THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA (AS OF 1600 EDST) NO. 11

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070022-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 13, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
13 April 1975
The Situation in Indochina
(As of 1600 EDST)
No. 11
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1. Heavy fighting continued in the Xuan Loc area for 25X1
the fifth consecutive day. Effective air and artillery
support has reportedly caused heavy Communist losses.
the bulk of the Communist attacks have
us tar been conducted by the North Vietnamese 341st Divi-
sion. This unit is made up of young and inexperienced troops
which might partly account for the high casualty rates
claimed by government forces.
2. Route 1 connecting Xuan Loc with Saigon is still
blocked by Communist forces. The regional commander, Gen-
eral Toan, is not attempting to break through the blocking
force, but is pounding enemy troop concentrations with heavy
air and artillery strikes. Toan is considering using the
"Vietnamese B-52", the C-130, to bomb Communist troops massed
around the city.
-The Long An Battlefront
3. Strong counterattacks by elements of the South Viet-
namese 7th Division have forced two regiments of the North
Vietnamese 5th Division to pull back from their efforts to
cut Route 4 southwest of Sai on.
al three of the division's'
infantry regiments have been committed to a major effort to
block the rice lifeline in Long An Province. This effort
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could soon be augmented by elements of the North Vietnamese
3rd Division, which are located in adjacent Kien Tuong Prov-
ince.
4. Major Communist military activity remains concen-
trated in Vinh Long Province. Route 4 is still blocked north-
east of Can Tho,but government troops expect to have the road
cleared later today. The Communists have two regiments com-
mitted to the interdiction of Route 4 in this area, and
these forces also are responsible for the recent shellings of
Can Tho. Government troops manning the defense line around
Can Tho report heavy Communist losses as the result of con-
tinuing sharp clashes.,
Pressure Increases on Phan Thiet and Phan Rang
5. The government's Military Region 3 Forward Head-
quarters at Phan Rang reports that Communist forces are less
than 10 miles from the city and moving into attack positions
west and southwest of the airbase. Officials believe the
forces are part of North Vietnamese 320th Division. Some 40
tanks and several 130-mm. field guns have also been observed
moving south on Route 1 towards Phan Rang. The defense of
Phan Rang includes some 800 troops of the South Vietnamese
2nd Division which was hastily regrouped after its departure
from old Military Region i last month and 300 territorial
forces. The Aizborne Brigade presently there is being sent
back to Saigon and will be replaced by a Ranger group of some
900 men. The Phan Rang Airbase has 1,500 men of the 6th
Air Division with 20 fighter-bombers, 22 helicopters and two
gunships.
6. The loss of a government position just four miles
northeast of Phan Thiet on April 12 further reduces the
government defenses of the city. The city was shelled again
on April 12 as a regiment of the 2nd Division was sent in to
bolster the defenses.
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Communist Forces Relocating on Central Coast
7. Recent reporting indicates the Communists are
strengthening their military position along the central
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north.
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in Binh Dinh Province has, however, appar itransferred
one of its regiments to Khanh Hoa Province.
9. The North Vietnamese 320th Division which has been
active in the Tuy Hoa area of Phu Yen Province also is show-
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10. the
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for transporting troops and supplies to South Vietnam was
relocating to the Nha Trang area.
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The Political Situation
11. South Vietnamese officials while buoyed by the large
amount of military assistance 3:?equested of Congress, remain
skeptical that the sums will be appropriated. The 19th of
April generally is being regarded as a sort of "doomsday"
for South Vietnam and the pending debate on the aid requests
between now and then could have a significant impact on the
military and political situation in South Vietnam.
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12. President Thieu's principal economic adviser,
Nguyen Van Hao, has stated that President's Ford's address
to the Congress implied that the US wants South Vietnam to
"do all it can to stabilize the military situation" and
that "some military victories" before April 19 would improve
chances of Congressional approval of the aid package. Such
an attitude probably in part explains the large numbers of
troops and amounts of equipment the South Vietnamese are
committing to the battle for Xuan Loc.
Communist Reactions
13. Communist reaction to the President's speech con-
tinues to decry the additional requests for military assist-
ance and the forced evacuation of Vietnamese orphans and
civilians. Hanoi and the Viet Cong media, however, have
begun to focus more sharply on the evacuation. of Americans
from South Vietnam. Both have charged that the "protection
of the safety of Americans" is a pretext for military inter-
vention and warn that such a scheme will be "severely pun-
ished." The Viet Conq's Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment, in a statement broadcast Sunday, maintained that the
best protection the US could afford its personnel was to
"immedia t,.,ly withdraw" them from. South Vietnam. The broad-
cast sated that such withdrawals "will certainly not en-
counter any difficulties or obstacles" if begun immediately
but that the Viet Cong "are determined not to allow the
US... to send warships and marines to intervene in South
Vietnam."
The New Cabinet
14. Prime Minister-designate Nguyen Ba Can presided
over the first working session of his new cabinet Saturday
preparatory to swearing-in ceremonies scheduled for sometime
tomorrow. The important portfolios of defense, interior and
foreign affairs apparently have been filled and approved by
President Thieu. Tran Van Don, Buu Vien and Vuong Van Bac,
who hold the three positions respectively, are all holdovers
from the previous cabinet. Don and Bac are generally regarded
as independents and probably can be best characterized as mem-
bers of the loyal opposition.
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0p osition Maneuvers
15. Meanwhile, opponents of President Thieu are con-
tinuing to maneuver behind the scenes in anticipation of
his possible removal or resignation. One scheme, advocated
by a combination of Buddhist and Catholic politicans in the
Senate, calls for the election of Buddhist leader Vu Van Mau
to the Senate presidency immediately following Thieu's ab-
dication. Such a scenario envisions the resignations of
incumbent vice president, Tan Van Huong, and the present
Senate president Tran Van Lam. Following their departure,
Mau as the new Senate president, would become the de facto
president of South Vietnam.
16. The new government essentially would take the form
of the current regime except that military matters would be
handled by a committee consisting of the chairman of the
Joint General Staff, the defense minister and a new position
entitled commander of the front. The senators believe that
General Vien, the current JGS chief, could be persuaded to
stay on in that position. The new defense minister would be
Nguyen Cao Ky, and the front commander would be General Nguyen
Duc Thang, former commander in the delta.
17.. The newly reahu-ffled. leadership in Phnom Penh appears
resolved to hold on as long as possible. In announcing the
formation of a new "supreme council" and the imposition of
martial law over the weekend, both Sak Sutsakhan and Long
Boret -- the president and vice-president of the council
respectively -- pledged a policy of "strengthening the mili-
tary and political position" of the government with the aim
of achieving a "peaceful solution through negotiations. Although
there is an indisputable element of valor in the desire of the
remz:ining leaders to see things through to the end, the
government's position will become untenable within two weeks
as it simply runs out of the wherewithal to continue fight-
ing. The absence of any dramatic new Communist battlefield
initiatives in the past few days may be fueling any sense of
false optimism that exists.
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