IM CEAUCESCU'S VULNERABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 18, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Top Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Ceausescu 's Vulnerabilities
Top Secret
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December 18, 1975
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 Ceausescu's Vulnerabilities
Summary
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December 18, 1975
Ceausescu's current position nonetheless appears to be sufficiently secure to see
him through any domestic challenges.
Romania's highly publicized indepen-
dent foreign policy has long made Ceausescu
vulnerable to criticism and pressures from his
Pact allies. A major factor in his ability to
withstand these pressures has been the tight
hold he has maintained over the Romanian
body politic. Recently, however, there have
been signs that domestic opposition to his
rule may be increasing.
Ceausescu' most visible area of vulner-
ability at home is the growing "cult of per-
sonality" that he tacitly encourages. Future
economic conditions in Romania could prove
to be the weakest link in the chain of hard-
line domestic policies that Ceausescu has for-
mulated sincL coming to power in 1965. Fur-
thermore, there have been indications of dis-
satisfaction with the way he runs the party
and with some aspects of foreign policy.
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During the initial period of his rule, Ceausescu stressed collective
leadership, but subsequently he moved steadily to gain absolute control of
the country's key levers of institutional power. His current posts, unmatched
by any other East European leader, include:
? Party secretary general, a post he assumed from the deceased
Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965,
? President of the Council of State (December 1967), the country's
corpc rate head of state,
? Chairman of the Socialist Unity Front (November 1968), the
umbrella organization for mass activities established in the wake of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia,
? Chairman of the Supreme Defense Council (March 1969),
Romania's paramount body for formulating defense and military policy,
? Chairman of the Supreme Council for Economic and Social De-
velopment (May 1973), a joint party and government organ mainly
intended to promote economic efficiency,
? President of the Republic (March 1975).
This concentra.ion of power is consistent with Ceausescu's personal
characteristics, his basic policies, and Romanian traditions. Ceausescu at age
57 is an egotistical, shrewd, dyed-in-the-wool national Communist goading
his country :nrough forced-draft modernization. His obsession with pro-
pelling Romania to the status of an industrially developed nation by 1990 is,
however, based not so much on Communist doctrine as on the conviction
that only thus can Romania survive Moscow's imperial impulses.
At the same time, Ceausescu's nationalist outlook often suggests a sense
of inferiority; he acknowledges that Romania is one of the least developed
socialist countries. He probably views his steady acquisition of political and
economic power as the most certain way to bolster national confidence and
to force economic development. Between now and 1990, he will alienate
himself from Moscow even further by using Romania's underdeveloped
status both to identify more closely with tlx.:- nonaligned movement and to
insist that CEMA give top priority to equalizing the level of development of
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its members. Each of these points increasingly clashes with doctrinal views
that the Soviet party has long considered non-negotiable.
Ceausescu's "Cult of Personality"
Ceausescu's decision to hold all the reins of power has predictably led
to a "cult of personality" that in some key respects works to his advantage.
He rules a country that has never had a genuine democratic tradition.
Indeed, strong central authority has more often than not meant protection
and hope for the Romanian people. His people have traditionally considered
human frailty in a leader to be a plus factor. Most Romanians are thus
willing to tolerate considerable domestic mismanagement and belt-tightening
so long as Ceausescu can credibly claim that his policies are keeping the
Soviets out of Romania.
On the negative side, however, there lurks the real possibility that the
"cult" will make too many people afraid to disagree with Ceausescu.
Opportunists bent on promoting their own careers can be prone to acclaim
everything that he proposes. A serious miscalculation in policy is thus
possible, particularly if the "cult" continues to grow.
A lesser, albeit important, negative aspect of the "cult" is public
resentment of the attention given to Ceausescu's family. Many Romanians
are especially irked by the high party rank and also by the conduct of his
wife Elena. She is strong-willed, generally abrasive in persona': contacts, and
often meddles in personnel appointments. Moreover, Ceausescu's three
children-alt in their twenties-have been much in the spotlight, and their
generally poor conduct has reportedly offended the public.
Signs of Opposition
Over the past year, there have been several hints of dissatisfaction in
Romania with Ceausescu and with at least some of his policies. Some of the
first signs emerged at the party congress in November 1974. Ceausescu
personally had to intervene twice at the congress-first to decline the post of
party secretary general for life, and then to call for the defeat of a proposed
age limitation on all party office holders. He could, of course, pretend
modesty in taking the first step, but the fact that his intervention was
necessary suggests that strong elements in the party opposed the life-tenure
proposal. Some of the same people may have sponsored the second proposal,
which would, in effect, have set a terminal date on his tenure.
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Ceausescu waves to delegates at Romanis!n Party Congress in November 1974
Significant post-congress changes in the party statutes also pointed to
discontent. Ceausescu's moralistic, puritanical streak emerged in the "ethical
code" governing the personal conduct of party members; who must now
pledge to obey all party decisions. More importantly, only the Political
Executive Committee-the party's supreme policy organ-has the authority
to appoint and remove members of the Central Committee. These and other
changes were probably intended to minimize disaffection and thus tighten
Ceausescu's control.
Romania's parliamentary elections last March indicated increasing
worker dissatisfaction with the regime's economic priorities. The number of
negative votes was still small, but it did increase to nearly 180,000-
compared to about 31,000 in the elections of 1969. The highest percentage
of these votes came from such industrial counties as Sibiu, Prahova, Cluj, and
Brasov.
Some of these areas have large minority groups, but some also were
places whi,re dissatisfied workers engaged in industrial sabotage in 1974.
long hours, low pay, and extremely poor
wing conditions prompted the sabotage.
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The most recent sign of disaffection came in mid-October, when Ceau-
sescu made a bow to the public by announcinr? extensive increases in the
availability of food and consumer durables th_,.;ugh next June. He almost
certainly made this rare gesture because he was convinced that consumer
reaction to shortages of sugar, milk, and cooking oil had become critical in a
number of counties, particularly after the July floods. The announcement
followed a spate of rumors about disturbances that severe food shortages
were creating. Ceausescu's concession came after his decision to postpone
planned talks with President Tito, raising the possibility that the distur-
baiiices were more serious and widespread than available reporting indicated.
Some observers believe that Ceausescu's practice of frequently shuffling
the membership of top party and government agencies is primarily intended
to minimize the opportunity for opposition to coalesce. Ceausescu openly
claims that these shifts develop more effective party and state managers. His
approach has, however, resulted in a "revolving door leadership." It has
taken a heavy toll of the politically savvy, older hands, replacing them with
better educated, though politically unimpressive and more pliable, younger
officials. There are doubts that economic efficiency is best served by the
high turnover in top-level personnel.
there has been serious discord in the leader-
ship over economic policy and relations with Moscow. Unspecified critics are
said to have called for policy adjustments, although not for complete
redirection of policy. Some critics reportedly believe that Bucharest has
received insufficient rewards from its expanded trade with the West. Others
allegedly favor greater accommodation with the Soviets, while still others are
said to want less stress on the development of heavy industry.
Threats to Ceausescu's Control
The signs of opposition to Ceausescu, although perhaps becoming more
frequent, are still relatively vague and sporadic. Individually or collectively,
they do not yet pose a credible threat to his primacy, but they bear close
watching. They also suggest a range of possible actions-internal or external--
against him.
A Coup: Despite the signs of.growing domestic opposition, this appears
to be the least likely threat to Ceausescu. The major considerations arguing
against a palace coup or a Soviet-instigated overthrow almost certainly are
Romanian fears that the Soviets might somehow benefit, and the absence of
a credible successor.
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The party leadership seems free of organized factions, and there is no
cohesive pro-Soviet clique that might try to capitalize on disenchantment
with Ceausescu. To the extent that differences exist in the leadership, they
seem to focus mainly on adjusting policy rather than on sharp changes. The
composition of those critical of a given policy also reportedly varies from
issue to issue.
Ceausescu's "revolving door leadership" has made it very difficult-
probably by design-for opposing elements to organize a clique to oust him.
In any case, the Romanian party does not have a legacy of factionalism-a
phenomenon that more than likely reflects the nation's tradition of passively
accepting strong central authority.
The more serious threats, then, emanate from Moscow, and they could
take several forms.
Economic Sanctions: The Ceausescu leadership knows that its obstruc-
tionist tactics within CEMA entail serious risks, including economic sanc-
tions. Bucharest nonetheless is clearly determined to stick to its guns, and
will continue its efforts to ensure that the pace and type of integration does
not impinge on its sovereignty. The Romanians will demand that the level of
economic development of all CEMA members be equalized; they will also
insist that "procedural" arrangements, such as CEMA-EC relations, grant
individual CEMA members the right to negotiate with the EC.
There is no evidence that Moscow and its loyalist allies intend to apply
economic sanctions against Bucharest, but Romania would certainly be
vulnerable to any such action. The country lacks both coal and iron ore, and
has long been a leading importer of Soviet coke-taking nearly one fourth of
all Soviet exports in 1974. Moreover, the Soviet coke supply is tight because
of a steady rise in domestic requirements, and coke available for export from
other East European countries is also limited.
It would thus be relatively easy for Moscow to plead that it is unable to
meet increased Romanian demands or to insist on some form of export
rationinr in accordance with the Soviet-dominated CEMA Secretariat's view
of what CEMA integration requires. Because such restrictions could severely
affect Romanian heavy industry, Bucharest is actively seeking alternative
sources of supply, including purchase of a substantial interest in a US coal
mining company. The Romanians reportedly are also having difficulty in
obtaining a sufficient allotment of iron ore from the Soviets.
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Another potentially troublesome area is Romania's relatively close and
expanding economic and commercial relations with non-Communist nations,
which now account for over one half of Romanian foreign trade. As the
country continues to develop greater economic independence and trades
with a wider range of nations, it finds itself facing soaring import costs,
expensive-and perhaps increasingly s,earce-credit, and the uncertainties of
the world money market. It also must find hard currency markets for its
finished and unfinished goods, and at the same time maintain a strong and
growing economy at home.
Ceausescu knows that it is not easy to keep all these balls in the air at
the same time. Should the Romanians fumble badly, they would obviously
be in a poor position to parry any Soviet attempt to draw them back into
line. Although the regime has evidently avoided tempting Moscow to meddle
in Romanian economic matters, some top-level officials reportedly believed
earlier this year that Ceausescu's opening to the West had paid insufficient
dividends. This private criticism has reportedly abated, and there is no
evidence that the Soviets tried to exploit the differences. If the discord
re-emerges in a stronger and public form, however, it could provide other
CEMA regimes with a tempting target.
Soviet Meddling in Romania: One of the most remarkable aspects of
Ceausescu's decade in power is the relative absence of specific charges-even
from the congenitally anti-Russian Romanians-of Soviet interference in
Romanian internal affairs. The only exceptions are the puzzling and still
unexplained General Serb case of late 1971, and Ceausescu's speech in May
1967, when he rebuked the Soviets-and perhaps other allies-fo:r seeking to
develop ties "outside the organized framework of the party."
In every major speech, Ceausescu nevertheless warns against foreign
interference. When a group of Cominformists-pro-Soviet subversives-was
tried and convicted in neighboring Yugoslavia, Ceausescu reacted by crank-
ing up his internal security forces to detect and quash any similar activities
by the Soviets and others in Romania.
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Ceausescu's accelerated economic development program is becoming
both harder to implement and harder to sell. He appears quite capable of
coping with the situation, but from a Soviet point of view, the combined
problems of consumer grumbling over food shortages, a worsened hard-
currency picture, disappointing crops, and other economic problems
stemming from the devastating floods last July offer substantial issues for
promoting disaffection with his leadership. Romania's two million ethnic
Magyars are an especially attractive target.
A New Soviet Leadership: Some of the reporting about Brezhnev's
illness earlier this year clearly reflected deep concern in Bucharest over a
possible shake-up in the Kremlin. The Romanians reportedly feared either
that Kirilenko would succeed Brezhnev or that the Soviet military would
gain a dominant role in any post-Brezhnev scramble for power. They were
also allegedly worried that a Kremlin power struggle could restore a col-
lective leadership, a phenomenon that might embarrass Ceausescu's pro-
nounced one-man show.
Whenever Brezhnev leaves the scene, the Romanians know that their
selective defiance of Moscow will have to be tuned to the limits of tolerance
of his successor, whether it is a collective or a new boss. Bucharest, and
indeed most East European countries, would prefer the first alternative
because of the greater freedom of maneuver that collegiality provides.
From the Romanian point of view, the worst option would be a
dominant role for the military. Bucharest knows that Moscow's marshals
would brook little foot-dragging in the Warsaw Pact. Bucharest could
probably learn to live with Kirilenko. When Khrushchev was ousted in
October 1964, the anguished Romanians were ascribing many of the same
tough qualities to Brezhnev that they now attribute to Kirilenko.
Soviet Military Intervention: The ultimate threat to the Ceausescu
regime, of course, is Soviet military intervention. There is absolutely no
evidence that the Soviets intend to take such a step, but Ceausescu's careful
tailoring of his resistance to Kremlin policies shows he is aware of the risks
that an independent foreign policy involves. Should the Romanians grossly
miscalculate the limits of Moscow's toleration, Bucharest also knows that
detente certainly would not deter the Soviets from acting. Meantime, the
leadership jealously preserves the leading role of the party and tight internal
controls, thereby depriving the Soviets of the reasons that they used to
"justify" their invasion of Czechoslovakia.
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Even in the event of military intervention, the Kremlin probably would
find it difficult to install a Quisling who could succeed in preventing
Romania from becoming a heavy burden on the Soviet economy. Further-
more, it would be very difficult for any Soviet satrap to maintain stricter
internal controls or better preserve the party's leading role than has
Ceausescu.
Should Moscow nevertheless decide to intervene, Colonel-General
Alexandru Draghici, a former interior minister, probably would be their
candidate to replace Ceausescu. Draghici, whose name is synonymous with
Soviet influence in Romania in the 1950s, was ousted by Ceausescu in 1967.
Ceausescu's grip on power is part of a growing paradox in Bucharest.
Romania's political, economic, and even military opening to non-Communist
countries-including the US, the nonaligned world, and Portugal-is
widening, to Moscow's irritation. His domestic policies have generally
become tighter, however, in response to the domestic strains that his ac-
celerated economic development program and his dogged independent line
entail.
Ceausescu's longer range problem is the erosion of popular confidence,
particularly within party ranks. Tangible improvement in the economic
sector and perhaps some relaxation in the cultural field would, of course,
help to head off the problem. If internal pressure mounts against consumer
hardships, the cult, or excessive regimentation, he has enough flexibility to
give a bit-as he did last month-without radically revising his regime's
priorities.
Moreover, he knows that the traditional passivity and the ingrained
anti-Russian outlook of the Romanian people will probably allow him to
pursue his course by making only minor adjustments in domestic policy. As
a hedge, he has used his power to make it more difficult for either domestic
or foreign opponents to undermine his position. He has thus ensured that his
mandate derives from broad, not elite, party and state organs-from the
party congress and parliament rather than from the party's central com-
mittee or the government's Council of State.
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Ceausescu's power should enable him to cope with any purely internal
and most external challenges to his authority. He exuded such confidence
earlier this fall when, in speaking to the tenth congress of the Romanian
youth organization, he stressed the theme of a Romanian nationalistic poem
of the nineteenth century-to oversee his country's affairs so that all
Romanians "may live like lions and remain unchained forever."
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