STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE (Classified) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120035-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: February 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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secret
No Forrig;r DiJfem
~4af~~ a04C~
Western Europe
2sxs
International Organizations
Secret
X18
OCI-0138-75
5'ebruary 24, 1975
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9ACKCROUN~' USS CNLY
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from genoral declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11852, axemptlon category:
g 5B (11,121, and 131
Automatically declassified
on: Data Impossible to Oaterrnine
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SFCR~T
25X6
WESTERN EUROPE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welco~re. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
25X6
25X6
Plan Ready ~n Military Role in
Portuga 1 1- 2
Spanish Army Appears Split on Police
Role 3
IVew Danish Government Program. 4-~
Bilderberg Ccriference To Diseass
Inflation . 6
. 7
Iceland Reasserts LOS Position . 8
Italian Republican Leader Softens Line
on Communists. 9-10
.11-12
A Potpourri of Energy Developments in
Western Europe .13-14
February 24, 1975
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25X1A
Phone: [phone]
Plan Ready on Military Role in Portugal
The Armed Forces Movement's 20~J-member General
Assembly has approved a plan to formalize the mili-
tary's role in the government's decision-making
Process.
25X1C 25X1X
have told
that a seven-point program was approved by the assembly
last week and is'now~being discussed with the military
rank and file and political party leaders. The pro-
gram provides that:
--The r4ovament will continue to gixide Portugal's
political process indefinitely.
--The recently announced economic plan cannot
be made more conservative, but only more "pro-
gressive."
--The campaign for constituent assembly elections
will not begin on March 3 unless the political
parties have agreed on minimum standards for
their platforms set by the Movement.
--Presidential candidates mu~~t be approved by
the Movement.
--The future constitution will be based on the
program of the Armed Forces Movement that was
published shortly after the coup last April.
--The new constitution will grant legislative
powers to the Council of ;state, now a rubber-
stamp body that approves all legislation.
The Council will be controlled by the military,
anu the Movement will help select the civilians
that comprise one third of the body.
--The Movement will choose the ministers of
defense and ,economy after a constitutional
go~?ernment is elected.
February 24, 1975
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Although the Movement has repeatedly insisted
that it does not intend to install a military
dictatorship, Movement officers have been impatient
wa..th the bickering among political parties and
believe that they must keep a firm hand on Portugal's
progress. They fear an inexperienced civilian
government might destroy the crianges they have
already instituted. Continuing dissension might
precipitate a return to a right-wing system and
place Movement officers in jeopardy.
The program is certain to provoke opposition
from Portugal's civilian leaders, although even
moderate politicians recognize that the Movement
must have some role in order to preserve security
and to guarantee basic civil liberties. Moderates
will resist, however, those parts of the program
they iegard as ar: overly active intervention by
the military in politics.
Both Socialist and Popular Democratic leaders
were critical. of the new "legislative" powers given
to the seven-man military junta earlier this month.
Since then, Movement members, including Prime Minister
Goncalves, have retaliated by attacking those who
have warned against the possibility of a "civil
war" and of divisiveness within the Movement. These
attacks were clearly directed at Socialist Party
leader Soares and other who have spoken out on these
lines.
On~Friday, Soares abruptly canceled a trip
to Bonn for "internal reasons." Soares may have
decided he needs to concentrate on his party's
response to the assemb.ly's plan to formalize the
Movement. (Secret)
February 24, 1975
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SECRET
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25X1X
Spanish Arrny Appears 5p.lit on Police Role
The arrest of two army officers in Barcelona
last week suggests there is serious disagreement
within the army over the role th~a military should
play in maintaining order in Spain.
According to the most plausible account, the
two officers had been urging colleagues to pressure
the captain general of the Barcelona military district
to refrain from using the army to maintain public
order. They apparently also pushed for an organized
protest against th~a disciplining of a fellow officer
who disobeyed a direct order to divulge the names
of subway strikers in Barcelona.
The arrests have given ripe to speculation
that a military plot may be under way against the
Franco regime. Although there is little support for
such speculation, it will add 'to olitical uncertainty
in Madrid. told 25X6
that'the affair'is an'isolated
incident, not evidence of a dissident movement. They
ackn~~lledge that the arrests will be misconstrued,
however, and claim that a simple reprimand would have
sufficed. Indeed, the arrests indicate that the
government is both nervous and determined to nip in
the bud any military dissidence. (Confidential)
February 24, 1975
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25X1A
New Danish Government Pror~ram
Danish Primn Minister Jorgensen's economic
proposals, announced to parliament on February 20,
aim primarily at attacking unemployment.
Jorgensen labeled the depressed construction
industry the major cause of the country's highest
unemployment rate in 20 years and proposed a doubl~
ing of new housing construction. Jorgensen's plan
also c?11s for an easing of spending limitations
on local and provincial governments to increase
public works projects. The export industries and
aid to the unemployed will a].~so get boosts under
the new program.
The new budget will be similar to the Hartling
government's budget. The tax reduction measures,
which the Social Democrats opposed when they were
introduced by Hartling .last May, will be retained.
Jorgensen said savings measures to offset the re-
duced tax will be more limited than the Hartling
government would have liked and predicted a larger
deficit for 19 75.
Foreign policy received only brief mention
from Jorgensen. He said that foreign, defense,
and EC policies would be carried out along tra-
ditional lines based on Denmark's membership in
the UN, NATO, and the EC.
The government's program is. moderate by
Social Democratic standards, reflecting Jorgensen's
dilemma in the face of tough parliamentary opposi-
tion. The Social Democrats control only 53 of the
179 seats in parliament. The Social Democrats' pet
"economic democracy" plan to socialize Denmark by
gradually turning over ownership of businesses t4
employees wi].1 have to be shelved for the time
being.
February 24, 1975
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$ ~ CRFT
Jorgensen's heavy emph~:sis on domestic affairs,
particularly the economy, shows where Danish priorities
~.~,e. Public impatience with government leaders dnd
frustration over the government's inability to turn
the economy around have pushed foreign affairs into a
secondary. role. (Confidential)
February 24, 1975
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25X1A
one: 05
Bilderbe~g Conference To 1Discuss inflation
The twenty-second Bilderbort~ conference, an
annual gathering of US and European business,
scientific, and political leaders for an unofficial
exchange of views on matters of international con-
cern, will be held at Tsmir, Turkey in April. For
the discussions this year on "Inflation and its
Effects," the group wi11 include more central bank
directors and trade union officials i;han usual.
British Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher has
alto been asked to attend. Dutch Prince Bernhard,
who initiated the series of m?etings in 1954 at
the Bilderberg hotel in the eastern Netherlands,
chairs the annual sessions, at which main speakers
are allowed only ten minutes and others are limited
to fiva. (Unclassif.ied)
February 24, 1975
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25X1A
Phone: [phone]
Iceland Reasserts LOS Position
Iceland informed a meeting of the Nordic
Council in Reykjavik last week that it intends
to proceed with plans to extend its territorial
waters to 200 miles later this year. To the
disappointment of the Icelanders, the other
Nordic countries did not express support for
Iceland's position and limited themselves to
expressions of "understanding" for Reykjavik's
special position.
Protection of the vital fishing industry
is an emotional issue in Iceland and probably
the principal political topic. Disputes over
fishing rights led to the 1972-73 Cod War with
the UK and to current sparring with the West
Germans. The present government is anxious to
prove that it can be just as tough as the pre-
vious leftist coalition on the fishing issue
and will take every opportunity to press its
position.
Iceland will not take any decisive action
until the outcome of the Law of the Sea Con-
ference, scheduled for March 17-May 10, is
known. If the conference fails to reach an
agreement, Reykjavik will probably act unilat-
erally. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem)
February 24, 1975
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25X1A
Phone: [phone]
Italian Republican Leader Softens Line on
Communists
According to press reports, Deputy P rime Minister
Ugo La Ma1fa is drawing fire from conservative Italian
politicians for his recent statements suggesting that
the Republican Party--which La Malfa heads--should
not rule out some form of governmental co1laYJoration
with the Communists after the nationwide local elections
in June.
La Malfa has recently noted that the local elections--
which will provide the clearest measure of party strengths
in the last three years--will inevitably be followed by
a reassessment of the political situation. Fie says
that it is impossible to predict how the dominant
Christian Democrats will respond to the Communists'
renewed offer of collaboration until the election
results are known. In his latest remarks, La Malfa
seems to be saying that, in any event, his party will
not make a firm decision on the Communist question
until after the elections. Since he does not exclude
a riori the possibility of an agreement with the
Communists, conservatives are accusing La Malfa of
tacitly endorsing one.
La Malfa is a committed l~tlanticist and a
professional economist who frequently clashes with
the left on economic policy.
25X1C ~ however, La Malfa has had at least two wide-
ranging private discuss~.ons since last fall with
Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer, once at his own
request and once at Berlinguer's.
25X1 C
Such contacts between the Communists and the
governing parties are riot unusual, but the La Malfa-
Berlinguer discussions were notable for their generally
non--ideological tone. The two differed on some points--
the effects on the economy of recent labor-management
agreements, for example--but they were in accord on a
number of other issues. They agreed that the Christian
Democrats are unable to make ?(:he hard choices necessary
for economic reform. La Ma1fa criticized the Socialists,
moreover, for acting like the Christian Democrats and
February 2.4, 1975
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failing to live up t~ their reformist image= Ber-
linguer has directed the same criticism at the Socialists
in reec:i~ ~ speeches .
The overall tone ~~f the talcs was conciliatory.
Derlingt~er assured La Malfa that ?the Moro government
did not have ~"o worry about hard opposition from the
Communists, and La Ma1fa offered to provic?e the
Communist leader with some economic data that his
aides could not obtain from government sources.
A softer stance on the Communiitt issue by
the Republicans--the smallest- of the four center-
left coalition parties--would not be a decisive
factor in the deliberations of t;ze larger parities.
Because they are a relatively homogeneous party of
intellectuals, however, the Republicans enjoy
influence out of proportion to their size. A
less hostile Republican attitude toward the Communists
would thus help to legitimize the letter's claim to
a direct voice ;.n the government.
In recent meetings, the other i:hree coalition
parties--Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Social
Democrats--have flatly ruled out any concessions to
the Communists. La Ma1fa's equivocal remarks may
indicate a less ideological view of the Communists,
but they almost certainly reflect as well his fear
of being left out in the event of rapprochement
between the Christian Democrats and Communists.
(;;ecrEt No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem/No Dissem
Abroad/Background Use Only)
February l4, 1975
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