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October 24, 1975
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Secret Weekly Summary Secret No. 0043/75 October 24, 1975 Copy N! 1399 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Iii WI I I.I'f ',UMMMARY, i,?,ut?(I rv,?,y ,i,L,y nunnin(l I,y III,. Ofli?,r ,.I (ur,rnt lutr?lli(tr:u,,, rrfr.ril?? un,l (uolyz(,s siynifi unt ,h ?.,?~?lrnrrnl~ (,I tli:? WOW, I111nu,r~iun,1lny. II (rrrrl,r(?(I by :hr Off;(" of 1-11,?mi, P....ru'rh, ;!~,? ()ffirr of Strntr(li( i7r??, ?,,ntl,, Ih? Oflirr If (;,,ugrnl)hi( , nul Crrrtolruf,hi, R,?,rnr,.I' nn(I III, I)irrllt,rulr of will ,? un(f I"(hnuioty fulur rr,lui,in,I . I . . . ? unul?rrh(?n,i,,? t7, ?trn,?nt ?7nrl for'' IIul,ir.l,: ?,rlrurut?ly u?, ,i1;,?, irrl F', I,?ut. nr,? li,t- (I ill 25X1 Oil, (nni('iit',. CONTENTS (Octob r.'?l, /975) MII)I)tI. I /\SI nl R1(A WI SIf I?N III MISI'IIf Ill I ASI A`.,IA 1'n( If 1( I Slr,un: I ,1(.rnrl th(' 1 11 i?loll (1',SI(-I t,rn(r': /\ (:hilly Vi',it .I lift If 4 Ituu:dnid: M(?rr h,rnt I I't'f I.xlr,u,',nnI / I (lyl)I-(1S `,,trt,rt Vi?,it It Slr,uu?dr Mill it r.,rn M,((( Ir II) I (I,,ur(nr: Nc ,ololurrr I I :,yri'l l',r,n'l. (Iulnrr I(?n.u,n?, 17 /\ itq I I. I)un f'rn?,Ir(?1 I%% 1.1 ( .n,uln: 1 ru11!,ru (h,rllengr(1 14 , I I_/\ (rr,rt(,i 15 !t(,hvi.r i.hil(,-Ih,ru: 1 nh?, Nu /\( ton Il, (.h(Ir '.r~urity ( ill It(Inwn 1 / /\rgr'nlirr,(: Perim ?. 12-turn I It I Inill in,r', I I `,,Iv,uIur 1'1 It,,r; il. Oil I)r(i',nnr llrilrnlrul,n 1 ,ru?, I hr (ununinr,?,f?, (rlrludfr .'.3 ( hni,r'?, (nnrlu,hn Inrtu',l,y Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 SPAIN: FACING THE TRANSITION The outlook for General Franco's survival from th-, severe heart attack suffered earlier this week remains guarded because of the danger of another attack that is likely to be fatal. Even if the 82-year-old leader should linger on, he will lack the stamina and ability to fulfill his duties. If Franco clings to office and refuses to transfer his powers to Juan Carlos, pressures will mount for the government to invoke the .con- stitutional provisions declaring the chief of state incapacitated and invest Juan Carlos with these powers. These procedures require recognition of the chief of state's incapacitation by a two-thirds majority of the cabinet, of "he advisory Council of the Realm, and of the legislature. Prince Juan Carlos would then be sworn in as king within eight days. If Franco dies or agrees to a transfer, the Prince would automatically succeed and be sworn in, also within eight days. to preserve order. The overriding factor in the transition will be the wish to preserve the image of national unity by following the precise terms for the succession devised by Franco. It is unlikely that any impor- tant political sector will question efforts to preserve this image of n,itional unity. In the event terrorists and disaffected cLrnents try to prevent an orderly transfer of power, the government, backed by the Civil Guard, is exc.ected to be able Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 USSR-FRANCE: A CHILLY '!SIT The Soviet-French ";perial relationship" looked a litre frayed around the edges at the end of French President Giscard's four-day visit last week. There apparently was less than met the eye to the mid-visit changes in Giscard's schedule, but the two countries are obviously having to strain hard to find new areas of substantive agreement. The principal documents signed by G,;card and party chief Brezhnev were a brief formal communique and a friendship declar_'tioi,. The declaration speaks of the reed to deepen bilateral consuilations, but does not formally change the 1970 protocol on consultations. It stresses the im- portance of summit meetings and agrees to hold them on a "periodic basis," which may be a step toward formalizing the annual summt conclaves. ,;ie French endorsed the Soviet proposal to convene a world disarmament conference, probably because they regarded this as the least painful way to appear responsive to Soviet pressure on disarmament matters. The declara- tion makes no explicit mention of the European force reduction talks, which the French have refused to join. The declaration refers in glowing terms to the European security conference, with both sides pledging to implement fully all the provisions of Party chief 11rezhnev greets President Giscard in Moscow its final act. Another phrase, however, suggests t`iat the implementation will he achieved through "bilateral agreements and understandings," an apparent nod toward the Soviet view that the agreements made in Helsinki concerning im- proved East-West contacts are not automatically self-implementing. The French made some progress, on East-West contacts. The Soviets agreed to issue multiple exit-entry visas for journalists alor,g the lines of the US-Soviet accord, and also agreed-unenthusiastically according to the French--to consider convening a working group to discuss improved working conditions for jour- nalists. Bilateral agreements were signed on cooperation in civil aviation, tourism, and energy. Most of these had been negotiated beforehand and were intended mainly to ensure some tangi- ble results from the talks. Sizable trade agreements iere also signed, and Giscard said that the possibility of increasing French oil im- ports from the Soviet Union was discussed, but no agreements were reached. V'r-it would have been a routine visit at- tracted considerable attention on the second day Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 SECRET when the Soviets abruptly postponed for two days Giscard's talks with Brezhnev and the related ministerial meetings. Some mystery still surrounds this decision. The two leaders had differed over the propriety of ideoiogical detente the night before, and it is possible Brezhnev decided a show of diplomatic pique was appropriate. It is also possible that E rezhnev's health was a factor. Over the past year Brezhnev's physical stamina has waned. He can and does work quite hard in spurts, but he apparently can no longer sustain a heavy schedule over a long period. In the ten days before Giscard's visit, Brezhnev met with Portuguese President Costa Gomes, par- ticipated actively in the three-day visit to Moscow of East German party chief Flonecker, and con- ferred with Syrian leader Asad. It is possible that EUROPE COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE Delegations from 27 communist and workers parties that met in East Berlin, on Oc- tobc-r y and 10 apparently made some progress toward holding a European conference of communist parties. The Soviets evidently decided that just getting the conference held was more important than holding out for a strongly worded and binding final conference document. As a result, they apparently made some concessions. A number of problems must still be overcome before the formal conference can be held, but the outlook for its convening late this year or early next year has improved. Although) Ithe draft of the conference document presented in East Berlin was more acceptable than its predecessors, the East Germans were nevertheless instructed to produce yet another draft incorporating the comments and criticisms made at the East Berlin mneeting. A sub-working group will meet in East Berlin sometime next month -o discuss the latest ver- sion before referring it to an editorial commis- he felt the need to slow his pace last week it vipw of his busy schedule between now and the tarty congress next February. Nevertheless, newsmen who saw Brezhnev on the closing day of the talks said he was looking well. Despite the cold, he accompanied the French President to the airport for his departure and seemed animated and in good spirits. By the end of the visit, both Soviet and French officials seemed anxious to put to rest the rumors of serious substar. ve or health problems. Brezhnev brushed off his absence, saying it was due to a cold. The impression remained, nevertheless, that the Giscard-Brezhnev relationship has not yet achieved the amicability that existed between Brezhnev and Pom- pidou. Among the problems still to be resolved are how to describe the relationship between the communist and Western socialist parties, and how to sell Moscow's interpretation of the rlel-,;nki summit document. Independent- minded parties such as the Italians, Romanians and Yugoslavs still differ with the Soviets over these points. New Times, a Soviet foreign affairs weekly, said the recent Berlin meeting was an "impor- tant" step forward, but stopped short e` predicting that a European Communist ce,.i- ference is a certainty. By conveying a positive impression of the conference preparations, the journal is showing how the separate parties in- tend to exploit its outcome. If a bland noncon- troversial final document is eventually signed by the European Communist parties, each wi',I be able to cite those portions that accord best with its own positions and to portray the con- ference outcome as a victory for its own prin- WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 ROMANIA: MERCHANT FLEET EXPANSION The Romanians are expanding their merchant fleet so it can carry a greater share of their growing foreign trade. It now carries about 30 percent of the country's seaborne foreign trade. Since 1971, the fleet has newly doubled in tonnage, adding about 500,000 dead-weight tons, a major portion coming from Romania's own shipyards. D6mestic yards have supplied nearly 200,000 deadweight tons to the fleet since 1971, nearly all of which are general cargo ships and bulk carriers. Domestically produced tonnage represents nearly 40 percent of all acquisitions and 75 percent of dry cargo additions to the fleet since 1971. Over one half of Romania's domestic ship production goes to other countries. Fostered by a guaranteed Soviet market for its surplus products, these yards export dry cargo vessels (o the Soviet Union, bulk coal carriers to India, and semi-con- tainer ships to Norway. The current five-year plan began with a fleet of 53 ships, totaling 595,000 deadweight tons. Ac- quisitions during the first three years were modest, totaling only 112,009 tons. The additions of three Japanese-built tankers totaling nearly 260,000 tons and substantial other tonnage brought acquisitions in 1974 to 373,000 tons. Total additions for 1975 should go over 130,000 tons if two bulk ore carriers are delivered. At the end of 1970, general-purpose dry cargo ships and tankers each accounted for about one third of the fleet. The purchase of the Japanese-built tankers brought the tanker inven- tory to nearly 40 percent of the fleet by mid-1975. Despite the acquisition of bulk carriers totaling 125,000 tons since 1971, their share of total fleet tonnage dropped to 32 percent by mid-year. The fleet's portion of dry cargo tonnage also fell slightly to 28 percent during this period. The 1976-1980 plan calls for an ocean-going flee( of nearly 200 ships totaling 3.2 million deadweight tons, an increase of i.8 million tons over 1975. Tankers and bulk carriers will account for much of the expanded tonnage. Planned growth will allow Romanian ships to carry over 70 percent of its seaborne foreign trade by 198". 25X1 NATO-GREECE: TALKS TO BEGIN On the eve of negotiations to restore Greece to full partnership in the alliance, the outlook is for protracted talks with chances for success heavily influenced by whatever progress is made in the Cyprus negotiations. Athens' decision last summer to withdraw from the military side of NATO, made after Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, has never been fully implemented. Greece now occupies a position within the alliance somewhere between its original commitment and the French example of total military withdrawal. This may prove difficult to alter because a modified Greek commitment is generally suited to the present requirements of Greek policy. Surrounded by unfriendly neighbors and lacking adequate means for its own defense, Athens retains an interest in maintaining ties to the alliance. Yet the present arrangement of limited membership is acceptable to the Greek public, which continues to hold the alliance responsible for failing to prevent the Turkish ac- tion against Cyprus. In order to free attention and resources for the I urkish problem, Greece as sought to convene a Balkan Conference that would encourage good relations with its com- munist neighbors. To guard against diploma-tic and political isolation from its European alhec, Athens has pledged fealty to Eurooc and vigorously pressed its application for EC membership. These efforts to buttress Greek in- dependence nevertheless do not adequately satisfy Greece's security requirements. Page WEEKLY SUMMARY ~1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 The negotiations with NATO will focus on two related issues: the renewal of regional com- mand ties with Turkey and the restoration of Greek forces to NATO command. Prospects for restoration of Turkish corr.- munications and overflight rights on the southern flank appear good. There are strong iilitary reasons for ending Turkey's strate'iic isolation, and the allies are determined to bring pressure to bear on Greece to satisfy NATO requirements as well as Turkish needs. Athens has recently in- dicated willingness to discuss these points. Furthermore, Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis is prepared to argue that such concessions do not compromise a qualified Greek commitment to NATO because this type of regional cooperation satisfies Greece's own defense needs in the event of an East-West conflict. Restoring Greek forces to NATO command is likely to prove more difficult. A substantial im- provement in Greek-Turkish relations would be necessary before this could take place. Greece indicated recently that it is prepared to soften earlier reservations regarding the com- mitment of its forces to NATO cc-.mand, which again suggests a new willingness to reconsider its present position it tiie alliance. Evidence of a Greek desire to retain substantial control over its forces was also clear, however, in the failure of the Greeks to clarify the precise terms of the new Greek relationship. Turkey has argued that unless and until Greece agrees to submit its troops to the authority of NATO's integrated command, Athens will not have met the minimal political and military re- quirements of an ally. The alliance itself is in agreement on this point and is sensitive at the moment to the need to emphasize allied political unity. Accordingly, it will allow the negotiations to go forward at a leisurely pace out of a prudent respect for the political barrier- 'o Greek-Turkish cooperation. The allies will continue to emphasize that financial assistance and the con- tinued commitment of tactical nuclear weapons to Greece's defense depend upon an unqualified Greek commitment. Progress on the Cyprus question is clearly critical to progress in the NATO talks. Yet Prime Minister Caramanlis' assurances that a satisfactory settlement of this question will enable Greece to resume full military participation in the alliance is probably exaggerated. Other problems, such as the dispute over Turkey's rights in the Aegean, are likely to continue to aggravate Greek-Turkish relations. Under these conditions, Greece is likely to seek to retain for a while the benefits of securi- ty at seduced cost. In the long run, however, Greece needs the alliance, and a return to something resembling the original Greek com- mitment seems likely, provided there is progress in the Cyprus negotiations and some negotiating 25X1 Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 25X6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 EGYPT-US: SADAT VISIT President Sadat will arrive in Washington next week in search of both a symbolic and a tangible affirmation of a friendship that is now more vital than ever to Egypt and to his own position within Egypt. Sadat's leadership of the Arab world is hanging in the balance as a result of the second Sinai disengagement agreement. Even his position at home, although apparently secure at present, is vulnerable over the longer term. He will use his trip to demonstrate to Egyp- tians and to other Arabs the symbolic importance of his success in winning the good will of the US after years of estrangement. ro give substance to the symbol, he will seek expressions of that friendship in the form of economic and military aid. He needs this aid to compensate for his grow- ing isolation in the Arab world and, more impor- tantly, to reassure his domestic constituents that his foreign policy has not bankrupted Egypt. Sadat's chief purpose in signing the interim accord with Israel last month was to obtain a respite from preparations for war so he could devote total attention to revitalizing Egypt's badly neglected economy. He will look to the US for financial and technical assistance in overcoming the many obstacles that confront this endeavor, ranging from the immediate problems of an enormous balance-of-payments deficit to the longer range problems posed by bureaucratic in- ertia and Egypt's inability to plan adequately for ec - jmic development. Sadat will probably seek a multi-year commitment for economic support, US government assistance in attracting private US investment in Egypt, and technical assistance in orienting Egypt's socialist economy toward greater liberalization. Sadat will also ask the US for arms. The fact that the US delivers arms to Israel does not in itself bother Sadat; he recognizes this relationship as a necessary inrredient in Washington's ability to press Israel for diplomatic concessions. The fact, on the other hand, that the US does not deliver arms to Egypt as well does bother Sadat. To him, it is a symbol of virtually the only thing still wrong in the US-Egyptian-Israeli triangle: that the US still putts Egypt in a second-class status and still regards Israel's interests as more deserving of attention. Sadat needs US arms, moreover, as a support for his own domestic position. He has long been subject to criticism from the Egyptian military es- tablishment for so estranging the Soviets that Egypt's source of arms and spare parts has been endangered. The fact that he has succes',ully used the concomitant improvement in relations with the US to regain Egyptian territory-and has at least begun the process of obtaining arms from the West-has eased the criticism. Unless he ob- tains US arms, however, he may come under heavy criticism from the military for seeming to condone US efforts to reinforce Israel's military superiority while allowing Egypt to lapse still deeper into a position of military in- feriority. 25X1 Page WEEKLY SUMMARY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 SECRET SPANISH SAHARA MOROCCAN MARCH King Hassan accelerated preparations this week for a mass march into Spanish Sahara by 350,000 unarmed Moroccans; the first groups may reach the border early next week. Despite Hassan's protestations that the march will be peaceful,clashes could occur with Spanish forces or with armed elements of indigenous Saharan political groups that want independence for the region. Both Spain and Algeria are clearly unhap- py over the King's latest gambit in his effort to annex the disputed territory. The first contingent left by bus, truck, and train on October 21 from Ksar es Souk in the Atlas Mountains for Tarfaya. More than 500,000 Moroc- cans reportedly volunteered to participate; Moroccan authorities are said to have selected only those physically fit to endure the trek. Most of the volunteers seem unconcerned about the hardships they will face, accepting on blind faith that the monumental logistic problems will be overcome. By staging a civilian march, King Hassan hopes to avoid a direct confrontation with superior Spanish military forces. He has given notice, however, that Morocco will fight in any en-ounter with non-Spanish forces, presumably meaning any Saharans and possibly Algerians who might try to oppose the marchers. Hassan apparently hopes to head off a debate on the Spanish Sahara issue in the UN General Assembly this year. Rabat's cause was seriously weakened by the opinion issued last week by the International Court of justice, which in effect en- dorsed self-determination for the territory, and the King probably fears that any General Assembly debate would culminate in a new and stronger resolution in favor of self-determination. Morocco and Mauritania claim historic sovereignty over Spanish Sahara and insist that Madrid should turn the territory over to them on the basis of the principle of territorial integrity. The planned march is clearly intended to over- come Spain's reluctance to settle the issue Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 SECRET through direct negotiations with Rabat and Nouakchott. Contacts between Madrid and Rabat this week have made some Spanish officials optimistic that an agreement can be reached that would at 25X1 least reduce the tension surround' ne th march The King restated in a speech or. Uctober 23 his intention to proceed as planned. Meanwhile, Spain petitioned the UN S'curity Council to enjoin Morocco from staging the march on grounds that it jeopardizes peace and ignores the rights of the Saharans to self-deter- mination. On October 22, the Council approved a resolution requesting all parties to exercise restraint and begin a dialogue. The resolution also authorized Secretary General Waldheim to begin immediate consultations to resolve the dispute. It avoided, however, any direct mertion of Moroc- co's planned mass march. In El Aaiun, the Saharan General Assembly, cimprised of indigenous tribal and religious leaders, has condemned thz Moroccan march and announced plans to resist the "invasion" of their territory. The major Saharan political parties in the territory-the Spanish-backed Saharan National Union Party and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front-have said they would stage a countermarch north to the border. Both groups probably have access to arms. Should either become involved in clashes with the Moroccans, the 12,000 ',15,000 Moroccan troops deployed in southern Morocco might well iltervene. Such an intervention could escalate and involve Spa;,ish and Algerian forces in the area Algeria, surprised by Morocco's move, has begun a diplomatic and propaganda campaign in support of self-determination for Spanish Sahara. On October 20, the Foreign Ministry summoned Arab, Islamic, and African ambassadors in Algiers, presumably to stress that the Saharans' right to self-determination must be respected, in keeping with the Court's opinion and a recent report by a UN fact-finding group. The Algerian Press has labeled Morocco's policy as imperialism. On Oc- tober 22, the government-controlled radio charg- ed that Algerians living in Morocco are being prevented from leaving the country and that Rabat has suspended rail service between the two cou ntries. Algerian officials have indicated they would pre'er a transition period in which Spain would have a considerable role. This would be followed by a referendum offerii,g a range of options from independence to union with M.:,rocc3 and Mauritania. Algeria is also taking defensive precaut-ons along its western border with Morocco. Although Algiers will probably not initiate hostilities with Morocco, its reinforcement of the border area will exert pressure on King Hassan and may tie down a large number of Moroccan troops. The Algerians can be expected to provide arms to the Po lisario Front and ossibly some "volunteers." 25X1 Rabat rrakeW . Mar 89-801A .Oueuazate Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75 Spain F'~rtte Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 SECRET LEBANON: NO SOLUTION Intermittent and sometimes heavy fighting between Muslim and leftist elements and their Christian adversaries continued in Beirut this week as efforts to find a political solution appeared to be making no progress. The economic damage from the long crisis is moun- ting. Most of the fighting was in Beirut's southern and eastern suburbs, with particularly intense clashes taking place between the Sunni Muslims of the Ras an-Nabeh region and the Christians of Ashrafiyah. Over the weekend of October 18-19, the fighting also briefly t!-,reaened to spread to the Ras Beirut section in the western suburbs where many Americans live. Except for a few minor clashes, Tripoli, in northern Lebanon, and Zahlah, east of the capital, have remained quiet. Kidnaping continued during the week with both sides using mobile roadblocks as a means of snatching members of opposing groups. On Oc- tober 22, two USIA officials were taken from their car by armed men at a roadblock in a largely lef- tist-controlled southern suburb of the capital. The Christian Phalanges Party opposes any concessions to the country's Muslim majority. It still insists that security be restored and the ques- tion of "sovereignty"-a reference to the Palisti- nian presence-be settled before constitutional reforms are considered. Early in the week, Phalangist leader Pierre Jumay;1l threatened to pull his organization out of the national dialogue committee, charging that attacks on Christian areas of Beirut are intended to force the Christians to make concessions. Saeb Salam, a former prime minister and a moderate Muslim leader, warned that if reforms were not made soon, "the whole system will be swept away." Lebanon's parliament reconvenec; this week, and the question of its role in finding a solution to the crisis will be intensively discussed over the next few weeks. Interior Minister Shamun believes the "recommendations" of the dialogue committee must be endorsed by parliament as a legally competent body. It is unlike;y, however, that the politically impotent parliament will have any success in resolving the conflict. On the economic front, the fighting is rapidly causing Beirut to lose its status as the business center of the Middle East. Some major firms, such as McDonnell Douglas and Bechtel Corporation, have already pulled out. Bank of America, First National City Bank, and General Motors have also evacuated employees and their families. If hostilities ceased, most of the firms would probably return because there is no readily available alternative to Beirut as a regional business center. Athens is too far away, Cairo is over-taxed and over-bureaucratized, and Am- man, Kuwait, and other Gulf cities that would like to replace Beirut cannot match its com- munications network, highly trained work force, or housing and educational facilities. If the fighting goes on, some companies are likely to co.isider controlling their Middle East operations from outside the region and eventual- ly may bypass Beirut altogether. The impact of such a shift would be disastrous for Lebanon. Physical destruction and lost tourist and trade earnings are already estimated at some $3.5 bi!Iion-nearly a full year's gross national product. A loss of earnings from financial services, transit fees, and other commercial services would turn Lebanon's usual trade surplus into a chronic deficit. Two thirds of the country's gross national product is drawn from its services, primarily bank- Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY n_t Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 I SECRET SYRIA-ISRAEL: GOLAN TENSIONS The Syrians, while continuing their propaganda attacks on tie Sinai accord, have taken some military measures recently that may be aimed at raising tensio is on the Golan Height;. again. With the mandate of the UN observer forces up for renewal at tl.e end of next month, Damascus probably hopes to create as much ::n ? certainty as possible about its real intentions until then in hopes of prodding the US and Israel on negotiations. So far, Israel's public reaction has been low key, but Tel Aviv is clearly watching the situation on the Heights closely. Both the First and Third Syrian armored divisions-the core of Syria's armored strength-have been returning to their regular positions near Damascus over the past few weeks. They were sent to the northeast last spring at the height of tensions with Iraq. In themselves, these moves are not alarmin ~ Late last week, about two brigades of Syrian troops, possibly unconnected with the movement of th,, armored units, were also spotted strung out on the road from Homs, north of Damascus, to a point 25 miles south of the capital. Israeli position on the Golan Heights Meanwhile, there were reports in Damascus last weekend that the Syrians are planning a limited military operation of ~?hort duration to seize some Israeli-held territory along the dis- engagement line. Such a plan cannot be entirely discounted. The Syrians could calculate that the US would restrain the Israelis in order to keep the fighting from spreading and jeopardizing the Sinai accord. On the other hand, the "plan" may have been only a story delibe rely leaked by the Syrians to increase tensions over the next few weeks. The Syrians could hold exercises near the front and call up some reservists, making it almost impossible to tell a real operation from a bluff. Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 The objective would be to force the US to step in quickly to defuse the situation and refocus its ef- forts on obtaining a Syrian-Israeli accord. In a recent interview with it Kuwaiti newspaper, Syrian Preside it As ad casualty dis- missed the importance of the UN mandate, stating that Syria would extend the mandate if it were in its interests to do so, but that the presence of the UN observer forces would not make any difference if Syria decided to go to war. Asad's remarks and those of other Syrian officia,s sugggest that no official public decision on the 'Mandate should be expected before late November. The Israelis, or their part, may have in- structed their forces on the Golan to adopt a more aggressive posture to signal Da.-iascus that Tel Aviv is fully alert to the cos i ill fight:.ig. ave e i erase y initiate a number of minor incidents in the vicinity of the disengage- ment line during the past few weeks. Both the Israelis and the Syrians, in fact, have recently committed an increasing number of minor violations in the UN buffer zone. Last week, two Syrian shepherds were killed by the Israelis in a disputed part of the zone, and this week the Syrians claim to have clashed with an Israeli patrol. Such violations and provocations are certain to keep both sides on edge and could lead to more serious incidents ANGOLA: DIM PROSPECTS With less than three weeks to go before the scheduled date for independence-November 11-the chances of a political settlement being arranged among Angola's warring liberar;ion groups still appear dim. Portugal may withdraw from the territory without formally transferring sovereignty to anyone. After almost two weeks of new fighting, the Zairian-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola has made some progress in northern Angola, Front forces are now within 1. miles of Luanda, the capital, which has hen controlled since June by the Soviet-backed Popular Move- m,:'t for the Liberation of Angola. Front troops apparently have met less resistance than they had expected. Unless the Popular Movement's resistance stiffens, the Front could be emboldened t,-) try fighting its way back into Luanda. Since being driven from the city, the Front has based its strategy on the premise that its forces could riot militarily re-enter the capital, but that they could maintain a siege of the city that would be suf- ficient to pressure th,. Movement into agreeing to a coalition government. In central Angola, forces of the Popular Movement and of the National Urion for the Total Independence of Angola have fought to a standstill. The Pop,ilar Movement wants to cap- ture Nova Lisboa, the headquarters of ,he National Union, and the National Union wants to recapture the port of Lobitz, which has been held by the Popular Movement since August. The reconciliation committee recently sent to Angola by the Organization of African Unity returned to Kampala on October 21 after conferr- ing with the three liberation groups !..;sbon is stilt trying to put together some sort of coalition to take over on November 11. Earlier this week, a high-ranking Portuguese cabinet minister arrived in Angola to talk with liberation group representatives. Barring a eke-over of the government in Lisbon between now and in- dependence by radicals who would recognize the Popular Movement, Lisbon may unilaterally transfer sovereignty to all three groL, s in the name of the "Angolan people," leaving the final solution to a r~militar struggle amon the libera- tion groups. 25X1 SECRET Page 12 `MEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 CANADA: TRUDEAU CHALLENGED the (.rn.rdi.rn postal and sorters union has quickly challenged the Inuieau governnrent's new econnrni( prr)y,ram by shutting down post offices in virtually .ill major cities. the r!niorr is demanding salary ins reasrs far in excess of those allowed under the control program. the postal workers' ac lion is aimed directly at the main goals of the control plan which are to (heck excessive wage iC1(reases and to refurbish Prince Minister I rudeau's image is a "take-charge" leader. the union, demanding .1 51-perc('nt increase over a 12-m )nth I,eriod, rejected the recorrrnien- (lations of a i offici.cl arbitrator for a .3f1-percent wage increase' over a i0-month period. 1 he governnrene was willing to grant the .3I1-percent raise ev,?n though it exceeded the c ontrol program's guidelines. A provision in the new prchrarn grants exceptions for such raises to workers whose jobs are closely related to those of another group which recently has gained a more favorable settler ivnt. Canada's other major postal union, the letter carriers, received a _3f3-percent v` age hike in A,rril. The large wage settlements this year have been it major factor contributing to Canada's in- flation, WHO, is running at a rate higher than that of most major industrial countries. The com- petitiveness of Canadian goods ( n world markets has been affected, and the nation's trade deficit has grown rc.pidly. Canadian labor leaders were quick to recognize that Trudeau's economic program was aimed chiefly at controlling wages. In addition to the postal workers, several other unions have threatened to ignore wage controls or to challenge their constitutionality n the courts. The Trudeau administration had hoped the first case to come before its new Anti-Inflation Review Board would deal with a rollback of prices in order to convince labor of Ottawa's good faith. The postal strike appears to have upset this strategy. lrudeau has staked his political future on a hold program of ec onornic controls to c heck in- flation and cannot afford to ha( k down. Members of his own Liberal Party have threa;,'ned to call for a special leadership convention at a party con- ference nest month-a move,.ome observers felt might have the support of 20 to 25 percent of the conference delegates. Trudeau hoped to avoid this h ow to his prestige as party leader by an- nouncing the new economic program. The postal workers ma" eventually com- promise on a wage settlement along the lines of the government offer. In the meantime, however, Trudeau's political skills will be severely tested as he seeks the necessary nationwide support for his program and hip own leadership. A portent of trouble ahead was 'ie defeat last week of Trudeau's hang-picked candidate, Com- munications Minister Juneau, who lost a by-elec- tion in a working class Monti --I constituency that had been held by Trudeau's Liberal Party for over Page 13 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 I Ili, I atir, Amer if an I ( ononlf( SyStem, ,1 new S( helve for 4`( ollOIlli( irlt(Kl,ltioII .(dung I atln .,ld (arihl)ean governments, was established .11 ,l ministe. ial meeting in I'ananl,l on O ioher 17. I he f)ro(ess That led finally to its forril,ll ( (ration generated heightened sensitivity among ill(, governrtn?nts to each other's politi(,ll -u?eds ,IS well IS S( ).' new fo;nlulas for r('gi()na! coopera- 11011. I I(?,l(lcluarl(?rti of SI I A will he C,uac.is, its Se( rel,lry general IS a for met fin.ui (` minister of I cua(Ior, and its starting adrniniStrative budget of $400,000 will derive from a carefully contrived dues-paying SySlem based on ,lhilit? to pay. tit I A was shaped IS ,i fairly loose federation with nunlem long-range goals, minirn,il strut tor(', and sonic' con( rote plans for joint enterprise. I he emergence of SF! A as a forum for prac- Iical business and technical exchange among members is largely the result of the resistance by a bloc of nations to the visionary and ideologically inclined motivations of its original promoters. The oo-ton o1 sl I A wa?, Itr'.t adv,ull rd ovel I ye,lr ,Il;O by nlexu u) I'r4'?J1f1?Ilt I I hr?vrrri,l, 114(414? a?, a thel(,(4( ,II huortsii than 1 ( (III s41I ' i' I Ora Vrnl'~uel,t'. I',4??,itl(?nt ( ,III()', Amitr??. I'r?1l'i, I plop(4n1?nt (If I .lt111 orlity, a( tively supported Ih)' t ( 4 11 ( e 1 ) I I he I II g Ily 11.111( )11 .111 %1 11 F.( )%'('I I In if 'I W, w4?14?,Itlr,Il tell I() the fit opnsell (u1,,Inii,tl,) ! f,y it-. ex( I11%inn (If 11 if I I) I)III 1111 IU?,I(If I (4I ( ul).I, ,ln(I IIy till' r?xl)(?( Lofton III finan11.tl %trpp1u fl(;Ill wr?.(Ilhy V4 n( iu( L1 Itr.tiil ,Ind st'ver,tl ()III(,( I (IUntrie?, flit:Ilyd I111(?rest III 1h(? 5,tk4? Ut 1'Itll) Unity hilt %V( It( ex( ee, It nf;Iy If 'I of 1.1111 1O If 't Ihr,n?,l'I vr?, h(? tr,lllilrti ill yr?t lilt lhr'r I mitt( lvrrvi.ll Ihir(!-'\')1Id .1%,.(1( 1,11If III Who )%(' 1IfIn( 11)al full IIf III Inil,bt he Io 1,111 al;ain?.t till' I iti. Il.tlher I! an rolling with the 1)()liti(.11 Iid that had often swa'pt thl'nl into una1111IMus positions and re?.olunnns with whi( It they felt 11114 ornfor- 1,1h1e, the govern111ent5 of Braid, t Iruguay, Argen- 1111,1 and others industriorlsly parti( ip.'te(l in the negotiations p1eparatury to SI IA's foundling. I hey insistId on rules to prevent "! dec warns from het ultliFig 111 )1l atory, Ill demanded spec iti( gOals IOI the it garIIIat i()n, ant I the' offered 5,01( )it% Grafts Uf charter language and development prollosais. the (andid (-x( Imrige of views ( re,ted an atmosphere of cooperation and positive thinking, u) that the I,uge majority of the members have come to view SFLA as a business-like ass()( iation for formulating regional str,uegy, setting up multinational corporations, funding regional transportation and on)mUnica- tion systems, and other practical ventures. The experience is likely to attract the interest of tile' less assertive 141)vern?ients in playing a more active role in regional ,ltfairs. For the lighter weight pretenders to regional leadership, the ex- pcrienc e may prompt ,c:mv sober thoughts about the wisdom of int,odut ing ( onfrontatiorml ISSUes into regional bodies in view of the sharp political different'. produced by the Lcheverria-Loper in- itiative ar(I the unlooked for concern expressed by some countries over the appearance of in- stitotion.-,lited antagonism toward the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8 BOLIVIA-CHILE-PERU I),??.IIIIf IIit- Iof Iy rhr?Ioril ent.InaIIIIF ItoIIIIIIf, ntecUng III I irn.t l.,st we,.k of the nnhtary Ivadr?r?. of IIrrllvl.r, ( hilt-, and I'eru, the nnnl ontnlitt.II joint ( urltnIOni(1ue c Ica, ly Indio .111??. Lu k (if agree rnr?nl on Iwo ii,I?.rc issue-. involving the flit(',' An dean nations it uui,Cl amts Iirnit.Ition and Bolt vi.ul .(c I es% In Ih,? %1,.1 R,?L,'c?II I.rlk?, were held in I t I'.r, I,ist August and in Santiago in ,.lily ',eptl?nlht?r, ,1 follow-up -nrt?ting on .11111% limitation is %( he