MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 17, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

~L.AO~.I ~ SNM-EA~A 7501 17~
` ApproJe~f F' r.Relefise.20d0/09/14 :CIA-RDP86 00 R00 400Q100?2-
~..~
w1~~d~le~ :Ec~~#, ,A~r~c~a~ South {Asia ~ ~ ~ ~:.~a
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R0004~e0~1r0e0t12-5
No Foreign Diarem
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
127
No. 0413/75
January 17, 1975
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 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010012-5
No foreign Disaem/Nn Disoem Abroad
Baakgrounc`l Use Un~y/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O, 1'1652, exemption category:
g 58 (11, (21, and (31
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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 Approved For Release 2000/09/14~86T00608R000400010012-5
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East -Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other uffices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of khe individual articles.
Tunisia: Bourguiba Leaves Tunis for Rest
in France i
India:
Upswing in Tribal Insurgencies 2
India:
Nation-wide Port Strike . 4
Bangladesh: Opposition to Presidential
System Grows 5
Jan 17, 1975
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2000/09/1~E~~DP86T00608R000400010012-5
'Tunisia
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Dour~gur".ha Laavetl !'urtir ,j'ar lieD t; in !'ranee
President Bourg~~iba wi.11 depart for France on
Sunday for several weeks of rest and a medical
checkup.
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Extended peri~~~~s
of relaxation and medical treatment in the past }nave
reinvigorated Bourguiba and enabled him to appear: to
function normally for a period of time.
Prime Minister Nouira will be in charge of i~he
government while Bourguiba is abroad. The Prime Minister is a
competent administrator whose star has risen since
the ruling Destourian Socialist Party congress last
fall when Bourguiba publicly reconfirmed Nouira as
his heir designate. In subsequent interviews and
speeches, Nouira has demonstrated greater self-
confi..dence, and seems to be emerging from the ~Y~adow
of Bourguiba, who has dominated Tunisian poli?t:.ics
for more than ~0 years. (SECRET NO FOREIGN I)'i:SSE!~'I/
CONTROLLED DISSEfQ)
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Jai; i7, 1975
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5'EC{~ET
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India
UpswinU in Tribal, l'nr~urrjeneie~
A recent increase in armed insurgency by two
traditionally restive tribal groups in northeastern
India seems to have dampenr~d considerably any
chances for a peaceful settlement of longstanding
disputes between the central government and the
remote Li~ibal states scelcing autonomy.
In the state of Nagaland, the Plaoist-oriented under-
ground has stepZ~ed up military actions, recruitment,
and proselytizing in recent months, giving new life
to the 19-year old insurgency. 7.'he Indian army has
sent additional troops to Nagaland; they nrob,:~bJy
will be allowed a freer hand ire dealing :?~ ?..i:h. L-he
1,300 hard-core insurgents.
As a result of the increasEd ine;ur3e:it activity,
Prime Minister Gandhi has ruled, out ne~~aotiations with
Nagaland's ruling political party, which wa;; voted in-
to power last F~ebrudry on the basis nr". it:?, s;~mpathy
with the underg_cound's demand for a ~~*ithdraw~;.:i. of
Indian troops frc>m the state and more local ~orli;rol
over Nagaland ar":::~.ix?!~. New Delhi probably expects
that the state gov:~.r~unent's inability to obtain these
goals wil]. lead to .its early downfall and the eventual
reinstatement of the more moderate party that ruled
in Nagaland from 1964-74 with Near Delhi's tacit
support.
The Naga movement had seemed to be waning with
the growing realization among separatist-minded Naga
'l~~aders that the insurgents are no match for govern-
mE~~nt forces. New Delhi is thus disturbed by the
resumption last year, after a two-year lapse, of
low-level Chinese assis~.ance to the rebels. At.
preser-t, 80 Nagas are reportedly trying to enter
Burma enrout~, to training ramps in China's Yunnan
Province. They would replace another group that,
returned hcane in late
1974. Indian border troops captured some of the
(Continued)
Jan 17, 1975 2
SECZET
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recent returnees, along with documents confirming
t-.heir stay in China for 6 to 12 months. New Delhi
suspects China may intend to use its involvement
with the Nagas as a minor negotiat~.ng lever sizould
the two countries eventually move toward normalizing
relations.
In the neighboring union territory of Mizoram,
three senior police officials were murdered by rebels
on January 13 in the most. seriouG terrorist incident
since the Mizo insurgents organized nine years ago.
The assassinations probably were meant to underscore
the insurgent ultimatum issued in late 1974 demanding
that all non-Mizos leave the territory by January 1,
1975. The order reflects a deep resentment of non-
Mizo Hindus who administer the territory and monopolize
its commerce. The Mizos, who are predominantly
Christian, are also rebelling against their forced
confinement in pacification centers formed in the late
1960s to enable the Indian army to tighten its contro].
of the state. Although. the 700-man underground move-
ment can be intimidated. bk? the introduction of more
Indian military forces, New Delhi faces an extremely
difficult political problem in trying to quell a
population of some 350,000 that is unanimously opposed
to the central government's heavy ?~nvolvement in Mizo
affairs.
Demands for regional autonomy have troubled New
Delhi since independence. The government's hard line
reflects fear that concess.`ions to one group will
intensify calls for autonomy elsewhere, such as in
Kashmir and South India. Additionally, the possibility
that at any time political chaos may erupt in Bangla-
desh, which separates India's central and northeast
regions, compels New Delhi to keep a firm grip over
tribal insurgents, who probably would like greater
access to long-held s~inctuaries in the Chittagong Hill
area of Bangladesh. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Jan 17, 1975 3
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SECl~ET
The government on January 16 invoked emergency
regulations to declare iii~.~gal a strike by port and
dock workers that began that day and ordered workers
back to their jobs. As of January 17 the workers
were generally defying the ban and continuing the
strike which quickly paralyzed I.ndia's eight major
ports. Police and security forces have been posted
at the docks as a precautionary measure.
The motivation for the strike appears to be
purely economic. S, R. Kulkarni, president of the
union leading tYie strike, has described the dif-
ferences between labor and management a~ very narrow
and has called for resumption of negotiations, which
broke down on ~Tanuary 15. Labor is seeking an interim
wage increase pending full revision of the dockers'
wage structure and has already reduced its initial
demands.
Indian officials say they expect a settlement to
be reached soon. An extended strike could seriously
affect badly needed imports or food, oil,and industrial
supplies and could result in a drop in vital export
earnings. The parties will, thus, be under heavy
government pressure to reach an early accord. In any
event, the government will not allow the strike to
continue long enough to jeopardize the fl.o~r of food
imports. Last May the government took ha?:sh measures--
also under emergency powers--to smash a nation-wide
strike by rail workers, including the arrest of top
union leaders and more than 30,000 striking workers.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
Jan 17, 1975
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Bangladesh
Opposition to PreaiderttiaZ Syat~m Grown
Foreign Minister ICama1 Hossain--the major
architect of the Bangladesh constitution--is report-
edly upset with Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman's
proposal to change from a parliamentary government
to an authoritarian, one-party presidential system.
The Foreign Minister is known to be one of Mujib's
closest confidants. ~Iis defection could embolden
others who have been resisting Mujib's plans. Some
cabinet ministers and parliament members have privately
expressed opposition to a presidential form of govern-
ment, fearing it would diminish their own power and
influence.
Parliament members in Mujib's ruling Awami League
are meeting this weekend to plan the next legislative
session set to open on idorday. Some Bengalee observers
think Mujib will unveil his proposals for a new govern-
ment at this time and that the Awami League will ulti-
mately support him. Mujib prefers to act with the
support of his followers, and he may hope to persuade
them to go along with his scheme.
Mujib, who is well aware of the opposi-
tion he faces, instead iaay dissolve Parliament and
proclaim a presidential system under the powers granted
him by the state of emergency decreed in late December.
The decree was imposed, according to the government,
to deal with corruption, lawlessness, and political
violence, but Dacca so far has not cracked down on
these problems. `.Phis has enhanced speculation in
Bangladesh tha~L- the emergency is merely a stepping-
stone to a more authoritarian system. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DIS5EM/DTO DISSI;M ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/
CONTROLLED DIS5EM)
25X1A
Jan 17, 1975
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SECRET'
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