WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020045-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 17, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020045-9
Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0042 / 75
October 17, 1975
Copy N!
1399
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CONTENTS (October 17, 197.5)
The WEEi;I.Y SUMMARY, iswed every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signifi-
cant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently include; nrcrteriol coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more cornprehunsive treatment and there-
fore published separately 'as Special Reports are listed in
the contents.
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
1 USSR: Sakharov; Siberian Development
4 USSR-Syria: An Important Symbol
5 The UK, EC, and Energy
6 Soviet Meteorological Satellite
7 Turkey: Stronger Hand to Demirel
8 Portugal: Testing Azevedo
9 Angola: Little Change
10 India: Economic Prospects Good
11 Lebanon: Cease-Fire Threatened
12 Spanish Sahara: Court Decision
13 Panama: No Fireworks
14 Chile: ChanginU Advisers
15 Brazil: Shifting Oil Policy
16 Ecuador: Counting Down
16 Argentina: State of the Presidei,cy
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^ SECRET
Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov (r) toasts his winning of the Nobel Peace Prize
USSR
The already sizable headache presented the
Soviet regime by dissident spokesman physicist
Andrey Sakharov seems destined to grow worse,
now that he has been awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize. This spring, Sakharov lent his name to the
organizers of a blue-ribbon international tribunal
on the status of human rights in the Soviet Union.
The conclave, which has been almost a year in the
planning, is slated to be held in Copenhagen Oc-
tober 17-19.
Soviet officials have so far declined to com-
ment on SAkharov's Nobel award. Moscow's
foreign-language broadcasts, however, have at-
tacked the Nobel Committee's "political
gesture," saying it was designed to "kindle the an-
ti-Soviet campaign and impede the easing of in-
ternational tension." In calling Szkharov a man
who has "put himself in a position of an anti-
patriot and an opponent of peaceful coex-
istence," Moscow's broadsides suggest that a ma-
jor campaign to discredit Sakharov is in the mak-
ing. The first domestic assault on Sakharov as a
"hater of peace" appeared in the Soviet press on
Ocober 15.
Sakharov, meanwhile, has told Western
reporters that he views the prize as beneficial to
the cause of human rights in the USSR, and he has
renewed his call for a general amnesty for
political prisoners. In telephone interviews with
Western media, Sakharov said that the CSCE
agreements and his Nobel award should give im-
petus to an "international crusade" for human
rights in the USSR.
Sakharov has also said that he hopes the
Kremlin will not see his Nobel award as a
"challenge" and that he believes it would
"violate the spirit of detente" if he were
not permitted to go to Oslo in December to
collect the prize. The Norwegian embassy in
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Moscow reportedly has assumd Sakharov of its
government's support.
Whether to let Sakharov go to Oslo-and
to return-will, nevertheless, be a difficult
decision for the Soviet leaders, even more so
now that prominent Soviet non-dissident
scientist Dr. Leonid Kantorovich has been
named co-recipient of the 1975 Nobel prize
for economics. The Kremlin may find it
embarrassing to charge the Nobel Committee
with playing politics in Sakharov's case, while
recognizing in Kantorovich-a Lenin-prize
winner-the contributions of a major establish-
ment scientist.
Soviet leaders also remember clearly the
case of exiled writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,
who won the Nobel Literature Prize in 1970,
but declined to go to Stockholm unless assured
he could return to the USSR. The affair ended
with his expulsion in February 1974. In
the intervening four years, Solzhenitsyn's
name remained in the headlines and tarred
the Soviet reputation abroad.
Moscow has not yet commented directly on
the Copenhagen tribunal. Tass, however, has
replayed for foreign consumption some of the
more derisive comments by Western leftist media,
including questioning of the dissident physicist's
"humanist" credentials and dark hints about the
sources of the meeting's financial backing.
If the tribunal follows early plans, it will range
across human rights violations in the USSR, from
religious oppression to curbs on freedom of
movement. Its focus will be on testimony from
survivors of Soviet prisons, labor camps, and psy-
chiatric hospitals.
The sponsors, a group of Soviet and East
European exiles resident in Denmark, have
solicited testimony, oral and written, from "any
person able to give it." Several prominent Soviet
exiles are expected to testify. Solzhenitsyn has
been invited but has reportedly declined to at-
tend.
Sakharov's prominence at home and abroad,
along with his record of public appeals on behalf
of the very causes the tribunal intends to ex-
amine, made his name an obvious and early
choice for the sponsors of the Copenhagen
meeting. There is no evidence that they knew
beforehand that Sakharov would win the Nobel
Peace Prize. The award will be sure to attract add-
ed attention to the tribunal's proceedings.
The two events, the Peace Prize and the
tribunal, will intensify speculation about
Sakharov's future.
Sakharov gradually took up dissident ac-
tivities in the 1960s and was slowly cut off from his
work on the Soviet nuclear program. He was fired
and his security clearance lifted shortly after
publication in the West during 1968 of his essay,
"Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual
Freedom." Since May 1969, he has held a low-
ranking job as a parttime researcher at the
Lebedev Institute of Physics in Moscow.
Sakharov, however, remains a member of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences. He even attended
the opening of the academy's 250th anniversary
celebrations in Moscow on October 7 and listen-
ed to General Secretary Brezhnev's keynote ad-
dress. Sakharov's contacts there with numerous
visiting Western scientists increases the size of the
problem he poses for the regime.
The strongly democratic, soberly reformist
Sakharov has never subscribed to the
authoritarian, nationalistic outlook expressed by
Solzhenitsyn. Sakharov has thus been able to
reach a wider Western audience as a spokesman
for human rights in the USSR. The contrast
between Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov is a further
measure of the Kremlin's problem in dealing with
the dissident physicist.
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SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT CHUGS ALONG
The Soviet Union opened two bridges along
the route of the Baykal-Amur railroad in
September, crossing another hurdle in Siberian
railroad construction. These two are among the
largest of 142 major bridges envisioned for the
railroad, and their completion will have a signifi-
cant psychological and technological impact. The
construction techniques were new to the USSR,
and the experience gained should aid construc-
tion of the other bridges.
fhe 1,100-meter Amur River bridge at the
eastern end of the railroad provides a major year-
round connection between the railroad and the
Pacific Ocean. This link should alleviate
bottlenecks in existing rail capacity. Until now,
the Soviets have relied on a rail ferry during
srummer and tracks across the ice during winter.
At the western end, the Lena River bridge will
simplify moving heavy equipment needed at two
of the largest planned tunnel sites-one near
Nizhneangarsk and the other, which will be the
longest tunnel in the USSR, at Severo-Muyskiy.
Railroad construction-particularly the
Baykal-Amur railroad-has top priority in the
Kremlin's plans for developing Siberia. Construc-
tion on the Baykal-Amur was to increase fivefold
this year and is planned to double again in 1976.
Although work on the railroad generally has
progressed on schedule, it is still too early to
evaluate whether the 1982 completion deadline
can be met because construction over the most
rugged terrain has yet to start in earnest.
West, Sib,ria
Ob' Niver
tTn,~;`t'' ? Surgut
Nizhnevortovsk
Sainollor
r)ilbclta
Chul'ru;tn Cbal
pclr:'.Ili
Barkakit
Tyndtr
neanBersk
Amur River
Pivan" f I rldga-
R
Cast Siberia
tend I7'vr
tlridge,,
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SECRET'
The railroad is viewed as critical to any inten-
sive Siberian development program because
more than 75 percent of the machinery in Siberia
is transported from other regions. Complaints
about recurrent equipment breakdowns, repair
difficulties, and shortages of equipment have
resulted in imports of more reliable equipment
from the US.
The Soviets have also completed several
other rail projects this year. Among them are the
Bam-Tynda rail line, facilitating the movement of
construction materials to sites along the
Baykal-Amur railroad, and a bridge across the Ob
River on the Tyumen-Surgut line, expanding
access to West Siberian energy resources. The
Barn-Tynda line is being extended north to
Berkakit and the Chulman coal deposits.
Moscow is planning to upgrade existing lines
from Pivan to Sovyetskaya Gavan and from
Tayshet to the Lena River to permit more inten-
sive use of the Baykal-Amur railroad. Only track
laying is needed to complete the extension of the
Tyumen-Surgut line to Nizhnevartovsk and the
Samotlor oil fields.
Other transportation projects under con-
sideration for Siberia include the extension of a
rail line from Nizhnevartovsi, eastward to the
Baykal-Amur to form a grand "North Siberian
Railroad" and the construction of several north-
south road and rail "tentacles" to intersect with
the Baykal-Amur and provide direct access to
mineral deposits and other resources.
The Soviets reportedly are considering a road
paralleling the Baykal-Amur to handle short-haul
traffic. It is unlikely, however, that sufficient
resources for these projects will be available until
the Baykal-Amur line nears com-
L) letion.
USSR-SYRIA: AN IMPORTANT SYMBOL
Whatever the practical results of Syrian
President Asad's brief visit to the USSR last
weekend turn out to be, there is no doubt
Moscow considered the visit an important sym-
bol of its continuing role in the Middle East.
Party boss Brezhnev and other top Soviet
leaders greeted Asad at the airport and saw him
off when he left.
One obvious purpose of the visit, aside
from demonstrating the solidarity of
Syrian-Soviet opposition to Sinai II, was almost
certainly to discuss strategy for the next round
of Middle East diplomacy. The Soviets
doubtless sought to explore Syria's attitude
toward new talks, especially since Damascus,
unlike Moscow, is cool to the idea of
reconvening the Geneva conference.
The composition of Asad's delegation,
which included Defense Minister Talas as 'veil
as Foreign Minister Khaddam, indicates that
military issues were also high on the agenda.
Talas and Khaddam remained in Moscow until
October 15, probably to try to negotiate more
Soviet military aid for Syria as a counterbalance
to new US arms commitments for Israel.
The two sides probably also discussed the
situation in Lebanon. Moscow has applauded
Syrian efforts to mediate the conflict there.
The brevity of the communique issued
after Asad's departure suggests that the two
sides did not see eye to eye on .ill matters. At
the least, however, their silence on substantive
issues keeps the options of each open as they
consider the next steps in the Middle East
negotiating process.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 17, 75
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British Foreign S .cretary Callaghan (I) at recent EC foreign ministers meeting
THE UK, THE EC, AND ENERGY
Delegates from several industria! and
developing countries agreed this week in Paris to
hold a conference of 27 states on "international
economic cooperation." The session, which con-
venes in Paris on Decembe-, 16, will bring
together rich and poor nations to consider
energy, raw materials, economic development,
and related financial issues.
Foreign Secretary Callaghan's firm stand at the EC
Council last week caused surprise and dism?y
among London's EC partners. Predictably, most of
them assailed the British for threatening EC
"solidarity" by neglecting to make any reference
to the need for a common stand, even though all
recognize that agree:nent on an EC energy policy25X1
is an extremely difficult matter. 25X1
London's decision not to allow the EC to
represent it at i:he meeting has had little effect as
yet on the preparations, but the UK's action will
enormously complicate the process of selecting
which countries will represent the industrialized
nations and how they will coordinate policies.
The move reflects Britain's difficulty in balancing
national and community interests and is another
example of the trouble the EC has had recently
reaching common stands on international
economic issues. If the EC members make Lon-
don's move a matter of principle, a bitter, divisive
wrangle could develop.
The UK had been on record for some time
that it might seek its own seat. Nevertheless,
Most EC members are taking London's move
as a serious threat to the community.
Callag'ian contends that Britain-as the only
potential 1 exporter among the Nine-could not
have K. interests adequately represented by the
community. This )ighlights the disparate con-
cerns among the partners that obstruct their
search for a cc-mmon energy policy. Satisfaction
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of even the UK's principal demand-a long-range
energy price guarantee for its North Sea
oil-would, in itself, do little to narrow the gap.
The Wilson government has been under
domestic pressure on the issue of sovereignty
over North Sea production since well before last
summer's referendum that confirmed the UK's
continued participation in the EC. The Labor
government, faced with a deteriorating economic
situation, cannot afford to give the impression
that it has surrendered control over the resource
many have touted as Britain's best hope for the
future.
USSR
London's reluctance to delegate representa-
tion may be aimed in part at getting the com-
munity to develop a common energy policy. The
UK's impatience with its partners can also be seen
in other areas, however. On relations with the
developing countries, the EC has yet to formulate
a coherent stand. As recently as Monday, the
Nine failed to agree on an aid program for those
developing states that are not already associated
with the community-many of them Asian coun-
tries with ties to Britain.
The EC took a back seat to the US at last
month.'s special session of the UN, where a com-
promise was struck between the developed and
developing states. London had advanced its own
program for development cooperation to its com-
monwealth associates last spring, and the Wilson
government may feel that the lack of inter-
national response is, at least in part, because of
London's difficulty in securing the support of its
community partners. London can thus also make
the argument that its development policy cannot
be adequately represented by the community and
could further insist that its importance as an inter-
national financial center dictatf s the need for
separate representation or finacicial issues.
near-earth orbit, an improved Meteor satellite The EC and the other industrialized states
Cosmos 775, launched last week into a
stationary orbit over the Indian Ocean, may be
part of the "three-tier" meteorological satellite
system the Soviets have been talking about for
many years. Soviet literature describes the
three-tier system as a manned satellite in
in a medi';m-altitude orbit, and a stationary will, of course, have to settle the representation
satellite over the Indian Ocean. question before the conference in Cecember.
Short of an accommodation with its partners,
Last July, the Soviets launched into a there are few workable alternatives. One
medium-altitude orbit the first of a new series possibility-not generally favored by most par-
of Meteor satellites designated Meteor 2 which ticipants-would be to increase the number of
are probably improved versions of the Meteor participants to accommodate other developed
1 series, first '-lunched in 1969. states, along with a commensurate increase in
developing-state representatives. Another would
A future manned space station operation be to allow both the EC and Britain to attend the
using the Salyut spacecraft could provide the conference or participa'e in one or more of its
low-altitude portion of the three tiers. fellow-up commissions. Other, less likely,
25X1 solutions include a full agreement among the
The precise mission of Cosmos 775 has not Nine on common energy and development
been identified; it may be meteorological, or polices or permitting Britain to take the EC seat
related to intelligence collection. on energy matters. The latter would not resolve
the basic conflict of interests between Britain and
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SECRET
the rest of the community. In the end, the UK
faces the possibility of not gaining its own seat at
the conference and, having declined EC
representation, not being represented at
all.
25X1
TURKEY: STRONGER HAND TO DEMIREL
Last Sunday's partial Senate elections in
Turkey strengthened Prime Minister Demirel's
position within the governing coalition and in
relation to his political opponents.
According to the unofficial tabulation,
Demirel's conservative Justice Party won 27 of the
54 Senate seats and 5 of the 6 National Assembly
seats that were contested. Although Demirel's
main opponent-Bulent Ecevit's Republican
People's Party-won a higher percentage of the
vote (43.3 compared to 40.8 for the Justice Party)
the Republicans took only 25 Senate seats and 1
assembly seat.
Ecevit has claimed victory, pointing to his
party's higher percentage of the vote and its net
gain of 17 Senate seats. These figures may,
however, somewhat exaggerate the party's
nationwide strength. A larger percentage of the
seats at stake were in Republican strongholds
than would be the case in a general election.
Turkey's minor conservative parties did poor-
ly. US embassy officials think this may mean
that-for the present at least-Turkey is moving
back toward a two-party system after two years
during which no party had a majority and only
weak coalition or caretaker governments were
possible.
Among the small parties that lost ground was
Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party, a
partner in the government coalition. Erbakan's re-
cent uncompromising stands on several issues
had largely immobilized the government. Its poor
%4p= ' 7 r M'
Prime Minister Demirel votes during recent election
showing could give Demirel more flexibility in
dealing with such pressing problems as Cyprus.
In confroming contentious issues, Demirel
will, however, be sensitive to the prospect of a full
parliamentary election, which must be held in
1977 and could even be held earlier. He will try,
therefore, to avoid taking positions that could
harm his party's electoral chances. F
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SECRET
PORTUGAL: TESTING AZEVEDO
Portugal's anti-Communist leaders have
backed down in the face of a serious incident of
military indiscipline instigated by the far left and
the Communists. If further such challenges are
not countered, an early end to the Azevedo
government is probable.
The week-long occupation of an artillery unit
in Porto by leftist soldiers and their civilian sup-
porters-the most serious challenge faced by the
month-old Azevedo government-was resolved
earlier this week by a compromise worked out by
Army Chief of Staff Fabiao. The agreement meets
many of the demands of the rebellious troops and
skirts the issue of their open defiance of the
government. No punishment is called for, despite
a government announcement during the
rebellion that those responsible for the civil un-
rest would be prosecuted. Scores of people were
injured when center-left Popular Democratic Par-
ty supporters were fired on by the militants.
The government's failure to take a strong
stand on this issue is probably due to the lack of a
reliable securit; force. The military intervention
force, announced several weeks ago, still exists
only on paper. Lack of support from President
Costa Gorses may also have been a factor.
Calls for the return of pro-Communist former
prime minister Vasco Goncalves to power have
occurred at leftist gatherings, and the Com-
rnunist-influenced Lisbon press is increasingly
referring to such a possibility. The Porto incidents
and other anti-government activities on the part
of the military are linked with Goncalves and
other pro-Communist officers who formerly held
key positions and have been allowed to remain
on duty.
A challenge is also developing in the labor
sector. Metallurgical and agricultural worker un-
ions have threatened to paralyze southern Por-
tugal by strikes within a few days if $160 million in
agricultural credits promised by the Goncalves
regime are not forthcoming. The Communists
have solidified their control over the
metalworkers-the most important blue-collar
federation in Portugal-in recent elections and
also succeeded in obtaining wage increases
despite government appeals to the workers to
curb their demands.
Both the Communists and the extreme left
had refrained from criticizing Azevedo personally
but-following his speech on October 13 on
economic problems-he was attacked by
newspapers of both factions. The far-left
Republica sharply criticized him for saying that
the workers are partially to blame for the
economic crisis, while the pro-Communist Diario
de Noticias questioned whether Azevedo is on
the side of the majority political parties or of the
workers and farmers.
The government's conciliatory stand on the
Porto incidents raises difficult questions about its
resolve to enforce its own decisions and is likely
to encourage similar incidents elsewhere. A flurry
of anti-government demonstrations and strikes
fomented by the far left and the Communists is
expected to further test Azevedo's mettle in the
weeks to come. 25X1
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MPI_A head Agostinho Neto (r)
ANGOLA: LITTLE CHANGE
After a week of renewed fighting, Angola's
three warring liberation groups have made little
headway toward improving their respective
military positions. The Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola, the dominant political and
military organization in the territory, still projects
itself as the only group capable of governing after
independence on November 11.
Military offensives by all three groups an-
parently are being hampered by logistic
problems. The Soviet-backed Popular Movement
has not been able to drive the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola from its
headquarters in Nova Lisboa, Angola's second
largest city. Nor cu the National Union push the
Popular Movement out of Lobito, the territory's
major port. Both groups are having difficulty
providing a continuous flow of fresh troops and
supplies to their forces.
In northern Angola, the National Front con-
tinues to move very slowly toward Luanda from its
base of operations at Caxito, some 40 miles to the
northeast. The Front naively hopes that by laying
siege to the capital it can buttress its claims to
political legitimacy and pressure the Popular
Movement into accepting the Front as a partner
in an independent government.
Lisbon maintains that all three liberation
groups have a legitimate and equal claim to
political participation after independence, and to
transfer sovereignty to a single liberation group
would be contrary to Portugal's philosophy of
decolonization. Nevertheless, the Popular Move-
ment seems to believe that Portugal will have no
choice on November 11 but to turn over power
exclusively to the Movement. Movement Presi-
dent Agostinho Neto stated this week that he
hopes a reconciliation committee recently sent to
Angola by the Organization of African Unity will
recognize his group as the sole legitimate
representative of the Angolan people. In Neto's
view, this would place heavy pressure on the Por-
tuguese to follow suit.
Neto has also said that, in the event the Por-
tuguese refuse to transfer sovereignty officially to
the Popular Movement, his organization is
prepared to proclaim the independence of
Angola under its own banner. The Portuguese
could do nothing to counter such a move. Por-
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tugal still plans to have all of its troops out of the
territory by November 11.
The Popular Movement prefers to gain
power with the legitimacy a Portuguese transfer
of sovereignty would confer. To that end, it is
continuing to project itself as the unoffic;al
successor to Portugal, most recently by sending a
delegation to the UN General Assembly. The
delegation will receive no formal recognition
from the UN, but will probably engage in heavy
ec n
lobbying, es i ll UN intervantion
in Angola.
25X1
INDIA: ECONOMIC PROSPECTS GOOD
Shortly after extending her authority in June,
Prime Minister Gandh! announced a 20-point
econon,;c program to reduce the prices of essen-
tial commodities, expand agricultural and in-
dustrial production, and improve the position of
the rural poor. Most of the 20 points were
restatements of earlier promises, but the Prime
Minister's new authority gave her more power to
implement changes.
Now, several months later, short-term
economic prospects are good:
? The best monsoon i iins in five years
are likely to produce a record grain harvest
this fall.
? Increased supplies of hydroelectric
power and agricultural raw materials will
stimulate industrial recovery.
? Strict monetary controls have reduc-
ed inflation dramatically, and the large
harvest will help keep inflationary pressure,
in check.
Good weather, rather than government in-
itiative, is responsible for the favorable outlook;
Gandhi, nonetheless, will take credit for any
economic upturn.
Food grain imports this year will probably be
some 1 to 2 million tons less than the 6 million im-
ported last year. About 2,5 million tons were on
hand at the beginning of the year, compared with
a peak of 10 million tons in 1972; New Delhi in-
tends to import substantial amounts of food
grains to build up buffer stocks.
To date, India has arranged to import about
3.5 million tons of wheat for 1975, with 2.5 million
tons coining from the US. Continuing foreig.. ex-
change shortages will limit additional purchases,
and New Delhi will probably seek concessional
grain.
India's trade deficit, $1.4 billion in the year.
ending March 1975, will increase moderately, at-
tributable to higher prices for petroleum, fer-
tilizer, and food grain. These have caused trade
deficits for the past two years in contrast to a sur-
plus in 1972. India now pays $1.5 billion for im-
ported petroleum. The recent 10-percent price
hike for oil and increased consumption will cost
India $200-$300 million more next year. Offshore
oil exploration and exploitation is not far enough
along to reduce Indian dependence on foreign
oil before 1980.
The trade deficits have resulted in a massive
increase in foreign borrowing. Despite rising
debt-service payments, net capital receipts in-
creased sharply in 1973 and 1974. During these
years, India obtained nearly $700 million from the
International Monetary Fund, in addition to $1.7
billion in net aid from other sources. Much of the
IMF borrowing will be due by 1978, when total
debt service obligations will rise about 20 percent
to $900 million. India's ability to meet payments
will continue to hinge largely on new loans,
repeated rescheduling of payments, and IMF
borrowings.
Promising short-term prospects notwithstand-
ing, the long-term outlook remains pessimistic.
Changes more fundamental than those embodied
in the 20-point program are needed to attack
deep-rooted economic problems of Population
pressure, low domestic savings and investment,
dependence on forei n aid, and huge externa'
debts. 25X1
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LEBANON: CEASE-FIRE THREATENED
The security situation in Beirut improved
markedly following the cease-fire arranged dur-
ing Prime Minister Karami's trip to Damascus late
last week. In midweek, however, the developing
truce was marred by new clashes between Muslim
and Christian militiamen in the eastern suburbs of
Beirut. There has been no significant progress
toward resolving fundamental political issues that
underlie the continuing crisis.
The fighting on the night of October 14-15 in-
volved a refugee camp under the control of "re-
jectionist" fedayeen who fired anti-aircraft
batteries at an adjoining Christian community.
Some of the rounds fell on a nearby Armenian
quarter, threatening to bring the Armenians into
the conflict for the first time.
This week, the national reconciliation com-
mittee for the first time took steps to come to
grips with the underlying causes of the crisis. On
October 13, subcommittees were formed to con-
sider political, economic, and social reforms. 13oth
Ip
Lebanese army bulldozer dismantles sandbag barricade in Beirut
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt and co'iservative
Christian leader Pierre Jumayyil, he, d of the
Phalanges Party, were named to the political com-
mittee, which was scheduled to holo its first
meeting on October 16. There is no indication,
however, that the Phalangists are prepared to
agree to a modification of the existing political
structure in a way that would give the Muslims
greater political power.
The conference of Arab foreign ministers
which convened in Cairo on October 15 achieved
ve1y little. The ministers appealed for self-
restraint to end the fighting and called on Arab
League members to provide Lebanon with finar,-
cial aid. Neither Syria nor the Palestine Liberation
Organization, which are both heavily involved in
the Lebanese crisis, attended the conference. A
PLO spokesman described the conference as an
attempt to divert attention from the second Sinai
agreement, while the Syrians, who regard
Lebanon within their sphere of influence, op-
posed "Arabizing" the crisis.
Oct 17, 75
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SPANISH SAHARP: COURT DECISION
The International Court of Justice and a UN
fact-finding group released their findings on the
status of Spanish Sahara this week, moving the
long-simmering dispi;te over the territory into a
crucial stage.
The International Court's advisory opinion
on October 16 asserted that both Morocco and
Mauritania had legal ties with the "Western
Sahara" at the time of Spanish occupation, but
not ties of territorial sovereignty. The Court
decided, by wide majorities, that these ties do not
preclude the application of the principle of
self-determination to the territory. The Court
took up the case in response to a request from the
UN General lssembly last December.
The report by the UN group-a delegation
from the Decolonization Committee that visited
the area last spring-suggested that the UN en-
courage dialogue among all "interested parties"
includirg Saharan refugees living in exile. It also
recommended that the UN designate a commis-
sion of e. nerts to determine who is a Saharan, but
stopped short of explicitly backing a referendum.
In an apparent reference to Morocco, which has
threatened to use force if necessary to "recover"
the territory, the report urged all parties to
recognize Spain's responsibility during the
decolonization process and avoid provocative
acts that could upset the status quo.
Both the UN report, if adopted in committee,
and the Court's opinion will be submitted to the
current session of the UN General Assembly,
which has to decide whether to formulate a
proposal for decolonization of Spanish Sahara or
to leave settlement of the dispute to the countries
invol'.ed. Earlier assembly resolutions have en-
dorsed self-determination.
Morocco's King Hassan is committed to
annexing at ;east part of Spanish Sahara. In a
speech following the release of the Court's opi-
nion, Hassan announced he will organize a
"peaceful" mass march into the Spanish Sahara.
He said he would not seek an armed conflict with
Spain, but would fight in self-defense.
At the same time, Hassan may interpret the
Court's opinion as supporting partition of Spanish
Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. The
two counties reached an agreement in principle
earlier this year that would partition the territory,
giving Morocco tie northern region with its
phosphates and granting Mauritania some of the
southern portion containing iron ore.
Rabat probably will try to have the UN report
shelved in committee or submitted to the General
Assembly as information only. The report implies
a role for Algeria, which insists it is an "interested
party," in settling the Saharan dispute. Morocco
vigorously opposes any such ro'e.
King Hassan has apparently not abandoned
his year-end deadline for resolving the dispute or
his threat to use force. Rabat has taken various
measures to meet any military contingency that
may arise with Spain or P,I eria.
Algeria opposes Morocco's aspirations and
has publicly supported a referendum, supervised
and guaranteed by the UN. It also has been sup-
porting a Saharan group seeking independence
for the territory. Algiers will probably argue that
the Court opinion and the UN report's call for
consultations with Saharans is recognition of their
right to self -determinatic;,.
Spain, for its part, would welcome new talks
with Morocco in order to achieve a peaceful .id
orderly withdrawal from the Sahara. Madrid may
view the Court's findings as a basis for an
amicable solution and drop its earlier wish for a
referendum. Spain has been unwilling in the past
to disregard Algeria's interests, however, and this
may still be a major stumbling block.
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PANAMA: NO FIREWORKS
The celebration on October 11 of the 1968
"revolution" that brought General Omar Torrijos
to power was a peaceful and rather sober affair.
The government went out of its way to stress the
positive image of a responsible, popularly sup-
ported government and to take a moderate line
toward the treaty talks.
Chief of Government Torrijos and President
Lakas delivered sober, moderate speeches. Lakas
dwelt on the regime's accomplishments while
Torrijos emphasized that national unity and
patience would be needed to weather the dif-
ficult canal negotia ions. Torrijos stressed the
need for restraint, pointing out the realities of
negotiating with a "sometimes irrational"
colossus with a formidable military presence in
the zone. He said any treaty that could be achiev-
ed quickly would only be rejected when sub-
mitted to his promised popular referendum. His
toile and specific reference tc US political needs
regarding the 1976 election again made clear that
he is resigned to continue negotiating at least
through text year. Also on a conciliatory note,
Torrijos uromised US canal workers that his
governmt nt would respect labor gains and that
extraterritorial protection is unnecessary. Those
who think otherwise, he war ned, should leave.
Torrijos commented on two major sticking
points in the negotiations-US bases and the
durat;on of the treaty-by stating that Panama was
not negotiating on US military bases, only the
period within which they must be dismantled;
any presence beyond the end of the century
would be unacceptable. By constantly reiterating
this position, even in the context of an otherwise
generally conciliatory speech, Torrijos has made
retreat on this issue extremely difficult, if not im-
possible.
The press had anticipated that some 128,000
persons would attend the main rally, but only 35,-
000 were present, even though the government
provided free transportation from outlying
provinces and probably pressed government
employees to attend. Several secondary events
were canceled, apparently to build attendance at
the main rally. The disappointing crowd was the
combined result of poor weather, the weekend
rather than weekday anniversary date, and the
absence of any recent noteworthy government
achievement or prospective announcement to
generate enthusiasm.
The government carefully scheduled main
events away from the Canal Zone and did not
emphasize the concurrent 50th anniversary of the
1925 renters' strike, when US troops were called
by the Panamanian government to put down riots
in the capital. Students apparently got the word
that the National Guard wanted no incidents to
detract from the negotiations; no anti-US
demonstrations of any kind were
General Torrijos
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The Junta
Admiral Merino President Piuochet General Leigh General Mendoza
CHILE: CHANGING ADVISERS
President Pinochet's dismissal off four ul-
traconservative civilian advisers seems likely to
soften some of the hard-line policies that have
been so damaging to the government's image-
building attempts.
The outspoken air force member of the junta,
General Leigh, frequently has been contemp-
tuous of decisions made at the behest of
Pinochet's civilian team. On several occasions
these objections, shared by other junta members,
caused the President to change his mind and steer
away from the more extreme positions advocated
by the ultraconservatives.
The Human Rig is Com,.iission
released an ex?remely harsh report in the UN this
week that is certain to stir renewed attacks on the
military regime.
The advisers' ouster evidently was calculated
to check fighting within the regime and to res-
pond to army complaints about the dictatorial,
right-win; influences created by their presence.
Another important motivation undoubtedly was
to foster some measure of international respec-
tabil;ty by el1minating the most vocal exponents
of the government's right-wing philosophy.
Less conservative elements within the military
and some members of the junta have resented
this sma". -;gl,tist clique and have blamed its
members for the poor advice given to Pinochet
on domestic and foreign affairs. Even conservative
politicians who strongly support the government
have voiced reservations about the "unhealthy"
influence of these advisers, whom one prominent
National Party leader described as "semi-fascist."
119 Chileans
allegedly killed or missing outside the country.
Strong evidence that the 119 were killed while un-
der detention in Chile has evoked sharp condem-
nation in the foreign press. Official claims that
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they were exiles operating from Argentina have
not been substantiated, and the government's
credibility has grown so thin that the whole inci-
dent is now a source of acute embarrassment.
In another shift involving a civilian adviser,
Pinochet demanded and received the resignation
of respected economist Fernando Leniz, vice
president of the Chilean Copper Corporation and
a for, -,er econGmy minister. He was dismissed ap-
parently because Pinochet and some senior army
officers opposed his policies. His replacement by
a general believed to be close to Pinochet will
give the military closer control over the planned
reorganization of the copper ccrporation.
Meanwhile, there are strong indications that
another high-level member of the civilian
economic team may be leaving the government
BRAZIL: SHIFTING OIL POLICY
Last week's announcement that foreign oil
firms will be invited to prospect in Brazil--a
dramatic departure from past practice-points up
the urgency that President Geisel and his advisers
attach to the search for energy in general and
petroleum in particular. Geisel's announcement
was the culmination of a well-planned effort to
prepare the public for such a move and blunt the
arguments of ardent nationalists opposed to it.
Brazil relies on imports for approximately 80
percent of its oil and has suffered under the rapid
price hikes imposed by OPEC. Costly imports
have aggravated serious balance-of-payments and
inflationary problems, sharply reducing the high
growth rates the military regime has come to
count on as its justification for holding power.
The pressing need for more energy supplies
has led Brazil to push ahead in other
areas-notably nuclear power-while continuing
the search for more oil. While new deposits are
being discovered and developed, production
from these areas thus far has done little more than
offset declining output from older fields.
Even before gaining the presidency, Geisel as
head of the state oil monopoly was believed to
favor some form of participation for foreign firms
possessing greater cap;tal and technology. Eariy
this year, his administration floated a proposal for
overseas companies to enter Brazil on a risk con-
tract basis. The general reaction, however, was
not favorable, and the idea was shelved tem-
porarily because of opposition from nationalists.
In recent weeks, the government has sought
to focus attention on the need to take more
definitive action. The heavily censored press, for
example, gave considerable play to September's
domestic price increase in order to curb demand
and to the most recent OPEC price hike.
Moreover, newspapers highlighted reports that
some developing nations had invited foreign
firms to explore for oil. Possible rationing and the
prospect of stretching motor fuel by increasing
the alcohol content were also featured.
Last week, Geisel presented the cabinet with
the proposal to invite foreign exploration through
risk contracts as part of an overall economic and
energy program designed to cope with the
nation's serious balance-of-payments problem.
Geisel appears to have 25X1
the all-important backing of the military high
command, * as well as others in govern-
ment. 25X1
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ECUADOR: COUNTING DOWN
Despite the continuing deterioration of sup-
port from military officers and civilians, General
Guillermo Rodriguez Lara remains President of
Ecuador. The painful prolongation of his tenure
owes largely to the absence of a widely accep-
table alternative; that his days are numbered is
now virtually beyond dispute. He could readily be
forced to step down by the three service chiefs,
who might then rule as a junta or appoint a
civilian to the presidency. The change could oc-
cur at any time, but probably no later than
February 15, the fourth anniversary of the coup
that brought Rodriguez to power. The President
would be likely to step down then if his support
continued to dissolve.
Rodriguez, undoubtedly now aware that his
position is precarious, was reportedly amazed at
the extensive dissatisfaction revealed by his in-
vestigation of the coup attempt on September 1.
Fearful that a second and more successful coup is
imminent, he seems to be looking for a face-
saving way out and apparently envisions a transi-
tion to civilian government that would be more
gradual than most of his critics would be like!y to
tolerate. He may be obliged to settle for an in-
terim government that is neither military nor
uite civilian.
In their almost four years in government, the
armed forces have brought about significant
changes in the style of Ecuadorean administra-
tion. Perhaps their major accomplishment was to
reduce the incidence of corruption among
gcvern,nent officials. This is all the more
remarkable in these years of growing national
wealth from petroleum. The military has also
reduced nepotism and launched a new tradition
of bringing technical expertise to bear on the
problems of administration. Concerned officers
now want to be reasonably certain that these in-
novations will not be swept away after the military
bows out. This will make very difficult any agree-
ment on even an interim solution, much less a
permanent successor government
ARGENTINA: THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY
Maria Estela Peron's resumption of the
presidency, in the face of opposition from several
powerful sectors, is likely to intensify the coun-
try's political and economic crisis.
Many middle-of-the-road political and union
leaders had joined the military high command in
pressing the President to extend her leave of
absence. They believed that the governing team
of Acting President Luder, Interior Minister
Robledo, and Economy Minister Cafiero was
maKing creditable progress in the key areas of the
economy and counterterrorism.
Other Perui.ists, particularly those conser-
vative labor bosses who have staked their political
future on her retention of the presidency, urged
her return. Their support reinforced Peron's own
stubborn determination to continue her dead
husband's work despite the physical and
emotional toll of the job.
The forces arrayed against President Peron
could have prevented her return. They chose not
to, however, because she is the legitimate presi-
dent and most Argentines still prefer a con-
stitutional solution to their leadership crisis.
This sentiment, though steadily eroding, was
strong enough to convince military leaders to
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Acting President Luder waves to crowd seeking his continuation as president
stop trying to keep Peron away from Buenos
Aires. They have apparently decided again to
stand aside and allow her government to fall vic-
tim to its own incompetence. They undoubtedly
reason that public disenchantment will then
create a situation amenable to more direct
military intervention in politics.
Peron's acceptance of the role of a
ceremonial head-of-state is crucial to her survival.
If she listens to the high command and allows
Robledo and Catiero a free hand, her government
could limp along for several more months, with
the military staying on the sidelines. If she insists
on trying to rule as well as reign, the least she can
expect will be another period of enforced rest
away from the capital.
Cafiero's emergency economic program is
another key to her survival. He has acquired
significant foreign assistance and adopted
reasonable, gradual measures at home which
might succeed if he is able to fend off the exorbi-
tant wage demands which the unions are
making. 25X1
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his wife, and it is now widely accepted in China
that he has all but washed his hands of her.
Chiang Ching's star began to fade when she
failed to win a government position at the
National People's Congress in January. This failure
has been attributed to Mao, who reportedly
vetoed her nomination. Throughout the year,
M' has stepped into the cultural arena to
me,'i ite disputes, in each case siding with
beleaguered artists accused by his wife of political
errors. This summer, Mao lifted a ban imposed by
Chiang Ching on the distribution of a docurnen-
tary film on the life of a model worker. Mao also
personally authorized the rehabilitation of several
leading cultural officials who were among the
most viciously attacked during the cultural
rev-;ution.
Mao and his wife have evidently crossed
swords on issues other than culture. Chiang
Ching's behavior when alone with foreign visitors
The Mao-endorsed rehabilitations are the
latest and clearest of a series of signs that Chiang
Ching is being nudged off the cultural stage.
Evidence is growing in fact that the cultural port-
folio is now in the hands of Politburo member
Chang Chun-chiao.
seems to be an especially sore point.
Chiang Ching
CHINA
CHIANG CHING, A FADING STAR
Chiang Ching, wife of Mao Tse-tung, has suf-
fered a series of setbacks this year that have vir-
tually stripped her of the power she had wielded
over cultural matters for nearly a decade. Her mis-
fortunes raise serious doubts about her present
and future role in politics. Significantly, Mao has
been personally associated with the moves against
Chiang Ching's last solo outing with an
official visitor was a year ago, when she played
host to Imelda Marcos of the Philippines. After
the establishment in June of diplomatic relations,
the Philippine government offered to name an
orchid after Madame Mao, only to be told by Pek-
ing to rename the orchid to commemorate
Sino-Filipino friendship.
Incidents such as these may have been
behind the six prohibitions on Chiang Ching's
political activity that Mao reportedly ret down in a
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document recently circulated within China. She is
prohibited from meeting with foreigne-s alone,
from making speeches without prior party ap-
proval, and from meeting with Mao. The word is
clearly out to the Chinese people that Chiang
Ching does not have Mao's support. This deprives
her of a powerful weapon she has used effectively
in the past and could have been expected to use
after Mao's death; namely, that opposition to her
is tantamount to opposition to Mao, that she is
the sole repository of Mao Tse-tong's thought,
and that others in the leadership distort Mao's
policies.
She cannot credibly make these claims today,
and, more important, she will not be able to do so
in the post-Mao era, unless she finds some way to
promote her ambitions. This is not to say that the
left wing of the party, which she represents, is
politically dead. Chiang Ching's views have a con-
stituency throughout the country, and she per-
sonally may still have supporters in the cultural
field.
Given Mao's dissociation from hrr, however,
it appears that her personal political future is
bleak and that the party's left wing will have to
find another spokesman, one more adept at the
political game than Chiang Ching has been.
The fall Canton Fair, to be held October 15
through November 15, will provide some indica-
tion of the prospects for China's foreign trade in
1976. Peking is undoubtedly hoping that sales will
be better than the low levels of the previous two
fairs. The slow economic recovery in the West,
however, will probably inhibit any large increase
over the $700-million level for the last two fairs.
Purchases by Japanese traders, traditionally
the largest contingent at the fair, will show a con-
tinued slack demand for Chinese goods in Japan.
The less-develcped countries have recently been
represented in greater numbers, but the prospect
of higher oil import bills may inhibit purchasing
by these countries.
US visitors, including dependent:,, may reach
500. At the spring fair, US sales of about $35
million exceeded the $30 million in US purchases,
which were mostly minerals and metals. Chinese
consumer goods have a limited market in the US.
Peking will probably again stress exports at
the fair. Last spring, the Chinese cut prices on
many items and were forthcoming on matters of
styling, labeling, packaging, and delivery dates.
Techimport, China's whole plant import corpora-
tion, is not likely to be represented because major
Chinese import deals are conducted outside the
fair.
China's record $1-billion trade deficit in 1974
has led to a retrenchment in imports this year.
Total trade is expected to increase less than 10
percent, perhaps between $14 and $15 billion.
Preliminary trade returns from its Western trading
partners over the first half of this year show
China's imposts up only 1 percent and exports up
3 percent over the same period in "1974.
Sharp reductions in purchases of US
agricultural products have accounted for most of
the cutbacks in iriports. Deliveries under 1973-74
whole plant contracts are boosting imports of
machinery and equipment, but new plant
purchases this year total less than $50 million, a
fraction of the total in the past two years.
China's trade in 1975 will still show a deficit,
although a smaller one than last year. Credits and
other short-term borrowing will finance much of
the deficit, and the balance of payments will likely
improve. Sales of Chinese petroleum are only
offsetting the decline in traditional exports.
Unless oil exports can be boosted above current
levels, Peking will probably maintain its present
policy of restricting import growth to reduce its
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