STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 20, 2004
Sequence Number: 
30
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 12, 1975
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5.pdf232.21 KB
Body: 
25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/16 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 Approved ;For Release 2;004/08/16 CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 25X1 Top Secret Top Secret 25X1 134 Approve pq .l ~ ase, t 4 4 8/. ; ,-:."CIA-RDP86T00608R000400 96-trY 12, 1975 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA 25X1 25X1 25X1 United Arab Emirates: Three Years of Union 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 Approved For Release 2 - 8R000400010030-5 United Arab Emirates Three Years of Union The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a union of seven Persian Gulf sheikhdoms that was launched in December 1971,; appears fairly well established as a federal state, confounding observers who pre- dicted its early break up. Much of the credit for its existence and survival belongs to its President Sheikh Zayid, ruler of Abu Dhabi, the union's most important member-state. From the outset, Zayid shaped the UAE's institutions and had the vision to place federal interests ahead of those of any of the member states. The pace of integration is retarded by con- tinuing rivalries, often petty, among the rulers, most of whom want to maintain only a very loose confederation. As a result, some key federal insti- tutions have not become significantly stronger dur- ing the past three years. The member sheikhdoms, for example, are still autonomous in the important matters of oil revenues, defense,and internal security. The rulers who oppose close ties appear, however,'to be fighting a losing battle; like it or not, economic forces set in motion by the oil boom in which the sheikhdoms are sharing are foster- ing the growth of national cohesion. UAE merchants, who comprise an important political interest group, support, the federation. They realize that the economic boom has been fueled by innovations and activities sponsored by the central government, such as the creation of a stable uniform currency, the building of roads and communications systems, and the abolition of customs between the sheikhdoms. Favorable attitudes among'young people toward the union is also a solid asset for Sheikh Zayid and other UAE leaders who would like to move ahead with integration of the seven sheikhdoms. Unlike the older generation, which is still conditioned (Continued) Feb 12, 1975 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 Approved For Release 20 8R000400010030-5 by the parochial values previously dominant in the area, the young identify more readily with-the new, system. The federal government has control over educational system and funds; this gives it a power- ful influence in strengthening support for the union among the country's future leaders. Sheikh Zayid is the cement that binds together the member states. The greatest foreseeable threat to the federation would come from his early death; his likely successor Sheikh Rashid, UAE vice presi- dent and ruler of Dubai, is lukewarm toward the union. Zayid, in his late fifties, is in reasonably good health and may have time to put succession on a sounder footing, perhaps by grooming and maneuvering into position'his capable younger son, Sultan. The leadership that Zayid has given the fledging state is, to a large extent, attributable to his personal style of dealing with his fellow rulers. Using a deft combination of consensus politics and timely handouts of money, Zayid has maintained good relations with each of them, no mean feat since they constantly squabble among themselves. Zayid's cautious middle-of-the-road course in domestic and foreign policy, moreover, has not given too many openings to his enemies. Even thc';gh centrifugal forces in the UAE now seem in check, Zayid has taken out some insurance against moves by member states to break away from the federation and against power grabs within the sheikhdoms. He has built the 10,000-man Abu Dhabi Defense Force, which is personally responsive to him, into the largest and by far the best equipped military force in the UAE. The prospect of taking on this powerful force which would be supported by the 4-400-man Union Defense Force, will presumably. make any elements considering insurrection think 25X1 twice. 25X1 25X1 Feb 12, 1975 4 25X1 Approved For. Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5 Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010030-5