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December 19, 2016
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June 21, 2005
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December 10, 1975
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25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049 4 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Secret Latin American Trends 7, 1 25X1 Secret i44 December 10, 1975 No. 0539/75 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 S E C R E T 25X1 CONTENTS December 10, 1975 Paraguay: Moving Toward Brazil . . . . . . 1 25X6 Argentina: Mounting Violence NAMUCAR: A Faltering Start . . Venezuela: COPEI - A Divided Political Force Bolivia/ 'Chile: The Long, Hard Road to the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25X1 -i- S E C R E T Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/uJEC;Rft1 P86T00608R000300120049-4 25X1 Paraguay: Moving Toward Brazil Paraguay, in its buffer position between the large countries of Argentina and Brazil, has in the past generally dispensed separate but more or less equal treatment. It has not necessarily been trying to play one big power off against the other but has been trying to garner the advantages from each re- lationship without allowing either larger country to dominate Paraguayan affairs. Traditionally, the Paraguayans have identified culturally with the Argentines. The government, however, views the govern- ment of Isabel Peron as unstable, is concerned about a possible turn toward the left by Argentina, and is now indicating a marked in the direction of Brazil, which Paraguay views as a future world power whose economic interests in Latin America could assist Paraguayan development. This tilt was particularly evident during the visit to Paraguay by Brazilian President Geisel in early December. Pomp and ceremony attended the first visit of a Brazilian Chief of State in 35 years, and the government declared a three-day holiday for public em- ployees. Preparations included a crackdown on Com- munist Party members and subversives, with the number of arrests rumored as high as 400 although official records acknowledged only about one-tenth as many. President Geisel received the highest decoration Paraguay bestows on a foreign official, and he returned a priceless gold book captured by the Brazilians in the War of the Triple Alliance some 100 years ago. More concrete accomplishments included the settlement of a boundary dispute, the granting to Paraguay of $3.5 billion in credits for construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric project, and the signing of a new treaty of friendship and cooperation calling for extensive Brazilian involve- ment in Paraguayan development. December 10, 1975 -1- SECRET Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/03EaAftqP86T00608R000300120049-4 Paraguay admits privately to a deliberate policy of closer rapprochement with Brazil but at the same time is worried about retaliation from Argentina, perhaps in the form of harassment of river shipping. Argentina has previously tried to torpedo the Itaipu project. Brazil wants to draw Paraguay closer into its sphere of influence but is also concerned about reaction from Argentina and from Bolivia as well. Although both countries hope to avoid needless offense with their new treaty, they are not at all sure this is possible. I December 10, 1975 -2- SECRET Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/9.- P86T00608R000300120049-4 Argentina: Mounting Violence The "rules" of political violence may be under- going some changes in the current exchange of killings by both left and right. Last week's guerrilla murder of a retired general outraged the military, but was not unprecedented. What was unusual about that incident was the deliberate killing of the officer's wife, who was abducted, then strangled and shot. This particularly vicious, inten- tional killing of a bystander may have been the spark that ignited subsequent retaliatory killings. Late in the week rightwing groups seeking to avenge the death of the general killed 12 university students in two different cities. The students, some from Peru and Boliva, were not known to be linked to the general's murder, and were apparently chosen at random. The latest violence also included other killings carried out in extremely brutal fashion,. For some time political viclence has generally been selective, attempting to avoid innocent bystanders. The left, in resorting now to the murder of the general's wl.fe, seems driven by frustration over continuing failure to foment social upheaval and provoke the military. Even so, the act was limited. The right, however, judging from its massive retaliation, feels far more enthusiastic than the left about the prospect of widening the scope of political killings. December 10, 1975 25X1 25X1 -3- Approved For Release 2005/07/ E EP86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 25X6 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 SECRET NAMUCAR: A Faltering Start The constituting articles for NAMUCAR (Naviera Multinacional Del Caribe) were signed by Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Jamaica, and Costa 24ca last week. Each country contributed $500,000 to cover operating expenses for the first six months. Colombia and Panama, two of the original states setting up the organization, did not sign the official agreement; Panama is expected to do so early next year. Colombia's interest in NAMUCAR has waned perceptibly and government officials are open2y pessimistic about the organization's chances of success. The .Lopez go v- ernment is still committed publicly to membership in NAMUCAR--for pol.:Ltical reasons--but its participation at best will be reluctant and minimal. Although NAMUCAR's finances are temporarily as- sured, it will be many years before trained personnel are available and the fleet will lie large enough to pose a serious challenge to foreign ship operators in January 1976 are overly optimistic; the first two ships will not be ready until March, at the earliest. Heavy financial looses are expected during the first months of operation and NAMUCAR is not expected to break even until near the end of its second year. The big question, of course, is who will be shoul- dering the losses in the meantime. In the past Caracas has been irritated by the attitude of some of the NAMUCAP members who believe that Venezuela's massive oil wealth obliges it to fund a substantial part of the shipping company's operations. Any attempt to pressure Venezuela to do more than its share could cause the Perez administration to reassess its support for the fleet, an action which could have a crippling effect on the organi- zation's long-term prospects. December 10, 1975 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 SECRET 25X1 Venezuela: COPEI - A Divided Political Force The opposition Social Christian (COPEI) party's national convention has been postponed again, this time until early next year. The delay reflects the intense battle within COPEI to elect a new secretary general and national executive committee. Radical Senator Luis Herrera Campins and former president Rafael Caldera are presently involved in a bitter struggle for control of the party. Another factor is Herrera's maneuvering for the presidential nomination two years hence. Herrera has strong sup- port from the party's radical youth organization and from a number of influential leftist party leaders. Herrera is dissatisfied with Caldera's leadership and has accused him of imposing party candidates for na- tional elections. Many Copeyanos, including Herrera, believe that had it not been for Caldera's personal intervention in 1973, Herrera would have been the party's choice and made a better showing in the cam- paign than Caldera's hand-picked candidate. In the current battle for the secretary general post, Herrera is supporting the candidacy of a former ambassador to the US, Pedro Pablo Aguilar. Caldera and party moderates, in the meantime, are campaigning for Jose Curiel, former cabinet minister and Caldera's campaign manager in the 1968 elections. The intensity of the struggle for what some perceive as the soul of the party is reflected in clashes that have occurred at several regional party meetings where delegates to the national convention are being selected. Preliminary results of these conventions indicate that Aguilar will control over three-fourths of the delegates and will win election as secretary general. December 10, 1975 -~~8- Approved For Release 2005/07/0 ` 'f~86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 SECRET No matter who wins, divisions within the party will persist and perhaps become even deeper as time draw-Ts near for the nominating convention. Supporters of Herrera are already warning of a split if he is again denied the party's nomination. Moderate elements within COPEI are also saying that Herrera's nomination as standard bearer would be disastrous for the party and would ensure the governing Democratic Action Part another five years in office. December. 10, 1975 F -9- Approved For Release 2005/0-H01~C'IkRTDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Approved For Release 2005//A-1kpi RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Bolivia/Chile: The Long, Hard Road to the Sea The recent announcement by the Chilean Foreign Ministry that there is little likelihood of a quick solution to Bolivia's aspiration for a sovereign out- let to the sea suggests that Santiago has not yet decided on how far to go in satisfying La Paz and is deliberately stalling to protract the negotiations. Chile's statement reflects its intent to squelch continual Bolivian agitation for some concrete indi- cation that progress is being made. Persistent claims by Bolivian ambassadors and officials that Santiago is expected to answer La Paz's demands on such and such a date are indicative of the kind of pressures Presi- dent Banzer's government is using to keep the issue alive and to urge faster movement in reaching a settle- ment. 25X1 25X1 December 10, 1975 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07`/0`r"'C i'RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Sam Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 SECRET Meanwhile, Peru is standing fast and making no proposals of its own, apparently content to let Chile and Bolivia haggle over the problem alone. The new leadership in Lima would be unlikely to get actively involved unless an agreement was at hand that affected the erstwhile Peruvian provinces won by Chile in the War of the Pacific. Under the terms of a 1929 protocol, Peru would then have a voice in any arrangement to be concluded. Bolivia may be underestimating the diplomatic difficulties in squaring any settlement with Peru while it focuses primarily on urging Chile to table an offer satisfactory from La Paz's point of view. It is difficult to predict how long Chile can string Banzer along without making at least a token gesture. If Banzer is under pressure from his own armed forces to resolve the issue soon, then he might be forced at some point to break relations with Chile and accuse Santiago of bad faith. The most likely course of events, however, is that Bolivia will continue to spar gently in hopes that Chile will eventually find it more profitable to retain an ally--especially in light of its distrust of Peruvian intentions--then to risk addin yet another black mark to its international image. December 10, 1975 -11- Approved For Release 2005/ RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4