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December 30, 1975
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Re1e-se 2005106122 :16IA-RDP86T00608Rb00400110037,7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7 Soviet U niore-Easte ?'n Europe TAFF NOTES State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Secret 171 December 30, 1975 No. 0785/75 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7 661 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7 CONTENTS December 30, 1975 Pay Raise for Romaniar, Military. . . . . . . . . 1 Zagladin Takes on the Hard Liners on Communist Tactic-s. . 2 Soviets May Be Building Case That CSCE Act Is Equivalent to a Treaty. . . . . . . . . 6 USSR: Electzic Power in the New Five Year Plan. 8 CHRONOLOGY.10 ANNEX: Yugoslavia: Coirinformism as a Domestic Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Approved For Release 2005/0 0 i ff- DP86T00608R000400110037-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/ (CgJ 1 P86T00608R000400110037-7 Pay_ Raise for Romanian Milii ar 5X1 The recently announced liberalization of pay and annual leave for the Romanian military suggests that Ceausescu is worried about possible dissatis- faction in the armed services. On December 29, the Executive Political Committee issued a decree callin,_. for pay hikes of 100 percent for r)rivates, 65 and 70 percent for corporals and sergeants, and 29 percent. for military cadets, commissioned and noncommissior'v3d officers, and reservists. The decree also grants increased pay allowances for food and longer vacations. In a rare public admission, the Ceausescu regime last fall confirmed that food shortages existed i.r. Romania. The situation had apparently deteriorat.od rapidly following the devastating floods which h'i, t. Romania in July. The military played a leading role in fighting the floods and in maintaining basic serv- ices throughout the country. Indeed, consumer problems may have played a part in Ceausescu's decision to cancel his visit to Yugoslavia in mid-October. The regime has now made foodstuffs more readily available throughout the country, and modest pay hikes have been announced foz the civilian sector of the economy. Although the pay scales for the Romanian mili- tary, particularly the enlisted men, are low,, the military pay raises are the first hint that public discontent may have spread into the ranks of the armed forces. The military is a mainstay of the Ceau- sescu regime, and the size of the wage inci- ases re- flects the leadership's sensitivity to any signs of discontent. Meantime., Ceausescu has still not offe._,ed any significant broad policy changes to ease pot.~ilar dis- content over the long run. The regime, for ----,ample, seems determined to proceed with -a'pid industriali- zation regardless of its effect c, the average Ro- manian. December 30, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06/2 j l86T00608R000400110037-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/4PP86T00608R000400110037-7 Zagladin Takes on the Hard Liners on Communist Tactics A two--part article in Questions of P;ailooophy this fall by V. V. Zagladin differs sharply from the hard-line views on communist party tactics expressed in August by Konstantin Zarodov. The differences are sc, pronounced that Zagladin m%y well have intended his article as a rebuttal of the hard liners. As is character:.stic of this type of Soviet :,siting, Zag- ladin sets up symbolic villains. When he upholds Lenin against "left revisionists" such as Bukharin, Zagladin is attack,ing those unnamed individuals whom he deems to be the modern advocates of Bukharin's heresy. Zagladin's position as First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee carries far more prestige than Zarodov's post as edi- tor of the World Marxist Neview. On the other hand, Zarodov's article, which appeared in F avda, re- ceived far wider dissemination than is customary for such arcane doctrinal treatises. In any case; Zagladin's effort is no more the last word in this ancient dispute than was Zarodov's. The most significant aspect of Zagladin's article may be that, despite Brezhnev's highly publicized reception o Zarodov in September, it is still possi- ble to present a divergent opinion in a major publication. The theoretical debate over the preconditions for the transformation to socialism, which Zagladin addresses, reaches practical application in the ques- tion of communist party tactics for obtaining power. Where Zarodov is militant and uncompromising in op- position to the idea of cooperation --h-tween social- ists and communis=ts, Zagladin sE xns to feel at it is more important to secure tan ibie impr(, nts in the position of the workers than to adher, some -Abstract ideal of party purity. December 3t,, 1973 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/WCAkilk Zagladin explicitly states th,.t it is necessary to win over a majority of the working h:lass before attempting the socialist trans ormation of society. As is customary in there theological debates, Zagladizt draws freely on the Leninist gospel, citing those maxims that favor mass movements and majorities. He quotes Lenin to the effect that it is essential to win over "not merely a simple majority of workers, but the majority of those exploited." All this is in striking contrast to Zarodov, who seemed to endorse Portuguese party leader Cunhal's argument that mere numerical majorities were inconse- quential and that a determined cadre could seize power regardless of the latest poll results. Zagladin's poo ition is diametrically opposed. Ag;~n citing Lenin, he argues that "It is criminal to lead only the vanguard alone--the working class---into the battle for the revolution." Insofar as Zagladin acknowledges the importance of "subjective` factors---the intangibles such as the willingness of comn-ur.ists to seize the ;,foment and convert a revolutionary situation into revolution-- he is in agreement with the militants. But his final weighing of the factors is much different and, al- though he does not dismiss the importance of the sub- jective element, he says explicitly that if the neces- sary preconditions are absent, no subjective activity can lead to a victorious revolution. "The party cannot by its will summon up the enormous surge of the overwhelming majority of the people's mass which is extremely important for the revolution." In what may be a necessary effort to rationalize retroactively the Russian experience, Zagladin asserts that under certain historic conditions 4.t is some- times possible for states at the midule level of de- velopment to leap directly into socialism. But the inescapable concl,.uoi'n of Zagladin's reasoning is that such a leap is nearly impossible in ecuntric4t; of developed capitalism. Indeed, it appears that he is December 30, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06,x# ,1P86T00608R000400110037-7 Approved For Release 2005/0e I &k DP86T00608R000400110037-7 firmer in this position in hiss second section, whi,%:h was signed to press in November, than in the first, which was dated a month previously. Both were prob- ably prepared considerably earlier. In the interval between the two parts, Zagladin may have felt the need to rebut contrary statements more forcefully. While the shadow of the leftist setback in Chile hangs over these debates, their current application is clearly in Western Europe. Zagladin has frequent dealings with West,-_::n communist parties and may have felt the need to present a thesis with which they would be sympathetic and which would justify their independence while avoiding a doctrinal break with Moscow. The hard-line po.;ition to which Zarodov seems to subscribe, and which the Italian Communists have been compelled to rebut, maintains that the defeat in Chile occurred in large measure because the left forces were not sufficiently resolute. The Italians will be much more comfortable with Zagladin's thesis, which supports their analysis that the left- ists failed in Chile because they lacked the mass electoral support necessary to push thru the funda- mental social changes they undertook. The differences between Zagladin and Zarodov are also of intense concern to the French party. As the prospect of obtaining at least a share of power has grown closer, the French seen to be moving steadily away from Zarodovite orthodoxy, which con- signed them to an opposition they now increasingly believe was both permanent and sterile. While Zagladin offers a doctrinal rationaliza- tion for participation in government by the major Western communist parties, his thesis tends to post- pone the actual transformation to socialism. In- deed, he lists a variety of "negative phenomena" in modern advanced societies that collectively act to render such a transformation difficult. While he also cites, almost in an obligatory fashion, develop- ment that tend to enhance the preconditions for a December 30, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/0 6rg RlA DP86T00608R000400110037-7 Approved For Release 2005/06I Ei"&86T00608R000400110037-7 5X1 socialist transformation, his overall conclusion leans toward pessimism about the immediate like:Lihood of socialist revolutions in advanced countries. in the continuing debate within the Soviet Union over whether the current economic distress of the West makes it susceptible to social transformation, and hence, perhaps, to Soviet meddling, Zagladin is clearly a voice of caution. Zagladin seems aware that his evolutionary pre- scription for achieving socialism suffers somewhat in comparison with the shortcuts offered by the militants who emphasize "subjective" factors, i.e., the willingness of a well-disciplined faction to seize power regardless of shortcomings in the "ob- jective" preconditions. As if in compensation, Zag- ladin presents the concept, seldom heard nowadays, that state-monopoly capitalism is a significant step toward the socialization of production. Presumably this is because it then becomes impossible for pri- vate capital to recover its former position. This resembles the line taken by some Soviets with re- gard to Portugal, in which the temporary fluctuations in the fortunes of the communist party were seen as less significant than the fact that irreversible socio-economic cha,liges were taking place that would prevent a return to the prerevolutionary situation. Thus, while Zagladin cannot offer shortcuts, the transformation achieved by his formula is likely to be more solidly grounded and more permanent. 25X1A December 30, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06&Q( '=FP86T00608R000400110037-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/SEJ]'P86T00608R000400110037-7 Soviets Play Be Building Case That CSCE Act Is Equivalent to a Treaty In their continuing campaign to inflate the importance of CSCE, the Soviets now seem t. b'a moving toward the position that the CSCE Final Act. is binding under international law. Writing in New Ttnes, Va- lentin Yaroslavtsev asserts that, although the act is not formally a treaty, there is an obligation to observe its provisions. The crux of his argument is that "The Final Act contains so many stipulations calling for its observance that taken together they carry no less force in relation to thi; aucument than the pacta sunt servanda (pact3 should be observed) principle does in relation to international treaties." While Yaroslavtsev's legal reasoning is tortured, his article indicates the extent of Soviet sensitivity to Western claims that the acts not binding in international law. Although YaroslavtE~~-v's article appears to he the farthest the Soviets have gone in controverting the Western interpretation, they have argued from the start that they felt obliged to observe all the provisions of the Final Act. The Soviets are, of course, interested in mag- nifying the importance of favorable aspects of the CSCE act, particularly the statement on the invio- lability of frontiers. To be consistent, however, they would have to acknowledge that all parts of the document, including the "freer movement" provisions they find distasteful, have equal legal force. Some of the "freer movement" clauses are more loosely worded than the principles such as the inviolability of frontiers, but the Soviets cannot altogether escape the dilemma. Asserting that the Final Act approximates a treaty in its legal force merely seems to transfer the current debate over the relative merits of various sections of the document to a dif- ferent plane. Deceml,er 30, 1375 Approved For Release 2005/0@ECR1E-rfDP86T00608R000400110037-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/2~ii86T00608R000400110037-7 If the Soviets continue to insist that the Final Act is legally binding, there may be ;;ome potential for mischief over the longer term. It could, at the extreme, even serve as a rationale for taking action against a nation that they deem to be in violation of it. This prospect is still remote, but it is a logical culmination to the growing Soviet tendency to regard the CSCE act as a substitute for the World War II peace tFeaf-v f-haf- them recognize will never come to pass. 25X1A December 30, 1975 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7 USSR: Electric Power in The New Five Year Plan Soviet plans for production of electric power during the tenth five-year plan period may not be fully realized, but lags in power-consuming sectors of the economy probably will be sufficient to off- set the shortfall and maintain an overall balance between electric power supply and requirements. The new plan provides for production of 1,340 to 1,380 billion kilowatt hours of electricity in 1980, an increase of 29 to 33 percent over 1975. This is considerably less than the 40 percent in- crease achieved in 1971-75, and is the lowest rate of growth projected for power output since World War II. Total industrial output is to incre&;3e at a faster rate than electric power--35 to 39 percent-- with an even greater increase in consumption of power by industry as a result of plans for increased automation and mechanization. This suggests that the share of total power output consumed by industry may be greater than in the past. The rural economy will also increase its use of electric power, from 7 percent of the total power supply in 1975 to 10 percent in 1980. Even if power production goals are achieved, some competition for electricity is likely to develop between the indus- trial, rural, and urban sectors of the economy. Regional shortages of power almost certainly will become more prevalent, especially in the Eu- ropean USSR, which is deficient in energy resource:;, but which consumes 00 p,-~rcent of the electricity. December 30, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06/28"86T00608R000400110037-7 Approved For Release 2005/06/JQI-BtJP86T00608R000400110037-7 5X1 Achievement of the goal for electric power production depends on fulfillment of plans to in- stall 67,000 to 70,000 megawatts of new generating capacity and to construct high-voltage, long-dis- tance transmission lines. Approximately 20 percent of the planned additions to capacity are to be in nuclear electric powerplants--compared with about 7 percent in the last five year plan. Another 20 percent will go to hydroelectric plants, and the remainder to conventional thermal powerplants, some to be built in the eastern regions of the country to utilize cheap coal. All the nuclear capacity and more than a third of the hydro capacity will be located in the European USSR. Past performance suggests that fulfillment of the plan for installation of new capacity will be difficult. The goal for the previous five-year pe- riod was 67,200 megawatts, but installation probably has fallen short by 10,000 to 12,000 megawatts. December 30, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/068.EP86T00608R000400110037-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/OISBC- December 23 Politburo member Suslov and the other ranking East European delegates to the Cuban party congr a s s?,h I nh Anded yesterday, fly home. Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja completes a Awo-dav al visit to the USSR. Foreign Minister Gromyko and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov have separate talks with the visiting Jordanian delegation headed former prime minister Rifai. December 24 UK chief rabbi Jakobovits completes a ten-day official visit to the USSR, the first by the chief rabbi of a Western state. Politburo member Suslov arrives in Moscow from Havana and is met at the port by Brezhnev and others. Romanian Foreign Trade Minister Patan arrives in Belgrade for trade First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov ends talks with Jordanian delegation in Moscow. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1' December 30, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/($j;MDP86T00608R000400110037-7 Approved For Release 2005/06DP86T00608R000400110037-7 December 24-25 Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic holds talks in Bucharest with his Romanian counterpart Ghoorghe Macovescu. (U) December 25 Israeli Foreign Minister Allon confers with Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister Pacoste. (U) Yugoslavia and Romania sign in Belgrade a trade agreement for 1976-80 and a commodity tr