THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (AS OF 1600 EDST) NO. 21

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070030-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 22, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 April 1975
The Situation in Vietnam
(As of 1600 EDST)
No. 21
Reaction to Thieu's Resignation
1. There is near unanimous agreement among senior
South Vietnamese civilian and military officials that
President Thieu's decision to resign was a good one and
that a new government should be formed immediately to
attempt to arrange negotiations with the Communists.
Nguyen Ba Can has told President Huong that he would
resign and assist in any way possible to form a new
cabinet. Beyond this, however, there are few specifics
on what form. the new government will take or who w4.11
serve in it.
2. General "Big" Minh, probably the leading candi-
date to head a new cabinet, is calling for a new govern-
ment which would include staunch anti-Thieu members of
the Catholic and Buddhist opposition groups. Former vice-
president Ky wants to lead a new government, which would
include General Vien, the chairman of the Joint General
Staff, and former Prime Minister Khiem. "Big" Minh, in
Ky's words, would play a "ceremonial role." There is
also some maneuvering in the Senate to replace Tran Van
Lam with Buddhist leader Vu Van Mau to allow Mau to
become president when Huong resigns.
3. Communist reaction to Thieu's resignation continues
to provide nr, encouragement for the prospects of meaning-
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ful negotiations. The Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary 25X
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Government dismissed Thieu's departure as a "clumsy and
deceptive trick." Hanoi's Radio and party daily, Nhan
Dan, focused on the continuation of American support
for the new government and stated that the US in effect
had replaced one loser with another. The Ncrth Viet-
namese commentaries also gave considerable attention
to the withdrawal of Americans from South Viet',zam. They
stated that all Americans could br; evacuated "in a very
short time, even in one day, without any difficulty or
obstacle." They went on to strongly condemn US expres-
sions of concern about Communist reprisals and warned
against any US effort to evacuate large numbers of South
Vietnamese. US naval vessels moving toward South Viet-
namese waters, it was stL,.ted, are far more than would be
needed simply to evacuate Americans.
4. In short, the Communists are continuing to demand
a totally new South Vietnamese government and a quick and
total US withdrawal as the price for a negotiated surrender.
At least in their public commentary, there is no hint of
give in their position, but there is the clear implication
that time is quickly running out.
Military Action
5. Communist shellings and ground attacks have fallen
off sharply as both sides appear to be getting ready for
future combat. The only significant military action was the
reopening of Route 22 south of Tay Ninh City on April 22.
Initial reporting indicates that elements of the North Viet-
namese 316th Division were involved in the fighting. The
South Vietnamese 25th Division headquarters reported. the
Communists sustained heavy casualties and that the North
Vietnamese soldiers were very young and obviously inexperi-
enced in combat.
South Vietnamese Estimate Gloomy
6. A South Vietnamese estimate of Communist intentions
and capabilities as of April 22 indicated that the current
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lull in military activity is only to permit the Communists
time to prepare their forces and coordinate plans to launch
a combined attack on Bien Hoa and Saigon. The estimate
of the ability of the government forces to resist the
anticipated final thrust towards the capital city is bleak.
Senior officials believe that if the attack is well coor-
dinated, the government's defenses could crumble in a
matter of hours. The estimate considers Saigon's remain-
ing forces as battle weary, understrength, and unlikely
to make a determined stand. South Vietnamese pilots are
reportedly ready to fly out of the country and the military
planners are not counting heavily on their support in a
final battle. It is also expected that most of the terri-
torial forces, National Police, and some regular soldiers
will desert to look after their families.
7. Many senior South Vietnamese officials are beginning
to seek a way to escape from the country. This effort has
become the major concern of key staff officers at Military
Region 3 headquarters and as a result much of the necessary
coordination and staff work is not being done.
Tan Son Nhut Airbase to be Attacked
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8. A Communist force comprised of artillery, armor,
sappers, and infantry is planning to conduct a coordinated
attack on Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase.
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north, west, and southwest. Infantry and tank units are
to hold the base until reinforcements can arrive.
9. The attacking forces probably will come from the 25X1 . -n nn.-,if-ion for
Communist 9th Division which has mov
an assault on Saigon from the west.
The iiowly created
232nd Corps headquarters, which controls the four Communist
divisions arrayed against Saigon's western and southwestern
approaches, will orchestrate the drive. 25X1
10. The Communists may now have air defense units close
to Tan Son Nhut
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cates the North Vietnamese j I have moved an antiaircraft fire
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control radar to a position eight miles northwest of the-
airbase, and a transport aircraft which had taken off
from-the base the same day was fired on but was nog dam-
aged.
Bien Hoa in Communist Artillery Umbrella
11. The Bien Hoa airbase and nearby munitions depot
at Long Binh are being shelled almost daily by North Viet-
namese long range artillery. A shelling on April 22
reportedly caused a number of explosions in one of the
munitions storage areas near Bien Hoa.
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.
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North Vietnamese gun crews have targeted specific areas
of the Bien Hoa airbase.
Government Realigns Bien Hoa - Long Binh Defenses
13. The South Vietnamese have now decided to trans-
fer only one of the two Marine brigades at Bien Hoa back
to Vung Tau. The other brigade will continue to man
defensive positions in the Long Binh area. The Marines
suffer from poor morale and a lack of discipline, and
they probably will not fight hard if attacked.
14. The 18th Division and the Airborne's 1st Brigade
are now moving into the Bien Hoa - Long Binh area to
strengthen government defenses. Both units withdrew in
an orderly fashion from Xuaii Loc, and they appear to be
capable of further combat. The division, howe'rer, has
only two regiments. A third was virtually destroyed
in the Xuan Loc fighting.
North Vietnamese Aircraft to Fly South
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soon reopen additional airfields in central South Vietnam.
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