THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA (AS OF 1600 EDST) NO. 14

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: April 16, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
16 April 1975
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Indochina
(As of 1600 EDST)
No. 14
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1. The level of military activity dropped somewhat on
April 15, with the bulk of Communist-initiated actions occur-
ring in Dinh Tuong Province. The Communists still appear
intent on severing Route 4 to cut Saigon off from the delta
provinces.
2. At least two regiments of the North Vietnamese 3rd
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have moved rom the Moc Hoa - Cambodian border area to Dinh
Tuong Province.
3. To counter the new Communist buildup in Dinh Tuong
and Long An provinces, the commander of the delta region
realigned some of his forces on April 15. He has divided
the five most threatened provinces in the northeastern part
of the region into two zones, assigning the zones to the 7th
and 9th Divisions, respectively. Despite these changes, the
region's three divisions are already overextended, with one
regiment of the 7th Division in Long An Province southwest
of Saigon and with the 21st Division tied down in defense
of Can Tho City.
Phan Rang Lost
4. The city of Phan Rang and the nearby airbase have
been overrun by Communist forces. Although government offi-
cials recognized that the rebuilt 4th Regiment of the 2nd
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completed.
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Division was not in condition to engage in heavy fighting,
they did not think the Communists would be able to sweep
aside the Airborne and Ranger units there.
5. The fate of the government forces is unclear.
Some remnants of the 2nd Division including the division
commander, apparently were evacuated by s,Ba. The commanding
general of the regional forward headquarters was unable to
leave Phan Rang Airbase by plane because rebellious Rangers
seized his plane at gunpoint and fled.. It is believed that
the general and his staff are heading south overland together
with survivors of the hard hit Airborne brigade.
6. Some regional officials are blaming President Thieu
for the defeat because he had personally ordered Military
Region 3 Commander General Toan to extend his forces into
MR-2 to defend Phan Rang. There have been no recent reports
from Phan Thiet the last government enclave in MR-2 --
but the Communists are likely to continue, their southward
thrust through Phan Thiet and than follow Route 1 west
towards Saigon.
The Xuan Loc Battlefront
7. Although government forces are still holding the
city of Xuan Loc, the situation along the roads west of
town is rapidly becoming critical. The Communists launched
heavy new attacks on the Airborne brigade southeast of Xuan
Loc on April 16. Since other government units defending the
perimeter of the city were not attacked, regional officials
believe the Communists are deliberately attacking the strong-
est unit hoping to inflict a major loss and thereby sap t:,e
resolve of the remaining forces defending Xuan Loc.
8. The South Vietnamese are speculating that the entire
North Vietnamese 325th Division may now be involved in the
fighting west of Xuan Loc. A document captured on April 15
suggests that one regiment of the division helped overrun
Kiem Tan District, and officials are guessing that the large
number of attacks throughout the Route 20 area could mean
that more of the division may be committed. Even without this
additional division, the Communists three-division force
-2-
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appears to be on the verge of smashing Saigon's eastern
flank and moving towards Bien Hoa and Saigon.
'9. The Communists have also been putt'i.ng heavy pres-
sure on the junction of routes 1 and 20 west of Xuan Loc
and now control the intersection and much oil the surrounding
terrain. A series of sharp attacks against the South Viet-
namese 18th Division's 52nd Regiment yesterday near the
junction forced most of the regiment to destroy artillery'
weapons and retreat. About 300 survivors of the regiment
made their way back to friendly lines, but the 52nd is no
longer an effective fighting unit. The eight artillery
pieces destroyed were providing good supp')rt to government
units in the area, and the loss of this support further
erodes the government overall position or the Xuan Loc
battlefront.
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10. With the recent fall of Kiem Tan District on Route
20 and the rout of the 42nd Regiment, the Communists now
have complete control of this highway and can bring additional
combat units directly to the battlefront from the southern
highlands.
North Vietnamese 1st Corps Nearing Saigon Area
11. The North Vietnamese Army 1st Corps is rapidly
approaching the provinces northeast of Sa=aon.
IThe 1st Corps left North
Vietnam in early April and was spotted in the triborder area
of Laos - Cambodia - South Vietnam on April 12.
12. Two of the corps four divisions -- the 312th and
the 320B -- preceded the corps headquarters in the move
South, and both have now had sufficLent.time to reach the
provinces north of Saigon in Military Region 3.
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arrival of the corps headquarters in Quang Duc Province
and the 312th on the border provide:.. further confirmation
that those units are indeed destined for the Saigon area.
PRG Offers to Negotiate
13. Deputy Prime Minister Tran Van Don has reported
that he is in contact with a spokesman for the Viet Cong's
Provisional Revolutionary Government. Don apparently has
developed this contact through a trusted intermediary for
over a week.
position w ere he conceivably could head a government
.Li, a suitable to the Communists, however, this latest report may
be intended by Don as a signal,to the US that it should
exert pressure on Thieu to step down.
15. Nonetheless, the scenario that Don says he has
be'~n receiving from his PRC contact could be a Communist
effort to persuade someone in senior South Vietnamese gov-
ernment circles that a political settlement of the conflict
is still possible. A similar scenario has been given to
Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang through a contact he also
believes speaks for the PRG.
16. During what appears to be. the initial contact on
April 11, Don was again reminded that the PRG would never
consider negotiations with Thieu as president. Such dis-
cussions could begin only after Thieu had been replaced by
a government headed by a "neutral" figure and comprised of
"third force" personalities and "leftists." This new govern-
ment could include "pro-American politicians." Vie contact
allegedly indicated that this meant a government headed by
Don would be acceptable.
17. According to Don, the PRG spokesman stated that
Communist strategy "at the moment" is to isolate Saigon.
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The Communists allegedly do not want to attack Saigon directly,
preferring to "take their time" in assuming control, mean-
while allowing evacuations to proceed in an "orderly" fashion.
If Communise, troops should move into the city quickly, evac-
uations for "everyone" would be "impossible."
18. In a follow-up contact on April 14, Don was informed
that he should assume control of the government "within 72
hours and call for a ceasefire. All Americans would be per-
mitted to leave the country except for 'a "core" that would be
needed to run the US Embassy. In addition, any Vietnamese
who wished to leave, including those at Hue and Da Nang,
allegedly would also be given safe passage.
19. The PRG spokesman indicated, however, that the
Communists might be running out of patience and that the
"next week or two" was crucial. Saigon would be safe for
that period, but, if talks had not begun by then, Communist
forces would be "in position" to take over the city.
20. These warnings conform to the line passed by PRG
representatives overseas, particularly Paris. The latter have
maintained that the Communists do not want to attack Saigon
but prefer a "political solution," but that this is impossible
with Thieu still in power.
21. Prince Sihanouk has reportedly rejected as "unaccept-
able" a ceasefire proposal offered by government leaders in
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the prop a was worked out at an all-night session
ai rime Minister Long Boret's home in Phnom Penh
the proposal fell somewhat short of being an
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22. So far there has been no reaction to the government's
proposal from the Khmer Communists, who would obviously have
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learnod the details of the government offer. Given the
rapidity of the Communist advance on Phnom Penh, it seems
likely that the fighting will end as government forces lay
down their arms of their own accord rather than through
any formal surrender talks.
23. Meanwhile, Red Cross representatives in Geneva and
government officials in Phnom Penh have declared Le Phnom
Hotel to be a "neutral zone". Approximately 30 westerners,
including a number of US journalists, are at the hotel.
United Nations Secretary General Waldheim is also reportedly
trying to make the hotel a "safety zone" under United
Nations auspices.
cations that the Communists plan to move large numbers of
civilians out of Phnom Penh after it falls. The secretary
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regions was willing to accept responsibility
24. confirmed earlier indi-
insurgent forces are advancing on the capital so rapidly
that Communist battlefield headquarters are having a hard time
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A number of nations are planning to or are in the
process of switching diplomatic recognition to Sihanouk's
"government."
IStockholm announce
today that it would establish relations with Sihanouk as soon
as possible and the Australians and Finns indicated that they
were also ready to do so when the Communists assume power in
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