WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500010008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
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Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
1.22
No. 0202-75
June 6, 1975
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
EC Developing Ties to Latin America . . . . . . 1
Ei.iro-Arab Dialogue Moves Ahead. . . . . . . . . 3
Portuguese Wind Blowing on the F-:ench
Left Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Madrid Proposes Spanish Sahara Negotiations . . 7
Spanish Government Reacts to Increasing
Basque Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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EC Developing Ties to Latin America
The possibility of strengthening Latin Americans
economic and political ties with the EC will La a
principal topic at the sixth meeting between flC
officials and the Latin American ambassadors '..n
Brussels later this month.
The Latin Americans have some problems with the
EC, and these also will be raised. Their main con-
cern is that trade preferences granted by t'ie EC to
46 developing African, Caribbean, and Pacific states
under the Lomb Convention will hinder Latin 2-merican
access to EC markets. They want the EC to extend
preferential arrangements to Latin America in order
to reduce their trade dependence on the US and to
improve their balance of payments.
Several Caribbean states signed the Lome' Con-
vention, and they are showing little concorn for the
Latin American complaints. Other countries, notably
Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina are tending
to ignore the interests of other Latin rii:tericans in
pursuit of individual deals for themselves.
Mexico is negotiating a five-year ,ion-preferential
trade agreement with the EC. The Commr.'.iity would like
to conclude this agreement because Mexico will have
an influential role among developing countries at
the international discussions on raw materials later
this year.
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An accord to enter into force next January is, in
fact, likely early this summer.
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The EC will use the Mexican model when It re-
negotiates its non-preferential accords with Brazil,
Argentina,'and Uruguay. The EC will be looking
for increased protection for investments and improved
access to raw materials. The Latin Americans want
to borrow more from the EC. They are also seeking
more direct investment by West European firms and
liberalization of the Community's beef import policy.
The EC is increasing technical assistance to
the six members of the Andean Pact--Peru, Chile,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. Community
officials have ruled out the possibility of a pre-
ferential agreement, but are encouraging the formation
of a permanent joint committee to facilitate the
development of stronger economic and political ties.
The Brussels meeting is viewed by several Latin
American states, Brazil in particular, as a potential
step toward improved political relations with Western
Europe. The EC is Brazil's most rapidly expanding
export market, and Brasilia hopes that broader con-
sultations will bring better opportunities to prevent
anticipated protectionist moves b the EC in textiles
25X1 beef, and other products. 25X1
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Euro-Arab Dialogue Moves Ahead
EC and Arab League experts hold their
first meeting in Cairo on Tuesday to open
the substantive part of the EC-Arab dialogue
that France initiated in January 1974.
The EC Nine are pushing for a "no-nonsense
dialogue" that would avoid political controversy.
They have proposed to begin with the immediate
creation of five groups of experts that would
study prospects for joint cooperation on agriculture
and food; industrial infrastructure and peaceful
uses of atomic energy; financial, commercial,
and trade cooperation; social aspects and labor;
and cultural, scientific, and technical coopera-
tion.
Some of the Arab participants would prefer
to devote considerable time to general debate
in a plenary session, which would probably
include a discussion of the Palestinian issue.
A principle factor in delaying the talks
until now has been the disagreement over the
role of the Palestine Liberation Organization
in the talks. A compromise has been reached
which calls for both EC and Arab delegations
of technical experts who will not be specifically
identified as to nationality. The Arabs threatened
to reek a further postponement because of
the signature of a new "C-Israeli trade agreement
on May 11 but this threat appears to have
evaporated. 25X1
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Portuguese Wind Blowing on the French Left
Alliance
Events in Portugal are placing new strains
on relations between French Communists and
Socialists.
The closure of the Portuguese Socialist
newspaper Republica after a dispute with its
Communist-dominated printers union over the
publication of anti-Communist articles, has
highlighted the basic differences between the
two French parties on the touchy issues of
freedom of the press and democratic procedures.
French Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand has
publicly supported the position of Portuguese
Socialist leader Mario Soares and castigated
the Portuguese Communist Party for its role
in the Republica affair. He was careful,
however, to first secure a promise from
Soares that his party would not break all
relations with the Portuguese Communists.
He is afraid that such a break could set a
trend that would erode Socialist-Communist
cooperation elsewhere in Europe, including
France.
The French Communists claim the Republica
incident is simply a trade union problem and
their leader, Georges Marqhais, dismissed it
as "nothing but wind." Marchais bitterly accused
the French Socialists of hypocrisy for supporting
what he termed the anti-Communist stand of Soares.
The French Communist newspaper, L'Humanite,
further charged that Mitterrand's support of Soares
had provided the ammunition for Prime Minister
Chirac's attack'on*Marchais last weekend Chirac,
speaking at a Gaullist Party meeting, denounced
Marchais for approving of the "murder" of Republica,
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and called him one of the' worst enemies of
freedom. In a blunt warning, Marchais said
that the Socialist attitude raises doubts
about the utility of talks, scheduled later
this month, between leaders of the two French
parties.
The French Socialists, too., may be having
second thoughts about the proposed summit of
the Left Alliance. An editorial in the Socialist
weekly, L'Unite, states categorically "there
cannot be one truth in Paris and another in
Lisbon, one cannot espouse pluralism here and
contest it there." Mitterrand observed that
the French Communists, in their unconditional
support for the Portuguese Communists, have
gone even further than the Soviets who recently
expressed reservations to Mitterrand about
Alvaro Cunhal. French Socialists are comparing
the intransigent position of the French Communists
to that of Italian, Yugoslavian, Romanian and
Spanish Communists who have all supported Soares
to some degree. Mitterrand's Socialists are
also disturbed by the recent election of Jean
Kanapa to the French Communist Politburo. Kanapa,
a foreign policy specialist, is considered one
of the most pro-Soviet hardl.ners in the French
party.
The top-level meeting of the French left
was first proposed in early May by Socialist
leader Mitterrand to discuss three topics:
the international "crisis of capitalism," the
EC and European unity, and defense. The idea
of the meeting was to mend fences and demonstrate
that the Left Alliance is intact after a long
winter of Communist polemics against the Socialists.
The Communist Party Central Committee, at
a meeting on 27 May, accepted the invitation,
although no date was announced. Marchais took
the opportunity to express disagreement with
known Socialist views on all three points and
added a controversial fourth issue: the "defense
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and advancement of liberty." The latter point
in particular has been jeopardized by the
controversy over Republica.
Another divisive and potentially explosive
proposal that will be made by the Communists
if the summit is held is that of obligatory first
round electoral alliances for all major municipal
elections. This runs counter to Mitterrand's wish
to reserve the possibility of putting forward
party candidates in the first round--a desire
that was undoubtedly strengthened by the municipal
by-election at Quimper two weeks ago in which a
Gaullist defeated iii the first round a Socialist
running as the Left A'liance candidate. The
neat nationwide municipal elections are scheduled
for 1977. 25X1
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Madrid Proposes Spanish Sahara Negotiations
A Spanish Foreign Ministry official has
indicated that his government informed Morocco,
Mauritania, and Algeria this week that it would
soon invite them formally to a four-party inter-
national conference to discuss the future of
Spanish Sahara.
In the recent past Rabat has objected to
Algerian participation in negotiations to
settle the disposition of the territory, but
we believe Morocco will acquiesce to prevent
an early Spanish withdrawal--a possibility
raised in a statement issued by Madrid last
month.
According to the official, if one or
more of the parties reject the invitation,
Spain then plans to request UN Secretary
General Waldheim to convoke such a conference
under his own auspices. Waldheim's announced
visit to all "our countries next week may lay
the groundwork for such a conference.
The official stated that if a conference
cannot be successfully convoked even under UN
auspices, Spain'r: "hands will be clean" as it
will have made an honest effort to seek a
solution among the interested parties. The
next step then would be up to the UN.
The official stressed Spain's willingness
to consider any possible solution--not excluding
annexation or partition--that the interested
parties may propose. He insisted that Madrid
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is not committed to the creation of an indepen-
dent state or to surrender sovereignty to any
particular Saharan political force.
A mutually acceptable political solution
will be difficult to achieve and require compromise
by all sides. Algiers opposes Moroccan annexation
of all the territory just as Rabat will reject an
agreement that permits Spanish Sahara to become
independent. Both Morocco and Mauritania fear
a hasty Spanish withdrawal before a political
settlement can be negotiated.
For the present, the Algerians seem uncon-
cerned about Moroccan pressure tactics. They
would like to see Spain withdraw leaving an
established government in place, presumably
the pro-independence party in the Sahara that
they are publicly supporting. They have the
capability to exert pressure on Morocco by
enlisting international diplomatic support
for granting Spanish Sahara independence or
by supporting subversive activity by Moroccan
dissidents residing in Algeria.
Mauritania, for its part, seeks a partition
of the region with Morocco and claims to have
reached agreement with Rabat. It accepts Algeria
as an interested party, but gives it secondary
role because Algiers has no territorial. claim.
In any negotiations Nouakchott will argue that
25X1 partition is the most viable compromise solution.
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Spanish Government Reacts to Increasing Basque
Terrorism
Madrid's handling of the upsurge of violence
in Spain's Basque provinces reflects rightist de-
mands for continued stringent controls. The tough
measures may also arise from Prime minister Arias'
desire to show that his government is able to deal
effectively with public disorder.
The two death sentences meted out this week
in the trial of seven alleged members of the ter-
rorist organization Basque Fatherland and Liberty
are intended to set an example. The police have
been deployed in force in the Basque provinces,
and there are rumors of a government-imposed cur-
few.
Rightwing extremists are circulating leaflets
calling on the government to provide arms to pri-
vate citizens. Despite public statements that
it deplores violence from any source, the govern-
ment's failure to crack down on the right seems
to imply government approval of rightwing
vigilante activities against Basque sympathizers.
The situation is tense and ominous, according
to the American consul in Bilbao. opponents of
the state of emergency imposed in the Basque
area--which permits harsher measures by the police--
have planned a general strike and demonstration
for June 11 that may lead to confrontation with
security forces.
The commanding general in Catalonia--the
other dissident region in Spain--has echoed the
support expressed earlier by the Basque area
commander that the army stands behind the police
and is the ultimate guarantor of order.
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The minister of justice, however, has tried
to sound a moderate note. lie said the government 25X1
will establish a commission to investigate the
reasons for Basque subversion and the existence
of any "valid points" in the problem.
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