STAFF NOTES: LATIN AMERICA TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120032-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: August 13, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Latin American Trends
State Dept. review completed
Secret
132
August 13, 1975
No. 0522/75
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with oc...,,sional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
August 13, 1975
Chile: The Church Anr Human Rights . . . . . 1
Colombia: Foreign Banks And The
Investment Climate 4
Uruguay: Possible Showdown Over
Economic Policymaking 5
Guatemala-Belize: Situation
Stalemated 6
El Salvador: A Warning To The
Oppo:. i tion 10
Spiny Lobsters: Prickly US-
Bahamas Issue 11
Costa Rica: Communist Secretary
General May Resign 12
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Chile: The Church And Human Rights
There are growing indications that the Catholic
church in Chile is taking a stronger stand on human
rights issues. Recent statements by church leaders
suggest that they are concerned over the military
government's suspected complicity in the reported
deaths and disappearances of Chilean extremists, ac-
counts of which surfaced in the South American press
in mid-July and subsequently received wide publicity.
The bishop of Santiago celebrated a mass last
week for the families of 119 persons, mostly members
of the MoverLant of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) , who
allegedly were killed or wounded by government forces,
or have been reported missing abroad under mysterious
circumstances. The mass drew an overflow crowd and
the bishop's sharp words about the need for Chileans
to overcome "fear and insecurity" left no doubt among
his listeners that he was rapping the junta's handling
of the matter.
The Interdenominational Committee for Peace in
Santiago believes that stories of leftist deaths in
clashes in Argentina were circulated by security
forces concerned with accounting for the disappear-
ances, especially in view of a then impending visit
of the UN Human Rights investigating mission, which
has since been cancelled. The committee claims that
the facts support its thesis that the 119 individuals
had been detained by the military government and died
in custody, and that the bodies were disposed of in
Chile. Although the evidence is still circumstantial,
accounts of the killings in Argentina could be a cover
for secret executions by Chilean intelligence and
security agents. Chile's controlled newspapers claimed
that a number of Chilean extremists were killed ir, gun
battles with Argentine police, and that others were
August 13, 1975
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killed in a purge by the MIR, but no proof has been
offered by either country. Moreover, there is a
strong possibility that right-wing Argentines under
the control of former presidential adviser Lopez Rega
collaborated with Ch.-'lean intelligence forces to plant
false reports on the c--ashes.
When these reports first began gaining interna-
tional attention, the peace committee filed a request
with the Santiago appals court to investigate the
alleged disappearance3, but the court refused and the
Supreme Court upheld the decision. Foreign Ministry
sources have since stated that an investigation is
under way, but the lick of official information is en-
couraging a belief that the regime is engaged in a
cover-up.
Meanwhile, in a meeting with Cardinal Raul Silva
several weeks ago, President Pinochet pledged that the
government would look into the case. Church sources,
however, claim that the Cardinal's entreaty did not
make much of an in:)act on Pinochet. Shortly after the
meeting, Cardinal Silva gave the first hint that the
church was losing; patience with the government when he
said he had "tole the highest authorities of my country"
that without unity Chile could not have prosperity,
peace, or justic-. He then appealed for a crusade for
mutual respect a-:d tolerance.
In a recent press statement, the Cardinal said he
had no objection to publication of the peace committee's
findings on the missing extremists, thereby implicitly
encouraging its probe. The US Embassy assumes that
Cardinal Silva 31so authorized or at least was aware of
the mass offered lazt week for the families of the miss-
ing persons. The church's views were echoed by the
Papal Nuncio, who expressed shock and the "disquiet of
ambassadors accrediteL in Santiago" over the fate of the
missing Chileans.
August 13, 1975
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While the church is not likely to engage in open
polemics with the government, its spokesmen will un-
questionably be more vocal in airing their misgivings
about the government's conduct in dealing with human
rights problems. Attention will probably be focused
on two principal areas:
...The apparent failure of officials to explain
satisfactorily the disappearance of persons
presumably detained by security forces.
...Continued indications that the regime is not
living up to promises that it would abide by
new national security laws spelling out re-
strictions against illegal detention and
torture.
Unless the Pinochet government takes some remedial
action, the church will probably find itself on com-
mon ground with those in the opposition parties and
labor who are becoming more critical of the regime.
I I
August 13, 1975
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Colombia: Foreign Banks And The Investment Climate
All foreign banks operating in Colombia--with one
notable exception--are apparently prepared to comply
with a government program of reducing foreign owner-
ship in banks to 49 percent or less by , 1978
The exception is First National City Bank of New
York, which maintains the largest foreign-owned bank-
ing operation in the country. Citibank has all but
rejected the "Colombianization" policy, but has in-
dicated an interest in exploring other ownership
formulas. The government, while very unlikely to
make separate policy for Citibank, could probably be
persuaded to relax the announced timetable.
Officials of the Ministry of Economic Development
may fear that the remaining foreign banks--including
Bank of America, the other US-owned bank in Colombia--
will see their treatment as the first phase of a gradual
takeover of other foreign businesses. If these banks
begin advising their clients that the investment climate
in Colombia is deteriorating, and if the Colombian con-
gress should learn that such advice is being given,
there is a remote possibility that the nationalistic
legislators could turn their fears into a self-fulfill-
ing prophesy.
August 13, 1975
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Uruguay: Possible Showdown Over Economic Policymaking
Efforts by politically ambitious generals to make
economic policy decisions have provoked Economy Minis-
ter Vegh into offering his resignation. This is the
latest in a series of clashes between Vegh and General
Gregorio Alvarez, Commander of the Fourth Army, who is
now backed by General Abdor. Raimundez, Vice President
of the Bank of the Republic.
Although the military high command has acceded to
Vegh's austerity policies in the past, several generals
apparently regard the civilian minister as too powerful
and not responsive to their directives. There are in-
dications that opposition to Vegh is growing because of
his close ties to international lending institutions
and multinational corporations.
The current confrontation between Vegh and the mili-
tary was triggered by the armed forces' attempt last
week to cancel the signing of a $110 million loan Vegh
had negotiated with a consortium of foreign banks to be
secured by Uruguay's gold reserves. President Bordaberry
has refused to accept Vegh's resignation, but has not
responded to his request for authority to implement his
program without interference. In Vegh's previous dis-
putes with the military he has been supported by
Bordaberry, but both sides have eventually compromised
their view to avoid a major political crisis.
If Vegh leaves the cabinet, Bordaberry's prestige
will suffer another blow. He has already lost most of
his executive power and each confrontation with the mili-
I seems to leave him in a weaker position.
August 13, 1975
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Guatemala-Belize: Situation Stalemated
The latest round of talks over Guatemala's claim
to Belize, the self-governing British colony, ended
in deadlock last month and no date has been set for
their resumption. The issue will now lie dormant
until #eptember, when Belize will take it before the
United Nations General Assembly.
Talks ended after only one day when the parties
could not agree on proposals to cede Belizean terri-
tory to Guatemala. Guatemala stood firm on its demand
to take all land south of 16" 30' latitude, an area
equal to about one quarter of Belize, in exchange for
acceptance of Belizean independence. Other proposals
offered by the British ceding less Belizean territory
were firmly rejected by Guatemala.
Despite the impasse, Belizean Premier George Price
is said to want the negotiations to resume. Until last
month, he appeared willing to surrender some territory,
although not nearly as much as the Guatemalans want.
Lately, however, the premier has been encountering
stiff opposition at home to his efforts to obtain
settlement and his chief negotiator returned from the
talks and said that Belize would yield none of its ter-
ritory. Conservatives, angry at being excluded from the
negotiations, accuse Price of being soft on Guatemalan
demands. Price's major problem in the coming months
will be to overcome this opposition while continuing to
work for some sort of settlement. His next move will
be to lobby for international support and attempt to
use the UN to exert pressure on Guatemala.
The Guatemalans are likely to counter Belizean at-
tempts to gain international support with similar efforts
of their own. They are said to be awaiting the World
Court's hearing of the Morocco-Spanish Sahara dispute,
which they regard as similar to the problem with Belize.
August 13, 1975
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A UN resolution calling on the parties to nego-
tiate a settlement may provide impetus for greater
flexibility, but Guatamala's nationalistic and his-
torical claims to Belize and the growing opposition
there to any settlement that would give up territory
are likely to lead to a continued impasse.
August 13, 1975
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Panama: Paredes To The Cabinet
Last month, Agriculture Minister Gerardo Gonzalez
was chosen by General Torrijos to be the new vice
president, and was dutifully elected by the National
Assembly. On August 9, Torrijos filled the vacancy
in his cabinet by appointing Lt. Col. Ruben Paredes,
the only military officer in that body.
In part, Paredes probably owes his appointment to
Us demonstrated competence both in military and admin-
istrative matters. Although the government has announced
that Paredes will concurrently maintain his post as As-
sistant Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), the cabinet
job will obviously leave him with less time for Guard
affairs. Torrijos may view Paredes, who is one of the
most popular top officers, as a potential rival, and may
have taken this opportunity to weaken his ties to the
Guard. Paredes has been G-1 since November 1972, when
he was transferred from the important post of Chief of
Staff for Operations (G-3). That move appeared to be a
demotion, but he has continued to perform capably and
has evidenced no resentment.
Paredes has spent much of his time recently working
on'the planning and construction of the Bayano hydro-
electric project, the Torrijos administration's public
works showpiece, and this will probably continue to
receive his prime attention as minister.
The new cabinet job may reduce two handicaps that
Paredes has faced during his career with the Guard:
Torrijos' wariness about officers who attain personal
popularity, and the rivalry with the ambitious and astute
G-2, Lt. Col. Manuel Noriega. The two officers are
probably the most capable in the Guard, and have fre-
quently locked horns. Thus far, however, they have
shared a strong loyalty to Torrijos, and this probably
August 13, 1975
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has kept them from permitting their differences to
interfere with their work. The two played important
roles in the October 1968 coup that brought Torrijos
to power, and have worked to keep him there. Paredes
was with Torrijos in Mexico in December 1969 when
dissident Guard elements attempted a counter coup,
while Noriega organized loyal forces that made pos-
sible Torrijos' triumphal return to Panama City.
I
August 13, 1975
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El Salvador: A Warning to the Opposition
President Molina's decision to take the politica_
offensive in the wake of the bloody clash between stu-
dents and secrrity forces on July 30 has at least tem-
porarily cowed the opposition. In the week following
the clash, students temporarily occupied the capital's
cathedral, an extremist group took over a radio station
to broadcast a revolutionary message, and a bank guard
was killed near the university. None of the incidents
sparked further unrest; significantly, no political
organization called for protests against t'-e government.
Molina has publicly blamed the initial clash on a
conspiracy directed by communist and opposition groups.
Although he implicated organizations of almost every
stripe, he singled out the major opposition Christian
Democratic party for special attention and issued a
not-so-veiled threat that the parties could be outlawed.
He also warned students that even greater force might
be used in the future to maintain order.
The opposition surely recognizes--with legislative
and presidential elections scheduled for 1976 and 1977
respectively--that the President's words are not to be
taken lightly. Fraud is generally credited with pro-
viding the government's edge in recent elections and
Molina is probably uneasy about next year's prospects.
Additionally, a hard line against students and leftist
opposition is sure to win favor with the military.
In recent years, the military-backed governments
have resorted to electoral fraud to prevent any possi-
bility that a Christian Democrat might win. This has
helped to move the Christian Democrats into coalitions
with the leftist and communist parties. As evidenced
by his most recent performance, President Molina intends
to cont;nue the hard line and perhaps press it further
than him predecessors if the opposition mounts an ef-
fective challenge. 25XV
August 13, 1975
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Spiny Lobsters: Prickly US-Bahamas Issue
US-Bahamian talks on the spiny lobster issue,
scheduled to begin this week i- Nassau, appear head-
ed for trouble. Having declared the profitable
lobster a national resource of the Bahamas continen-
tal shelf and therefore off-limits to foreign fisher-
men, the government scheduled talks with the US to see
if there is room for a reciprocal agreement on sharing
the lobster take.
e auras overnmen as a rea y created some ric-
tion by rejecting a proposed agenda for the talks and
by demanding a "formal representation from the United
States Government before the commencement of discus-
sions."
Pending resolution of the issue, a sensitive one
among the island fishermen, the Bahamian Government
wants to restrict foreign lobster trapping only to US
citizens actually working the traps. This would ex-
clude many fishing boats having US captains or US
ownership but crewed by Cuban exiles. Many Cuban
emigres operate their own boats from Florida, and
carry guns to assert their interests.
The lobster quarrel will be sol:-'l in time with-
out permanently damaging Bahamian-US relations, but
Bahamian efforts to prosecute Cuban exile fishermen
before the problem can be solved definitively could
lead to armed clashes between Florida-based Cuban
fishermen and Bahamian police and fishermen. I
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Costa Rica: Communist Se^retary General May Resign
Manuel Mora Valverde, the grand old man of Costa
Rican communism, may soon resign as secretary general
of the Popular Vanguard Party, the country's communist
party. According to a party member, the resignation
will probably come before the party congress scheduled
for March 1976. Mora's age (he is almost 66) and his
poor health will probably be cited as the reasons.
The Popular Vanguard Party received only four per-
cent of the vote in the general elections of February
1974 and since then many members have dropped out, and
the party has gone deeply into debt. Mora, worried
about the financial hind, reportedly mortgaged his home
to prevent creditors from foreclosing on the party's
printing house. He has no personal money worries, how-
ever. He lives in relative luxury and owns or has an
interest in a variety of successful commercial enter-
prises, including a radio station.
Mora founded the Communist party of Costa Rica in
about 1930 and has always been its leading figure.
Under Mora's direction, the party has shunned violence
in favor of achieving a peaceful transition to socialism.
It has gained an air of respectability with Costa Rica's
democratic framework. In May 1975, Mora achieved his
long-sought goal of legality for his party.
To attain these goals Mora has had to walk a tight-
rope--not antagonizing the government on the one hand
and avoiding allegations of collaborating too closely
with it on the other. When his friend Jose Figueres
left the presidency in 1974, P flora's influence at the
highest government levels diminished. His relationship
with the current president, Daniel Oduber, can at best
be termed fair.
August 13, 1975
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The party approximates a Mora family activity--his
wife, son, brothers, and a cousin are all party mili-
tants. The consensus among central committee members
is that party Sub secretary General Humberto Vargas
will succeed Mora. Mora, however, may want to keep the
party leadership within the family. His brother Eduardo,
a former subsecretary general who is currently serving
in the National Assembly, is a possibility, but one
party member has said Mora wants his son, Manuel Mora
personally been training him for the post.
Salas, to replace him. For the past two years, Mora has
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