SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE STAFF NOTES

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8
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RIPPUB
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T
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20
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December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 29, 2004
Sequence Number: 
27
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Publication Date: 
December 11, 1975
Content Type: 
REPORT
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25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110p . Secret Soviet Union-Eastern Eunpe Top Secret 25X1 December 11, 1975 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 25X1 Approved Forl SOVIET UNION ? EASTERN EUROPE 25X1 CONTEN'rs DocomLor 11, 1975 Yugoslav Foreign Miniaior Viaitc Moscow. 25X6 Mounting Soviet and East European Trade Deficits with US . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 25X1 25X1 Czechoslovak Premier Visits Belgrade . . . . . . . 8 Prague to End Ban on Foreign Business Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The Big Parade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 ANNEX: Yugoslavia: The Cominformist Threat Approved For R4 X2000400110027-8 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rele Yugoslav Coreign Mininter Visits Moscow 25X1 The commuliic uo cn tha four-day visit of Foreign Minintor Minia to Lila Soviet Union nuggusLu that. both aides ae trying to squelch speculation about a widun- ing breach in their relations. Minic's official talks in Moscow took place, the aommuniquu says in an atumophere of "friendship, mu- tual trust, and franknasa." Although the comununiquo iti uprinklud with praise for improvements in bilateral relations and promises to continue the "constructive spirit," ii focuses primarily on increased economic ties and areas of general agreement in foreign affairs. The iuaues o: Soviet support for Stalinist sub- versivan in Yugoslavia--the central problem between the two countries--and the deadlock over the European Communist confuror,ce wore nut mentioned directly. The Yugo;lava, however, are clearly irritated by Moscow's stance on both problems and are venting their anger in various ways. On Wednesday, for ox- ample, Radio Zagreb's chief foreign affairs com- mentator broke a ong-standing taboo by criticizing Brezhnev by name. Ile said that Brezhnev's speech to the Polish party congress was a reversion to the Kremlin's habit of setting ideological standards for the world communist movement and dictating do- mestic and foreign policy to the "socialist com- munity." The commentator also accused the Soviets of violating understandings on preparations for the European party conference. The party prenidium met in Belgrade on Thurs- day and, among other things, gave its full bless- 25X1 ing to the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to accept Soviet ;.nitiatives at last month's prepara- tor, talks for the Curoaean party conference_ I~ December 11, 1975 Approved For Rolease 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00604 25X1 25X6 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 Approved For Rele 14ountinV Soviet anti East furo can r& ot:; tt) With Us SOVie+: and Last European imports from the US dur- ing January-September 1975 wore up 60 percent and ox- ports were off 20 percent, according to US statistics. For the year as a whole, the USSUU and Eastern Europe seem euro to incur their largest trade deficit over with the US. Imports amounted to $1.6 billion, a $600-million increase over the first three quarters of 1974. Most of the rise was accounted for by the USSR and Poland. Exports fell by about $100 million, to roughly $500 million. The decline was divided among a number of countries. 25X1 Soviet imports from the US were more than double last year's because of large deliveries of grain and equipment. Grain imports will approach $1 billion for the year; imports of machinery and equipment may reach $500 million. Soviets exports to the US were down 25 percent in the first nine months of 1975 compared with the same period last year. Soviet exports to the US, mainly platinum group metals and oil, fell victim to the world-wide recession. Fourth quarter exports, particularly oil, may, however, pick up. East European trade with the US grew very little. The less than $100-million increase in imports was the result mainly of Polish and Romanian purchases of agri- cultural products; exports were down. Marked increases in exports of Polish hams and Bulgarian tobacco failed to compensate for the decline in exports of Romanian gasoline, Hungarian gold coins, and Polish steel and zinc. Imports are expected 1-o rise for the balance of the year, in large part because of substantial grain purchases by Poland and East Germany. The outlook for exports in the fourth quarter of 1975 is uncertain. December 11, 1975 25X1 Approved For Releasle 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000#00110027-8 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rel would reduce substantially the Soviet deficit in 1976. which is now negotiating with a US firm for exports of gasoline at reduced prices. An increase in Soviet oil exports--assuming a US-Soviet agreement is concluded-- The Soviet and Last European deficit w;_h l:he US of $l.. billion in the first three quarters of 1975 in double th it for all of 1974. Large purchasnns of grain will hall) raise Soviet imports from the US to about $1.7 billion and Last European imports to roughly $1 billion in 1975. Exports for the year are cintimated at $300 million and $500 million, respectively. A trade deficit of roughly $1.9 billion in thcraforo likely. Outstanding orders for US grain and eruipment-'- mainly by the USSR and Poland--will ensure~a high level of imports in 1976, although balance-of-payments con- straints in a number of East European countries an well as the USSR may affect now orders. Eastern Europe has a limited export potential, and a shrrp increase in exports to the US in not anticipated even for Romania, December 11, 1975 Approved For Relo 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 Approved For Relea$ Czachor lovak Premier Visits belt rade Economic relations wore the focal point of Czecho- slovak nromior Strougal'e three-day visit to Yugosla- via, which rn ded on Wednesday. A five-year (1976-00% trade agreement and a trade protocol for 1976 wore signed. The long-term agreement calls for a douLling of the present trade level to $4.3 billion. Metallurgical and agricultural coopera- tion, the transport of Soviet natural gas for Yugosla- via acrosn Czechoslovak territory, the Pan Adria pipe- line, and economic cooperation beyond 1980 apparently wore also discussed. In the political realm, where there are far fewer possibilities for agreement, the two sides "exchanged views" on "topical questions in international rela- tions." Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are on opposite sides in the deadlocked preparations for a European communist party conference, and Prague is viewed by Belgrade as a major support center for the Yugoslav Cominformists. Moreover, the basic tenets of Czecho- slovak foreign policy--proletarian internationalism and a coordinated bloc approach--are anathema to Bel- grade. The Yugoslavs may have complained to Strougal about Czechoslovak press treatment of their country. Prague's repeated emphasis on the role of the Soviet Union in the liberation of Yugoslavia has persist- ently rankled Belgrade. Strougal probably pushed for a Tito visit to Prague. Although party chief ilusak visited Belgrade in 1973 and Yugoslav officials have stated that the ill will of the post-invasion period has dissipated, the Czechoslovaks have sought a Tito visit as the decisive sign that relations :,t:?:e normalized. December 11, 1975 Approved For Relea 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 5+:rougal, who was received by the Marshal, said in an interview at the and of the visit that Tito had promised to visit Prague "in the near future." The Yugoslav version of the interview omitted this point. 25X1 December 11, 1975 Approved For Releas 25X1 Approved For 25X1 According to a decree published on Thurnday, the 27-year-old ban on permanent representation by foreign fivmn in Czechoslovakia will be lifted on January 1. Prague is the last Warsaw Pact country to remove legal rostrictionn on such representation. Prague hopes that removal of the ban will stim- ulate trade with the West. The regime, however, clearly intends to maintain tight control over the foreign representation. Business offices will be rostricted to large corporations, and the numbers of foreigners will be kept small. In addition, the special permits granted to foreign firms will ap- parently have to be renewed annr"1.ly. Those foreign business representatives who do make it to Czechoslovakia will face significant prob- lems. In addition to the secret police surveillance and an understandable reluctance of Czechoslovaks to maintain more than perfunctory contacts with Westerners, the Czechoslovak legal system contains a wide-ranging eefinition of state secrets, often including the basic economic data necessary for of- fectivo business relations. 25X1 December 11, 1975 -10- 25X1 Prague To t;nd flan on t'orui. n u fine ss ?f f -con Approved F P8R000400110027-8 Approved For 00400110027-8 25X1 `t'he Bie Parnde Videotapes of ttoncow television's two and a half hours of coverage of the parade in tied Square on tdov- ember 7 have given a more realistic view of the Soviet leadership on the reviewing stand than the stiff pic- ture published in the press the next day. The televi- nion program even tried, with questionable success, to cover up the absence of some of the leaders during the civilian portion of the parade. After showing the arrival of all the leaders a few minutes before the start of the ceremonies at 10 a.m., the TV cameras concentrated on an animated tre1zhnev and those near him. The military portion of the proram, including Grechko's ten-minute speech, lasted 45 min- utes and featured cloneupn of Podgorny, Grochko, I3rezhnev, and Konygin saluting and talking as the troops and military equipment panned by. When the fanfare signaled the start of the civilian part of the parade, Podgorny moved over next to Brezhnev and for the next 25 minutes the cameras spotlighted ?odgorny, Brezhnev, Konygin, and Sunlov. A diplomatic source reported that Brezhnev disappeared about this time, and the television seems to confirm thin, nince the next 45 minutes passed with no glimpse of any leaders. That urezhnev was not the only defector from the reviewing stand was apparent when the cameras renumod their leadership coverage a little before noon and revealed a jumbled lineup of Konygin, Brezhnev, Sunlov, Grishin, and Atazurov. Podgorny and Kirilonko did not reappear for another 14 minutes, just before the and of the parade. Their absence could have been prompted by waning interest an much an lack of stamina. At the time they December 11, 1975 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T0060q Approved For Relea left, the precinion formations from :soviet organi%a- ti:ons had ended and the "parade" had become a milling mans of adULtn from different done?w districts walking through the square carrying children, balloon", flowers, and placards. The `I'V commentators often cut away to interview npowkatorn. During the last 20 minutes, the cameras made up for lost time and lingered on the lead- ors rather than on the laut contingents of the parade, making more obvious the long period that had passed without one shot of the top men. 25X1 25X1 December 11, 1975 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0p0400110027-8 25X1 Approved For Rele Yugoslavia s The Cominformint Throat For almost a year and a half, the aubveraivo activities of pro-Soviet titaliniats in Yugoslavia have been Bel- grade's favorite propaganda theme and the main target of investigation and suppression by the Tito regime. For various reasons, however, Tito still has not provided a definitive explana- tion of the actual threat that the Comin- formiats pone. We begin today a series of articles that will examine the di- mensions of Cominformiat activity, on- aeon its potential impact on Yugoelavia'a relations with Moscow, and present some tentative judgments about the possible affects within the Yugoslav leadership. The Dimensions of the Problem Official Yugoslav propaganda on the strength of the Cominforminta generally maip tains that the group in small, totally dependent on unnamed foreign--but implicitly Soviet--support, and determined to ally itself with other dissidents to broaden its resources for pro-Soviet activity. As a corollary, the propa- ganda asserts that the principal organizers, who are uniformly described au "men of the pant," are al- ready in jail or soon will be. The resultant public image in of a clumpy, parasitic, pro-Soviet effort compared to a calmly efficient, "vigilant" regime. December 11. 1975 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/09: CIA-RDP86T00608R00q400110027-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110027-8 25X1 Included in the pessimistic picture emerging from Zagreb in a report to parliament by the republic min- inter of interior that there are 3, 000 known Comin- formisto in the republic alone and that their misdeeds often go unreported because of high-level political protection. Another member of the Croat party execu- tive committee chime that of 370 Croat Cominformints in exile, 202 are now in Western Europe working to subvert Yugoslavs temporarily employed there. The Croat regime has also reported er.me disturbing trends in at least one other republic. "ftdio Zagreb recently asserted that !itograd, the capital city of flontenagro, hen at leant 250 "rehabilitated" Comin- fornniote in its party organization. The broadcast al- leged thd, some of these Stalinists have adopted their old anti-Titoint line and have sought contacts with their cohorts in loenia-Hercegovina, Belgrade, "and even the USSfl." Zagreb' s lead in putting out thin kind of passi- m=ctic public version of the threat appears to be part of an assigned division of labor in the regime's over- all effort to lot the facts out gradually, so an not to net off hysterical reactions. Vladimir Bakeric, the Croat party's chief spokesman in Belgrade--and head of the presidential commission for protection of the Constitution--in clearly the ;:wing force behind the revelations coming from Zagreb. His sober views are shared by others in Belgrade, who have privately expressed unease over the regime's failure to iden- tify the real ringleaders and by persistent rumors that an many as 20 army officers are under arrest. "Are You Now, or Have You Ever Been?" In addition to its propaganda campaign, Belgrade has launched a major effort from the grass roots to Docombur 11, 1975 25X1 Approved For Rele 25X1 Approved For Rel 0400110027-8 crush whatever opposition exists, but particularly those forma sympathetic to the pro-Soviets. The broad-brush approach strongly suggests a new facet in the wall developed art of the Yugoslav polit- ical purge. In most of the recent massive efforts by Tito to purge his advernnriee. -primarily the fankovic followers in 1966-67 and liberals and nationalists in 1972-73--Tito's rhetoric far outstripped actual ad- ministrative measures. This time, to Judge from the Croat revelations, Tito's admissions arcs at boat a timid reflection of the problem. The actual, impetus in the current arrests is clearly coming from his underlings, from trade unionists, officials of vot- orens organizations, and a host of other local spokesmen. The Yugoslav proclivity for random political epithets was most apparent in recant weeks in a de- nunciation of flilovan Djilas--a hard-bitten anti- Stalinist--as a Cominformist. One explanation is that the Yugoslavs are determined to avoid an exclu- sively anti-Soviet campaign and to mop up opposition of any stripe before Tito dies. As a result, some 60 Croat nationalists and another 30-40 Albanian "irredentist?s" are also under arrest. Aside from in- accurate labeling of dissidents, Belgrade hus alp;, had trouble in controlling such excesses as :~unjuct- ified attacks on honest Communists." Groping in the Dark? Yugoslav doubletalk and manipulation of the avi- donce serve to obfuscate the actual magnitude of the Cominformist threat. The leadership's call for a popular effort to identify Cominformists also suggests that Belgrade is simply not satisfied that the police knew the full range of the conspiracy. Further, the several months' delay in holding trials--a catharsis for most of Tito's purc'.-!ss--pro- uumably means that he believes the time fo casing December 11, 1975 25X1 Approved For 25X1 Approved For Rele tensions had not yet arrived. The investigations may be reaching into increasingly s^nnitive levels of the Yugoslav hierarchy, with the remelt that Tito in able to use the throat of an indictment for treason--and execution--to assure that no political clique opposes his effort to search out latent subversion. Another sign that more revelations are to come is the absence of major exposes of Cominformism in those regions of the country where Stalinist influence in presumably greater than in Croatia. Serbia, its two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Montenegro, aW Bosnia-1{orcegovina are the traditional hitbods o2 Yugoslav conservatism. The Cominformist program is tailored to appeal to advocates of strong central authority, an opposed to the looser federal system Tito has created. Serb and Montenegrin nationalists--who see their dominant role in Belgrade an ensuring control over the smaller nationalities--and the old-line Communists, who prefer their politics uncluttered by compromise with or back-tall: from the locals, all fall into this category. Belgrade particularly fears a latent attraction to this simplistic "firm hand" approach within the powerful Yugoslav military and the followers of Aleksandr Runkovic, Tito's one-time heir-apparent. Rankovic still has considerable prestige in Serb na- tionalist circles and among older hands in the secret police. one of the most sensitive tasks in the current investigations, therefore, in to separate the na- tionalists from the genuine pro-Soviets who ire making similar noises. The message of currant anti-Stalinist propaganda is essentially to make clear that excessive nationalism serves dangerous subversives who would take Yugoslavia back into the Soviet camp. Tito thus appears once again to be telling the Yugoslavs that December 11, 1975 -17- 25X1 Approved For Rele Approved For 9 25X1 their patty aquabblon are a dangerous luxury. Throughout the country, the local party and mans organizations arc focusing th6ir attention on this internal waaknenn. Until all the returns are in, 25X1 tho l d hi oa orn p in Belcgrade may be content to lot the campaign rock aloe at its current pace. December 11, 1975 25X1 Approved For Rlelease 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608RQ00400110027-8