SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE STAFF NOTES
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
20
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 29, 2004
Sequence Number:
27
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 11, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
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Soviet Union-Eastern Eunpe
Top Secret
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December 11, 1975
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SOVIET UNION ? EASTERN EUROPE
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CONTEN'rs
DocomLor 11, 1975
Yugoslav Foreign Miniaior Viaitc Moscow.
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Mounting Soviet and East European
Trade Deficits with US . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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Czechoslovak Premier Visits Belgrade . . . . . . . 8
Prague to End Ban on
Foreign Business Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Big Parade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ANNEX: Yugoslavia: The Cominformist
Threat
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Yugoslav Coreign Mininter Visits Moscow
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The commuliic uo cn tha four-day visit of Foreign
Minintor Minia to Lila Soviet Union nuggusLu that. both
aides ae trying to squelch speculation about a widun-
ing breach in their relations.
Minic's official talks in Moscow took place, the
aommuniquu says in an atumophere of "friendship, mu-
tual trust, and franknasa." Although the comununiquo
iti uprinklud with praise for improvements in bilateral
relations and promises to continue the "constructive
spirit," ii focuses primarily on increased economic
ties and areas of general agreement in foreign affairs.
The iuaues o: Soviet support for Stalinist sub-
versivan in Yugoslavia--the central problem between
the two countries--and the deadlock over the European
Communist confuror,ce wore nut mentioned directly.
The Yugo;lava, however, are clearly irritated
by Moscow's stance on both problems and are venting
their anger in various ways. On Wednesday, for ox-
ample, Radio Zagreb's chief foreign affairs com-
mentator broke a ong-standing taboo by criticizing
Brezhnev by name. Ile said that Brezhnev's speech
to the Polish party congress was a reversion to the
Kremlin's habit of setting ideological standards
for the world communist movement and dictating do-
mestic and foreign policy to the "socialist com-
munity." The commentator also accused the Soviets
of violating understandings on preparations for the
European party conference.
The party prenidium met in Belgrade on Thurs-
day and, among other things, gave its full bless- 25X1
ing to the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to
accept Soviet ;.nitiatives at last month's prepara-
tor, talks for the Curoaean party conference_ I~
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14ountinV Soviet anti East furo can
r& ot:; tt) With Us
SOVie+: and Last European imports from the US dur-
ing January-September 1975 wore up 60 percent and ox-
ports were off 20 percent, according to US statistics.
For the year as a whole, the USSUU and Eastern Europe
seem euro to incur their largest trade deficit over
with the US.
Imports amounted to $1.6 billion, a $600-million
increase over the first three quarters of 1974. Most
of the rise was accounted for by the USSR and Poland.
Exports fell by about $100 million, to roughly $500
million. The decline was divided among a number of
countries.
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Soviet imports from the US were more than double
last year's because of large deliveries of grain and
equipment. Grain imports will approach $1 billion for
the year; imports of machinery and equipment may reach
$500 million. Soviets exports to the US were down 25
percent in the first nine months of 1975 compared with
the same period last year. Soviet exports to the US,
mainly platinum group metals and oil, fell victim to
the world-wide recession. Fourth quarter exports,
particularly oil, may, however, pick up.
East European trade with the US grew very little.
The less than $100-million increase in imports was the
result mainly of Polish and Romanian purchases of agri-
cultural products; exports were down. Marked increases
in exports of Polish hams and Bulgarian tobacco failed
to compensate for the decline in exports of Romanian
gasoline, Hungarian gold coins, and Polish steel and
zinc. Imports are expected 1-o rise for the balance
of the year, in large part because of substantial grain
purchases by Poland and East Germany. The outlook for
exports in the fourth quarter of 1975 is uncertain.
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would reduce substantially the Soviet deficit in 1976.
which is now negotiating with a US firm for exports of
gasoline at reduced prices. An increase in Soviet oil
exports--assuming a US-Soviet agreement is concluded--
The Soviet and Last European deficit w;_h l:he US
of $l.. billion in the first three quarters of 1975 in
double th it for all of 1974. Large purchasnns of grain
will hall) raise Soviet imports from the US to about
$1.7 billion and Last European imports to roughly $1
billion in 1975. Exports for the year are cintimated
at $300 million and $500 million, respectively. A
trade deficit of roughly $1.9 billion in thcraforo
likely.
Outstanding orders for US grain and eruipment-'-
mainly by the USSR and Poland--will ensure~a high level
of imports in 1976, although balance-of-payments con-
straints in a number of East European countries an well
as the USSR may affect now orders. Eastern Europe has
a limited export potential, and a shrrp increase in
exports to the US in not anticipated even for Romania,
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Czachor lovak Premier Visits belt rade
Economic relations wore the focal point of Czecho-
slovak nromior Strougal'e three-day visit to Yugosla-
via, which rn ded on Wednesday.
A five-year (1976-00% trade agreement and a trade
protocol for 1976 wore signed. The long-term agreement
calls for a douLling of the present trade level to
$4.3 billion. Metallurgical and agricultural coopera-
tion, the transport of Soviet natural gas for Yugosla-
via acrosn Czechoslovak territory, the Pan Adria pipe-
line, and economic cooperation beyond 1980 apparently
wore also discussed.
In the political realm, where there are far fewer
possibilities for agreement, the two sides "exchanged
views" on "topical questions in international rela-
tions." Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are on opposite
sides in the deadlocked preparations for a European
communist party conference, and Prague is viewed by
Belgrade as a major support center for the Yugoslav
Cominformists. Moreover, the basic tenets of Czecho-
slovak foreign policy--proletarian internationalism
and a coordinated bloc approach--are anathema to Bel-
grade.
The Yugoslavs may have complained to Strougal
about Czechoslovak press treatment of their country.
Prague's repeated emphasis on the role of the Soviet
Union in the liberation of Yugoslavia has persist-
ently rankled Belgrade.
Strougal probably pushed for a Tito visit to
Prague. Although party chief ilusak visited Belgrade
in 1973 and Yugoslav officials have stated that the
ill will of the post-invasion period has dissipated,
the Czechoslovaks have sought a Tito visit as the
decisive sign that relations :,t:?:e normalized.
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5+:rougal, who was received by the Marshal, said in
an interview at the and of the visit that Tito had
promised to visit Prague "in the near future." The
Yugoslav version of the interview omitted this point.
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According to a decree published on Thurnday,
the 27-year-old ban on permanent representation by
foreign fivmn in Czechoslovakia will be lifted on
January 1. Prague is the last Warsaw Pact country
to remove legal rostrictionn on such representation.
Prague hopes that removal of the ban will stim-
ulate trade with the West. The regime, however,
clearly intends to maintain tight control over the
foreign representation. Business offices will be
rostricted to large corporations, and the numbers
of foreigners will be kept small. In addition, the
special permits granted to foreign firms will ap-
parently have to be renewed annr"1.ly.
Those foreign business representatives who do
make it to Czechoslovakia will face significant prob-
lems. In addition to the secret police surveillance
and an understandable reluctance of Czechoslovaks
to maintain more than perfunctory contacts with
Westerners, the Czechoslovak legal system contains
a wide-ranging eefinition of state secrets, often
including the basic economic data necessary for of-
fectivo business relations.
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Prague To t;nd flan on t'orui. n
u fine ss ?f f -con
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`t'he Bie Parnde
Videotapes of ttoncow television's two and a half
hours of coverage of the parade in tied Square on tdov-
ember 7 have given a more realistic view of the Soviet
leadership on the reviewing stand than the stiff pic-
ture published in the press the next day. The televi-
nion program even tried, with questionable success, to
cover up the absence of some of the leaders during the
civilian portion of the parade.
After showing the arrival of all the leaders a few
minutes before the start of the ceremonies at 10 a.m.,
the TV cameras concentrated on an animated tre1zhnev and
those near him. The military portion of the proram,
including Grechko's ten-minute speech, lasted 45 min-
utes and featured cloneupn of Podgorny, Grochko,
I3rezhnev, and Konygin saluting and talking as the
troops and military equipment panned by.
When the fanfare signaled the start of the civilian
part of the parade, Podgorny moved over next to Brezhnev
and for the next 25 minutes the cameras spotlighted
?odgorny, Brezhnev, Konygin, and Sunlov. A diplomatic
source reported that Brezhnev disappeared about this
time, and the television seems to confirm thin, nince
the next 45 minutes passed with no glimpse of any
leaders.
That urezhnev was not the only defector from the
reviewing stand was apparent when the cameras renumod
their leadership coverage a little before noon and
revealed a jumbled lineup of Konygin, Brezhnev, Sunlov,
Grishin, and Atazurov. Podgorny and Kirilonko did not
reappear for another 14 minutes, just before the and
of the parade.
Their absence could have been prompted by waning
interest an much an lack of stamina. At the time they
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left, the precinion formations from :soviet organi%a-
ti:ons had ended and the "parade" had become a milling
mans of adULtn from different done?w districts walking
through the square carrying children, balloon", flowers,
and placards. The `I'V commentators often cut away to
interview npowkatorn. During the last 20 minutes, the
cameras made up for lost time and lingered on the lead-
ors rather than on the laut contingents of the parade,
making more obvious the long period that had passed
without one shot of the top men.
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Yugoslavia s The Cominformint Throat
For almost a year and a half, the
aubveraivo activities of pro-Soviet
titaliniats in Yugoslavia have been Bel-
grade's favorite propaganda theme and
the main target of investigation and
suppression by the Tito regime. For
various reasons, however, Tito still
has not provided a definitive explana-
tion of the actual threat that the Comin-
formiats pone. We begin today a series
of articles that will examine the di-
mensions of Cominformiat activity, on-
aeon its potential impact on Yugoelavia'a
relations with Moscow, and present some
tentative judgments about the possible
affects within the Yugoslav leadership.
The Dimensions of the Problem
Official Yugoslav propaganda on the strength of
the Cominforminta generally maip tains that the group
in small, totally dependent on unnamed foreign--but
implicitly Soviet--support, and determined to ally
itself with other dissidents to broaden its resources
for pro-Soviet activity. As a corollary, the propa-
ganda asserts that the principal organizers, who are
uniformly described au "men of the pant," are al-
ready in jail or soon will be. The resultant public
image in of a clumpy, parasitic, pro-Soviet effort
compared to a calmly efficient, "vigilant" regime.
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Included in the pessimistic picture emerging from
Zagreb in a report to parliament by the republic min-
inter of interior that there are 3, 000 known Comin-
formisto in the republic alone and that their misdeeds
often go unreported because of high-level political
protection. Another member of the Croat party execu-
tive committee chime that of 370 Croat Cominformints
in exile, 202 are now in Western Europe working to
subvert Yugoslavs temporarily employed there.
The Croat regime has also reported er.me disturbing
trends in at least one other republic. "ftdio Zagreb
recently asserted that !itograd, the capital city of
flontenagro, hen at leant 250 "rehabilitated" Comin-
fornniote in its party organization. The broadcast al-
leged thd, some of these Stalinists have adopted their
old anti-Titoint line and have sought contacts with
their cohorts in loenia-Hercegovina, Belgrade, "and
even the USSfl."
Zagreb' s lead in putting out thin kind of passi-
m=ctic public version of the threat appears to be part
of an assigned division of labor in the regime's over-
all effort to lot the facts out gradually, so an not
to net off hysterical reactions. Vladimir Bakeric,
the Croat party's chief spokesman in Belgrade--and
head of the presidential commission for protection of
the Constitution--in clearly the ;:wing force behind
the revelations coming from Zagreb. His sober views
are shared by others in Belgrade, who have privately
expressed unease over the regime's failure to iden-
tify the real ringleaders and by persistent rumors
that an many as 20 army officers are under arrest.
"Are You Now, or Have You Ever Been?"
In addition to its propaganda campaign, Belgrade
has launched a major effort from the grass roots to
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crush whatever opposition exists, but particularly
those forma sympathetic to the pro-Soviets.
The broad-brush approach strongly suggests a new
facet in the wall developed art of the Yugoslav polit-
ical purge. In most of the recent massive efforts by
Tito to purge his advernnriee. -primarily the fankovic
followers in 1966-67 and liberals and nationalists in
1972-73--Tito's rhetoric far outstripped actual ad-
ministrative measures. This time, to Judge from the
Croat revelations, Tito's admissions arcs at boat a
timid reflection of the problem. The actual, impetus
in the current arrests is clearly coming from his
underlings, from trade unionists, officials of vot-
orens organizations, and a host of other local
spokesmen.
The Yugoslav proclivity for random political
epithets was most apparent in recant weeks in a de-
nunciation of flilovan Djilas--a hard-bitten anti-
Stalinist--as a Cominformist. One explanation is
that the Yugoslavs are determined to avoid an exclu-
sively anti-Soviet campaign and to mop up opposition
of any stripe before Tito dies. As a result, some
60 Croat nationalists and another 30-40 Albanian
"irredentist?s" are also under arrest. Aside from in-
accurate labeling of dissidents, Belgrade hus alp;,
had trouble in controlling such excesses as :~unjuct-
ified attacks on honest Communists."
Groping in the Dark?
Yugoslav doubletalk and manipulation of the avi-
donce serve to obfuscate the actual magnitude of the
Cominformist threat. The leadership's call for a
popular effort to identify Cominformists also suggests
that Belgrade is simply not satisfied that the police
knew the full range of the conspiracy.
Further, the several months' delay in holding
trials--a catharsis for most of Tito's purc'.-!ss--pro-
uumably means that he believes the time fo casing
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tensions had not yet arrived. The investigations may
be reaching into increasingly s^nnitive levels of the
Yugoslav hierarchy, with the remelt that Tito in able
to use the throat of an indictment for treason--and
execution--to assure that no political clique opposes
his effort to search out latent subversion.
Another sign that more revelations are to come
is the absence of major exposes of Cominformism in
those regions of the country where Stalinist influence
in presumably greater than in Croatia. Serbia, its
two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina,
Montenegro, aW Bosnia-1{orcegovina are the traditional
hitbods o2 Yugoslav conservatism. The Cominformist
program is tailored to appeal to advocates of strong
central authority, an opposed to the looser federal
system Tito has created. Serb and Montenegrin
nationalists--who see their dominant role in Belgrade
an ensuring control over the smaller nationalities--and
the old-line Communists, who prefer their politics
uncluttered by compromise with or back-tall: from the
locals, all fall into this category.
Belgrade particularly fears a latent attraction
to this simplistic "firm hand" approach within the
powerful Yugoslav military and the followers of
Aleksandr Runkovic, Tito's one-time heir-apparent.
Rankovic still has considerable prestige in Serb na-
tionalist circles and among older hands in the secret
police.
one of the most sensitive tasks in the current
investigations, therefore, in to separate the na-
tionalists from the genuine pro-Soviets who ire making
similar noises. The message of currant anti-Stalinist
propaganda is essentially to make clear that excessive
nationalism serves dangerous subversives who would
take Yugoslavia back into the Soviet camp. Tito thus
appears once again to be telling the Yugoslavs that
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their patty aquabblon are a dangerous luxury.
Throughout the country, the local party and mans
organizations arc focusing th6ir attention on this
internal waaknenn. Until all the returns are in, 25X1
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d
hi
oa
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p in Belcgrade may be content to lot
the campaign rock aloe at its current pace.
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