STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010027-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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becret
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
DIA andDOS review(s) completed.
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Secret
134
No. 0426/75
February 7, 1975
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This publication Is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles,
Syria: Brotherly Split . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Morocco-Spain: Rabat Continues Campaign
Against Spanish Territorial Holdings . . . . . 2
Guinea -? Arab States: Bauxite Consortium
Being Formed 4
Angola: Agostinho Neto and the MPLA . . . . . . 5
Afghanistan: Assessment of the Daoud Regime . . 8
Feb 7, 1975
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Syria
Brotherly Split
President Asad and his brother Rifaat, who
commands the elite units around Damascus,. have
allegedly had a falling out.
Asad dismissed his brother from his command in
early December Rifaat has recently been
trying to interes some suspected anti-regime offi-
cers in coup plans. Rifaat is also said to have
publicly criticized both Asad and Minister of
Defense Talas, a long-time antagonist.
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The rifti stems 25X1
from a dispute over a sale of housing .plots by
Rifaat's subordinates.
the President reprimande i as in December
tor using his troops to drive some army units off
land he coveted. Following the reprimand, Asad
reportedly agreed to accept Rifaat's angry offer to
resign.
This would not be the first time Asad has had
to discipline Rifaat for high-handedness. A few
years ago, Asad was forced to admonish Rifaat after
he and some of his men tore up the office of the then
prime minister, who had protested Rifaat's unFiuthorized
commandeering of some Soviet military equipment.
In the latest instance, however, it would not
be out of character for Asad and Rifaat to h:.Vve
staged a dispute in an attempt to.smoke out ;;apposi-
tion elements in the army. They have used this
tactic before.
Even if there has been a split between the two
brothers, it is doubtful that Rifaat could pull off
a coup. He is highly.unpopular in the Baa
and the regular army,
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? Morocco-Spain
Rabat Continues Campaign Against
Spanish Territorial Holdings
With interest in the Spanish Sahara issue
diminishing now that it has been referred to the
International Court of Justice, Morocco has made a
new bid to keep world and domestic attention focused
on Spain's African territories.
Late last month, Rabat made a formal demarche
to the UN Committee on Decolonization requesting an
examination of the status of the Spanish enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla. The Moroccans followed with
a press campaign that played up the demarche. Prime
Minister Laraki kept up the pace in a press con-
ference last week by reiterating calls for the return
of the two enclaves and two off-shore rocks in the
Mediterranean, as well as Spanish Sahara.
The enclave issue will help the King continue
to rally public opinion and to enhance his prastige.
His success in forcing action on the decolonization
of Spanish Sahara was one of the most popular actions
of his reign, but it will be another month before
the World Court even examines that problem.
Favorable articles by the opposition press indi-
cate that the King's latest effort has succeeded in
creating a new wave of anti-colonialist jingoism.
This should continue to distract attention from
middle-class and liberal grievances and provide an
outlet for the energies of disaffected milita'.=y
officers.
The Moroccan action on the enclaves provoked
surprise, alarm, and near unanimous indignation in
Spanish news media and official circles. Spanish
military contacts of the US attaches in Madrid
immediately stressed that although Spain intends to
withdraw from the Sahara, it will never withdraw from
the enclaves.
(Continued)
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Spanish Foreign Minister Cortina held an urgent
high-level meeting on the Sahara question and North
Africa, but there has been no indication of any
de
The Spanish legislature introduced an informal
resolution affirming Spain's "adhesion".to.Ceuta and
Melilla. It linked this to an appeal for the
restoration to Spain of the "Spanish city" of
Gibraltar.,, a reminder that the British have not
complied with UN resolutions to decolonize Gibraltar.
Some Spanish newspapers have characterized the
Moroccan move as an effort by Hassan to improve a
deteriorating domestic situation. One prominent
Madrid newspaper, nonetheless, admitted that, Morocco
has raised the issue at a good psychological moment
in view of the third world domination of the UN and
its support for decolonization.
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Guinea - Arab States
Bauxite Consortium Being Formed
Guinea and a group of Arab states have taken
steps toward establishing a $2 billion bauxite min-
ing consortium. According to reports published in
Guinea, the Arab states involved are Kuwait, Egypt,
Libya, and the United Arab Emirates. Other reports
have included Saudi Arabia and possibly Algeria.
The consortium is to exploit reserves in north-
west Guinea estimated at 500 million tons'. Plans
call for annual production of 9 million tons of
bauxite, 5 million of which is to be exported as
ore. The rest will be converted to alumina--an
intermediate product in the manufacture of aluminum
--at a planned refinery in Guinea designed for a
2-million ton capacity. The consortium plans to
commission a feasibility study and to subcontract
design work, possibly to a US firm.
The consortium scheme probably is an effort by
the Arabs to line up a supply of bauxite for plants
in their countries. Egypt has almost completed an
alumina producing plant, and Saudi Arabia is known
to have plans for an aluminum smelter.
Guinea is already a major bauxite producer with
over one-fifth of the world's reserves. In 1973,
Guinea's bauxite output was 2.7 million tons.
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Angola
Agostinho Neto and the MPLA
Agostinho Neto, leader of the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola, returned to Luanda on
February 4 sifter 14 years of exile. Neto probably
had mixed feelings about his return. In the late
1960s, when he was the unchallenged head of what
was then the largest and most active of the three
nationalist groups in Angola, Neto probably envisioned
his return would be that of leader of an independent
Angolan government. Now, however, he must share the
political arena with his longtime rival--Jonas
Savimbi and Holden Roberto--and his organization has
had to settle for an equal, share of the places in
the new transitional government.
The Popular Movement began its insurgent activity
in 1961, in northern Angola from bases in Congo
(Brazzaville), but did not become a significant mili-
tary threat until late in the decade after it had
shifted its headquarters to Zambia and was able to
make substantial advances into eastern Angola. A
strong Portuguese reaction in the early 1970s, however,
inflicted serious losses on the organization. The
setback sparked a struggle for leadership between
Neto, who was following a policy of emphasizing poli-
tical organizing, and Daniel Chipenda, the Popular
Move'ment's vice-president and leading military figure,
who argued for greater emphasis on the military
struggle. The conflict between the two leaders para-
lyzed the movement and finally culminated in Chipenda
bolting the party in 1973, taking several thousand
well-trained troops with him.
Neto's concentration on political organizing
was not wasted, however. The Popular Movement cur-
rently enjoys strong support from labor unions and
other urban elements, particularly in Luanda, the
capital. As a poet and physician, Neto has also
long enjoyed wide support among Angola's predominantly
(Continued)
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white class of intellectuals and professionals, who
were careful to hide their sympathies during the
Salazar and Caetano regimes. These sympathizers
comprise an important part of the Angolan civil
service and are apparently prepared to use their
positions to boost Neto. Many journalists also
support the Popular Movement, an important factor
now that it holds the information portfolio in the
transitional government.
Nevertheless, the Popular Movement has to
exercise caution in exploiting such political assets.
Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation
of Angola already has accused it of censoring com-
muniques put out by the Front. In reprisal, Front
members entered the government-run radio station in
late January and. destroyed some equipment. Sub-
sequently, they kidnapped the station's deputy
director and beat him badly before releasing him.
The Popular Movement's strength in the labor move-
ment will be challenged by Savimbi's National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola, which holds
the labor portfolio in the transitional government.
Neto will be working under several other handi
caps. His avowed Marxism and close relations with
the Soviet Union--the Popular Movement's principal
supplier during the insurgency--is likely to limit
his general appeal throughout Angola. He also must
still reckon with Chipenda, who continues to campaign
for Neto's ouster, particularly in eastern Angola.
With 2,000-3,000 well-trained followers, Chipenda
will undoubtedly try to hamper Neto's political efforts
there. Moreover, Savimbi and Roberto believe that
Chipenda eventually must be allowed to participate
in the political process, although not as the leader
of a separate nationalist organization. Under the
independence accord signed with Portugal, political
legitimacy is reserved to the three existing groups.
(Continued)
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More important, perhaps, is the fact that the
Popular Movement has been unable to gain much poli-
tical momentum at the grass roots level. Its two
rivals began rallying their old supporters and cam-
paigning for new ones within Angola even before the
independence accord was negotiated. The Popular
Movement was bogged down by a lack of logistical
capability and poor internal organization. As a
result, Neto has been placed on the defensive and
may have some trouble catching up, particularly organizing support outside Luanda.
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Afghanistan
Assessment of the Daoud Regime
President Daoud consolidated his power at home
last year and strengthened Afghanistan's relations
with all nearby countries except Pakistan, according
to a recent assessment by the US embassy in Kabul.
The 65-year-old president now appears to have
no serious opposition anywhere in the country. There
has been little recent evidence of disaffection in
the military; most officers admire Daoud for the
improvements he wrought in the status and capabilities
of the armed forces between the 1930s and 1960s, when
he was a leading officer and later defense minister
and prime minister. Military backing for Daoud is
further enhanced by the influence wielded in the armed
forces by officers belonging to his clan.and tribal
groups. Army officers played a central role in the
coup that restored Daoud to power in mid-1973.
Daoud's formidable secret police organization
and informer network also play an important part in
helping maintain the regime in power. Additionally,
Daoud appears to have succeeded in maneuvering the
"central committee" into a minor role. This quasi-
governmental body, which is dominated by young leftist
military officers, was influential during the months
immediately after the 1973 coup. In general, Daoud,
a nationalist, has managed to weaken leftists in the
regime and to intimidate Islamic conservatives who
do not share his zeal for moving the extremely back-
ward country down the road toward modernization.
Some tribal groups and commercial interests may not
be entirely happy with Daoud's rule, but none seem
to pose any serious threat.
The embassy believes Daoud's political future
will depend to a great extent on whether his regime
can cope effectively with the pressures of world
inflation and shortages, which are just beginning
to affect Afghanistan. We :,alieve the regime's
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readiness to use force and, if necessary, terror
against its opponents could enable it to.stay in
power for some time even if the economic-situation
worsens.
Daoud has promised but not yet delivered a new
constitution. More importantly, he has made no
arrangements for a transfer of power should he die
or become incapacitated. Such a development, might
well lead to a full takeover by the Soviet-influenced
army, perhaps preceded by a period of severe turmoil.
In foreign affairs, the Daoud government enjoyed
a number of successes in 1974. It continued to
receive extensive Soviet military and economic aid,
but managed to avoid becoming totally Soviet-dominated,
in part by strengthening economic and diplomatic ties
elsewhere. In neighboring Iran, the Shah's initial
distrust of the Daoud regime eased, and Tehran
appears to have promised substantial economic aid.
Daoud also obtained pledges of aid from Saudi Arabia,.
Iraq, and perhaps Kuwait. Egypt and India launched
modest military training programs for Afghan military
personnel. The Chinese promised same new economic
aid. Friendly relations and aid ties were also
maintained with the US.
Relations with neighboring Pakistan remained
bad, with little letup in exchanges of vitriolic
propaganda. After he took power in 197.3, Daoud sharply
stepped up agitation on Afghanistan's longstanding
dispute with Pakistan over the status of Pakistan's
two frontier provinces. The Pakistanis are also uncom-
fortable about the Daoud regime's ties with the
Indians and Soviets.
"aoud has avoided a showdown with Islamabad,
however. He knows Pakistan's army is much stronger
than Afghanistan's. He well remembers that Pakistani-
Afghan friction over the frontier issue in the early
1960s led to a border closing that disrupted the
Afghan economy and helped topple his first government.
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