STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110037-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: December 30, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

or. Re1e-se 2005106122 :16IA-RDP86T00608Rb00400110037,7
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Soviet U niore-Easte ?'n Europe
TAFF NOTES
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Secret
171
December 30, 1975
No. 0785/75
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CONTENTS
December 30, 1975
Pay Raise for Romaniar, Military. . . . . . . . . 1
Zagladin Takes on the Hard Liners on
Communist Tactic-s. . 2
Soviets May Be Building Case That CSCE
Act Is Equivalent to a Treaty. . . . . . . . . 6
USSR: Electzic Power in the New Five
Year Plan. 8
CHRONOLOGY.10
ANNEX: Yugoslavia: Coirinformism as a Domestic
Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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Pay_ Raise for Romanian Milii ar
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The recently announced liberalization of pay
and annual leave for the Romanian military suggests
that Ceausescu is worried about possible dissatis-
faction in the armed services. On December 29, the
Executive Political Committee issued a decree callin,_.
for pay hikes of 100 percent for r)rivates, 65 and 70
percent for corporals and sergeants, and 29 percent.
for military cadets, commissioned and noncommissior'v3d
officers, and reservists. The decree also grants
increased pay allowances for food and longer vacations.
In a rare public admission, the Ceausescu regime
last fall confirmed that food shortages existed i.r.
Romania. The situation had apparently deteriorat.od
rapidly following the devastating floods which h'i, t.
Romania in July. The military played a leading role
in fighting the floods and in maintaining basic serv-
ices throughout the country. Indeed, consumer problems
may have played a part in Ceausescu's decision to
cancel his visit to Yugoslavia in mid-October. The
regime has now made foodstuffs more readily available
throughout the country, and modest pay hikes have
been announced foz the civilian sector of the economy.
Although the pay scales for the Romanian mili-
tary, particularly the enlisted men, are low,, the
military pay raises are the first hint that public
discontent may have spread into the ranks of the
armed forces. The military is a mainstay of the Ceau-
sescu regime, and the size of the wage inci- ases re-
flects the leadership's sensitivity to any signs of
discontent.
Meantime., Ceausescu has still not offe._,ed any
significant broad policy changes to ease pot.~ilar dis-
content over the long run. The regime, for ----,ample,
seems determined to proceed with -a'pid industriali-
zation regardless of its effect c, the average Ro-
manian.
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Zagladin Takes on the
Hard Liners on Communist Tactics
A two--part article in Questions of P;ailooophy
this fall by V. V. Zagladin differs sharply from the
hard-line views on communist party tactics expressed
in August by Konstantin Zarodov. The differences are
sc, pronounced that Zagladin m%y well have intended
his article as a rebuttal of the hard liners. As is
character:.stic of this type of Soviet :,siting, Zag-
ladin sets up symbolic villains. When he upholds
Lenin against "left revisionists" such as Bukharin,
Zagladin is attack,ing those unnamed individuals whom
he deems to be the modern advocates of Bukharin's
heresy.
Zagladin's position as First Deputy Chief of the
International Department of the CPSU Central Committee
carries far more prestige than Zarodov's post as edi-
tor of the World Marxist Neview. On the other hand,
Zarodov's article, which appeared in F avda, re-
ceived far wider dissemination than is customary for
such arcane doctrinal treatises.
In any case; Zagladin's effort is no more the
last word in this ancient dispute than was Zarodov's.
The most significant aspect of Zagladin's article
may be that, despite Brezhnev's highly publicized
reception o Zarodov in September, it is still possi-
ble to present a divergent opinion in a major
publication.
The theoretical debate over the preconditions
for the transformation to socialism, which Zagladin
addresses, reaches practical application in the ques-
tion of communist party tactics for obtaining power.
Where Zarodov is militant and uncompromising in op-
position to the idea of cooperation --h-tween social-
ists and communis=ts, Zagladin sE xns to feel at it
is more important to secure tan ibie impr(, nts in
the position of the workers than to adher, some
-Abstract ideal of party purity.
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Zagladin explicitly states th,.t it is necessary
to win over a majority of the working h:lass before
attempting the socialist trans ormation of society.
As is customary in there theological debates, Zagladizt
draws freely on the Leninist gospel, citing those
maxims that favor mass movements and majorities. He
quotes Lenin to the effect that it is essential to
win over "not merely a simple majority of workers,
but the majority of those exploited."
All this is in striking contrast to Zarodov, who
seemed to endorse Portuguese party leader Cunhal's
argument that mere numerical majorities were inconse-
quential and that a determined cadre could seize power
regardless of the latest poll results. Zagladin's
poo ition is diametrically opposed. Ag;~n citing
Lenin, he argues that "It is criminal to lead only
the vanguard alone--the working class---into the battle
for the revolution."
Insofar as Zagladin acknowledges the importance
of "subjective` factors---the intangibles such as the
willingness of comn-ur.ists to seize the ;,foment and
convert a revolutionary situation into revolution--
he is in agreement with the militants. But his final
weighing of the factors is much different and, al-
though he does not dismiss the importance of the sub-
jective element, he says explicitly that if the neces-
sary preconditions are absent, no subjective activity
can lead to a victorious revolution. "The party
cannot by its will summon up the enormous surge of
the overwhelming majority of the people's mass which
is extremely important for the revolution."
In what may be a necessary effort to rationalize
retroactively the Russian experience, Zagladin asserts
that under certain historic conditions 4.t is some-
times possible for states at the midule level of de-
velopment to leap directly into socialism. But the
inescapable concl,.uoi'n of Zagladin's reasoning is
that such a leap is nearly impossible in ecuntric4t; of
developed capitalism. Indeed, it appears that he is
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firmer in this position in hiss second section, whi,%:h
was signed to press in November, than in the first,
which was dated a month previously. Both were prob-
ably prepared considerably earlier. In the interval
between the two parts, Zagladin may have felt the
need to rebut contrary statements more forcefully.
While the shadow of the leftist setback in Chile
hangs over these debates, their current application
is clearly in Western Europe. Zagladin has frequent
dealings with West,-_::n communist parties and may have
felt the need to present a thesis with which they
would be sympathetic and which would justify their
independence while avoiding a doctrinal break with
Moscow.
The hard-line po.;ition to which Zarodov seems to
subscribe, and which the Italian Communists have been
compelled to rebut, maintains that the defeat in
Chile occurred in large measure because the left
forces were not sufficiently resolute. The Italians
will be much more comfortable with Zagladin's
thesis, which supports their analysis that the left-
ists failed in Chile because they lacked the mass
electoral support necessary to push thru the funda-
mental social changes they undertook.
The differences between Zagladin and Zarodov
are also of intense concern to the French party. As
the prospect of obtaining at least a share of power
has grown closer, the French seen to be moving
steadily away from Zarodovite orthodoxy, which con-
signed them to an opposition they now increasingly
believe was both permanent and sterile.
While Zagladin offers a doctrinal rationaliza-
tion for participation in government by the major
Western communist parties, his thesis tends to post-
pone the actual transformation to socialism. In-
deed, he lists a variety of "negative phenomena" in
modern advanced societies that collectively act to
render such a transformation difficult. While he
also cites, almost in an obligatory fashion, develop-
ment that tend to enhance the preconditions for a
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socialist transformation, his overall conclusion
leans toward pessimism about the immediate like:Lihood
of socialist revolutions in advanced countries. in
the continuing debate within the Soviet Union over
whether the current economic distress of the West
makes it susceptible to social transformation, and
hence, perhaps, to Soviet meddling, Zagladin is
clearly a voice of caution.
Zagladin seems aware that his evolutionary pre-
scription for achieving socialism suffers somewhat
in comparison with the shortcuts offered by the
militants who emphasize "subjective" factors, i.e.,
the willingness of a well-disciplined faction to
seize power regardless of shortcomings in the "ob-
jective" preconditions. As if in compensation, Zag-
ladin presents the concept, seldom heard nowadays,
that state-monopoly capitalism is a significant step
toward the socialization of production. Presumably
this is because it then becomes impossible for pri-
vate capital to recover its former position. This
resembles the line taken by some Soviets with re-
gard to Portugal, in which the temporary fluctuations
in the fortunes of the communist party were seen as
less significant than the fact that irreversible
socio-economic cha,liges were taking place that would
prevent a return to the prerevolutionary situation.
Thus, while Zagladin cannot offer shortcuts, the
transformation achieved by his formula is likely to
be more solidly grounded and more permanent.
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Soviets Play Be Building Case That CSCE
Act Is Equivalent to a Treaty
In their continuing campaign to inflate the
importance of CSCE, the Soviets now seem t. b'a moving
toward the position that the CSCE Final Act. is binding
under international law. Writing in New Ttnes, Va-
lentin Yaroslavtsev asserts that, although the act
is not formally a treaty, there is an obligation to
observe its provisions. The crux of his argument
is that "The Final Act contains so many stipulations
calling for its observance that taken together they
carry no less force in relation to thi; aucument than
the pacta sunt servanda (pact3 should be observed)
principle does in relation to international treaties."
While Yaroslavtsev's legal reasoning is tortured,
his article indicates the extent of Soviet sensitivity
to Western claims that the acts not binding in
international law. Although YaroslavtE~~-v's article
appears to he the farthest the Soviets have gone in
controverting the Western interpretation, they have
argued from the start that they felt obliged to
observe all the provisions of the Final Act.
The Soviets are, of course, interested in mag-
nifying the importance of favorable aspects of the
CSCE act, particularly the statement on the invio-
lability of frontiers. To be consistent, however,
they would have to acknowledge that all parts of the
document, including the "freer movement" provisions
they find distasteful, have equal legal force. Some
of the "freer movement" clauses are more loosely
worded than the principles such as the inviolability
of frontiers, but the Soviets cannot altogether
escape the dilemma. Asserting that the Final Act
approximates a treaty in its legal force merely seems
to transfer the current debate over the relative
merits of various sections of the document to a dif-
ferent plane.
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If the Soviets continue to insist that the Final
Act is legally binding, there may be ;;ome potential
for mischief over the longer term. It could, at the
extreme, even serve as a rationale for taking action
against a nation that they deem to be in violation
of it. This prospect is still remote, but it is a
logical culmination to the growing Soviet tendency
to regard the CSCE act as a substitute for the World
War II peace tFeaf-v f-haf- them recognize will never
come to pass.
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USSR: Electric Power in
The New Five Year Plan
Soviet plans for production of electric power
during the tenth five-year plan period may not be
fully realized, but lags in power-consuming sectors
of the economy probably will be sufficient to off-
set the shortfall and maintain an overall balance
between electric power supply and requirements.
The new plan provides for production of 1,340
to 1,380 billion kilowatt hours of electricity in
1980, an increase of 29 to 33 percent over 1975.
This is considerably less than the 40 percent in-
crease achieved in 1971-75, and is the lowest rate
of growth projected for power output since World
War II.
Total industrial output is to incre&;3e at a
faster rate than electric power--35 to 39 percent--
with an even greater increase in consumption of
power by industry as a result of plans for increased
automation and mechanization. This suggests that
the share of total power output consumed by industry
may be greater than in the past.
The rural economy will also increase its use
of electric power, from 7 percent of the total power
supply in 1975 to 10 percent in 1980. Even if power
production goals are achieved, some competition for
electricity is likely to develop between the indus-
trial, rural, and urban sectors of the economy.
Regional shortages of power almost certainly
will become more prevalent, especially in the Eu-
ropean USSR, which is deficient in energy resource:;,
but which consumes 00 p,-~rcent of the electricity.
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Achievement of the goal for electric power
production depends on fulfillment of plans to in-
stall 67,000 to 70,000 megawatts of new generating
capacity and to construct high-voltage, long-dis-
tance transmission lines. Approximately 20 percent
of the planned additions to capacity are to be in
nuclear electric powerplants--compared with about
7 percent in the last five year plan. Another 20
percent will go to hydroelectric plants, and the
remainder to conventional thermal powerplants, some
to be built in the eastern regions of the country
to utilize cheap coal. All the nuclear capacity
and more than a third of the hydro capacity will be
located in the European USSR.
Past performance suggests that fulfillment of
the plan for installation of new capacity will be
difficult. The goal for the previous five-year pe-
riod was 67,200 megawatts, but installation probably
has fallen short by 10,000 to 12,000 megawatts.
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December 23 Politburo member Suslov and the other
ranking East European delegates to
the Cuban party congr a s s?,h I nh Anded
yesterday, fly home.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja
completes a Awo-dav al visit
to the USSR.
Foreign Minister Gromyko and Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuznetsov have
separate talks with the visiting
Jordanian delegation headed
former prime minister Rifai.
December 24 UK chief rabbi Jakobovits completes
a ten-day official visit to the
USSR, the first by the chief rabbi
of a Western state.
Politburo member Suslov arrives in
Moscow from Havana and is met at
the port by Brezhnev and others.
Romanian Foreign Trade Minister
Patan arrives in Belgrade for trade
First Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov ends talks with Jordanian
delegation in Moscow.
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December 24-25 Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic
holds talks in Bucharest with his
Romanian counterpart Ghoorghe
Macovescu. (U)
December 25 Israeli Foreign Minister Allon
confers with Romanian Deputy Foreign
Minister Pacoste. (U)
Yugoslavia and Romania sign in
Belgrade a trade agreement for 1976-80
and a commodity tr