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December 9, 1975
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25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110I Secret Th\EFIF ?ccrc: Soviet Union Eastern Europe 25X1 DOS review(s) completed. Top Secret ? 25X1 Docombor 9 1975 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400 - 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0 25X1 Approved For Re SOV+rT UNION ? EASTERN EUROPE 25X1 C0N1IfN7'S buc:amber 9, 1975 Urezhnov's Speach in Warsaw. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Arbatov on US-Soviet folati,ons . . . . . . . . . . 3 25X1 Yugou 1aVia-USSf: Official Talks . . . . . . . . . 6 Bulgaria Protests Yugoslav Allegations on ttacadonian Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Romania and the Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 ttungary: Conversation with Kadar. . . . . . . . . 12 Czochonlovakia: Shades of 14 Cadrati Abroad Central Committee Post Filled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Approved For Rel 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rele4 Brezhnev's speech at thn Polish party congress Van shout: can nubsly.nnce, but., an in his wo 1t in racent months, boarish on the state of relations with the Went. An wan appropriate to the occasion,, Iirezhnev spent over half of hit; 30 minutes talking about the steps taken toward closer economic and p,1litical in- tegration between Poland and the UBStt, i nd more gen- orally, the beneficence of the socialist, community. In his encomium, tJrexhnev referred to the norms of "socialist internationalism"--words tho16,. in Yugoslavia and itomania translate as Soviet he quickly followed with a sentence portai.ning to the indcpondence and sovereignty of the st-iton that make up the socialist community. CSCE wan clearly on his mind, perhaps bacauso Warsaw offered an appropriate venue for repeating a few "truths" about the Helsinki agreements. His de- mand that no one aspect of the agreement be ompha- sized over another and his criticism of the West, for its fa:.lure to propagate the text sufficiently have on said before; no, too, has his reference to "ideological penetration" by the Wr,;,,t. Brezhnev made explicit reference to the follow- up CSCE session in Belgrade in 19?' and spoke favor- ably of the possibility of organs Ong European con- gresses on such problems as the e: ,/ironment and energy over the next two years. ';hie clearly was meant an a trial balloon, and more will probably be heard from Moscow. Srozhnev's speech, as is often the case, is as interesting for what he chose not to say as for what he said. There was no rejoinder, implicit or explicit, to criticism in the US regarding So- viet activities in Angola. Ile made no mention of December 9, 1975 Breyhnav' n ,_Speech in Warsaw 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0001400110025-0 Approved For Rele the socialist duty to support "liberation movomentn," nor did he refer to the immutable continuation of ideological struggle. Urethnev repeated the familiar formulation on the need to move ahead with detente despite the ef- forts of Western critics. tie did not, however, nay anything explicitly about relations with the Us or 25X1 December 9, 1975 25X1 25X1 Approved For R41ease 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0 25X1 Approved For Rele4 Arbatov on P0400110025-0 Soviut Relations Geergy Arbatov, Morcow'e moat prominent academic authority on the UG, last week offered Ambassador Stoenaal his latest views oti bilateral. relations. lie predicted that Soviet detente pole;iy would be reaf- firmed at the party congioun next February, but said that criticisms were being heard !n the USSR and that there have been "discuesionn" about detente within the Soviet leadership. Arbatov, director of the USA Institute, implied that tloncow was closely following the increased crit- icism of detente in the US, especially an that issue showed signs of becoming a center of debate in the U5 election campaigner. Other Soviet commentators are also speaking more frequently of the effect of the presidential campaign on US policy, particularly policy toward the USSR. Arbatov acknowledged that there is uncertainty about who would be the leaders in both the US and the USSR a year from now. Ile was careful to pr i.nt out, however, that Urezhnev was in "good shape" and would definitely be arouund for a while yet. lie ad- vised that both sides ought to strive for as much bilateral pro, ress an possible under the prevent leaderships, succession uncertainties notwithstanding. He ning,.ea out SALT as one "central" issue on which he thought both nidea could and should show flexibility "before it in too late." He reemad pleased about reports that Secretary Kissinger might noon return to Moscow in an effort to break the stalemate. Responding to a comment about Soviet involvement in Angola, Arbatov observed blandly that difforoncen between Moscow and Washington would inevitably arise, but argued that these problems should not prevent progress in other areas. December 9, 1975 25X1 Approved For Rel4ase 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608RQ00400110025-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rele Arbatov's views, frequently and freely conveyed to Americans, arc often plainly self-'sorving, intended by warning or cajolery to influence US perceptions in ways favorable to Soviet policy. Ilea apparently on- joys Orazhnav'n confidence as a substantive axpurt, howavor, and is evidently attuned to the mood in Mos- cow. on occasion, at in his rocant articla in In- vgatia against Western critics of Soviet behavior, he seams to nerve au a quasi-official conduit for points his patrons want made to the US. December 9, 1975 Approved For Rele 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rele Yu lavia-U551 : Official Talks The Yugoslav ministers of foreign affairs and of foreign trade are in Moscow to sign a long-range economic agreement and to make a first-hand assess- ment of pre-Congress politica in the Soviet capital. The conclusion of a five year trade agreement for 1976-80 will probably be the public highlight of the visit. on the political side, Foreign Minister Minic's talks--possibly the final ones at this level before the CPSU congress moats in February--promise to be less rewarding. Belgrade clearly is not satisfied with recent Soviet denials of involvement with Cominformist subversives. The two countries are also deadlocked over conflicting goals in the long- postponed mcuving of European Communist parties. Belgrade and Moscow both support the MPLA in Angola, but their stands on the last Sinai accords are in conflict and.could cause trouble. Similarly, Minic could face Soviet displeasure over the Yugo- slav premier's precedent-setting visit to China this fall. Yugoslav media are playing several tunes on the Minic visit. For the benefit of the West, the press is insisting that relations with the Soviets are more or less normal--and thus not susceptible to third party manipulation. A commentary broad- cast to Moscow last week, however, reasserted Bel- grado's nonaligned principles, including its con- tinuing struggle against "hegemony" by either bloc. December 9, 1975 Approved For ReI4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110025-0 25X1 BU1-__9a Protests Yu onlav Allegations on Mac on an 3:unue 25X1 Approved For Release Sofia has reportedly made a formal protest to Belgrade about Xugoulav propaganda claims that Bul- garia has used terrorism to suppress its Macedonians. Despite the pro test, Yugoslav media are again stop- ping up the pace of anti-Bulgarian commentary. According to press reports, the Yugoslav ambas- sador in Sofia was summoned to the Foreign Ministry last month to receive the protest. The Bulgarians reportedly decried allegations that Sofia had ar- rested numerous Macedonians and had deported them to camps in the north Neither side has publicly re erre to o protest. The Yugoslav media have nevertheless continued to repeat and even embellish these same allegations in the wake of the Bulg. rian census last week. The latest commentary flatly states there was no cate- gory for Macedonians, and notes the survey only served Sofia's political purposes by proclaiming that Macedonians are ethnic Bulgarians. The latest developments in the long-standing dispute shatter the climate of uneasy calm that lasted barely two weeks after Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladomov visited Belgrade last month. Mladenov and his Yugoslav counterpart, Milos Minic, 25X1 reportedly discussed the issue of Belgrade's in- flammatory polemics, but were unable to agr on muzzling Belgrade's outspoken nationalists. December 9, 1975 Approved For Release 25X1 00110025-0 25X1 Approved For ReIo Jtom ni fi and the Romania's pursuit of a balanced policy in the Middle taut--maintaining relations with both Thraol and the principal Arab antagonists--continuer to cause problems between Bucharest and some of the more militant Arab Staten. The US embassy in Romania has provided a wrap-up of the current difficulties Bucharest faces. The Arabs are annoyed with the large volume of business the Romanian national airline (TAROtt) does with Israel. Romania's repeated refusal to answer Arab queries about its air service to Tel Aviv or about how many dews it is allowing to emigrate ap- parontly led to the current Arab boycott of TAROM. More recently, Romania was absent when the Utt voted on the yeti-'Zionism resolution, and Libya reacted by refusing landing rights to a TAROrl plane. An Egyp- tian official in Bucharest labeled this action par- ticularly "dirty" because Tripoli had "bullied" Ro- mania into setting up the air route in the First place. The tgyptian did suggest, however, that if Romania made some concession, such as discontinuing TAROM's passenger pooling arrangement with El Al, the situation mig..t improve. Romania's relations with Israel have blocked Bucharest's attempts to improve relations with Kuwait and the Persian Gulf states. Earlier, Kuwait had floated a signed prospectus for a $100-million loan to Romania on condition that the Kuwaiti parliament ratify the Romanian-Kuwait trade protocol. Ceausescu was apparently anxious for the loan to go through in ordce to demonstrate that he is getting something in return for recent Romanian aid credits and the dis- play by Bucharest of some sympathy for the Arab cause. Failure of the trade protocol to pass the Kuwaiti par- liament not only killed the loan, but also caused Ceausescu to scrub his late November visit to Kuwait. December 9, 1975 25X1 25X1 Approved For Re ease 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608 000400110025-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For RO Uucharest has also had its problems wit-.h Algiers, which has been unsympathetic to Romanian attempts to gain observer status in the nonaligned movement. Dep- uty Prime Minister Oancea's visit to Algiers from Ho- vombor 26 to 20 was, in part, designed to gain Alge- rian support for Bucharest's overtures for admission to the nonaligned summit ir. Colombo next sun fler. beputy foreign Minister Paconte reportedly will not off soon on a tour of several Arab countries in search of "oil and money." Pacoste's itinerary has not been announced, but the cancellation of Ceau- soscu'e Kuwait trip probably means Pacoste will have little chance of gaining either oil or money from those Middle Cant states in the best position to meet Romanian needs. Docembor 9, 1975 Approved For Rel 400110025-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For Relo 1i itlgar 1. co"Vergation with ttuntjarian party leader Hadar told / hassador Hciuliffe last Week that Hudapest is prepared tO fulfill the "freer hover eht" provisions of the ttel- ginki accord and that it hopes to etpan>l trade with the Wi. t4adar characteristi+ ally tted?Jed his str.teb;ent on t uropean security. After sot`te jeneral observa- tiohs on the utility of ittereased travel in correct= inch iillusions, he condluded that icpleMentatiOn of the "freer t?avvefent" provisions has an "inevitabi l- ity" about it. He said this alas so despite the at that "gone" still entertain Many reservations about t3ashet Three and that the Corrnunist countries may not hove as quickly and orthrightl~ as others Micht wish. Hadar's Statements on increased trade With the U Was Mote than the usual call for r~,ir,t=fa*aare _ nation status. Apparently to dispel ally 14astern notion that ttuntJary's economic pro'bler..s would cause it to reduce econoiic ties with the west, gadar said that ttuntlary needs aegess to western technol- oqy, taarkets, and raw Materials. He added that al= t.houcgh CtR? 7 inte(jration is 1,--port-ant for resource= poor ttunrjary, -1e disagrees with "theoreticians" who arque for tore ecot onic inte tration solely for h ise dig .rtes int.e~rrit>ivft-s - -M-others who arjsue that tiunjary should shift note co.- erce to trade with other t.orhunist countries. Hadar, the consurate politician, could have been tailorin his words for weatorn ears, calculat= ink that hints of tiunrtarian dissent could field im- port- nt political and econonic benefits. On the other hand, sore of his private words are in line With his public adMission last June that tt?utz taxi December 9, 1975 25X1 Approved For Rel$ase 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP86T00608ROO0400110025-0 Approved For Rele e0nduots one third of its trade With tile tlestt "Of ne+ essit ," not-, ehoiee. this c 'tents also Jibe Witil reeettt ttunEatian iorei=ln trade PrOjeetions, which gh0W that ttunjarian trade With tile West duritij the noxt five years is extfeoted to increase at a faster rate than total trap. In a logo=keyed tAannet, i