers it was their withdrawal of support that forced former primer minister Rashid Sulh to resign last month. Karami's strategy at present is to delay forming a government in the hope that, in time, tempers will cool and both sides will be willing to compromise. Karami is working closely with the care- taker military cabinet to create buffer zones in Beirut between those areas controlled by the Phalangists and those controlled by the radical fedayeen. Sporadic shooting continued in the city this week, despite somewhat more aggres- sive patrolling by joint Lebanese-Palestinian security units. Approximately 130 persons have been killed since the latest round of fighting began on May 20. Economic activity in Lebanon has fallen off significantly as a resu:, of the fighting this year; the gross national product for 1975 will probably be about 2 percent less than antici- pated. The economy has not suffered irreparable damage, however, and will rebound strongly, as it did after the extended closure of the Leba- SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 LEBANON: STILL NO GOVERNMENT Lebanon's cabinet crisis shows no sign of ending soon. Prime Minister - designate Rashid Karami claims to have made some progress to- ward assembling a cabinet acceptable to the country's many political and religious blocs, but he has been unable to convince leftists to drop their demand th-it he right-wing Phalangists be excluded from any ? aw government. Kamal Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, is promoting what he calls a compromise under which representatives of his party and of the Phalanges Party would stay out of the government. The new cabinet, he main- tains, should be composed of civilians who are not members of parliament and of retired mili- tary officers. Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil has rejected this suggestion. He is supported by former president Camille Shamun, who has de- clared that his National Liberal Party will not join any government from which the Phalangists have been excluded. Under ordinary circumstances, Karami would be tempted to endorse Jumblatt's pro- posal, since it would create a weak cabinet that Karami could easily dominate. As a result of the continuing civil unrest, however, he almost cer- tainly will continue to seek a solution that can win the active backing of Jumayyil and Shamun; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 SECRET PANAMA: GOVERNMENT CRACKS DOI;V/N The Torrijos government has placed tough restrictions on the media in an effort to stifle domestic criticism during what it considers a crucial period in the canal treaty necotiations with the US. The crackdown is evidence of the government's concern over the impact of recent criticism by business organizations, student groups, and the media, and its fear that any sign of disunity at home may be exploited by domes- tic and foreign opponents of a new canal treaty. It also reflects the administration's growing tendency to adopt a "for us or against us" attitude. The new restrictions were imposed on radio and television stations, which previously have been under less direct control than the press. The stations were instructed not to com- ment, without prior consultation with the authorities, on "sensitive" subjects, including the treaty negotiations, student affairs, public services, or ,he restrictions themselves. The fol- lowing day, a "clarification" indicated that the restrictions were intended only to caution the stations rather than to order them to comply, but the message remained the same. For several years, the Torrijos govern- ment's prohibition of political activity has en- abled it to act with little fear of criticism by organized groups. During the past month, how- ever, members of the business community who have always been opposed to Torrijos have ag- gressively attacked the government's economic policies. Criticism by ultranationalist students is even more worrisome for the administration, which has always considered Panama's youth among its staunchest allies. Antigovernment students represent only a small minority of the student population, but they have made effec- tive use of demonstrations and radiobroadcasts :o attack the government for the nation's educa- tional shortcomings and for its handling of the treaty negotiations. The government, not wanting to use open repression against the radicals, apparently has decided to rely on pro-Torrijos students to si- lence the criticism. Recently, a group of high school students briefly took over an offending radio station, charging that it was a mouthpiece of "reactionary" businessmen and the CIA. The government's next step may be to turn its stu- dent allies loose on the radical youth groups. Also, government spokesmen will probably step up the campaign against the opposition, portray- ing the government's critics as servants of for- eign interests who want to sabots a the ne otia- tions and topple Torrijos. 25X1 REGIONALISM RISES IN LATIN AMERICA Latin leaders who are encouraging new forms of area cooperation are taking pains to sustain the momentum of the regionalist spirit as well as to keep pressur' on the developed world. Ten countries now appear ready to put their money behind a shipping fleet venture that has been under discussion for only a few months. Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Pan- ama, Jamaica, Cuba, Colombia, and Venezuela have already signed the pact to establish the Multinational Caribbean Fleet. Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago are also expected to be charter members. Each will contribute equally to an initial $30 million fund, and new members will be assessed a like amount. This system of equal shares, rather than some proportional as- sessment based on relative wealth, may have won over l inidad, which had been leery of domination by the big countries. The other Cen- tral American and Caribbean governments arc; vet to be convinced that the venture can be a success. The act creating the shipping enterprise empowers it to commission and operate all types of merchant ships, to construct or acquire shipyards and related facilities, and to buy or charter ships and appropriate material. The first move evidently will be to rent five freighters, which the consortium would like to see begin operating by the end of the year. If this is SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 successful, the group will consider moving into passenger lines and oil transport. Venezuela and Mexico appear ready to move forward also on their other all-Latin and Caribbean scheme, the Latin American Eco- nomic System. This system so far has little defi- nition beyond its outline as a vehicle to encour- age regional cooperation on a variety of eco- nomic and development questions, but like the proposed multinational fleet, it seems likely to take some shape fairly rapidly, at least as a paper organization. On the pressure side, there are signs that some governments may be contriving a joint declaration condemning illegal activities of mul- tinational corporations Earlier this year, Venezuela and Ecuador secured Latin support for similar OAS denuncia- tion of the Trade Reform Act. ARGENTINA: NEW ECONOMY MINISTER By engineering the replacement of highly respected economy minister Gomez Morales, presidential adviser Lopez Rega has given an- other indication of his power-but the move has dimmed the country's economic prospects. Early this week Celestino Rodrigo, for- merly an official in the Social Welfare Ministry, supplanted Gomez Morales in the top economic post. Rodrigo's transfer extends the influence of Lopez Rega, who is minister of social welfare, as well as presidential adviser. Lopez Rega has fa- vored accommodating the demands of organized labor through wage increases and extensive wel- fare spending. Gomez Morales lost out because he advocated restraint and austerity in the face of mounting inflation. The replacement of Gomez Morales by a lackluster successor is certain to hamper Argen- tina's efforts to secure financial assistance abroad. Although Rodrigo has made a bland call for decreased spending and increased productiv- ity, it is clear that he has no particular economic program of his own. His primary function will be to carry out Lopez Rega's instructions. The latest move not only emphasizes Lopez Rega's growing power-he also arranged recent changes in the army's command struc- ture-but points up the government's desire to maintain its populist image as the administration assumes an increasingly authoritarian posture. For similar reasons, Lopez Rega this week re- sponded for the first time to growing popular revulsion over the activities of a right-wing coun- terterrorist group by announcing that the organ- ization would be investigated. The announce- ment may be no more than a calculated gesture, however, since the group is widely thought to have at least tacit approval of the government. There is considerable speculation in Buenos Aires that more cabinet changes are imminent. Indeed, the success Lopez Rega has had to date may encourage him to press the extension of his influence to the maximum permitted by the nation's final political arbiter-the military. Thus far the officers do not appear disposed to rein in the ambitious minister, des ite wide- spread dislike of him. 25X1 SECRET Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 6, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020026-0