STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 23, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Former Chancellor Brandt to Visit
Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Portuguese Election to Proceed on
Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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Former Chancellor Brandt to Visit Moscow
Former chancellor Brandt's main task
during his visit to the Soviet Union on May
14-18, will be to reassure Soviet leaders
that the Schmidt government places a high
priority on good relations with the East.
The visit stems front an invitation by
Brezhrnev and Sc.viet officials are hinting that
the West Germans reciprocate later this year.
This eagerness for contacts at a highly visible
level suggests that Moscow's complaints that
Bonn has not done enough to further detente
are not so serious as to stand in the way
of Brezhiiev' :s "peace policy" toward Western
Europe.
Chancellor Schmidt's endorsement of the
trip reflects his intention to devote more
attention to Ostpolitik.
Brandt, chairman of the Social Demo-
cratic Party, has no formal mandate to speak
for the Schmidt government, but he will un-
doubtedly find himself in the role of inter-
mediary. For the Soviets, Brandt remains
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the principal exponent of reconciliation, and
Brezhnev reportedly has developed a good personal
relationship with the former chancellor.
Aside from listening to their complaint,
however, Brandt will have little to offer the
Soviets. The Soviets will probably point out
that Bonn, unlike London and Paris, still re-
fuses to provide subsidized credits for trade
and joint industrial projects. Some West German
officials--Brandt: probably included--feel than
promoting exports to the East is crucial at a
time when demand for German goods in the
economically-troubled West has slackened. For
the moment, however, Schmidt and his financial
advisers do not ssem ready to alter the current
policy.
April 23, 1975
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Portuguese Election to Proceed on Schedule
The Portuguese will go to the polls
Friday--the first anniversary of the
overthrow of the Caetano regime--to participate
in their first multiparty election in nearly
50 years. The stated purpose of the election
is to choose a representative assembly to
draft a new constitution, but in fact a substantial
portion of that document has already been
formulated by the ruling Armed Forces Movement
and accepted by the country's major political
parties. Although the results of the election--
which will not be officially released until
at least four drys after the voting--will
not affect the composition of the government
or significantly alter its policies, it
will provide the first reading of popular
reaction to the leftward coarse the Movement
has charted for Portugal.
Elections for the 247-member constituent
assembly were promised by the Movement
when it came to power last April. In mid-
February, however, the Movement, hoping
to present the assembly with a fait accompli,
approve3 and circulated its own proposals
for key provisions of the constitution designed
to insure a continuing role for the military
in the government.
The proposals ran into serious opposition
from the moderate Socialist and Popular
Democratic parties, as well as the moderate-
rightist Social Democratic Center. Shortly
April 23, 1975
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before the abortive March 11 coup attempt,
moderate party officials privately expressed
confide.tice that the Movement would accept
limitations on the wide-ranging powers
it was seeking. Further indications that
moderates were successfully reasserting
themselves at that time were seen in reports
that several key radical leftist leaders
in the Movement--including Prime Minister
Vasco Goncalves--had lost decisively in
elections for councils within the various
armed services.
The moderates' hopes were dashed,
however, by the abortive coup attempt on
March 11. Immediately after the uprising,
which was blamed on conservative former
president Antonio de Spinola and his supporters,
the Movement--with radical officers again in
firm control--announced that it was assuming
sole control of Portugal's political affairs.
It set up an all-military Supreme Revolutionary
Council to supplant both Movement and government
decision-making bodies. A cabinet shuffle
brought more Communists into the government.
Moving quickly to consolidate its
power, the Movement nationalized all banks
and insurance companies, arrested prominent
businessmen, and drove conservative party
leaders into hiding or exile. The Movement
also postponed the elections from April
12 to April 25.
The conservative Christian Democratic
Party was accused of complicity in the
coup attempt and prevented from participating
in the elections. The extreme leftist Reorganizing
Movement of the Proletariat Party and Worker-
Peasant Alliance were also prohibited from
electoral participation.
April 23, 1975
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In such an atmosphere of intimidation,
the Movement again confronted the parties--
this time with even tougher institutionalization
proposals. Under the implied threat of
alienation or dissolution, the moderate
parties agreed to continued Movement dominance
of Pcrtugal's institutions for a period
of 3 to 5 years.
The Campaign
The election campaign officially began
on April 2. Stiff new penalties for disrupting
political activities were enacted by the
Revolutionary Council and, surprisingly,
the campaign itself was relatively fr.e.3
of violent disruptions which had marred
political rallies in the preceding months.
Even the Social Democratic Center, the
former electoral partner of the banned
Christian Democrats and a primary target
for earlier extremist harassment, was able
to hold several rallies without incident.
All parties received equal time on radio
and television, although coverage was very
one-sided in the press, which is dominated
by the Communists and their sympathizers.
Fears of election rigging have been
dispelled to some extent by the manner
in which local electoral boards were set
up. Moderate parties reportedly will have
adequate representation in nearly every
precinct to guard against vote fra'id. Also,
in the event Communist Party loyalists attempt
to vote early and then obstruct their moderate
opponents[
a ballots in
:1e precinct will be declared invalid
and another vote taken later. Coverage of
the election by foreign correspondents has
been encouraged. Efforts have also been made
to avoid,fraud in the vote count, but some
April 23, 1975
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irregularities are likely to creep in despite
these precautions.
With the exception of its opposition
in January to the Communist-backed unitary
labor law, the Portuguese church has maintained
a judicious silence on political matters.
In recent months, however, the church has
been subjected to increasing pressure by
Communists and other radical groups.
In mid-April the nation's bishops
met in Fatima and issued a statement implicitly
supporting the moderate parties' election
efforts. Although not condemning the Communists
by name, the bishops urged Catholics to
vote against those parties whose doctrines
conflict with church teaching. This statement
is expected to be interpreted by many parish
priests as a signal to support moderate
parties from the pulpit.
The Fatima communique also took issue
with the Movement's appeal to undecided
voters to submit blank votes to show
their confidence in Portugal's revolu-
tionary leadership. The church, seeing
the use of !blank ballots as . a maneuver
to reduce the expected, moderate majority,
has condemned their use, as have the
moderate parties.
Although the Portuguese Communist
Party and its close ally, the Portuguese
Democratic Movement, have waged an impressive
campaign, recent polls show that they have
little chance of finishing better than
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third in the balloting. The Oommunists
have been aided by a superior organizational
structure and funds from the Sovi Union--
but they
be suffering from overexposure
and are not expected to do well outside
Lisbon and some areas of the rural south.
The last ditch attempt by some elements of
the Movement to give.the Communists a boost
by praising their role in thwarting the
March 11 coup attempt is not likely to make
a significant improvement in their showing.
The Socialist Party seemed to pick
up momentum in the waning days of the campaign
after a slow start. The Socialists closed
out their campaign with a rally Sunday night
that filled a Lisbon stadium with more
than 100,000 enthusiastic supporters. The
Socialists were aided by the West German
Social Democratic Parry which provided
an advisory group and generous financial
assistance. Advisors from Britain, France
and Sweden returned home early in the campaign
discouraged by the Socialists' lack of
organization.
The Popular Democratic Party, doubtless
encouraged by its continued participation
in the government, was able to campaign
in spite of a serious shortage of resources.
Following the March 11 uprising, it successfully
weathered a storm of Communist criticism
by closely identifying itself with Movement
policies--it was the first party to condemn
the coup attempt and to welcome the nationalization
measures. The Popular Democrats have a broad
base of support among Portugal's basically
conservative electorate, particularly in
t]-c` north.
The center-right Social Democratic
Center's election hopes were dealt a serious
blow when their partners on a joint slate,
April 23, 1975
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the Christian Democrats, were prohibited
from participating in the election after
the March 11 uprising. The Social Democratic
Center was allowed to substitute its own
candidates, however, and could still make
a good showing. The party should benefit
from the church's recent involvement, since
it is the only party whose program the
church can support unequivocally. Its
gains, however, are likely to be at the
expense of the Socialists and Popular Democrats.
These five parties--the Communists,
Democratic Movement, Socialists, Popular
Democrats, and Social Detnouratic Center--
are expected to draw the bulk of the vote,
perhaps as much as 90 percent. The seven
remaining parties in the field of twelve,
mostly leftist splinter groups, will share
the rest.
Given a vote relatively free from tampering,
the moderate, non-communist parties will
almost certainly pull a clear majority.
Some estimates give as high as 65-70 percent
to the combined Vote of the Socialists,
Popular Democrats, and Social Democratic
Center, who are expected to finish in that
order with the Communists possibly moving
into third place.
Political Impact
The vote will undoubtedly be open
to various interpretations. A large majority
for the moderate parties will not be seen
as a vote of confidence for the Armed Forces
Movement, but it may not be viewed as a decisive
defeat either. The moderate parties have
already agreed to the Movement's continued
rule, and all but the Social Democratic
Center have platforms that advocate many
of the same policies espoused by the Movement.
April 23, 1975
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The impact the radical officers who
are currently running things fear most is
the possible strengthening of moderate
elements within the military. A resounding
victory for the moderate parties might
provide the impetus for a move within the
Movement to restrict the influence the
Communists currently exert on the government.
Admiral Rosa Coutinho, who seems increasingly
to be assuming a position of leadership
in the Movement, might be the man to lead
an effort to head off the Communists' push
for ever increasing power. Coutinho has
spoken of forming a new party, ideologically
somewhere between the Socialist and Communist
parties, which would become the civilian
partner of the Armed Forces Movement. Such
a party might be the vehicle not only to
reduce the Communist role, but to water
down any moderate surge that results from
the election.
In any event, whatever the outcome
of the election, it will have minimal impact
on the course of the government. Both
President Costa Gomes and Admiral Coutinho
have said they will not feel constrained
by the outcome. The Armed Forces Movement
has set Portugal on a path toward socialism
from which they will not deviate. Similarly,
the Movement seems dedicated to moving
toward an international position closer
to the non-aligned group--maintaining its
ties with the West but at the same time
Wproving relations with the Third World
and Eastern Europe.
The election will not silence the
opposition to this course either. Conservatives
and moderates who oppose the current leadership
were thrown off balance by the events of
March 11 and what followed. They continue
April 23, 1975
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to he disorganized and unprepared to reassert
themselves, many of them clinging to the
hope that the elections will improve their
position.
Whether or not it does, there is likely
to be a renewed effort to organize against
the radical leadership in the months to
come. The continuing deterioration of
Portugal's economy may provide additional
allies to the opposition. At the same time,
increasing economic difficulties could
lead to something more closely resembling
anarchy as the extreme leftist factions
seek to take advantage of the confused
situation.
April 23, 1975
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