WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020027-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: June 13, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0024/75
June 13, 1975
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Tho WEEKLY SUMMARY, Issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Cflice of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directi7,rate of Science and Technotogy.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment or I
therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed
in the contents.
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CONTENTS (Tune 13, 1975)
EUROPE
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MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
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1 Portugal: Facing Tough Problems
2 Angola: On the Brink
4 Consortium Defends Decision
6 Cyprus: Inconclusive Talks
8 Italy: Election Campaign Windup
9 Finland: Government Resigns
9 France: Nuclear Testing Resumes
10 USSR: Seeking Aviation Technology
12 Iran: Air Power and Air Defense
13 Ethiopia: Another Insurgency
14 Libya-Egypt: Underminlog Sadat
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15 Argentina: Labor
16 Guatemala: Grounds for Divorce
17 Colombia: Declining Public Order
18 Dominican Republic: Crackdown
18 Peru: New Economic Measures
20 Laos: Consolidating Control
22 China-Philippines: Diplomatic Ties
23 China: Trade Retrenchment
24 Burma: Renewed Protests
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DeMenezes brothers, executives of Movement for Independence of the Azores
Portugal: Facing Tough Problems
An incipient rebellion in the Azores added
to Portugal's troubles this past wcol, when
separatists turned a farmers' protest demonstra-
tion into a rally for independence from the
mainland. The demonstrators forced the resigna-
tion of the civil governor of Sao Miguel Island,
thus dramatically focusing Lisbon's attention on
the growing independence sentiment in the
Azui es.
Lisbon's response was twofold: It promised
a sympathetic hearing to the Azoruans' legit-
imate economic grievances, while at the same
time clamping tight restrictions on separatist
activities. On June 10, Portuguese authorities
arrested 29 suspected leaders of the movement
in Sao Miguel. The leftist-controlled media in
Portugal are criticizing military and police of-
ficials in the Azores for their handling of the
demonsuation, and a purge of Portuguese
represontatives in the Azores known to be in
sympathy with the separatists seems likely to
follow.
Unlike Portugal's African colonies, the
Azores are regarded as an integral part of the
mainland. Lisbon will probably yield to many of
the economic demands of the Azoreans, but has
made known its strong opposition to the
nascent independence movement.
Although the separatists have demon-
strated that they have the necessary following to
create public disturbances, they have also shown
themselves to be badly organized and extremely
vu I nerabie. Further demonstrations by the
separatists have been proscribed by the Portu-
guese authorities, and the movement is expected
to go underground for a while.
Meanwhile, Lisbon is faced with serious
problems in Angola where the military situation
continues to worsen. Hostilities between the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
and the National Front are pushing the territory
to the brink of civil war. Additional Portuguese
troops were airlifted to Angola last weekend,
but leading Portuguese military authorities are
in general agreement that there is little they can
do to control the fighting there. Continuing
strife in Angola will lead to a further exodus of
refugees to Portugal and a further rise in un-
employment there. Even more important, the
Angolan developments will cast a pall over the
Armed Forces Movement's most significant
achievement to date?decolonization.
On the home front, the festering dispute
between the Movement and the Socialist Party
over press freedom abated somewhat after the
Socialists agreed to remain in the coalition gov-
ernment in exchange for the reopening of the
party newspaper, Republica. The critical issue in
the Republica dispute?whether the Communist
printers or the Socialists' editorial board would
exercise control of the paper?was resolved by
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the government in favor of the Socialists. The
printers are still demanding a voice in editorial
policy, however, and the agreement could come
unglued at any time.
A potentially explosive conflict with Por-
tugal's Catholic Church is also gathering momen-
tum. Lisbon's Cardinal Ribeiro told US embassy
officials that Communist seizure of the radio
station operated by the Church and government
interference in parochial schools are rapidly
leading to a church-state confrontation. Denun-
ciation of Movement policies from the country's
pulpits could deal a crippling blow to the ruling
military's already waning popularity.
Portugal's leaders are not faring any better
in their efforts to solve the nation's economic
headaches. When EC Council President Garrett
FitzGerald visited Lisbon last week, government
officials pleaded for EC assistance to shore up
the sagging economy. FitzGerald noted that EC
loans could be made only fov specific projects
and not solely to reduce balance-of-payments
pressures. As has happened repeatedly in the
past, the Portuguese were unable to come up
with specific proposals. FitzGerald emphasized
the need for Portugal's political development
along democratic lines and a reduction of com-
munist influence.
FitzGerald himself is prepared to argue
within the EC for early aid. EC foreign minis-
ters may agree in principle to be forthcoming
with assistancr, to Portugal when they meet later
this month, but implementation of more gener-
ous terms for renewing the trade agreement will
be tied to the further course of events in Por-
tugal.
Angola: On the Brink
The rival armies of the two main nation-
alist groups in Angola's transitional government
again engaged in heavy fighting in Luanda dur-
ing the past week. Coming on top of recent
clashes between the same groups throughout a
wide area north and east of the capital and in
the exclave of Cabinda, the latest round of fight-
ing appears to have edged the troubled territory
closer to all-out civil war.
Most of the fighting over the past three
weeks was touched off by the Soviet-backed
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola,
which has become militarily stronger than it was
last winter when the National Front for the
Liberation of Angola appeared to have a decided
edge in troops and guns. At present, neither the
Popular Movement nor the National Front has
the supplies or mobility to force a military
showdown. Both groups appear to be preparing
for such an eventuality, however.
Outside Luanda, each group has now
largely secured the areas in which its ethnic
support is strongest, clearing them of the troops
of the rival organization. This development has
undermined a key provision of the independ-
ence accord thot all three nationalist groups
signed with the Portuguese last January. It had
assured each group the right to engage freely in
political activity throughout the territory.
In the capital, where three rounds of fight-
ing have occurred since March, neither group is
clearly dominant at this time. The initiative
seems to rest with the Popular Movement, which
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Jonas Savimbi
Congo
0
Brazzaville
)
Kinshasa
1 Cabinda
Cabinda \
i...,,?
---.1?'-i?
South-West Africa
(International Tem)
also appears to be in a good position to disrupt
the National Front's supply routes to the city
from northern Angola. Portuguese forces in-
tervened in the latest Luancid fighting more
forcefully than in the past, losing at least three
dead. After the fighting ended, the Portuguese
raided arms depots in the city, a move that
could throw the Popular Movement and the
National Front off balance for the time being.
In Cabinda, representatives of the three
nationalist groups reportedly signed a cease-fire
that calls for each group to maintain only, a
token military force in the largest city. During
the fighting, the Popular Movement, which has
been active in Cabinda much longer than its
rivals, apparently succeeded in driving forces of
the National Front from the city and the adjoin-
ing countryside.
Further serious fighting seems unlikely,
pending the outcome of a meeting of the leaders
of the three groups that is scheduled to begin in
Nakuru, Kenya, on Sunday. The meeting was
promoted by Jonas Savimbi, head of the Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of
Angola, smallest of the three nationalist groups.
Savimbi has emerged as a conciliator in recent
months. His group has tried to stay neutral, but
was drawn into the recent fighting in Luanda.
At the Nakuru meeting, Savimbi, Popular
Movement leader Agostinho Neto and National
Front president Holden Roberto, as a means of
easing competition among them, may discuss
postponing constituent assembly elections until
after Angola receives independence in Novem-
ber. They may also try to reach agreement on a
candidate to head a post-independence govern-
ment. It seems clear that any bargains struck at
the meeting will only serve to postpone a final
reckoning between Roberto and Neto, who
display less inclination than ever to co-
operate.
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Consortium Defends Decision
After more than a year of intensive nego-
tiations, the four-nation consortium composed
of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and
Norway has agreed to buy the US-made F-16
fighter as a replacement for the obsolete F-104
aircraft. Some of the governm, nts, however,
face sharp domestic criticism as a result of their
decision, which is regarded as a blow to hopes of
developing a European aircraft industry. The
opposition parties as well as the left wings of the
governing parties in these countries may revive
the issue if defense spending and unemployment
become contentious questions in the future.
France spearheaded the campaign to "buy
European," and vigorously promoted its Mirage
F-1E. Francophones in the bilingual Belgian gov-
ernment favored the Mirage, and Prime Minister
Tindemans may be in political difficulty as a
result of the decision. There were veiled hints
that Paris might consider cooperating in Euro-
pean defense matters if the consortium chose
the Mirage. Sweden, with its entry, the Viggen,
tried to exert pressure on Denmark by stressing
"Scandinavian solidarity" and, like France, of-
fered a substantial eleventh-hour price reduc-
tion. All three planes fulfill NATO require-
ments, but the greater production run for the
F-16?which was also selected by the US Air
Force?made the American entry the best eco-
nomic choice. Additionally, some countries may
got sub-contracts for F-16 components that will
exceed their expenditures for the planes.
Last month, Denmark, the Netherlands,
ani Norway agreed to purchase the F-16 pro-
vided Belgium followed suit. The decision was
most difficult for Brussels because of its strong
cultural ties to France and the extensive French
business interests in Belgium. Two of the three
parties in Prime Minister Tindemans' coalition
government have French-speaking wings, and
the other is entirely French-speaking. Neverthe-
less, the government won a narrow vote of con-
fidence in parliament yesterday following a chal-
lenge by a French-speaking opposition party
that favored the Mirage.
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Leo Tindemans
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The minority Social Democratic govern-
ment in Denmark nIso has been criticized for its
choice of the F-16, but easily won pro forma
parlia,lentary approval on Wednesday despite a
Communist-inspired demonstration in Copen-
hagen earlier this week. Nevertheless, Stock-
holm's last-minute offer to Copenhagen of a
25-percent reduct:on in the price of the Viggen
may yet cause Prime Minister Jorgensen prob-
lems in Denmark, where there are few sup-
porters of large outlays for defense.
The Dutch government also encountered
opposition, especially from leftists in parliament
who oppose the purchase of any plane to re-
place the F-104. Prime Minister den Uyl, how-
ever, has the backing of the coalition parties for
his decisiun, which was predicated on a unani-
mous choice by the consortium, and does not
require parliamentary approval. Nnvertheless,
one of the small parties in the five-party coali-
tion has called for an investigation to determine
whether the aircraft companies may have tried
to influence The hague's selection. Although
the debate over the government's decision wiII
probably subside gradually, developments at the
recent Dutch Labor Party congress are indicative
of growing and-Americanism in Dutch political
life that Dutch leaders will have to deal with
before the elections in 1977.
Only the Norwegian government can ex-
pect little challenge over its choice. A strong
supporter of NATO and the Atlantic com-
munity, Norway attaches great importance to
Western defense cooperation. In addition, Oslo's
oil wealth will enable it to maintain a relatively
effective defense contribution to NATO, while
at the same time underwriting the extensive and
expensive domestic social welfare programs that
Norwegian voters demand.1
SOVIET SUB RETURNS TO PATROL AREA
The Y-class submarine cruising only
300 miles off the US east coast for about
ten days has returned to its normal oper-
ating area in the mid-Atlantic. Although the
purpose of this unprecedented patrol is still
not clear, it may have been an attempt to
provoke a reaction by US antisubmarine
forces. The Soviets may also want to demon-
strate they can occasionally move the At-
lantic patrol closer to the US. There are
presently six ballistic missile submarines on
opera-L:0ml patrol against US targets. Four
are Y-claFs submarines?two each in the
Atlantic and the Pacific?and the remainder
are D-class submarines in the Greenland
Sea.
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CYPRUS: INCONCLUSIVE TALKS
Another inconclwive round of intercom-
munal talks was held ir Vienna last week under
the auspices of !JN Secretary General Waldheim.
Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides and Turkish
Cypriot negot,ator Denktash could not come to
grips with major issues because the constitu-
tional committee commissioned at the first
Vienna round last month failed to make any
headway on the powers of the central govern-
ment in the proposed federation. The nego-
tiators, apparently under pressure from Athens
and Ankara, went through the motions in order
to maintain the cordial atmosphere created at
the meeting of the Greek and Turkish prime
ministers in Brussels last month.
The negotiators did have some heated ex-
changes. Denktash refused to set forth concrete
positions on the territorial and refugee questions
as promised in the earlier round, citing as justifi-
cation the lack of progress in delimiting the
structure of the proposed federation. He pre-
sented some tentative views on the powers and
functions of the central government and also
proposed that a joint transi:ional central govern-
ment be established, pending a final settlement.
Clerides did not respond to the proposals
on the central government because Denktash
had refused to discuss the territorial and refugee
issues. Clerides did give conditional acceptance
to the proposal for an interim government, and
both men agreed to examine the idea in detail
after the talks. It is doubtful they can agree to
an interim authority with jusrisdiction over
significant political matters.
The talks adjourned on June 7?two days
ahead of time?because of the constitutional
referendum for the Turkish Cypriot zone on
June 8. Denktash reiterated that the constitu-
tion?which was approved by an overwhelming
margin?is subject to revision when an overall
settlement is reached. The negotiators agreed to
meet in Vienna between July 24-27, but this
will depend on further developments in their
informal consultations in Cyprus, the progress
made by the constitutional committee, and the
state of relations between Athens and Ankara.
On June 13, the UN Security Council will
hear Waldheim's noncontroversial report on the
status of a negotiated Cyprus settlement. It
notes the lack of progress, but calls Cor the
continuation of ne otiations etween the two
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ITALY: ELECTION CAMPAIGN WINDUP
The campaign for regional and local elec-
tions on kne 15-16 ends today, with the
dominant Christian Democrats still hoping to
keep their losses to the left within the 2-3 per-
cent range by attracting increased support from
moderate and conservative voters.
The harsh debate between the Christian
Democrats and the Socialists continued to
dominate the campaign in its iinal week. Atten-
tion was distracted from regional and local
issues throughout the campaign by discussion of
what the vote would mean for national politics.
The entire Socialist campaign has been an
elaboration on two of their most widely broad-
cast electoral slogans: one advising voters that
"Italy is changing, but the Christian Democrats
are not," and the other asserting that a vote for
the Socialists is the only vote for the left that
will "really bnther the Christian Democrats."
They charge that the Christian Democrats, after
nearly 30 years as Italy's dominant party, are
too corrupt and conservative to respond to the
problems that have accompanied rapid social
and economic change in Italy. Concerned that
voters inclined to switch to the left might turn
to the Communists, the Socialists have insisted
that theirs is the only party?by virtue of its
access to the government?that can actually use
leftist votes as leverage against the Christian
Democrats.
The Christian Democrats, while claiming
credit for Italy's postwar transformation to an
industrialized society, have hit hard at the
Socialists' failure to advance specific proposals.
Christian Democrat leader Fani.dni, meanwhile,
has continued to dramatize the need for tough
law enforcement and to attack the Socialists for
their equivocal attitude toward anti-crime meas-
ures recently passed by parliament.
Fanfani also stepped up his attack this
week on the distinction the Socialists make
between themselves and the Communists. He
produced elaborate statistics, for example, to
support his argument that the Socialists are
Page
running on joint slates with the Communists in
more localities this year than ever before. The
Socialists, caught off guard, merely reiterated
their demand for a "free hand" at the local
level.
Among the reasons the Socialists insist on
this point is the fact that they may have an
opportunity after the elections to join the Com-
munists in administering two more regions; they
already share power with the Communists in the
latter's north-central strongholds of Emilia-
Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria. The two
parties now stand a chance of gaining slim
majorities in the neighboring regions of Marche
and Liguria.
Foreign policy issues continued to hinder
the Communists in their efforts to campaign on
the claim of running efficient administrations at
the regional and local levels. Communist chief
Berlinguer has complained, for example, about
the preoccupation of the press with such issues
as Portugal and relations with Moscow. The
Communists, nevertheless, have mounted a
vigorous and well-organized campaign and are
likely to continue their postwar trend of steady
gains at the polls.
As the campaign drew to a close, party
leaders began to think out loud about the future
of Prime Minister Moro's Christian Democratic -
Republican coalition, sVll widely regarded as a
stop-gap measure to jet the country through
the elections. Most -:omments were cautious,
however, and no party leader is yet demanding
Moro's resignation right after the elections. The
Socialists would probably trigger a crisis if they
scored dramatic gains?upwards of 3 percent for
example?but even they seem more inclined to
leave Moro in place through the summer. That
would give both the Socialists and the Christian
Democrats time to firm up bargaining positions
on the terms for a new government and to have
them approved by their respective party con-
gresses, tentatively set for the fall.
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FINLAND: GOVERNMEN1 RESIGNS
President Kekkonen has scheduled parlia-
mentary elections for September 21-22 follow-
ing the resignation of Prime Minister Sorsa's
center-left coalition government last week. Kek-
konen will probably wait until next week to
dissolve parliament; work should have been com-
pleted by then on several important bills.
The President is expected to appoint either
a non-political government of civil servants or a
"presidential" caretaker government that would
remain in office until a new cabinet is formed. A
"presidential" government would consist of na-
tionally known political figutes serving at the
request of the president and with the permission
of their respective parties. Kekkonen may opt
for the latter solution because the conclusion of
the European security conference will probably
take place in Helsinki this summer or fall, and
the President wishes to have a group of dis-
tinguished national figures representing Finland
as the host government.
The deeply divided four-party coalition
broke up after failure of repeated attempts to
resolve persistent disagreements. The dispute be-
tween the two niajor coalition partners?the So-
cial Democrats and Kekkonen's Center Party?
started in April when the Center Party an-
nounced it would not support the government's
regional development package. Despite Kek-
konen's intervention and intermittent efforts at
cooperation, neither major coalition partner was
willing to compromise.
Opinion polls indicate that both the Social
Democrats and the Center Party would
strengthen their parliamentary representation in
a new election. A Gallup poll published last
month indicated that in an election the Social
Democrats would garner 27 percent of the votes
and the Center Party could count on 18.7 per-
cent. The same poll indicated that the four
parties represented in the present coalition?the
Social Democrats, Center Party, Liberals, and
the Swedish Peoples Party?are supported by
54.6 percent of the electorate, compared with
their 1972 election total of 52.7.1
FRANCE: NUCLEAR TESTING RESUMES
The French conducted their first nuclear
test of 1975 on June 5 at the Fagataufa Atoll in
the South Pacific. The underground explosion
was France's first since underground testing was
terminated in 1965 in Algeria's Sahara desert.
The French conducted a series of underground
tests there through the mid-1960s.
/Defense Minister Bourges
said in a communique that the test was a com-
plete success both from the technical and safety
points of view.
Paris' decision to resume underground nu-
clear testing follows several years of protest
against French atmospheric tests in the Pacific
by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and several
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west coast Latin American countries. Bourges'
mention of the safety factor probably was in-
tended to head off another round of protests.
International reaction to the detonation has
been muted. Australian Prime Minister Whitlam
noted that France was refraining from con-
ducting atmospheric tests in the Pacific; how-
ever, both he and New Zealand Prime Minister
Rowling reaffirmed their countries' opposition
to any type of nuclear explosions?whether
atmospheric or underground.
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USSR: SEEKING AVIATION TECHNOLOGY
The Soviets want a modern civil air fleet
with safety, quality, and maintenance up to
Western standards, and an aircraft of Soviet
design that would be competitive in the inter-
national air transport market.
Recent agreements between the USSR and
the UK are the latest in a series of attempts to
acquire the much-needed technology.
? A science and technology agreement
signed in March set the stage for more spe-
cific ones between Soviet enterprises and
UK industries.
? A protocol signed with Rolls Royce in
April took the USSR a long step toward
acquiring the technology to modernize its
civil air fleet, and in particular toward pro-
ducing a wide-bodied transport.
The science and technology agreement is
similar to those signed earlier with the US. Six
of the 19 specific fields covered by the agree-
ment with the UK pertain directiy to the air-
craft industry. Of the six, one calls for contacts
and cooperation between British industries and
Soviet enterprises on gas turbine engines, auto-
matic engine controls, and engine component
fabrication.
The Soviets may thus be able to secure
technical details of a high-performance engine
comparable to those manufactured by General
Electric and Pratt and Whitney. The acquisition
of such technology is, in fact, the chief Soviet
purpose in negotiating the protocol with Rolls
Royce. Since March, Soviet delegations have
met at least twice with teams from Rolls Royce
to discuss the purchase of an improved engine.
The protocoi with Rolls Royce opens the
door for contracts to purchase Rolls Royce
engines already in production, as well as for the
cooperative manufacture of these high-thritst,
turbofan engines. Acquisition of such an engine
would make possible the production of signifi-
cantly improved versions of wide-bodied air-
craft, such as the IL-86. The joint development
of improved versions is also envisaged. Such
engines are essential to efficient, long-range
operation of large transport aircraft.
Co-production of engines will result in the
actual transfer of manufacturing technology, as
well as operational and maintenance methods
and processes. With this highly reliable and ef-
ficient turbofan engine technology the USSR
would overcome the principal barrier to its
development of transport aircraft that would be
competitive internationally.
Soviet Deficiencies
At present, the Soviets have two serious
deficiencies in commercial aviation tech-
nology?jet engines and internationally ac-
ceptable avionics equipment. Technical main-
tenance services will also ;lave to be brought up
to world standards. The TU-154s sold to Egypt
were a case in point; most became inoperative
because spare parts and maintenance were un-
available. Cairo eventually returned them.
The Soviets are from two to eight ears
behind the US in design and production tech-
nology for transport aircraft engines. They
started to develop turbofan engines Iter than
the West did, and then generally concentrated
on less sophisticated, less efficient models.
Furthermore, the So...9ts have been unwilling to
introduce the required complex production
technology and have been unable to match some
of the more advanced Western technology used
in producing engines with greater thrust for less
fuel.
By Western standards, the Soviets also have
serious deficiencies in avionic subsystems, es-
pecially in inertial navigation and flight-control.
They have had difficulty in achieving high ac-
curacy and reliability in components. Their
computers are bulky and slow, although they
have acquired some suitable US computer equip-
ment through third countries.
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Model of IL-86
During the past decade, the USSR has
maintained a high priority effort to acquire
Western aircraft technology through
France,
West Germany, tho UK, and the US. Soviet
officials have used the atmosphere of detente to
intensify overt collection efforts.
Intensive technical discussions have been
held with officials of each of the three US
manufacturers of wide-bodied aircraft: Lock-
heed, McDonnell-Douglas, and Boeing. In addi-
tion to Rolls Royce, Soviet delegationss have
visited various engine manufacturers, such as
General Electric and Pratt and Whitney. The
Soviets have studied Western business and
management methods, including marketing
analysis.
Some 30 US companies, including Boeing
and Lockheed, have signed Article 4 of the
US-USSR science and technology agreement.
This article, intended to promote contacts be-
tween Soviet officials and private US firms, has
greatly increased opportunities for Soviet engi-
neering and management personnel to hold di-
rect technical discussions and to observe aero-
space manufacturing equipment in operation.
No specific aircraft project is in the final
stages of negotiation, but whatever evolves will
be subject to US government approval. Never-
theless, a considerable amount of US technology
has already been revealed through preliminary
negotiations, proposals, and exchange visits.
How well the Soviets have been able to use this
technology is not yet clear.
One of the Soviet tactics in negotiations
with the US was to offer to buy wide-bodied
aircraft as an inducement for the construction
of a complete aircraft manutacturing complex in
the Soviet Union by US firms under contract.
The US has refused permission for the sale of
such a complex, and this has been a major factor
in Moscow's decision to move ahead with the
production of its own advanced transport air-
craft, as well as to look elsewhere for advanced
engines. 25X1
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IRAN: AIR POWER AND AIR DEFENSE
The Shah is taking steps to make more
effective use of the advanced aircraft and
sophisticated air defense missile, he is acquiring
Troth the US. His air force, already the dominant
local air power in the Persian Gull, by the 1980s
will be able to extend its influence to the
Arabian Sea. The Shah's plans also call for most
of Iran's military installations and key industrial
facilities to be protected by Hawk missile sites
within the next five years.
Northrop F-SE Tiger and F-SF trainer
The air force is rapidly phasing out its
older model US-built F-5 Freedom Fighters.
Some 20 of the F-5s were sent to Jordan earlier
this year and another 12 may 'ae sent this fall.
An additional 20 are to be returned to the US.
These aircraft are being replaced with improved
F-5E "Tiger II" interceptors. The Shah has
ordered 141 of these new F-5s, plus 28 trainer
models?some 75 have been delivered.
The Shah is intent on obtaining the newest
and best aircraft. In addition to the F-5 Tiger
Ils, he has some 135 F-4 Phartoms, with an
additional 70 to be d .1.vered. Irai, also has con-
iracted for at least 80 US F-14s equipped with
advanced Phoenix air-to-air missiles. The first of
the F-14s are scheduled for delivery before the
end of the year. The Shah has expressed an
interest in acquiring the F-16 lightweight jet
fighter as well.
To project his air power into the Arabian
Sea, the Shah is planning to base F-4s at two
forward airfields. Bandar Abbas will be the
home base for two squadrons of F-4s, and an-
other airfield is being built on the coast at Chah
Bahar, where two fighter squadrons will be sta-
tioned in the late 1970s. From these bases,
Iranian aircraft could dominate the nearby ship-
ping lanes and reach as far as Bombay, India.
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The Shah has re-evaluated the priorities for
locating the Hawk surface-to-air missiles. Hawks
will continue to be placed first at key military
installations, but more emphasis is to be di-
rected at protecting important industrial and
petroleum sites. The capital area, for example,
still is to receivo tha largest number of missiles,
but it will ricq get them until the Isfahan steel
works and cne Kharg Island petroleum facility
near Bushehr are protected.
The overall idr defense plan for the country
is steadily falling behind schedule, however.
Some 25 Hawk launchers have been delivered
under the purchase agreement with the US, but
none is yet operational. The first site at the
Vahdati air base will probably not be ready until
late this summer?several months behind sched-
ule.
ETHIOPIA: ANOTHER INSURGENCY
Ethiopia's military rulers, already beset by
rebellion in Eritrea and rural unrest in other
provinces, found themselves embroiled in still
another conflict on June 1 when heavy fighting
broke out between Afar tribesmen and govern-
ment security forces in eastern Ethiopia. The
clashes subsided this week, but the Afars will
probably continue guerrilla operations in an
attempt ta fend off control by the military
council in Addis Ababa.
Sultan Ali Mirah, the Afar leader, opposes
the council's socialist policies, especially its land
reform program. He was one of the few major
tribal figures to remain free during the council's
roundup of traditional leaders last year, but he
felt the council would eventually move against
him as part of its campaign to destroy Ethiopia's
old ruling class. He refused repeated council
requests to come to Addis Ababa, and a council
delegation that traveled to Afar territory in late
May was unable to reach an accommodation
with him. 25X1
Soon after the fighting began, Ali Mirah
fled to the nearby French Territory of Afars and
Issas/
/He will prob-
ably seek additional aid from Arab countries
and also try to promote cooperation between
his forces and the Eritrean rebels.
The Afars are a threat to both the main
highway linking Addis Ababa with the Red Sea
port of Assab?site of Ethiopia's only oil refin-
ery?and the railway to the port of Djibouti in
the French Territory. During the fighting last
week, the Afars blew up a bridge on the high-
way, setting off panic buying of gasoline in the
capital.
Government forces will probably be able to
control tho main towns in the area, but will not
be able to completely subdue the Afars. The
army is already stretched thin. The Afars num-
ber about 200,000, and almost all the :nen are
armed. Although most of their weapons are old,
some are recently acquired Soviet automatic ri-
fles and modern Western arms
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LIBYA-EGYPT: UNDERMINING SADAT
President Qadhafi is putting pressure on
Arab and Islamic leaders to denounce Egyptian
President Sadat's recent statements concerning
recognition of Israel and the possibility that
Israeli cargoes will be permitted to move
through the Suez Canal. Qadhafi's latest anti-
Sadat offensive may complicate Egypt's efforts
to put together a joint Arab negotiating policy.
Qadhafi
According to the Libyan press, Qadhafi has
received messages from Syria, Tunisia, Algeria,
North Yemen, and Bahrain disapproving of
Sadat's remarks. President Asad is quoted as
stating, "Syria has not and will not consider
recognition of the Zionist enemy, which is not
the right of any chief of state."
Qadhafi hopes that a general Arab con-
demnation of Egypt's recent moves will isolate
Sadat and undercut Egypt's credibility as
spokesman ;:or the Arabs during the next round
of negotiations with Israel. Libya probably also
wants to harden Arab negotiating positions
before the Arab summit later this summer.
Qadhafi has met with several fedayeen
leaders in Tripoli to consider other ways to
block Sadat. He has talked with George Habbash
and Ahmad Jabril?two of the most radical ter-
rorist leaders?and with Nayif Hawatmah and
Faruq Qaddumi, members of the more moderate
Palestine Liberation Organization. All four
Palestinians denounced Sadat's gestures toward
Israel, declaring that the Palestinians would not
accept Israeli use of the Suez Canal.
The Libyan media have stepped up their
denunciation of Sadat; some attacks contain
scarcely veiled calls for the Egyptian leader's
assassination. Last weekend, the Libyans staged
the largest anti-Sadat demonstrations since the
1973 "people's march" on Cairo. Nearly
10,000?including many Egyptian workers?
participated in a rally in Tripoli.
These actions are bound to draw a sharp
reaction from Cairo. They may once again bring
Libyan-Egyptian relations, which have been sour
for many months, to the breaking point.
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ARGENTINA
LABOR PROBLEMS
Even after a change of economy ministers
the government is still encountering consider-
able difficulty in its efforts to deal with the
country's severe economic problems without
alienating organized labor.
Not mollified by a 65-percent increase in
the minimum wage, Argentine workers have re-
acted strongly against price hikes announced by
Economy Minister Celestino Rodrigo who only
last week was named to replace an outspoken
foe of continuing concessions to them. Sharp
increases in utility rates and the prices of
gasoline, basic foods, transport, and services
have provoked strikes by taxi drivers and mari-
time and port workers. Nine persons were
wounded when police broke up an angry crowd
of steelworkers protesting rising prices.
Less than a week after taking office,
Rodrigo also announced the devaluation of he
peso to one third its Februacy value and
endorsed previously approved measures to cur-
tail imports. Argentina has been experiencing
mounting inflation?it now exceeds a
100-percent annual rate?and a deteriorating
balance of payments. In addition, the adminis-
tration has reiterated the urgent need to increase
productivity, probably in reference to the seri-
ous problem of worker absenteeism.
The government undoubtedly is in for even
greater problems with labor. More than a week
after the announced deadline for completion of
wage negotiations with industrial unions, the
Peronist labor confederation announced suspen-
sion of the talks until such time as the full
effects of the devaluation and price increases are
known.
The halt may really be due to dissension in
labor's ranks and to diminishing support for the
workers' own negotiators. Indeed, the heads of
two top labor groupings are rumored ready to
resign their posts. In the meantime, both sides
are clearly seeking to play down their differ-
ences, in public at least. Labor leaders, perhaps
in an effort to buy time, have assuP d workers
that the eventual agreement will be retroactive
to June 1, when the old accord expired. In the
final analysis, however, union leaders may be
ubliged to press the government hard if they are
to retain the support of the rank and file.1
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Sandoval
GUATEMALA: GROUNDS FOR LINORCE
Guatemalan President Laugerud appears to
be embarked on a plan to cast off the extreme
right-wing member of the two-party governing
coalition and eventually form a new political
alliance to govern the countrs . The alliance he
apparently has in mind would not significantly
change the conservative cast of the government.
Current maneuvering by Laugerud centers
on the election of a president of Congress on
June 15. This post, a much-sought-after political
plum, had been held for several years by the
senior partner in the coalition, the rightist
National Liberation Movement, led by Vice
President Sandoval. The Movement lost it last
year to a small party outside, but closely aligned
'th, the coalition and wants it back. Laugerud,
o has been trying for some time to ease the
p:rty and the power-hungry vice president out
of the political limelight, is suppo,ting a candi-
date of the Democratic Institutional Party, the
other member of the coalition. This party, less
strident in its conservatism, is regarded by
Laugerud as better suited to his style and pol it-
ical philosophy.
The two opposition parties, the centrist
Revolutionary Party and the leftist Christian
Democratic Party, have thrown their support to
the Laugerud candidate, making him the
favorite to win. These parties are only too will-
ing to support Laugerud on this issue, having
resented the iron-handed and arrogant way the
Sandoval party has run Congress in the past.
Moreover, they have been going along with the
President on other issues in hopes of beinci in-
cluded in any new coalition excluding tl-:e Na-
tional Liberation Movement.i
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Faced with the possibility of being bumped
from the coalition, National Liberation
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Movement members are becoming worried. One
has charged that Sandoval's inability to swing
the election to their candidate is leading the
party to ruin. Others claim that a weakening of
the coalition would weaken the government
itself.
5andoval is remaining publicly silent for
now. Although it is his nature to threaten and
intimidate in order to show opponents the
power of his party, he is also shrewd enough to
know that he would not succeed in any con-
frontation with Laugerud. Laugerud has the
backing of the army, which, in the end, is the
chief political arbiter in the country. After a
final try at persuading Laugerud to pick another
candidate, Sandoval is likely to go ak .1g with
the President's choice.
For the National Liberation Movement and
Sandoval, losing the congressional 'eldership
will not necessarily lead to an immediate plit in
the partnership, but it does indicate, along svith
previous disputes, that bitterness has grown to
point where a rupture seems inevitable.1
COLOMBIA: DECLINING PUBLIC ORDER
Pressure on President Alfonso Lopez
Michelsen to declare a state of siege continues to
mount. Public order is deteriorating, with
student protests in several cities now added to
existing country-wide demonstrations against
economic hardships. Army units have helped the
national police maintain order, but the army
high command has made clear its distaste for
such use of troops except when legalized by a
state of siege. Last week, following the letter of
constitutional law, the council of state auth-
orized the President to declare a state of siege.
Although Lopez remains extremely reluctant to
abridge civil liberties with such a declaration, it
Page
seems only a matter of time until he is obliged
to do so.
Student unrest has been focused on the
rectorship of the National University and a con-
troversy over medical students' management of
their own clinical training. In an attempt to
forestall existing and antkipated student prob-
lems, President Lopez appointed a Marxist to
the rectorship following his inauguration ten
months ago. In the midst of this month's out-
break of student demonstrations, Lopez fired
the Marxist rector for failing to provide a useful
channel of communication between the student
body and the government. This has only further
aggravated the students, who have intensified
their support of residents and interns seeking to
control one of Bogota's largest hospitals and
have carried the violence-charged issue to other
universities and other major cities.
The key argument in favor of a state of
siege may well be the politically explosive issue
of urban transportation fares. Colombia began
to import oil last year, erasing a tradition of
abundant domestic oil with subsidized low
prices at the gasoline pump. Lopez' efforts to
maintain the price level have led to an increasing
drain of treasury funds into fuel subsidies. In
late May, Lopez moved to suspend or minimize
gasoline imports and ration local consumption.
This will postpone but not eliminate an eventual
price rise and a resultant increase in transporta-
tion fares. In the past, even minor fare hikes
have provoked violent protests by lower income
riders. Lopez would probably be forced to use
the army to control such demonstrations, and
he would almost surely declare a state of siege
first.
Lopez may be tempted to act now in
response to the student unrest and then permit
gasoline prices and transport fares to rise with
the army already in control of public order.
With a mid-term election coming next April, the
President may prefer to confront sooner rather
than later what could be the most serious polit-
ical challenge of his tenure.
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DOMINICAN REPUPI IC: CRACKr,)WN
The government has undertaken a sweeping
crackdown on opponents in the wake of its
claim that three Dominican terrorists secretly
entered the country from Cuba on June 1.
During the past week, security forces have
carried out searches, set up roadblocks, and ar-
rested several hundred people in what they
claim is an effort to apprehend three Dominican
extremists who have been living in Cuba. The
authorities maintain that the trio was brought to
the Dominican Republic by thren Puerto Ricans
who were arrested on suspicion of narcotics
smuggling on June 2. Military and police forces
were dispatched to the area where the landing is
alleged to have taken place, but apparently did
not find their quarry.
General Nivar, the chief of the National
Police, has linked the widespread arrests to the
guerrilla landing and to "subversive plots."
Opposition party leaders, students, labor union
officials, and journalists seem to have been the
main target of the roundup. Many of the de-
tainees have been released after interrogation,
but others remain in custody. Fifteen, including
three important Communist labor leaders, have
been formally charged with conspiring to over-
throw the government.
Considerable skepticism has been reflected
in the press and in public and private statements
by many opposition politicians and some mili-
tary officers concerning the alleged arrival of the
three terrorists. There is a suspicion that the
incident was fabricated by General Nivar to
bolster his reputation with President Balaguer
and to steal a march on Nivar's arch-rival Gen-
eral Perez y Perez, the secretary of the interior
and police.
Now that the authorities have publicly
claimed that the three terrorists have returned,
they will be under increasing pressure to appre-
hend them, otherwise protests against the deten-
tions are almost certain to increase. It will be
very difficult for the government to continue to
maintain that the arrested people actually pre-
sent any security threat. General Nivar has been
making nearly all the public pronouncements on
the episode, and will probably have to Leal the
main responsibility if the government cannot
produce results.)
25X1
PERU: NEW ECONOMIC MEASURES
President Velasco made one of his infre-
quent public appearances this past week pre.
siding over the traditional pledgo-to-the-flag
ceremonies in Lima on June 7. The economic
and political spotlight, however, is increasingly
on his probable successor, Prime Minister Mo-
rales Bermudez.
Last week, Morales Bermudez "Innounced
plans for new economic measures to cohi'uat
spiraling inflation and a growing budgetary defi-
cit. The plane call for reduction?and in some
cases abandonment?of massive government sub-
sidies on essential agricultural and petroleum
products. The measures amount to a significant
departure from President Velasco's almost sacro-
sanct policy of keeping the potentially volatile
urban dwellers quiescent through massive sub-
sidies. To offset the anticipated reaction, Mo-
rales Bermudez is urging the government to
adopt a general price freeze and an increase in
minimum dal!!! wage and salary levels.
For some time, international lending age(..
cies and technical-level officials within the Peru-
vian government have been recommending
tough new measures to ward off what they see
as a serious economic problem. The present
system of direct and indirect subsidies ac-
counted for approximately half of the
1973-1974 biennial budget deficii. Further ag-
gravating the economic situation is the apparent
inability to deal with excessive wage demands.
Inflation, earlier estimated at 25 percent or
more this year, now appears to be heading even
higher.
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The economic plight of the government has
also sparked rumors of devaluation. Although
these rumors are being given some credence in
local business circles, there is no evidence that
the government is planning any such politically
unpalatable move in the immediate future. Fur-
ther, President Velasco has in the past been very
firm in stating that his government will not
preside over devaluation. Morales Bermudez'
views are not known, although he is generally
regarded as more flexible on financial policy
than Velasco. While it is true that he is gradually
assuming a greater role in the decision-making
process, particularly in economic affairs, he is
probably not ready to take such a major step.
In fact, Morales Bermudez will have his
hands full in trying to avoid being the political
victim of his controversial subsidy policy with-
out becoming the focus of opposition on an
even more controversial issue. As the subsidies
aru gradually reduced in the months ahead,
prices will inevitably rise and labor dissatisfac-
tion, already high, will increase. There are indi-
cations that the strong communist trade union
confederation is feeling increasing internal pres-
sure to refuse or withdraw its support of the
govarnment. Implementation of the new eco-
nomic measures will do little to assuage such
pressures. Perhaps symbolic of this new strained
relationship was the relatively minor role that
the confederation played in the Flag Day cere-
monies, and the absence of its representatives in
a "march" of enthusiastic civilians who followed
Velasco back to the presidential palace.
Public reaction to the economic measures
so far has been slight, but it may pick up in late
July when the government is expected to raise
the price of petroleum products, a move that
will almost immediately be felt in the vital trans-
portation sector.
For Morales Bermudez, much is at stake.
Successful implementation of the new policy
and an improvement in the economic situation
would further strengthen his position within the
government and solidify his hold on the succes-
sion. On the other hand, a major slip now would
probably leave the field to other ambitious and
less moderate generals.
25X1
Prime Minister M..rales Bermudez(I) welcoming Australian Prime Minister Whitlam
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LAOS
CONSOLIDATING CONTROLS
The Pathet Lao are moving quickly to con-
solidate political and military control. They still
pay lip service to the coalition concept, but it is
clear the coalition is now nothing more than a
convenient facade for a complete communist
take-over of Laos. 25X1
for the first
time in the 14-month history of the coalition
government, communist Deputy Prime Minister
Phoumi Vongvichit conti-olled the proceedings
at last week's cabinet meeting. In the past,
Phoumi presided only in the absence of Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma, but Souvanna was
present at the June 4 meeting and offered no
opposition to the actions of his deputy.
The communist deputy finance minister,
Boutsabong Souvannavong, appears to be emerg-
ing as the number-two communist in the cabi-
net. Boutsabong has been serving as the
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coalition's chief finance officer in the absence cf
a replacement for ousted rightist Ngon
Sananikone.
The Pathet Lao are also continuing efforts
to neutralize the non-communist Royal Lao
Army as an effective fighting force. Having al-
ready succeeded in driving most of the army's
competent commanders into exile, the commu-
nists are now busy conducting "thought re-
form" indoctrination seminars for non-commu-
nist officers who have not yet been purgecL
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS
There are tenuous indications that a Lao
Communist Party Central Committee meeting
may be under way in Sam Neua. Phoumi Vong-
vichit and Sanan Soutichak traveled from Vien-
tiane to Sam Neua for unexplained reasons last
weekend. Moreover, Prince Souphanouvong?the
nominal leader of the Lao communists?has in-
explicably delayed his scheduled return from
Sam Neua to Luang Prabang for the opening
session of the coalition's Joint National Political
Council, which the Prince chairs. Souphanou-
vong has been at communist headquarters for
the past two months.
If such a conclave has been called, the
Pathet Lao leadership will almost certainly want
to assess?among other things?the major suc-
cesses achieved over the past six weeks and to
determine the pace at which a complete take-
over of Laos should proceed"
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CHINA-PHILIPPMES: DIPLOMATIC TIES
Peking's campaign for improved official
relations with non-communist Southeast Asian
countries took an important step forward this
week with the announcement that China and
the Philippines had established diplomatic rela-
tions on June 9. A trade agreement w As signed
on the same day, but no details were provided.
President Marcos sees relations with Peking as a
vital part of his more general effort to create an
independent foreign policy and end his nation's
international image as a US client state.
Peking now has official ties with two mem-
ber countries of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations. Relations with Malaysia were
opened last year and, according to recent re-
ports, Thailand s prepared to follow suit with
an announcement that could come as early as
next month. That would leave Singapore and
Indonesia as the only remaining ASEAN coun-
tries having no active diplomatic relations with
Peking.
The Chinese used the occasion of Marcos'
visit to Peking to warn against attempts by the
USSR to expand its influence in Asia and to
express Peking's sensitivity about charges of Chi-
nese interference in the internal affairs of other
countries.
Chinese fears that the Soviets are attempt-
ing to take advantage of recent communist vic-
tories in Indochina to improve their position in
the area were evident in the joint communique
announcing the establishment of relations, as
weii as in Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's speech
at the banquet welcoming Marcos. The commu-
nique included a provision condemning any
country that attempts to "establish hegemony
or spheres of influence in any part of the
world," a now standard ingredient in Peking's
anti-Soviet fare.
In addition, Teng complimented Manila for
its opposition to "hegemonism" in recent years
and pointed out that Southeast Asian countries
had broad international support for the plan to
create a zone of peace and neutrality in South-
east Asia, a scheme that Peking apparently be-
lieves will help forestall any increase in Soviet
influence in the region. Teng confidently de-
clared that Asian countries would quickly see
through any Soviet "wiles and schemes" in the
region.
On the subject of interference in internal
affairs, the communique stated that both coun-
tries condemn foreign aggression and,,u',)version,
as well as all attempts by any country to control
another country or to interfere in its internal
affairs. In addition, Teng said in his speech that
China would near "bully" another country and
acknowledged that a country's social system can
be decided ' Dniy by its own people." This
formulation goes slightly further than that used
at the time of Malaysian recognition and appears
Lo be another indication that China expects to
play down support for Asian insurgencies in the
aftermath of Indochina.
On the Taiwan issue, the Philippines stated
in the communique that it "fully understands
and respects" Peking's claim to the island?a
standard formulation. The communique also in-
cluded notice of Manila's decision to withdraw
all official representatives from Taiwan within
one month. There is a good chance, however,
that the Philippines will maintain a significant
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Chou En-lai welcomes Presiderit Marcos
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Jun 13, 75
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25X1
number of commercial and other non-official
contacts with the Nationalists on Taiwan.
In the communique, both sides agreed that
citizens of one country who acquire citizenship
in the other automatically forfeit their original
citizenship, a formula for dealing with the sensi-
tive question of overseas Chinese residents in the
Philippines. The provision does not take into
account Peking's responsibilities toward those
ethnic Chinese who retain Chinese citizenship,
although Peking has for several years consis-
tently urged overseas Chinese to adopt the citi-
zenship of the country in which they reside.
CHINA: TRADE RETRENCHMENT
Worldwide inflation and recession defused
China's foreign trade boom in 1974 and is lead-
ing to a Ntrenchment in 1975.
Saaring prices boosted China's import bill
in 1974 to $7.4 billion, while the economic
slowdown in the West dampened the demand
for Chinese goods. Total exports rose to only
$6.3 billion, resulting in a record $1.1-billion
trade deficit. China's current account balance
with non-communist countries plunged $1.3 bi:-
lion into the red, and, despite a greater use of
supplier credits and short-term borrowing, Pe-
king had to draw down its reserves by $300
million to finance the gap.
Sales at the Canton Trade Fairs, a major
indicator of Chinese exports, point to lagging
exports this year. Although the Chinese tried to
boost sales by cutting prices at the fall 1974 and
spring 1975 fairs, commercially both were
dismal events. Attendance at the spring fair may
have fallen to 15,000, compared with the
25,000 figure Peking reported last fall, and the
volume of business was probably less than the
$700-million fall fair level?the lowest in years.
In an attempt to redress its trade deficit,
Peking will trim its imports during the year.
Based on existing contracts, imports of agricul-
tural products will fall from the record $1.9
billion in 1974 to about $1.3 billion this year.
China will purchase only 4.4 million tons of
grain?down from 7 million tons last year?at a
cost of $675 million. Cotton purchases also are
down sharply; soybean imports have been
phased out.
Machinery and equipment imports, which
more than doubled in 1974 to $1.7 billion, will
grow more slowly this year. Much equipment is
in the pipeline under contracts signed in the past
few years, but Peking has restricted new pur-
chases to badly needed replacements and high.
priority machinery such as oil drilling and
mining equipment. New orders for whole
plants?$1.2 billion in 1973 and $900 million in
1974?will probably decline sharply this year. In
the first four months, Peking only concluded
contracts for bearings plants worth $20 mil-
lion?a radical scale-down of the $100-million
facility originally sought.
Barring a rapid turnaround in the world
economy, Chinese exports this year will prob-
ably grow little over last year's level. Partial
trade returns for 1975 indicate that exports are
up about 10 percent over the same period last
year. If the trend continues, they would total
about $6.9 billion this year. With imports likely
to be about the same as in 1974, the trade
deficit would be reduced to about $500 million,
resulting in an improvement in China's hard-
currency balance of payments.
Despite the deficit in 1974, China's balance
of payments is not in crisis. Although repay-
ments of short-term credits and progress pay-
ments for whole plants will total more than $1
billion this year, reserves ate adequate and Pe-
king's credit rating is excellent. Credits for grain,
whole plant equipment, and Japanese steel and
fertilizer will finance much of the reduced trade
deficit in 1975. With continued large remit-
tances from overseas Chinese and some bank
borrowing, however, China will probably be ab:e
to avoid drawing down its reserves of gold and
foreign exchange. r
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BURMA: RENEWED PROTESTS
Small-srale protests against the Burmese
government by Audents and workers, largely
over poor economic conditions, began last
month in Rangoon. The unrest escalated last
week, as the protesting groups commemorated
the anniversary of the violent labor disoiders
last year, during which troops killed more than
20 demonstrators.
Last weekend the protests took on a more
virulent antigovernment tone as several thou-
sand students marched through the streets of
Rangoon. A considerable number of workers in
the Rangoon area joined in, and what had
originally been work slowdowns became strikes,
resulting in the closure of several factories.
Students in Mandalay also staged a demonstra-
tion. 25X1
This week, the government used troops to
arrest more than 200 students in Rangoon, after
ordering the universities closed. The universities
had reopened only last month, after being shut
down in December as a result of student-
initiated disorders over the funeral of former
UN secretary general U Thant. Troops were used
only after authorities first tried a conciliatory
policy, announcing that some of the economic
demands of the workers would be met and send-
ing high-ranking officials to meet with both
worker and student groups. The meetings with
students were called off, however, because the
sessions aroused considerable hostility among
the students.
The government's tough measures will
probably bring an end to the protests, although
they may lead to further bitterness a ainst the
regirne.1
iThe
government is publicly blaming the Burmese
communists for inciting the disturbances, but
there is no evidence to support this
charge. 25X1
? ? ?
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