STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400090012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 11, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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M
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
On file Department of Agriculture release instructions apply.
State Department review completed
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Top Secret
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June 11, 1975
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
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CONTENTS
June 11, 1975
Soviet Regime Strokes Nonconformists . . . . . . . 1
Hungary Resolves Two Contentious
Issues with the US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Czech-Slovak Frictions . . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR-Japan: Joint Fishing Project. . . . . . . . . 6
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Soviet Regime Strokes Nonconformists
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The regime, having recently subjected cultural
nonconformists to some harsh treatment
is now dangling a small ca rot In
ron? of oscow's unconventional artists. It con-
tinues to temporize, however, on most of their long-
standing demands. As a result, some of the artists
see a ray of hope on the horizon, and others re-
main skeptical of their prospects.
The artists' hopes were raised by a cordial,
two-hour meeting on June 9 of a leading spokesman ?or
the group and officials of the Moscow city party
mittee. The officials were noncommittal, but li ;_ti;:ned~
sympathetically to complaints about the recer.9? harass-
ment of the unconventional artists and agreed to raise
the matter with their party superiors. The two sides
also discussed the possibility of a large, public, in-
door exhibit this fall, and they chances for opening a
hard currency store as an outlet for nonconformist
art. The artists now sell only privately, mainly to
ranking Soviet officials and foreign diplomats.
Many of the other nonconformists, including the
respected Oskar Rabin who recalled the conflicts. last
month over.the aborted Leningrad exhibit, say that
optimism is premature until. some practical be,,;.,efits
develop. In view of the past history of the ?;-,xtists'
problems with the regime, and with the leadership
marking time on cultural policy, there is good reason
for skepticism.
There is some circumstantial evidence that the
decision to tamp down the conflict with the noncon-
formists was made on at least as high a level as the
Central Committee and that it hinged on the party's
realization that the artists' contacts with the West-
ern press--and Western interest in their plight--had
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not fallen off as much as the regime believed. The
Juno 9 meocing was suggested by officials of the
Cenral Committee Cultural Department. At the meet-
ing, the Moscow party officials c,.:nplained about
the a-Lists' connections with foreign journalists
and the resulting adverse coverage of the Soviet
cultural scene in the West. Aware of the role played
by official concern for the Soviet imago abroad
regime-nonconformist relations, the artists' spokes
man pointedly suggested that Western coverage would
improve or disappear if the artists' situation became
more "normal."
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The regime's willingness at least to discuss the
subject appears designed to take the artists' story
out of the headlines while the leadership continues
to grope for longer term guidelines for cultural pol-
icy. The tactics are relatively simple, but effec- 25X1
tive: the hopes raised at the June 9 meeting seem to
have educed the nonconformists to remain "reasonabl
quiet," pending developments in the fall.
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June 11, 1975
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I3ungary Resolves Two Contentious
Issues with the US
Budapest has given ground on two controversial
issues, suggesting that the Hungarians want to in-
ject new momentum into relations with the US.
Last week, the Hungarians showed some flexibil-
ity on the family reunification issue when they
said they will allow the son of a Hungarian-born
US citizen to emigrate. Budapest had taken no action
in this case--which had attracted congressional at-
tention--arguing that the son's emigration was pro-
hibited by Hungarian law.
Early this week, Budapest said it will pay a
claims installment on the basis of US data, even
though it continues to have "reservations" about
the US figures. Under the accord signed in 1973,
the amount of Hungarian payments to the US is pegged
to the level of bilateral trade, and the two sides
have disagreed over 1974 trade statistics.
Budapest's actions clearly seem intended to spur
forward movement at a time when the two capitals
have recently exchanged new ambassadors. In fact,
a Foreign Ministry official recently suggested that
US Ambassador McAuliffe seek an appointment with
party leader Kadar, who seldom sees Western diplomats.
The Hungarians, who have serious economic prob-
lems, may be looking to get some economic benefits
from the US. During the recent visit of Undersecretary
of Agriculture Campbell. the Hungarians made a pitch
for credits to finance the purchase of soybean meal
and raised the possibility of expanding cooperation
in other agricultural spheres. The Hungarians, how-
ever, are unlikely to step out ahead of Moscow on
the most-favored--nation issue.
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certain travel restrictions and is eager for the US
to return the Crown of St. Stephen--a traditional
symbol of political legitimacy.
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Czech-Slovak Frictions
The party registered its concern over increased
friction between the Czech and Slovak nationalities
in advance of the election of party leader Husak as
Czechoslovakia's first Slovak president.
A highly unusual corarnentary that appeared in
the party's theoretical Journal, Tribuna, on May 21
openly confirmed the existence of antagonism between
the Czechs and Slovaks. The article ostensibly
warned both against adopting "nationalist arguments,"
but the Czechs were the main target. The journal
sought to counter complaints that the minority Slovaks,
who constitute 30 percent of the population, enjoy
an overly large share of the country's budget and
that as a result Slovakia is booming at the expense
of Czech lands.
In fact, recent Western visitors to Czechoslovakia
report that they are struck by the general feeling
of dynamism in Slovakia and with the growth and
development in evidence there. In the Czech lands,
and particularly in Prague, on the other hand, an
atmosphere of lethargic stagnation prevails.
Any hints of favoritism toward the Slovaks is
politically sensitive and potentially damaging to
Husak and the other Slovaks who now dominate the
regime. There have been rumors.that Alois Indra,
the Czech head of the Federal Assembly and one of
Husak's major rivals, has tried to use the nation-
ality issue to strengthen his position within the
leadership.
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USSR-Japan: Joint Fishing Project
The Soviet Union and Japan, the world's
leading fishing nations, signed an agreement last
week to develop joint salmon-breeding facilities
in the northwest Pacific. Work on the project will
probably begin later this summer.
Japan had pushed for joint salmon-breeding
operations since 1962. The Soviets first: showed
some interest this spring--probably because they
recognized that salmon stocks needed rebuilding--
and proposed a joint project that would include
breeding facilities on southern Sakhalin and on the
Kamchatka Peninsula. Japan balked at including
Kamchatka, but facilities will probably be estab-
lished on Sakhalin.
Japan sought assurances that Soviet trawlers
operating north of Hokkaido would try to avoid
damaging Japanese fishing nets. The Soviets agreed
to continue to take preventive measures, but re-
='.sed to give a clear-cut response to Japan's re-
quest to exercise restraint in their trawling opera-
tions near Japan's coastal waters.
June 11, 1975
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