STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 23, 2005
Sequence Number: 
18
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 7, 1975
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2.pdf278.82 KB
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25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Secret No Poreign Dijinn 1~7)ff~vp mav~ Soviet Union Eastern Europe Secret 158 April '7, 1975 No. 0017/75 Approved For Release-2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 gPLAi6T00608R000400080018-2 SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com- munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel- ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. April 7, 1975 Jewish Emigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Tito Speaks in Kosc.vo . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 -Hungarian Economic Delegation in Moscow . 3 Soviets Woo Argentina with Additional Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 25X1 i SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/295]C(gk J5 6T00608R000400080018-2 Jewish Emigration 5X1 Approximately 875 Jews emigrated from the So- viet Union in March; this is the lowest monthly total in more than three years. The number of emigrants has been dropping steadily since the turn of the year. The first quarter total for 1975-- just over 3,000--is nearly 50 percent below the comparable figure for 1974. The Soviets are apparently reducing the flow by discouraging applications, rather' than by in- creasing outright refusals. They have mounted a psychological campaign emphasizing the problems emi- grants will face in Israel and the West, while making it clear that would-be emigrants will have a tough row to hoe before they can get out of the USSR. Applications for emigration remain subject to loss of employment and other forms of harassment, as well'as to the considerable expense of obtaining exit permits. At the same time they are cutting back the total number of emigrants, the Soviets are apply- ing the carrot and the stick to Jewish activists. Recently, several have been allowed to emigrate, for example, but two others have been sent into exile for a brief Moscow street demonstration. Moscow's policy may be to get rid of the most ar- ticulate Jewish activists, particularly those who are well known in the West and he 25X1 25X1 April 7, 1975 -1- SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 S]BI6-t'6T00608R000400080018-2 Tito Speaks in Kosovo On his visit to Kosovo from April 3-5, Presi- dent Tito reassured local officials that Delgrade intends to help ameliorate problems in the under- developed province. He also called again for stabilization :,n the Balkans through improved Yu- goslav relations with Albania. Tito's primary purpose was clearly to quell speculation following a small student demonstration last December that there were serious problems in Kosovo. He pointed out that the econumit develop- ment and political stability of Kosovo was linked to Yugoslavia's over-all fate. Tito criticized the northern republics for objecting to special federal aid to the less-developed southern regions and specifically promised that the government in Belgrade would soon increase aid to the Kosovo. Tito also warned against unspecified foreign at- tempts to exacerbate problems in Kosovo. In a typically bold move on Friday, Tito also took his case directly to Pristina University--the site of the December disturbances. Although Tito concentrated on vocal problems, he did make a sp`o al plea for improved relations with neighboring Albania. Warning that third parties would try to drive a deeper wedge between Albania and Yugoslavia, he argued for the under- standing of his countrymen regarding Albania's occasional regression into anti-Yugoslav polemics. Tito said he believes the Albanian leadership wants to improve relations with Yugoslavia and thus sta- bilize f-h i c ; mnn,-4-,,,,- -- _r - Balkans. April 7, 1975 -2- SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/ LA -Dr%n 86TOO608R000400080018-2 Hungarian Economic Delegation inT Moscow A top-level Hungarian economic delegation, led by Premier rock, arrived in Moscow on April 7. The rank and composition of the delegation--which osten- sibly will. open an exhibit on Hungary--suggest that it is prepared for major talks with the Soviets on bilateral cooperation in industrial development. Aside from Pock, the "party-government" dele- gation includes fellow Politburo member Karoly Nem- eth, party secretary for economic policy; deputy premier Matyas Timar, who oversees industrial de- velopment; and the minister of heavy industry. The group will be joined later by the minister of foreign trade and a deputy foreign minister. den of higher prices for Soviet raw materials. Budapest is eager to prune back some of its less efficient industrial sectors and to increase out- lays for priority sectors. The talks could touch on Hungarian problems in modernizing its aluminum industry, expanding the chemical industry, and meeting its obligation to help construct the Oren- The Hungarians may have gone to Moscow to work out details of the Soviet credits and concessions recently granted to Budapest to help offset the bur- burg gas pipeline in the UO_:.':R. April 7, 1975 -3- SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 5e-41'6T00608R000400080018-2 Soviets Woo Argentina with Addilt-io-nal Credits 25X1 C 25X1 C gen ina has been country in a new Soviet effort to undercut western economic influence in Latin America. Argentina reportedly was selected be- cause it would be more willing to accept economic aid and investments than other countries in the region. While the Soviets can hardly hope even to ap- proach the massive levels of US investment in Latin America, they have been willing to put up some money. In 1974, Moscow extended, through new open-ended agreements, at least $215 million in credits to Argentina--the largest sum it has granted any coun- try in LatinAmerica except for Cuba and Chile under Allende's rule. The Soviets are particularly interested in large scale hydroelectric power proj- ects. Here, the Soviets offer attractive fi- naLicing which Western governments find difficult to match, and are willing to work within consortia. For instance, Moscow has made bids on several proj- ects, and will supply and install 14 turbines for the Salto Grande hydroelectric project. The Peron government has recently given Moscow its approval to begin a feasibility study and to do design work on the Parana River Dam projects. Such large-scale investment projects as Salto Grande and the Parana will not only enable Moscow to show what it can do but will also eventually help to minimize the on- going trade deficit the Soviets have with Argentina. 25X1 C F:- I 25X1C e s that Argentine labor and youth groups might be useful in promoting Soviet economic and political inroads. For the moment, April 7, 1975 -4- SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 :8EIG1FT00608R000400080018-2 there is no sizable pro-Soviet element in any of these groups, and the Argentine Communist Party has little influence. Moscow is not neglecting the rest of South America while it pursues its Argentine policy. The Soviets have maintained an active political interest elsewhere, notably in Peru, although economic coopera- tion there does not nearly match the credits extended to Argentina. In addition, Moscow hart been holding talk's on further economic cooperation with Brazil and has expressed an i nf-nrccf- ;,, ~~,......... , _ April 7, 1975 -5- SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 25 X1 X1 X1 25 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080018-2