STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 14, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

C 1 ~ O[ I ~ ~~ ~.~~p~ed F~R~~s~?~Of~7~ CIA-RDP8fiT00608R000400010009-9
Middle East, Africa, Soutl~`Asia ' ' 14 Jan 75
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010009-9
Secret
No rnreig~t Dir.rem
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
,.,
f.
No. 0412/75
January 14 , 19 7
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No L'orcigrt Uioaem/No Dir~r~ern Abroad
AackUrvund Uae OnZU/ConGroZZed Diooern
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONALSECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
y 5B (11, (21, and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA -SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East ? Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Contents
South Yemen: Something for Nothing 1
India-Iraq: Mrs. GandYii's Visit 3
Pakistan - Law of the Sea: May Extend
Maritime Jurisdiction 5
Jan 14, 1975
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25X1 C
South Yemen
Sornnth?in;~ fvr NnGlt?~:~~a~~
the South Yemenis
believe t ey zave extracted financial sLipport from
their wealthy and c~nserva~tive Arab neighbors without
having to make any significant changes in their left-
ist foreign policy.
25X1 C
the information is consistent with other recent
reporting on the outlook of the Aden regime.
25X10 The Saudis and other Arab states in the Persian
Gulf, agreed at the Rabat
summit in October to give South Yemen financial help.
In return, Pre,ident Ali pleaged to "try" to reduce
the activities of the Dhofari rebels who Aden has
supported in their operations against neighboring
Oman. Other reporting suggests Cairo and Riyadh
laid on additional conditions agreed to by Ali. In
any event, South Yemeni leaders believe that the
Dhofari guerrilla effort is increasingly difficult
to sustain in the face of Iran's military commitment
to Oman, and that it is time for the rebels to shift
their main effort to political subversion. Accord-
ing to this and other sources, Aden is urging the
rebels to "defect" to the Sultan in order to go under-
ground and exploit Omani wea)cnesses.
In explaining to the party rank-and-file Aden's
new policy of "diplomatic rapprochement" with its
conservative neighbors, party leaders are stressing
that Aden will continue to infiltrate activists into
the Gulf sheikhdoms taslced with building South Yemen's
subversive networlc. The South Yemenis hope that the
new conciliatory posture toward its neighbors will
clear the way for the establishment of diplomatic
missions in the Persian Gulf that can logistically
support their subversive organizations there.
There have been earlier indications that Aden
sees its foreign policy departures as an attempt to
have the best of two worlds. President Ali reportedly
(Continued)
Jan 14, 1975 1
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25X1 C
promised Egypti?n President Sadat and Saudi King
Faysal at Rabat that Aden would loosen it.s ties
Wlth MOSCOW.
however, Ali's goal is to preserve South Yemeni-
5oviet military and economic relations, while trying
to secure unconditional Arab economic aid. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMjNO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUDID USE
ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
25X1A
Jan 14, 1975 2
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India-Iraq
Airs. C;andhi's Vis?i~
Prime Minister Gandhi is scheduled to visit
Iraq from January 18 to 21. The trip reflects
India's desire to maintain its longstanding rela-
?t~onship with Traq, even though New Delhi is cur-
rently more interested in the economic and politi-
cal benefits accruing from closer ties with Iran.
Baghdad reportedly had been pressing Mrs.
Gandhi to accept a four-year old invitation, and
her acceptance suggest) she was assured the trip
will be worthwhile in economic terms. In 1974,
Iraq provided India with about 17 percent of its
oil imports on a deferred payment basis, but terms
for this year's oil supplies reportedly are still
unresolved.
India's relations with Iraq are influenced by
a number of factors. Both countries have friend-
ship treaties with Moscow and are dependent on the
Soviets for sophisticated arms. Indian military
advisers help train Iraqis in the use of Soviet
military equipment, and New Delhi would like to
expand sales of compatible spare parts and other
military supplies it produces in increasing volume.
Despite close ties to Iraq, New Delhi seems to
place a higher val~ze on its warming relations with
Iran. Last year, Iran provide3 India with 60
percent of its oil imports. The Iranians also
recently have proved more generous than Iraq in
following through on long term trade and other
economic proposals aimed at helping India pay its
oil debt. In light of improving relations, spurred
by an exchange of. visits last year by Mrs. Gandhi
and the Shah, New Delhi sees less need to count on
Iraq as a counterweight to Iran's support of Pakistan.
(Continued)
Jan 14, 1975
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~i'he Indians are ~worlcing hard and with some
success to strengthen their position in ~h~ Persian
Gulf, although Palcistan still has grcat~r influence
in fiche area. New Delhi's decision last week to
permit the Palestine Liberation Jrganization to
open an office in the Indian capital is consistent
with India's traditional pro-Arab stance. (CONI'TDDNTIAL)
25X1A
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nalcis{:an - Law of the Sea
Mra~ 1;'xt~nd Mar'itirn~ cTLll?ZL'C.~ZCt20n
The Pa}vista nigovernment is discussing whether
to extend by presidential proclamation its
maritime ju:r.isdiction,prior to the Geneva Conference
on Law-of-the-Se a scheduled to convene itl mid-March.
Some of Prime Minister I3hutto's advisers are urging
him to issue a d ecree that would:
-- Declare Pakistan's entire continental
shelf--which exceeds 200 nautical miles--to be
an exclus?.ve economic zone.
-- Delineate Pakistan's maritime zone from those
of India, Oman, and presumably Iran.
-- Possibly declare a 50-mile territorial limit.
25X1X
25X1X
Pakistani extended its territorial sea by presidential
decree in 1966 from the traditional 3 nautical mile
limit to 12 miles. Officials in Islamabad say they
are justified in establishing new claims because
other countries are making similar moves without
waiting for a m~iltilateral convention on law-of-the-
sea. Pakistan':: move to extend i'ts territorial
jurisdiction was ~-~pparently prompted ~.n part by
Indian-sponsoz?ed otf-shore oil exploration which may
be encroaching on P~ikistani contested waters. Such
action by Pakistan could complicate the proceedings
at the coming conference.
25X1X
Looking forward to Geneva, the Pakistani -
pessimistic over prospects at the conference for
agreement on an international law-of -the-sea conven-
tion. Followin the end of the Caracas conference
last August, the 25X1X
delegations were ready to enter serious negotiations
at the next session. now
thera are a number of major obstacles to agreement. 25X1X
These include:
(Continued)
Jan 14, 1975
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- Wide differences over. what lim~.tations may
be placed on a nation's off--shop?e economic
zones.
-- Lack of corlsensu~: on the right of free
passage through straits.
-- Lack of agreement on access to the sea. far
landlocked coun~tr.ies.
The latter issue appears to be particularly
thorny, and Pakistani officials say it could ~,~reck
the unity of the "group of 77," a group of Third
Nlorld countries which have a virtual automatic
majority among the conference delegations. The
recent meeting in Kampala showed a sharp split among
the delegations on the right-of-access issue. Pak-
istan has been a leading opponent of the right-of-
access for landlocked countries primarily becuase
of its strained relations with Afghanistan. which must
seek access to the sea through Pakistani territory.
Islamabad appears to be modifying its stared on the
issue, however, to keep it from becoming a divi~~ive
factor among the 77 and a threat to harmony at the
Geneva Conference.
The Afro-Asian countries plan to meet in Tehran
on January 26 to consider, among otY:er questior_s,
the right of access .for landlocked countries. The
Pakistanis also expect represex'~tatives of the 77 to
meet again 'aefore March to try to work out a common
negotiating position for the Geneva ~c:.7ference.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
Jan 14, 1975 6
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