ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060012-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 26, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 0435/75
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
February 2 6 , 19'7 5
SUBJE('.T: Eritrea and Ethiopia
MICR?~'pL~~'~~~
Ethiopia's 27 million people are culturally diverse
and speak many lang~tiages. The country--three times the size
of California--consists of isolated mountain plateaus and
desert lowlands which have separated Ethiopians from each
other and from the rest of the world.
Successive Ethiopian emperors, who have taken pride
in their ties with the Mediterranean world e:,~tending back
to biblical times, have over the centuries fought a see-saw
battle from their mountain strongholds against Arab and other
Muslim invaders from the lowlands. S~.rong Emperors were
able to make local feudal lords submit to central authority,
while weaker emperors had their territorial sway redu~?d.
Eritrea, on the fringes of the empire, was only
sporadically and tenuously controlled from the Ethiopian
ca~~ital. For about 400 years, the Ottoman Turks controlled
the Red Sea coast, spreading Islam in the region. During
the half-century of Italian rule over Eritrea, beginning
in 1890,?roads and railways were built, and mod ern agriculture,
industry, education, and administration were introduced.
After the UK~ousted Italy in 1941, London encouraged the
development of labor unions and political parties, and also
established an elected legislature , Politically??coitscious
Eritreans became aware of the extent to which they had
outstripped the rest of Ethiopia, developing ir: the process
a separate political tradition.
In accordance with an earlier decision by the UN
General Assembly, Eritrea in 1952 became part of Ethiopia,
but retained a significant degree of ~.tutonom H ~as~=
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CONFIDENTIAL
gradually whittled down this autonomous status, and in 1962
reduced Eritrea to just another province--spurring Eri.tr can
resentment and giving a boost to separatist movements.
Eritreans approximately 2 million people are diti*ided
about equally into Christians and Muslims. There are other
social divisions based on language, ethnic affiliation, and
way of life. The province, about the size of Pennsylvania,
consists of the humid Red Sea littoral; a cooler, better -
watered central highland area where Asmara is located;
and the hot, dry lowlands next to the Sudanese border.
Population is unevenly distributed, with most people
concentrated in the highlands or in relatively hospitable
territory around the port of Massawa.
Until recently, support for the separatists came
primarily from the Muslim herdsmen of the lowlands. The
Christians, most of whom are settled agriculturalists in
the highlands, were traditionally more amenable to some kind
of continuing relationship with Ethiopia. The killing
of General Aman in November 1974 and the reversion of the
Ethiopian government to a hard line on Eritrea has undoubtedly
increased support for independence among the Christian
Eritreans.
If Eritrea becomes independent the status of its
southeastern portion, inhabited by the Danakils, will be
a question mark.. The Danakils are primitive tribesmen,
whose ferocity and desert environment has caused the Ethiopian
government to leave them pretty much on their own. The
Danakil are hostile to external authority, ar~d it is
uncertain whether ,the Eritreans could reach an accommodation
with thorn. ,~
An independent Eritrea would become another small
African country with a poor natural resource base and a
minuscule domestic market. Eritrea has a limited agricultura 1
potential. Cultivated land is only about.3 percent of the
total. Grain now. supplied from the Ethiopian hinterland
would have to be imported , e~Ten in years of good harvest .
Eritreans greatest agricultural wealth is in livestock.
Eritrea has some industrial establishments, including a
refinery at Assab--now supplied with crude from Saudi Arabia---
a cement plant at Massawa, and various small agricultural-
processing and consumer goods-producing facilities. Thus
far exploration for minerals has had disappointing results. ,
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The viability of Eritrea as a.separate state would
depend en foreign aid and investments, and on maintaining.
sufficient political stability to encourage foreign businessmen
and technicians to remain. Eritrea's prospects would be
considerably boosted by the return from Addis Ababa of
Eritrearis with business and cc,mmercial skills, and by a
future w:i.llingness of Ethiopia to do business with the
Eri.trear_s. The ports of Massawa and Assab could continue
to handle Ethiopian exports and imports.
Ethiopia is already one of the world's poorest nations,
but it would continue to be viable even if it lost Eritrea.
Ethiopia's people lack modern skills, there are few mineral
resources, the manufacturing sector is tiny, and agriculture
is inefficient and subject to the vagaries of weather and
world prices. .
The loss of Eritrea would make Ethiopia even more
isolated, and would further hamper presently inadequate
transportation and marketing facilities. The loss of its
seacoast and ports would be a bitter blow for Ethiopia, but
economically the impact would be mitigated by Ethiopia's
continuing use of Djibouti, in the French territory of Afars
and Issas. At present Djibouti, which is linked by road
and railway to Ethiopia, is Ethiopia's major ocean port,
handling almost two-thirds of its exports by value, and
importing much of the iron, steel and other raw materials
for the small industrial sector.
Eritrean rebel .spokesmen have publicly stated their
willingness to negotiate a settlement which would permit
continued Ethiopi~.n use of the Eritrean ports of Massawa
and Assab. Assuming Eritrea had won its independence,
Ethiopia would be under considerable economic pressure to
accept such an arrangement. Massawa and Assab are the
logical seaports for northern and western Ethiopia, and
reliance on Djibouti as the port of entry for all the country's
needs, however, does not seem feasible. Moreover, Ethiopia's
loss of its only petroleum refinery at Assab would add to
its economic difficulties.
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