STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE - (Classified) - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: February 18, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

~nt~rr~c~
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
Secret
No Foreign Di.r.u+:~
Western Europe
25X6
International Organizations
Secret
OCI-0134-75
February 18, 1975
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R00040(~-1~~031-2
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
No Dionem ~hroad/Background Uoa Only/%~~n~roZZed Di a..em
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
~ 5B (1-, (2), and 131
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
 Approved For Release 2000/09/~~~I~iTRDP86T00608R000400120031-2
25X6
WESTER111 EI~ROPE --- INTERNAYZONAL ORGANIZATION
This publication is prepared fur regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Westorn Europe Llivision, Office of current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions f~~om .r#hor offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the ir.~ividual articles.
Security Council To Debate Cyprus
1-2
Sweden's "Too" Active Neutrality
3-4
Disaffection Within Greek Military
5-6
February 18, 1975
SEC1tET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
 ~~~IR~~
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : A- P86T00608R000400120031-2
25X1A
P orie: 143-5205
Security Council' To D''?b'ate Cy ruse
The focus of Greek and Greek Cypriot: re-
sponse to last week's proclamation bf a Turkish
Federated State of Cyprus nas now shifted to the
UN. Monday night, Cyprus asked the Chinese
ambassador, who is president of tho Security
Council this month, to call an urgent medtina of
the Council. Despite the demand cf the Cypz.iot
permanen~. rapresentative for at least an initial
meeting Tuesday so as riot tc~ los? momentum, the
Counci]. will not convone before We~anesday.
Serious debate may be delayed unt~.i1 Thursday
afternoon, whe~i UN Secretary General Waldheim
returns from discussions with Turkish and Greek
leaders in Ankara and Athens. The Greeks and
Greek Cypriots will use the time before the
Council meeting to lobby among the Council's 15
members for the resolution they plan to table.
The Cypriot delegation leader, Clerides, has
stated that the draft resolution will not be
limited to a Security Council condemnation of
Turkey's action. The Cypriots intend to press
for implementation of previous UN resolutions
which call for:
--The speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces
from Cyprus.
--The safe return home of all refugees.
--The reaffirmation of the sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and
nonalignment of Cyprus.
In addition, Clerides has said that his
delegation will press for imposition of UN
sanctions against Turkey. It is unlikely that
such a proposal would gain broad support.
February 18, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
 Approved For Release 2000/09/1~~~lA=F~DP86T00608R000400120031-2
On Sunday, Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel
said that Greek plans to submit tho issue for
Security Council consideration would not weaken
the Turkish Cypriots' resolve to set up their
own state on the island. Turkish Cypriot Minister
of Commerce and Industry Celik has flown to New
York?to defend his community's interests at the
UN meeting. (Confidential)
February 18, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
 Approved For Release 2000/09/1~~E CTA=F~DP86T00608R000400120031-2
25X1A
Sweden's "Too" Active Neutrality
Foreign Minister Sven Anderson last week defended
publicly Sweden's policy of active neutrality against
criticism of partiality toward both the Fast and
the West.
In an interview published in D~a~e~ns_ Nyheter on
February 14, Anderson denied that tze Palme govern-
ment was anti-.American because of its position on
Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said Sweden supports
the Paris ag~e~ment, but is disappointed that the
fighting continues. He said Sweden has no interest
in Vietnam other than to see that it has an opportunity
to decide its o~,an future. Anderson did not repeat
earlier criticism of US policy in Southeast Asia,
and he did nc:t indicate who was to blame for the
continuation of hostilities in Vietnam.
Much of the interview vras devoted to answering
criticism from the Soviet Union and Finland about
Swedish o~Tertures towar ~ the West. High on this
list is Soviet concern about Swedish "guarantees"
to four NATO countries that, if they buy the Viggen
as a replacement plane for their air forces, Stockholm
will assure deliveries ever. in war time. Anderson's
statement that only the fighter version, not the
attack version, was being offered to NATO probably
did little to assuage Soviet concern.
Anderson also sidestepped criticism of a
recently published survey by the Swedish supreme
military commander concerning the potential threat
caused by improved Spviet and Finnish highway and
rail networks. He said the article may have been
"misunderstood" a.nd claimed his government regards
such Soviet-Fin:~ish cooperation as a contribution
to peace and stability in the Nordic a:-ea. Anderson
tempered this remark by dismissing the idea of
Nordic-Soviet cooperation, saying that "the Soviet
Un1Gn does not belong to the Nordic countries."
February 18, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
Desp~.te the Arabs' use of oil "as a political
weapon," Anderson said his government still supports
the existence of Israel. He defended Swede~:'s
support for PLO leader Arafat's appearance before
the UN because of the "position" the PLO has with-
in the Arab community. Anderson also felt that the
discovery of oil in the North Sea "opened new
possibilities" for Nordic cooperation.
The interview. reflects Anderson's difficult
job in trying to balance Swedish neutrality. At
least one Soviet diplomat--Belokvostikov, chief of
Scandinavian affairs in the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affair:,--has complained to his Swedish
counterparts about Stockholm's policy toward the
West. In addition, the Swedes feel obligated to
support the Finns because of their delicate rela-
tionship with Moscow--thus the praise for Soviet-
Finnish cooperation. As long as there is a remote
possibility of selling Vigg~~n aircraft to NATO
members, the Swedish Foreign Ministry may be pressed
even more .to come up with unique exp~.anations of its
policy of "active" neutrality. (Confidential
No Foreign Dissem)
Fe;~ruary 18, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2
 Approved For Release 2000/09/1 ~~A-~?P86T00608R000400120031-2
25X1A
Disaffection Within Greek Military
Disaffer:tioii has again surfaced within the Greek
armed forces, but it does not appear that any group
has the necessary organization, support or leadership
to mount a successful coup at this time.
The discontent stems largely from career
insecurity resulting from the government's purge
of senior junta officials and its seeming toleration
of attacks against the military in the press. Resent-
ment has also been expressed by some at the laxity
of government measures against student demonstrators
and government toleration of communist political
activity.
Aside from a common desire to oust Prime Minister
Karamanlis, the plotters have divergent goals. Some
support former junta leader and ex-president George
Papadopoulos. Others favor the return of the king.
Still. others favor rightist politicians other than
Karamanlis.
While many Hope to bring Greece back into the
military structure of NATO, a smaller number may be
willing to support leftist politicians such as Andreas
Papandreou or Ilias Iliou. claims that 25X10
a coup attempt may be imminent w ile others maintain
it may not take place for some time.
25X1 C
the Hellenic
Army amman , w ich has been keeping a close watch
for conspiratorial activity, is aware of talk about
' a coup among certain sectors of the officer corps
but does not believe that an organized plot exists.
25X10 the threat of war with
ur.ey over Cyprus and the Aegean has deterred such
25X10 a move. also suggests the confronta-
tion with Turkey has prevented disaffected elements
from taking any precipitous action against Karamanlis.
Once the crisis subsides, however, these elements
may step up their activity, particularly if attacks
against the military continue.
February 18, 1975
SEGRE~
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA- DP86T00608R000400120031-2
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 ~~~Al~DP86T00608R000400120031-2
Indications are, however, that 1Caramanlis is
taking measures to curb criticism of the military.
To this end, he has urged publishers to tone down
their anti-junta stories, to limit their attacks
to high junta officials, and to avoid criticism of
the military~in general. (Secret No Foreign Dissem/
Controlled Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Background Use
Only)
k'ebruary 18, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120031-2