Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 16, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 23, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9.pdf1.03 MB
~:I ,c /~~ r/ ~" /` ~ , ! ~ ~ ~~/~.~~ ` t ~,ApRroved;ForRe4ease20it110~17~Y1~P~R~~TU~e0~~~0~J/.~ ~y/~ / ~, ~ /-~ p~ /'~~i ~~ ~ M/ ~ I.~ , ;~ s _ ;.~ .. - Approved For Releae ~~/~~~ A~F~~86~60~R~003~00610023-9 Secret No Foreign Diraem MICii~O~IL~~ Intelligence Memora.ndu.n~ Cuba's tIS Policy: Ready f?r a Change Secret ~~ July 23, 1975 Ivo. 0748/75 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RD/P~T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Nu Diss~ m A Grvud I~uckgrounci Usc Only/Curitr~ gilled Dissc~rrr Warning iVot4cs Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved Additional Warning NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 005827 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: g 56 (11, (21, and (3) Automatically declassified on: Date Impossible to Determine Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SECRET No lbreign Disscm July 23, 1975 Cuba's US Policy: Ready for a Change Precis Fidel Castro wants to negotiate an improvement in relations with the US. He has said tl~is publicly; some of his top advisers are urging liim to do so; and Moscow has pressed him in this direction. He has made it clear, however, that: ? lze is in no hurry to restore full ties; ? h~ ~.~i!1 accept no loss of prestige ir: negotiating an improve- ment; ? his demands will be stiff,? ? Ize expects the US to make the first formal move. Castro resisted Soviet urgings in favor of detente until early last year. Brezh- nev's visit to Cuba in January and February seemed to be the turning point. Since then, the Cuban leader has biven signals through a variety ~f channels that he is ready to talk. He has even attempted to plant the idea th~7t he expected talks to begin after the Cuba-US anti?hijacking agreement in Febru~:~ry 1973, although the evidence does not bear this out. In finally opting for detr.:nte, Castro is clearly in agreement with the pro-Soviet faction in the Cuban leadership, and i:l so doing is continuing his long-standing role of final ~:~rbiter of differing viewpoints within the regime. Havana, however, wants to avoid the impression that it is anxious for recon- ciliation. Eagerness would imply the existence of an exploitable weakness. It would also undercut Cuba's policy of maintaining an aura of confrontation between the US and Latin America, and would z?un counter to Cuban domestic propaganda. More- over, it might alarm the more nationalistic Cuban leaders who have feared a recrudescence of US influence in Cuba. Castro will therefore do nothing publicly to suggest that he is preparing for talks without a clear signal from Washington that a timetable for discussions could be drawn tip. He maintains that the US initi^ red the break in 1961 and must therefore take the initiative for talks to end ic`... This face-saving gesture is extremely important to him. Comments and queries on the contents of this publicatiun are welcome. They may be directed to of the Office of Current Intellige-zce, code 143, extension 6228. iVo Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 C! ~gAN LEADERSHIP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS COUNCIL NATIONAL OF MINISTERS ASSEMBLY Fidel CASTRO (Fist Secretary) . a Fidel CASTRO (Chairman) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Fidel CASTRO (Prime hlinrster) ~ ~ a a Fidel CASTRO (fdmister-P+esrdent of Nabonal Agrana ~ Reform Institute) Raul CASTRO (Second Secretary).. Raul CASTRO (Deputy Charman) ..... Raul CASTRO (First Deputy Pnme ... Rout CASTRO (Munster of Mrmster) Revolutionary Araied Forces) Osvaldo DORTICOS a a a a Osvaldo DORTICOS a a a ~ ~ ~ a a Osvaldo DORTICOS (President of ihea a a Osvaldo DORTICOS(htmaier?PresiderK Republic) of Central Planning Board) Sergio DEL VALLE aaaaaaaaaaaaaa~a~aoaaaaaa~aaaaa~ry~ Sergio D0. VALLE(Interrar Minister) Ramiro VAlDES a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a~ a~ a a Ramiro VALDES (Deputy Pnme Minster for Construction) ELECTED IN 197b Juan ALMHDA (Delegate m Drente Province) ^7 t~ Armando HART (Party first secretary in Drrente Province) ~_ Guillermo GARCIA ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Guillermo GARCIA (Deputy Pnme Minister for Transportation aril Commun?atron) ~ M Bless ROCA (law, elections, Pedro MIRET(heavy industry) Faure CHOMON~~ Isidoro MALMIERCA Ancona PEREZ (ideology) Jorge RISOUET (agncutture, livestock) Raul GARCIA PELAEZ 'Popular Sadal Party ("Old" Communist) "Student Retmlotionary Dirttderate (Unmarked names belong to the praaM"goerritla elite".- RODRIGUEZ (Deputy Prrn: ~ Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ Minister for Foreign Affairs) (htmrster-President d Nabonal Cemm~ssron far Economic and Saentrfic-Technn:al Cooperation) There are 25 additional posts an the Cound of Ministers mrrying ifie rank of Minister. Diodes TORRALBA (Deputy Prime Munster for Sugar Industry) Belarmira CASTRLA (Deputy Pnme Munster far Education, Saence, C~Iture) Flavio BRAVO (Deputy Pnme Minister for Consumption and Servrcesl# Joel DOMENECH (Deputy Pnme Minister for Basic Industry)* Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SF,CRET No Foreign /~issem H~ wpparently believes that US flexibility on the Cuh~ r~rau wrli be reduced in 1976 because of the presidential electicns. He therefore would like to get talks tinder way this year so Cuba could be taking advantage of the easing of trade restrictions while prolonged negotiations on total normal- ization are taking plane. He probably believes that once some economic sanctions are lifted, US firms will exert enough pressure on the administra- tion to force removal of the rest. He would thus achieve a key goal, access t~ US trade and technology, without cost to himself. Once negotiations started, Castro would expect def;.nitive settlement of such problems as the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay and US r~connais- sance flights over Cuban territory before he would consider a resumption of the relations broken in January 1961. He fully expects the US to bring un Havana's Soviet ti~;s, compensation for nationalized US properties, and Cuban subversion in Latin America, and probably has suspicions that the issue of Cuban support for Puerto Rico's independence will be raised. Whatever the result of the negotiations, Cuba and the US will remain on the opposite sides of many important issues. Havana is committed to a long-term policy of promoting the unity of Latin America vis-a-vis the US and wil; not sacrifice its revolutionary bona fides for the sake of detente. The Leadership Debates Detente Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez appears to head the pro-detente forces in Cuba. The third - orfourth-ranking official in the Castro regime, he is brilliant, both as a theoretician and administrator, and is responsible for much of the considerable administrative and economic progress Cuba has achieved over the past three years. His ties with the Soviet leadership appear to be excellent; he established his bona fides with Moscow during two decades of service as a high official of the pre-Castro Cuban Cormunist party. Now Cuba's highest foreign relations official, he has assumed a central role in Havana's maneuverings toward detente with the In pressing for detente, Rodriguez is reflecting not only Moscow's interests but his own pragmatic political and economic views as well. He is supportea by the remnants of Cuba's pre-Castro Communist party-the "old" Communists-and apparently by some of those technocrats whose burdens would be lessened somewhat if they had access to US markets and trade. Although this group is small in number, its members occupy some significant posts in both the government and the party. The group's main strength, however, lies in its affiliation with Moscow, whose goals and policies it espouses. The group has been in ascendancy in the field of policy since 1970, when Castro reluctantly acceded to a greater Soviet voice in No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SECRET No Foreig~t Dissem determining Cuban domestic matters. Selecting from among the group's members, Rodriguez has reportedly established a small staff to assist him in engineering a normalization of relations. Others in the Cuban leadership, however, fear the ideological impact a restoration of ties with the US-or even the initiation of talks-would have on the Cuban population. A broad campaign to counteract US influence, especially among Cuban youth, has been in progress since 1972. Moreover, many in the leadership, particularly those who fought under Castro as guerrillas, remain bitterly anti-US and want no part of a reconciliation. Their memories of past TJS actio~is aimed at undermining the revolution are vivid; they are suspicious of US intentions, and fear that "materialist and cap- italist" influences could subvert many in the populace. Many of these nationalistic officials recognize the advantages of detente, however. Unlike the "old" Communists, they are uncomfortable with Havana's close ties to Moscow, and probably believe that li;nited rapprochement with the US would increase Cuba's freedom of action. They also would like access to US products, technology, and markets (primarily for sugar, nickel, tobacco, shellfish, and rum). They may believe that access to US markets and technolog~~ outweighs the advantages of continued use of the US embargo as a scapegoat for Cuba's limited economic progress. They therefore accept compelling reasons for submitting to the urgings of Moscow and its Cuban supporters to move toward gradual detente with Washington. They can be expected, however, to keep a close eye on the development of US-Cuban ties and to seek to limit US influence in Cuba. Responding to both schools of thought, Castro desires, but would not make major concessions to achieve, the economic benefits of a reconcilia- tion. As he and Rodriguez have said, Cuba's five-year plan running through No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SF;CRET No Forcrgu D/ssem 19130 was drawn up on the presump- tion that the "blockade" would not be terminated. As for diplomatic ties, Rodriguez has suggested pub- licly that relations might be resumed in 1976, but Castro may be thinking in even longer terms, and probably dies not expect much progress until after the US elections next year. In his view, the benefits are not so great as to necessitate a vigorous effort to negotiate under the pres- s u r e o f time. Neither are the economic advantages so tempting that lle would be willing to go decisively against the advice of those in the leadership who are counseling him to proceed slowly. Castro's View of the Issues Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Compensation: Tn recognition of the importance of the compensation issue, Castro appears ready to counter any demand for indemnification for nationalized properties with his own dem4~l~d that the US make restitution for the damage its economic denial program has done to the Cuban economy. Although this subterfuge would enable him to manufacture a figure for damages far in excess of any US Maims, he seems to believe this gambit would be too transparent to withstand reasoned argument. _ 25X1X6 Castro, without the pressure of the blockade, would be willing to adopt afall-back position that would permit a negotiated settlement of outstanding US claims. Castro himself has apparently implied much the same thing to visitors from the US. For obvious reasons, Havana would expect to settle for considerably less than the $1.8 billion now given as the total figure for valid claims. Special I,A STAMPA correspondent Ennio Caretto asked Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez if the resumption of diplomatic relations with Washington was possible and quoted Rodriguez as replying: "Yes, if nothing happens to prevent it. In fact, the process of international detente grows stronger. I even have a date in mind-1976. We no longer feel threatened by the United States. We are ready to negotiate, and we do not even make it a condition that the United States close down Guantanamo (naval base) or free Latin America- those are things we can discuss....I will tell you furthermore that, so it seems to me, 70 percent of the US people, the Congress, and the State Depaztment accept us. Burying our hostility will be to the advantage of everyone-us and them." (Dispatch from Ennio Caretto, LA STAMPA, Turin, March 23, 1975, p. 9) -5 - No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SECRET No Fvreig-r Dissem THE CUBAN CGMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE Fldel CASTRO- Fust Secralary Raul CASTRO- Second Secretary Osvaldo Dorticos Sergio del Valle Juan Ahncida Guillermo Garcia Fidel CASTRO-Chairman Raul CASTRO- Deputy Chairman Osvaldo DORTIC06 Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ* Antonio PEREZ Isidoro MALMIERCA~ Jorge RISOUET Roul GARCIA Joel GOMENECH* Osvaldo DORTICOS Vigor E. DREKE** Velma ESPIN Manuel E. hAJARDO Marcelo FE~NANDEZ Oscar FERNANDEZ Harold FERRER Caliato GARCIA Guillermo GARCIA Julio A. GARCtA~ Pedro M. GARCIA Rcul GARCIA E!~na GILD Fabio GROBART* Orestes GUERRA Raul GUERRA lose ABRANTES Rogel(o ACEVEDO Armando ACOSTA* Severn AGUIRRE* Juan ALMEIDA lose M. ALVAREZ Emilio ARAGONES Jose AitTEAGA Flavin BRAVO Julio E. CAMACHO lino CARRERAS Ernesto CASILLAS Bclarmino CASTILLA Fidel CASTRO Raul CASTRO Angel Joel CHAVECO Faure CHOMON# Osmani CIENFUEGOS* Secundino GUERRA* Leopoldo CINTRAS Armando HART Abelardo COLOME Joel IGLESIAS Raul CURBELO Omar H. ISER Sergio DEL VALLE Rienerio 11MENEZ Manuel DIAZ Rolando KINDELAN PINAR DEL RIO-Julio E. CAMACHO LAS VILLAS-Arnaldo MILIAN` HAVANA-Jose R. MACHADO CAMAGUEY-Raul CURBELO MATANZAS-Julian RIZO ORIENTE-Armando HART 'Popui~r Social Pury ("Old" Communip) "Student Rnrolutfon~ry Oinctanu No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Ramiro Valdes Armando Hart Military Department American Department Man Organizations Department Trantportollon and Communication Jose LLANUSA lose RAMIREZ* Department Antonio E. LUSSON Jorge RISOUET ,Manuel LUZARDO* Raul ROA General Foreign Relations Department ~- Josc R. MACHADU Blas ROCA'R Isidoro MAIMIERCA* Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ* Education, Science, Culture Department-)F Juan MARINELLO* Orlando RODRIGUEZ Miguel MA~TIN* Basllio RODRIGUEZ Juridical and State Organ(sms Department lonquin MENDEZ Ursin(o ROJAS* Raul MENDENDEZ Celia SANCHEZ Arnoldo MILIAN* Aldo SANTAMARIA Organization Department Carlos MIR Haydee SANTAMARIA Pedro MIRET Rene de Jos SANTOS * Agriculture and Livestock Department Jesus MONTANE Clamontino SERRA Jose NARANJO* lose R SILVA Arnaldo OCHOA Lionel 50T0* Heavy Industries Department Morin OLIVA Julio TARRAU* Filiberto OLIVERA Diocles TORRALBA Sugar Department Ramon PARDO Fel(pe TORRES* Antonio PEREZ Ramiro VAIDES Faustino PEREZ An(bal VELAZ Economy Department Wolfredo PLREZ Roberto VIERA Manuel PINEIRO Luls A. ZAYAS Consumption and Services Department Approved For Release 2001/08/21S~IQ~[~P,$~T00608R000300060023-9 No Foreign Disscm Guantanamo: Castro would be less conciliatory in other areas. He would expect to get a definite com- mitment by the US to abandon the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. His public statements, however, suggest that he would be content to estab- lish atimetable for US withdrawal rather than press uncompromisingly for immediate and total evacuation. He is keeping in close touch with the Panamanians on their canal negotiations with the US and will use these as an indicator of US flexibility. He sees Guantanamo as a much less important issue in US eyes than the Panama Canal, and he would therefore expect to negotiate a much more rapid withdrawal from the former. Acutely aware of strong resistance in the US to a new Panama canal treaty, Castro may try to profit from the Panamanian experience by doing some discreet politicking with Senators and their staff members to smooth the way for a base evacuation agreement, and coincidentally to bring domestic pressure on the Executive Branch to reach a solution satisfactory to Cuba. He seems convinced that there is considerable sentiment in both public and official circles in the US for the return of the base to Cuban control, and he apparently does not see the subject as a major threat to the success of negotiations. He would probably be primed to quote chapter and Mexico City, 14 February-Regarding the possibility of a rapprochement between Cuba and the United States, Fidel Castro said: "We are in no hurry. We can wait ten or twenty years. Condemnation of the blockade of Cuba is growing, and the North Americans are increasingly isolated. The blockade is harming us, but we can wait. Argentina's US companies are willing to sell us automobiles. The United States, as well as US businesses, are facing a dilemma. They have to choose between US and Argentine law." (Buenos Aires IPS press item, February 14, 1974) Asked about Cuban relations with the US, Prime Minister Castro demonstrated a relaxed and generally favorable attitude toward the US but apparently did not envisage the early resumption of formal US~Cuban ties. (SECRET) No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86 006088000300060023-9 SECRL: No Fnrcigrr Dissem verse from statements by a multitude of US political and military leaders as expert testimony to the very limited usefulness of the base to the US. He may also be prepared to give some guarantee that the base would not be turned over to the Soviet navy, despite the fact that such a pledge would theoretically impinge on Cuban sovereignty. The Soviet Connection: Castro would reject any attempt by the US to tamper with Cuba's military, political, or economic relationship with the USSR. This point would probably pose the most difficult negotiating problem in that it is an area where Castro has little maneuvering room to accommodate US demands. Castro believes that a small nation trying to exist in a superpower environment stands less chance of being smothered if it casts its lot with the more distant superpower. If Cuba cannot achieve the ideal-to be as independent of Moscow as of Washington- dependence on Moscow at least gives it more independence in Castro's eyes than the heavy dependence of previous Cuban governments on the US. Moreover, Castro cannot lightly dismiss the political and economic ties that bind him so tightly to Moscow. By his own choice, he has allied himself with the communist countries and adopted socialism as his creed and as an intermediate goal on the road to communism. He has destroyed Cuba's pre-revolutionary institutions and replaced them with socialist ones. He has accumulated such a monumental debt to the USSR that, even in the most favorable circumstances, Cuba will be tied to Moscow until well into the next century. Even with the economy's upturn in the past year, there is no end in sight to the Castro regime's dependence on Soviet assistance. Castro's political path, therefore, will continue to parallel that of the USSR no matter what develops in Cuban-US relations. Neither does he have much maneuverability with regard to his military ties to Moscow. Virtually all of the weapons and military equipment now in use in Cuba originated in the USSR. The Cuban military establishment, therefore, must look to the Soviets for compatible spare parts and replace- ment equipment. Given these facts, a termination of Cuba's military relation- ship with the USSR would have such far-reaching implications for Havana's defense capabilities that Castro would be obliged to opt for whatever course would guarantee continued Soviet supplies. Furthermore, Havana allegedly pays nothing for Soviet weapons and would be unlikely to look with favor on a policy shift that would require an expensive outlay for arms formerly obtained free of charge. Another aspect of the military relationship that Castro is also ill inclined to terminate concerns Soviet naval visits. The presence of Soviet warships in Cuban ports is the only tangible evidence of Moscow's willing- ness to involve its armed forces in Cuba's defense. Castro has no illusions about the steadfastness of Moscow's resolve on Havana's behalf in the face of No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/2~~C1A~F~Q~.86T00608R000300060023-9 No Foreign Dissenr a threat of a nuclear holocaust, but short of such a threat he probably looks upon his visitors as a modest yet useful and welcome deterrent, and about the most that can realistically be expected from a reluctant protector. Even if he were disposed to discourage the visits, Moscow's wishes would most likely prevail-an indication that this is more aSoviet-US than aCuba-US problem. Overflights: Castro would also assume an adamant stance on U-2 and SR-71 missions. He would demand, and expect to get, a pledge to respect Cuba's airspace and end reconnaissance overflights. He would argue that the flights are an intolerable affront to Cuban sovereignty and can even be considered unnecessary, given the ability of the US to achieve the same ends through more advanced technical means. His strong legal position would probably make him impervious to compromise on this point. He might even try to make an issue of US peripheral reconnaissance flights, but this would be more a harassment tactic than a bona fide item for negotiation. Puerto Rico: Castro has publicly belittled the benefits to Cuba of a reconciliation while claiming that the principal advantages would accrue to the US. This line is basically a tactic designed to bolster his negotiating position and to support the impression that he is under no pressure to change the status quo. He is much more realistic in his private assessment, however, and may even believe that Cuba has so much more to gain from detente that he needs to manufacture throwaway issues to be discarded during the negotiating process. This may be the principal reason for Havana's aggressive effort in recent months to focus world attention on the status of Puerto Rico. The Castro regime has: ? improved its ties with the Puerto Rico Communist Party; ? permitted the Puerto Rico Socialist Party (formerly the Puerto Rico Pro-Independence Movement) to maintain a permanent office in Havana; Normalization of relations with the US is a goal shared by Cuban authorities, but one comes away with the feeling that Cuba's asking price will be high. "Since Cuba's claims for compensation against the United States exceed American claims against Cuba, in effect, Cuba is asking the US government to compensate Americans who lost their properties in Cuba." No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/2~~~~f~86T00608R000300060023-9 No Foreigir Dissent ' ~~ ,..' ~ . /'' ~. NwN~~ _.,r L._.-`...._Smllyu -.~__~~~- -- - _U$fi NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY ,v;,~?,,,,rrr?' i ~~,` CUBA No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 ~~>FCRET No Foreign Dlsrenr ? pressed the independence issue in the United Nations and other international forums; ? promoted international symposia as part of its continuing propa- ganda campaign demanding Puerto Rico's independence; ? organized a domestic propaganda campaign to keep the issue before the Cuban people. Castro may briieve that he can agree to barter a more moderate Cuban stand on Puerto Rico in exchange for US concessions during neg ~tiations. He therefore would keep up a high level of publicity until negotiations start. He proved his flexibility on the issue in late 1972 and early 1973 when the Cuban representative at the United Nations kept an unusually low profile on the subject of Puerto Rico in order to avoid upsetting Cuban-US talks on aerial hijackings. On the other hand, focusing Cuban domestic attention on Puerto Rico suggests that Castro has more in mind than just developing a "throwaway" negotiating point. He would hardly risk raising the public's hopes on a matter linked so closely to Cuba's ow;n history if he did not intend to pursue it. Although he is usually well informed, he may be misreading the situation in Puerto Rico to the extent that he believes popular sentiment in favor of independence has increased significantly. It is most likely that elements of both perspectives are present in Castro's reasoning. US as "Gendarme": Castro would also use as a bargaining point his long-standing demand that the US cease its alleged role as "gendarme of the hemisphere." This is a broad term derived from the history of US interven- tion in Latin America, and intended by Havana as a counterpoint to the US insistence that Cuba cease "exporting the revolution." It has been used for so long to reinforce Cuba's revolutionary credentials among Latin American leftists that it could hardly be abandoned when Havana comes face-to-face with the US. But it will be one of the easiest "issues" for Castro to drop, should the US elect to soft-pedal the issue of Cuban subversion in the hemisphere. So far, every sign indicates that the Castro regime will refuse to make any public commitment to abjure the support or espousal of violent revolu- tion in Latin America. In fact, the draft of a new constitution released in Havana in early April specifically acknowledges the "right of peoples to reject imperialist violence with revolutionary violence" and "recognizes the legitimacy of wars of national liberation as well as armed resistance to aggression and conquest, and considers its right and its internationalist duty P/o Fai'r!e~ig~n D~isTsem Approved For Release 2001/08/2~~C`T~CR1~F~86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SECRET No Foreign Dissem Portions of an interview with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez by Kenize Mourad of Nouvel Obscrvateur as published in Mexico City's LT Dia on January 30, 1975. QUESTION: At a moment when US-USSR relations seem to be clouded, do you think that an improvement in relations between Cuba and Washington is possible? ANSWER: We do not have an apocalyptic view of what has happened. The detente policy is a permanent one; it is not based on circumstances or events of the moment; the world offers no other choice. However, should the ultrareactionary forces prevail in the US, it could not but reflect on Cuban-US relations. QUESTION: Last November's OAS meeting in Quito declined to lift the sanctions against Cuba. Another OAS meeting, slated for April in Washington, will reconsider the question. Are you optimistic? ANSWER: I have just be;,: ?riformed that Kissinger has conceded that the vote should be by simple majority, not by atwo-thirds majority. This will allow some countries that still have scruples about establishing relations with Cuba to have them. Kissinger's decision would also pave the way for a future agreement with the US once it decides to end the blockade. Because, as a matter of fact, it cannot be ignored that a favorable OAS decision in April does not, of necessity, mean the end of the blockade. This is a matter of domestic policy to North Americans -there is significant right wing strength in the Senate. QUESTION: It would seem that the USSR would be delighted with the resumption of relations between Cuba and the US. Is Cuba in favor of such relations, above all, to lighten the burden carried by the Soviet Union? Ai`ISWER: Absolutely. The improvement of our relations with the US would be written into the detente process. The continuation of a source of tension such as Cuba is not encompassed in USSR policy. Insofar as the question of the economic burden is concerned, they have never brought it up. QUESTION: After establishing relations with Washington, could Cuba make the voice of com- munism bebetter heard in Latin America? ANSWER: We do not pose the question in those terms. The final objective of communism, of course, is the establishment of communism throughout the world. It is essential at the current juncture, however, to safeguard the peace, because the alternative is nuclear war. I will not refer to the positions of the USSR with regard to Latin America. However, the Cuban position is as follows: Socialism cannot be built in Latin America overnight. Objective conditions for socialism do indeed exist in certain countries, but there are no immediate possibilities at hand. In our view, the development of the revolutionary process must first entail the defense of national interests. The Cuban model is not the only one. The Peruvian and Panamanian revolutions are led by military ~*oups who have grasped what their country's interests are and are carrying out a nationalist revolution. It is this which leads us to cooperate with the Peruvian government, as well as with Venezuela, which is also undertaking a policy of independence. QUESTION: The US has spoken about reestablishing relations with Cuba, if Cuba renounces the "export of the Revolution" to Latin America. Last February, when Brezhnev visited Cuba, did he voice his opposition to the "export of the revolution?" ANSWER: We have always talked about aiding revolution, never about exporting it. Cuba shall never renounce its right and its duty to cooperate with those who wish to change society, whenever such change is impossible by democratic means and above all whenever such change is deterred by the intervention of the US and the CIA. In Paraguay's case, for example, we can give aid to the revolutionaries without sending armed forces. In Chile's case, naturally, we shall aid the revolutionaries with all out strength to overthrow Pinochet's government. No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SFCR~T No Foreign Dissent Statements of Fidel Castro on March 19, 1975, at a press conference att the occasion of Canadian Minister of Trade, Commerce, and Industry Gillespie's visit to Cuba. QUESTION: Does Cuba want to recognize the United States and what would be the negative effects of that? A?dSWER: The United States is recognized, gener311y speaking, and the question is not of us recognizing them but of them recognizing us. It is not we that broke relations with the United States. Neither did we establish an economic blockade against the US. It was the US that broke diplomatic relations with us and established the economic blockade of Cuba. This was not a Cuban initiative; it was theirs. We have suffered no inconvenience from having no commerce with the US. QUESTION: Would you like to have the United States recognize Cuba? ANSWER: VVe are not impatient for that nur are we very anxious for it. We feel it will happen sooner or later. When it does happen, we will consider it a positive event. QUESTION: You have said that the first step to resumed relations with the US is the lifting of the embargo. ANSWER: Yes. We maintain a certain position regarding this point and it is that the economic embargo should cease before we can go into negotiations to solve the differences between Cuba and the US because the embargo was a coercive measure, a unilateral measure on the part of the US toward Cuba. One should not negotiate under conditions of pressure and coercion; that is why it is our position that the embargo, the economic blockade, should cease. We have not established any blockade against the US. For example, they need sugar. They have to go out to the different markets to find it and we have sugar. We have no law which forbids selling sugar to the US. If at any time they should need sugar and want to buy it in Cuba, we are ready to supply it. Therefore, there is not a situation of equal conditions. That is why the blockade must cease before any negotiations take place between the US and Cuba. QUESTION: Do you interpret the visits by American Senators and others as signs that the blockade might be lifted in the near future? ANSWER: We cannot establish a direct relationship between one thing and another. The visits to Cuba have been the result of the Congress' Foreign Relations Committee and the interests of US political personalities, and not part of the policy of the US government. In any case, we regard these visits as positive and believe they can contribute to the improvement of. relations between the US and Cuba. They are also the expression of r political trend, a trend of public opinion favorable to the lifting of the blockade and the improve~~tent of relations. Paris, 24 October-Fidel Castro reiterated that with regard to bilateral relations, there can be no dialog or negotiation with the United States so long as that country does not unconditionally lift the blockade. Once that requirement is met, there would be many other problems to discuss, among them the Caimanera (Guantanamo) naval base. "Later, we must see whether the United States tries to impose anything-for instance, anything that might limit even in the slightest way our country's sovereignty. We will not admit any condition. For a negotiation to get anywhere, for our relations with the United States to improve, it is essential for them to start by comprehending that present-day Cuba is not the Cuba of the past; that today, Cuba is a country that is absolutely free, a country that does not and will not accept any condition that might infringe on its dignity and political sovereignty even in the slightest way:' (Havana radio broadcast of October 24, 1974, discussing an interview of the same date granted by Castro to L'Humanite. J No FFor(e'~igRn DFisTsem Approved For Release 2001/08/2~:`CTAy~Dp$6T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SF,CRE'1:' Nu Foreign Dissent to aid the besieged and the peoples who fight for their liberation." The draft also codifies the "gendarme" issue by condemning "imperialist intervention, direct or indirect, in the internal or external affairs of any state" by any r-~eans. Rather than signifying Cuban intransigence, however, this type of policy definition suggests that Havana is leaving room for compromise. Recognizing that its past policy of "exporting the revolution" with violence is still a major hurdle, the right of "peoples to self-determination and self-defense" is postulated rather than any Cuban right to sponsor revolution abroad. As a confirmed revolutionary, Castro will not unequivocally renounce revolutionary violence; to do so would compromise his revolution- ary ethics and brand him as a pure opportunist. In this light, his "gendarme" demand appears as little more than rhetorical capital generated to counter one "unreasonable" demand with another, with the expectation that a compromise can be reached. As a pragmatic politician, Castro understands that the US could not renounce the Monroe Doctrine or any of its subsequent corollaries, and he does not expect this. In reiterating his "gendarme" demand, he does not intend to create an ideological impasse. Instead, he sees both sides, through negotiations, subscribing to a statement that would appear to address both demands satisfactorily without requiring either party to abjure publicly the practice of overt or covert intervention in other countries' internal affairs. This has ample precedent in agreements the Castro regime has signed to restore formal ties with other Latin American governments; each signatory agrees to respect the political and territorial integrity of the other. Outlook Castro appears to gauge the prospects for improved Cuban-US relations with a mixture of cautious optimism and realism. He understands that his maneuvering room is limited, especially on several key issues. Nevertheless, he appears confident that a restoration of formal ties is merely a matter of time. He appears willing to bargain on some points and apparently expects the US to recognize, and make allowances for, his inability to give ground on others. His knowledge of recent US negotiations with other Latin American countries has apparently convinced him that an accommodation is possible. This does not mean that Cuba would readily accede where flexibility exists in order to reach an agreement. On the contrary, Havana apparently believes the US is universally on the defensive and prepared to give ground on significant issues. The Cubans see the US Executive under strong domes- tic pressure to reach a more satisfactory relationship with Havana, and they -14- NoSFor(eigRn Di's~s[e'm Approved For Release 2001/08/21~~TA=R~P86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 sECRrT No l~nrergn Drssem apparently expect this pressure to grow as next year's elections draw near. They see no reason to soften their position and instead plan to press aggressively to maximize the concessions they believe the US is prepared to grant. A restoration of diplomatic relations, however, would have little impact on Cuba's long-range objectives. Havana would still be committed to pro- moting iconoclastic and far~~reaching social change in Latin America and elsewhere, probably resulting in selective endorsements of violent revolution- ary groups. The Castro government can be expected to persist vigorously in its efforts to unite Latin America and to reduce US influence. The Puerto Rico independence movement will continue to receive Cuban sympathy and propaganda support but probably at a reduced level. The Castro regime's ties with Moscow will remain strong regardless of the extent of detente with Washington, and Cuba's pursuit of socialism will continue unabated. Havana hopes to resume trading with the US, but will pragmatically look for the best possible deals with little or no regard for political or symbolic arrangements. US businessmen hoping to turn a profit would find the Cubans extremely hardheaded, shrewd, and capable at the bargaining table. At the same time, Cuban diplomats resident in the U5 would presum- ably make the most of their presence to advertise the Cuban Revolution to the US public through academic, cultural, and social groups and the mass media. They would also angage in a broad intelligence collection effort, partly in cooperation with the Soviets in response to Moscow's requirements and partly to gather technical data keyed to Cuba's agricultural and indus- trialdevelopment needs. Havana would continue to reproduce material in US technical journals, manuals, and books without regard to copyright restric- tions, and academic and scientific exchanges would be actively sought to enable Cuban scholars to pick the brains of US experts. To avoid contamina- tion of the Cuban population through exposure to US cultural influences, however, the Castro regime would step up its domestic campaign against "ideological diversionism" and adopt measures to limit the dissemination of US news and cultural publications within Cuba. In summing up the detente scenario as it develops, therefore, more of the chips would appear to be winding up in Havana's corner than the United States'. Following the termination of the US economic denial program, the Cubans would enter into talks with the US that, after long, hard bargaining, would probably result in the resumption of diplomatic relations. Cuba would gain a definitive commitment for the return of the Guantanamo naval base to Cuban control, cessation of reconnaissance overflights, termination of the economic denial campaign, access to US markets and technology, and -15- NoGFor(e~igRn DFissem Approved For Release 2001/08/7'IE~IA`~b~86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SECRET No Foreign Dissem political respectability. Moreover, the Castro regime's fundamental policies and international relationships would remain unchanged as would its hostility toward the US. For its part, the US would gain a nearly source of sugar, limited compensation for US claims, a modest market for US goods, and elimination of the expense of con~uc?ing reconnaissance overflights and the economic denial program. In addition, a major world-wide benefit would accrue to the US upon the elimination of the so-called Cuba question-a long-standing source of irritation particularly within the context of the Organization of American States. ACuban-US reconciliation would be roundly applauded by most Latin American governments, which sce the Cuba issue as a massive stumbling block in virtually all aspects of relations with the US. It would also be well received in countries outside the hemisphere where the legal requirements of the economic denial program frequently generate friction with the US and where the prospect of a superpower engaged in fruitless confrontation with a ministate serves to dilute US prestige. At the same time, some countries-specifically Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Nicara- gua-would probably react negatively, convinced that the bases for sanctions against Cuba still stand. No FEoreigRn DEissem Approved For Release 2001/08/21 SCI~RDl3>~T00608R000300060023-9