STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010028-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 19, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
No Foreign Di iem
5UI~~ G~04m~~
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
134
No. 0427/75
February 10, 1975
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No Foreign Disaem/No Diasem Abroad
Background Use Only/Controlled Disaem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
5 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Libya: A More Moderate Qadhafi? . . . . . . . . 1
Kenya: Parliament Reconvenes but Future
in Doubt : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Pakistan: Main Opposition Party Banned . . . . 4
Sri Lanka: By-election Underscores Tamil
Grievances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Feb 10, 1975
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Libya
A, More Moderate Qadhcxfi?
Recent reports that President Qadhafi is dis-
playing a new maturity have aroused Egyptian Presi-
dent Sadat's interest and could smooth the way for
a reunion of the two leaders.
Qadhafi apparently made a very favorable
impression on Ghassan Tueni, the respected and well-
connected publisher of Beirut's leading newspaper
An-Nahar. Tueni was especially taken by Qadhafi's
relaxed and moderate responses during a 90-minute
interview conducted in early January and published
last week. Tueni, for instance, purposely gave
Qadhafi several'opportunities to lash out at Sadat,
but--to his surprise--Qadhafi did not respond to the
leads.
Tueni recently relayed his impression of a
"sounder" Qadhafi to Sadat, who apparently was very
curious about the new moderation in his neighbor's
behavior. Sadat told Tueni that several other
individuals whose opinions he respected had gained
similar impressions of the T,ibyan leader. Sadat
cited a recent remark by the Sudanese interior
minister that Qadhafi is now showing signs of "states-
manship."
Other Arab notables in regular contact with
Sadat have probably also given him favorable impres
sions of Oadhafi.
Ashraf Marwan--Sa
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(Continued)
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Despite the positive experiences of others,
Sadat is probably still skeptical. For Sadat, deal-
ing with his young neighbor can spark strong emotions
and quickly drain his patience.
The Egyptians, however, are anxious to regain
at least the option of turning to Tripoli for money
and arms--especially Libya's growing inventory of
Soviet weapons. Egyptian officials recognize that
despite their successes in dealing with Qadhafi's
subordinates, the Libyan leader is still the key to
a cooperative relationship. Sadat, moreover, may
,feel that regardless of whether Qadhafi has truly
moderated his views, the Libyan leader is now in no
position to use his usual high-handed tactics.
Qadhafi, anxious to end his isolation in the Arab
world, is pushing hard to arrange a summit meeting
with the'Egyptian president. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
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Kenya
Parliament Reconvenes but Future in Doubt
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Kenya's parliament, dismissed last November by
an angered President Kenyatta because backbenchers
insisted on one of their own for deputy speaker,
reconvened on February 4. The session has so far
been uneventful, suggesting that Kenyatta and the
backbenchers may have been reconciled at least
temporarily. If Kenyatta's critics in parliament
push him too hard, however, the aged president
might send parliament home for good.
Kenyatta is reported to have accepted with
considetable reluctance the backbencher's candidate
for deputy speaker, J. M. Seroney. Seroney was
probably supported by Vice President Moi. The two
had been rivals for leadership of the Kalenjin tri-
bal group, but apparently they patched up their
differences.
government proposals. Some backbenchers are pre-
paring to denounce corruption and large land acqui-
sitions by top government figures. Such a move is
Even with the selection of the deputy speaker
apparently resolved, the future of parliament may
be imperiled by the reported intention of some back-
benchers to mount a vigorous campaign against
almost certain to provok
CONTROLLED DISSEM)
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Main Opposition Party Balined
Prime Minister Bhutto's government has formally
outlawed the National Awami Party (NAP), Pakistan's
leading opposition party, after arresting party
leader Wali Khan and dozens of his supporters over
the weekend. These moves followed the bombing inci-
dent Saturday that killed the home minister of the
Northwest Frontier Province, Hayat Mohammad Sherpao.
Sherpao was Bhutto's chief political lieutenant in
the frontier province and the de facto leader of
the provincial government.
So far, apparently no one has been formally
charged in Sherpao's murder, but the new.crackdown
on the NAP indicates that Bhutto intends to blame
the party and its supporters in neighboring Afghanistan.
Pakistani government-controlled media.already are
hinting that the NAP and the Afghans were. responsible.
In recent months,.?:slamabad has accused the party
and the Afghan government of being behind a number
of bombing incidents in the frontier province and
elsewhere in Pakistan, but both the NAP and the Afghans
have denied these allegations. Some observers in
Pakistan have suggested that young pro-NAP extremists,
including students, may have carried out the bombings
in disregard of the party leaders' wishes. The
evidence suggests student militants may have been
involved in Sherpao's death; he was killed inside
a university in ;Peshawar, the capital of the frontier
province.
The incident will further embitter Pakistan's
relations with Afghanistan. The'Afghan government
has long sympathized with tho. :;AP's efforts to win
greater autonomy for Pakistan's two frontier pro-
vinces, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier,
where the party's strength is concentrated. The
people of these provinces are ethnically more closely
related to the Afghans than the Pakistanis. Afghanistan
propagandizes on the NAP's behalf, provides sanctuary
to a prominent NAP leader, and may be giving the party some
material support. It has been accused by Islamabad
of training pro-NAP extremists. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Feb 10, 1975
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Sri Lanka
By-election Underscores Tamil Grievances
A sweeping by-election victory last week by S.
J. V. Chelvanayakam, a Tamil community leader,
refocused attention on long-festering Tamil dissatis-
faction with the government.
Although Chelvanayakam--the undisputed leader
of organized Tamil political groups and long they
symbol of Tamil aspirations--was expected to win,
the government mounted an active. campaign on behalf
of its candidate. Most Tamils apparently identified
with Chelvanayakam's demand for a separate.Tamil
state to overcome what they view as economic and
social inequities practiced by the Sinhalese majority.
Sensing the frustration among his people, Chelvana-
yakam recently adopted this more activist line,
abandoning his former position which merely called
for equal rights for Tamils.
The Tamils, who are concentrated in northern
Sri Lanka and compromise over 20 percent of the
population, could become an explosive problem for
Prime Minister Bandaranaike, especially as the
country's economic.woes continue. The Tamils are
quick to charge the government with discrimination,
particularly in job and educational opportunities.
Given these conditions, relative moderates like
Chelvanayakam will continue to be under pressure
from increasingly impatient and militant Tamil
youth who view the political process as irrelevant
to the separatist movement. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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