STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE (Classified) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120026-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: February 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Foreign Di.r.rrm
~4G^~~~ ~J04C~~~
Western Europe
2sxs
International Orgar~izations
Secret
1. ~~ ~
No. 0128-75
February 10, 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensit~~de Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. Q. 11652, exemption category:
g 5B 111, 121, and 131
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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US~ESTI=RN EUROPE ? INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington cum
rnunity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligr nr:e, with
nccasiona! contributions from othar offices within the Directorate ~(
Intelligence. Comments anri queries are vr~elccrme. They should be cirrected to
the authors of the individual articles.
Madrid Sends Reinforcements to Spanish.
Enclaves in Morocco
1
New Government in Faeroe Islands
2
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3-4
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7-s
West Euro~.eans Searching for Ways to Support
Portuguese Moderates
.ANNEX
9-1.0
UNCTAD Commodity Talks
.1.7.-].7
Februarj 10, 1975
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Phony:: 143-5135
r4adrid Sends Reinforcements tc, SPan.sh Enclaves
in Morocco
Spain's move over the weekend in sending naval
' and marine reinforcements to its enclaves of. Ceut~~,
and .Melilla on Moro,:.co's Mediterranean coast was
evidently designed to make clear Madrid's rejection
' of Moroccan claims to the territories.
Late last month, Rabat made a formal dema.rche
to the UN Committee on Decolonization requesting
an examination of the status of the Spanish enclaves.
Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki followed this with
a call for the return of the two enclaves, as well
as Spanish Sahara. The Moroccan move is seen as
an effort by King Hassan to enhance his domestic
prestige, now that interest in the Spanish Sahara
question is diminishing, following referral of trat
issue to the International Court of Justice.
The Moroccan action on the enclaves provoked
surprise, alarm, and near-unanimous indignation in
Spain. Spanish military contacts 25X1X
25X1X in Madrid immediately stressed that,
although Madrid intends to withdraw from the Sahara,
it will never withdraw from the enclaves.
Spanish officials are aware of the r vulnerability
on the Ceuta and Melilla issue in the UN because of
the strong influence exerted in that forum by the
" -
world nations, which support decolonization.
Madrid believes that if Spain loses
in the UN on this issue, it will ignore any subsequent
resolution calling for withdrawal from the enclaves.
The enclaves issue is also likely to affect
Madrid's relations with th,~ US. Spain may raise this
issue with the US in the negotiations that resume
today in Madrid over renewal of US base rights in
Spain. Spanish officials reacted negatively to news
of US arms sales to Morocco during the Spanish-Moroccan
dispute over the 5ahara,~and this bitterness may
intensify. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem/Background
Use Only)
February 10, 1975
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New Government in Faeroe Islands
Two of the triree parties in the coalition
'government that came to power in the Faeroe
Islands after the Danir~h elections on January
9, favor increased self-rule and ]lave taken
a stand against allowing NATO facilities to
remain in the islands. Despite the likelihood
that the Faeroes will demonstrate increase3
assertiveness in ii.s relations with Copenhagen,
the new coalition has agreed that no changes
should be made in the f?undamer:tal relationship
between the Faeroes and Denmark .for the ;text
four years. Even if the question of,rIATO facili-
ties is raised, Denmark is unlikely to relinquisY~
responsibil~.ty for t:~e islands' foreign relations
and assuring their defense as a part of NATO.
(Confidential Na Foreign Dis;~em)
February 10, 1975
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 `7L V .l~ 1'~ ~.~y
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Phone: J.43-5135
Phone: [phone]
West Europeans Searching for Ways to
Support Portuguese Moderates
West European officials are expressing grow-
ing concern about the drift to the left in Portugal,
but are having trouble finding ways to lend support
to moderate forces.
Although confused by Portuguese developments,
many officials believe that the future of democracy
in Portugal depends on the elections taking place
on schedule, not later .than April 25. The officials
are aware of estimates giving the Portuguese Com-
munist Party less than 10 percent of the vote. They
nevertheless fear that the ~;ommunists may attempt to
postpone or subvert the elections in order t;~ retain
their appearance of strength.
The actions by extreme leftists in breaking up
a center-right party congress in Oporto last month
received much attention in the European press,
especially since representativES of several West
European parties were them..
mhe inability of the Portuguese government to
specify its aid requirements has frustrated the
other Europeans in their attempts to provide direct
bilateral aid to Portugal. The UK has embarked upon
a modest assistance prugr?ani, howe~~er, and Norway is
at present negotiating a technical assistance pact.
Several EC capitals have expressed interest in
a Dutch proposal to "untie" development aid to ttie
former Portuguese colonies, thus allowing them to
turn to Portugal instea~3 of ?~.he ci.~nor country for
goods and services.
February 10, 1975
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The French, Danes, and Italians w~. to use
EC channels to provide governmental assistance,
but the EC Commission is reluctant to commit the
community to any long-term preferential arrange-
ments until the political situation in Lisbon
stabilizes. EC Vice President Soames will visit
Portugal this week to discuss the aid situation
and to publicize EC inter?st in Portugal.
ThP .i.ntent of this visit and that of UK
Foreign Secretary Callaghan's last week is to
provide moral support for Portuguese moderates.
In the period prior to the elections, such visits
by European leaders may provide the best means by
which Europe can respond to Portuguese Foreign
Minister Soares' recent call for support of plu-
ralistic democracy in Portugal.
The Dutch Socialist Party, meanwhile, has
launched a campaign to collect funds for its
Portuguese counterpart. social Democratic and
Labor parties in the ~:~., Italy, and West Germany
are also considering various forms of direct
pax~+:y-to-party assistance. (Confidential No
Fore_ gn Dissem)
February 10, 1975
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Phone: 1 3-5205
ANNNX
UNCTAD Commodity Talks
At this week's meeting in Geneva of the ~om-
mittee on commodities of the UN conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the developing
states will take a major step in their effori:s
to breathe life into the resolutions deman~3ir.g
a "new economic order" which they have imposed
on UN members. The over~;ahelming majorities
enjoyed by the developing countries enabled
these states, at a special session of the
UN on development last spring and at the
UN general assembly in the fall, to adopt
steamroller tactics and force adoption of
a Declaration for a New World Economic Order
and a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States. Both included provisions unpalatak~le
to most of the industrialized states. Other
meetings are scheduled for this year and
next on the problems of the developing states,
the most important of which ar~~ another special
UN general assembly in September 1975 and
a major UNCTAD gathering in Nai~~bi in May
1976.
This week's Geneva session comes on
the heels of a meeting last week in Dakar of
70- odd developing states aimed at establish-
ing a common position on commodity and develop-
ment issues.
At the Dakar conference, the participants
recited their familiar litany of complaints
over exploitation by the industrialized states.
The developing states agreed to seek "economic
emancipation through the recovery and control
of their natural riches and resources and the
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means of their economic development." They
further pledged unity in the case of egression--
"economic or otherwise"--directed against
developing states.
The delegates endorsed the communique
issued at last month's OPEC ministerial meeting
in Algiers which calls for expanding the scope
of a French-sponsored meeting of oil producers
and consumers to include raw materials and
development. The developing states also demanded
that they be allowed to select their own partic-
ipants in the meeting rather than allow Prance
to invite whom it chooses.
The principal debate in Geneva will
be over an "integrated program for commodities"
prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat i~. response
to one of the provisions adopted at last
spring's special UN session. The corollary
issue o~ indexation--tying the prices for
raw material exports to those of manufactured
goods imported by developing countries--
will not be emphasized in Geneva because
the developed states want to avoid the subject
at all costs and the developing countries
have agreed to give priority to the integrated
program on commodities. In3exation will
nevertheless return t~ influence future meetings
on development because many of the developing
states feel some such scheme is the only
means by which they can maintain the earning
power of their exports.
Integrated Program
The integrated program would establish
international stocks for a number of commodities
to be used to stabilize prices at remunerative
levels for the producers. The stocks would
be financed by a central fund to which producers
and consumers would contribute. For commodity
markets in which stockpiles could not provide
stability or would be difficult to maintain
February 10, 1975
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 pprove or a ease
STAN LEY by Murray Boll
Continuing tho advonturos of tho Groot Palooolithic Horo
"N11[A i1DR YOU TbrW6HT
aoa u~sc you uaco
One view of the development problem
s~cx~;?r?
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the program would provide direct compensatory
financ.:.ng to developing states whose earnings
from their exports decline below a certain
level .
The program implies that for some minerals
producer cartels could maintain price levels.
The draft program pays lip service to the
need to consider consumer interests.
The goal of the UNCTAD secretariat is
tc~ secure acceptance now in principle for
the program and get the details worked out
before the UNCTAD Trade Development Board
meets this summer.
Developing States
The developing states will certainly
maintain, in Geneva, the united front they
have been showing on economic issues in the
UN. They are nevertheless not a homogeneous
group and are divided by regional interests,
ideological differences, disparity in levels
of development and endowment in natural resources.
Radical elements among these states
have led the developing country bloc in demanding
recognition of its new power and influence.
These countries are likely to insist on a
rapid adoption of the commodities program, or
even more radical programs.
The moderates are nevertheless cautioning
that the developing countries do not have
very much real power outside of the UN forum
where they hold an automatic majority and
that adoption of radical positions only increases
the resistance of the industrialized states
to cooperating in multilateral development
plans. The moderates also realize that exploitation
of commodity issues is shaky ground on which
to attain developing country solidarity,
since not all developing states are commodity
producers. Moreover, some of the industrialized
states are also exporters of raw materials
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and stand to benefit more from commodity
arrangements than the developing countries.
Still, the moderate: states have not
yet broken solidarity with the developing-
country bloc on economic issues and are not
likely to do so in Geneva. They see little
alternative offered by the developed countries
to help tY~em face their economic problems.
Moderate elements lack an effective
spokesman for their position and the radicals,
led by Algeria, have remained well organized
and prepared to meet internal and external
challenges to their leadership. Last week's
meeting in Dakar, Senegal reflects this;
Algeria financed, organized and set the agenda
for the affair. Senegal--along with the other
moderate developing states--found itself car-
ried along in support of radical positions at
a meeting held in its own capital.
Looking for an alternative to the radical
positions, the moderates could seize on certain
provisions in the recently negotiated trade
and aid agreement--to be known as the Lome
Convention--between the EC and 46 developi:~g
states. The agreement commits the EC to
protect the developing states' purchasing
power earned from exports of 12 commodities
to the EC.
Formal agreement to this provision is
the first such accord between developing
and developed states, and the moderates may
point to this concession, reached by negotiation,
as a more concrete achievement than any reached
by the confrontational tactics of the radicals.
The latter may well argue that the EC agreement
~.~ limited in scope and that a stronger version
of its provisions have in any case been incorporated
in the proposed integrated commodity program.
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Developed Country Attitudes
The industrialized states met in late
January a.n the OECD to coordinate their position
for the Geneva meeting, agreeing to maintain
a common front and to avoid confrontation
with t't~e developing states if possible. Many
of the industrialized states are themselves
interested in some mechanism that would lend
stability to commodity markets. They are
also concerned that the success of the oil
producers may encourage the development of
other commodity cartels. The emphasis cif
the industrialized countries will thus be
on gaining multilateral and bilateral guarantees
of access to raw materials.
While they will consider the commodity
program in a "positive perspective," the
industrialized states have agreed to take
a slow approach. They want more time to
study the program and point out that the
proposal is both complex and would be difficult
to admi.zister as present?y conceived. They
want to be sure that the commodity program
would not be ~:sed to support prices above
long-term equilibrium levels but only to
smooth out temporary Price fluctuations.
The EC countries, for their part, may
seek political capital in Geneva from their
concessions in the Lome Convention on earnings
stabilization, claiming that the agreement
shows that the community is taking the interests
of the developing countries to heart. Although
most of the 46 states that signed the agreement
with the EC are traditionally members of
the moderate camp among developing states,
the debate on commodities has not approached
the point where the solidarity of the developing
states wi].1 be seriously tested by calculations
of economic benefit. While eager to curry
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favor with developing states when possible, the
EC is not likely to break ranks with the other
induEtrialized countries in their cautious approach
to the proposed commodity schemes. (Confidential
No Foreign Dissem)
February 10, 1975
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