STAFF NOTES; WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500010028-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: July 14, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
12ffmp~ KGU~
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
122
No. 0226-75
July 14, ].975
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
Bombings and Footdragging Complicate
Spanish Sahara Settlement . . . . . . . . . . 4
French Comment on 'Thill in Relations
with Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Visit of French Minister Marks Continued
Improvement in French-Canadian Relations. . . 9
Cypriot President Makarios Planning New
Strategy Against Rival. . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CSCE Summit Set for July 30 . . . . . . . . . . 15
July 14, 1975
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SLIJKL I
Bombings and Footdragging Complicate Spanish
Sahara Settlement
Madrid's efforts to settle the dispute
over the future of Spanish Sahara are being
frustrated by the delaying tactics of Morocco
and Mauritania over a four-power conference
and renewed violence in the territory.
Spain's inability to persuade Morocco,
Algeria and Mauritania to attend a conference
in Madrid on July 9 has led the Spanish government
to instruct its UN representative to urge
Secretary General Waldheim to convoke four-
power talks on Spanish Sahara under his auspices.
Spanish officials hope that direct UN involvement
in the dispute would deter the three powers
from engaging in aggressive actions against
the Sahara while talks are in progress.
The three African states may be no more
responsive to a request by the Secretary
General than they were to Spain's earlier
invitation to meet in Madrid. Rabat is likely
to be opposed, probably citing the pending
decision by the International Court of Justice
expected in October. Mauritania will probably
straddle the fence and simply not reply,
and the Algerians are likely to favor the
conference. If action is not forthcoming
and violence continues, Madrid is likely
again to threaten unilateral withdrawal from
Spanish Sahara.
Meanwhile, there was renewed violence
in Spanish Sahara over the weekend. Three
policemen in El Aaiun, the Saharan capital,
were killed and a fourth seriously injured
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JI Vl\J.i J.
by a bomb allegedly planted by followers
of the pro-independence Polisario Front backr-d
by Algiers. In another incident, the son
of the leader of the Spanish-backed Saharan
National Union Party was killed when a bomb
demolished a car. According to press reports,
police arrested more than 150 persons in
El Aaiun suspected of supporting the Polisario
Front.
These bombings and a statement issued
on July 7 by a Polisario Front representative
in Paris demanding self-determination, cast
further doubt on the recent statement by
Morocco and Algeria that they had reached
an understanding on the future of Snanish
Sahara. This understanding envisages partition
of thL. disputed territory between Morocco
and Mauritania without recourse to a referendum.
July 14, 1975
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French Comment on Chill in Relations with Moscow
French foreign ministry officials have recently
admitted to the US embassy that the USSR seems dis-
appointed with President Giscard's foreign policy.
The French officials, however, are confident that
Giscard's trip to Moscow next October will clear the
air, and they are not worried about adverse effects
on bilateral relations.
The most recent manifestation of a "cnill" in
French-Soviet relations is the vitriolic attack on
French Minister of the Interior Poniatowski carried
by Tass, the Soviet news agency, last week. Poniatow-
ski was condemned for asserting that the alleged
Ponomarev document recently published in a French
newspaper was not a fraud, as claimed by the French
Communist Party, but a Soviet guideline for seizure
of power by Communist parties.
Moscow could hardly have ignored Poniatowski's
remarks, in view of its strong protestations that
the "Ponomarev document" was a forgery trumped up
by the Portuguese socialists to discredit the Soviets
and the Portuguese Communists. The French nevertheless
assume that the Soviet attack on Giscard's closest
political associate was also a thinly-veiled signal
from Moscow to the French president on other issues.
One high-ranking foreign ministry official believes
that the Soviets have found Giscard too European and
too Atlanticist.
The official believes that Moscow is particularly
concerned about the possibility of a secret agreement
between Paris and Bonn that would allow French Pluton
tactical nuclear missiles to be stationed in West
Germany. The Soviets fear that an agreement on Pluton
July 14, 19%5
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could enhance the prospects for an independent Euro-
pean defense, to which Moscow is strongly opposed.
Moscow may have viewed its blast at Poniatowski as
an opportunity to weigh in with Giscard prior to the
French-West German summit meeting at the end of this
month.
Paris and Bonn continue to deny that there are
plans for stationing Plutons in West Germany, al-
though the French and West German military planners
are probably engaged in contingency planning for
use of the Pluton in the event of hostilities.
Giscard has already demonstrated an awareness
of the Soviet concerns in this area. Last May, he
sympathized with Soviet fears of an independent
European defense arrangement and asserted that the
problem should not be addressed until more political
unification has been achieved. His statement was
widely criticized in France as a concession to the
Soviets.
French-Soviet relations have suffered other,
more minor irritants in the past two months. The
irritants include Giscard's -termination of V-E Day
celebrations in France and his visit to Poland in
mid-June. The Soviets were also annoyed by the
several strong attacks on the USSR made by Chinese
Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping during his visit to
Paris in mid-May. Pravda took French Prime Minister
Chirac to task for expressing satisfaction with the
visit.
We have reason to believe that French-Soviet
economic relations, in addition, are not proceeding
as smoothly as Paris had expected, despite Minister
of Finance Fourcade's "successful" trip to Moscow
last week. In March, Paris had predicted orders of
$2.8 billion from the USSR this year; so far, ac-
cording to the Paris daily Le Figaro, firm orders
amount to less than $14 million.
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The discrepancy is probably duo in part to over-
optimism by French businessmen. It may also reflect
Soviet delay while the USSR "digests" the flood of
goods it ordered at the end of last year in order to
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Visit of French Minister Marks Continued
Improvement in French-Canadian Relations
Canadian officials, as well as the media,
are hailing the visit to Ottawa last week
of French Minister of State and Interior
Poniatowski as further evidence of the continued
improvement in relations between Ottawa and
Paris. Poniatowski is the highest-ranking
French official to visit Canada since DeGaulle's
controversial visit in 1967.
An official in the Department of External
Affairs told the US embassy that the chief
accomplishments of the five-day visit were:
--reaffirmation of French support for
a Canadian "contractual link" with
the EC;
--news that President Giscard was planning
to visit Canada no later than spring
of 1977 rather than near the end of
his term in 1981 as previously suggested;
--the agreement Lo expand cultural exchanges
between France and the Canadian provinces,
which up until now had been limited
to Quebec.
Ottawa was also said to be more receptive
to the possibility of establishing a joint
French-Quebec uranium enrichment plant at
James Bay in Quebec. Although he was previously
thought to be cool toward the project, Prime
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Minister Trudeau told Parliament on July
10 that the results of the feasibility study
indicated the case against the project was
not as clear cut as he had previously believed.
Poniatowski said that Paris warted a Canadian
decision on the project within the next six
to eight months. He also said that he was
more optimistic about an affirmative answer
after talking with Canadian officials.
Althougl Paris is well along in the
negotiations _eading to the sale of uranium
reprocessing equipment to Seoul, Poniatowski
at a press conference on July 8 stated flatly
that France did not intend to sell such equipment
to South Korea. Canadians have been concerned
that the sale of such equipment by Paris,
when combined with the sale of Canadian nuclear
reactors, could give Seoul a nuclear weapons
capability.
Apparently unaware of Paniatowski's
remarks, Canadian Minister of External Affairs
MacEachen the next day told Parliament that
the South Korean Foreign Minister had said
that Seoul intended to buv reprocessing equipment
July 14, 1975
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`il ;(.,K.1",'.1.'
Cypriot President Makarion P.1anninc New Str.ata91
Ag a i n s t
Rival
a car r os >as a..way ; r. iec o pr. c~sen
a pu is image of a state,
;man above politic:=,
while playing off various .i.nd:i.vi.duaIs and
parties against each other.. The Archbishop
believes that cooherrat:ion, rather than competition,
with Cleri.de:; offers the mor,L promic,i_ng
means of maintaini.ne:7 control. over the iardest
possible segment of the Greek Cypriot commr._d.i.Ly.
Makar.'ios and his advisers are reportedly
worried over the growing inf l.uence of.' the
left and the relative weakness of the center
and moderate right. They apparently 1)01love
that a non-communist con 1. i Lion of nro-Matra r.i.os
and pro-Cleridr s for,-e:, will. ctrengt.hen
the center and moderate' right, thereby per.mitt.i.nq
Makarios to maintain li.i.s IinIanci.ng ,rct between
left and right and, aL t: tie same 1:i.rne, control
Cleri.des.
Makarios reportoeily hccalne int:ere-st:ed
in the idea of joi.ni.eq forcer, with Clerides
whe:) he discovered that C 1 eor idles wanted
to share 1('ador.ship of hi.:; movement: with
individuals Makrir.ios hcol..icevcs arc more loyal
to 11 imsc' l f than to C 1 r: r i dc,!, . The I1rchh i ,;hop
apparently decided Ln qiv(, Cle?ri(105 fre'erlom
to organize in .rnt:ic.irMAt ion of flooding
the movement with own loyal is;ts .end
gaining control of its central cemmi t torn.
July 14, 1`75
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Cl.er:i.tle n has been unwillinq in the
pant to launch a direct cha l.lengv to Make r. i.c):;
and the 1)O Mill Ly of succuedinq the Archbishop
in the future in return for Lactical cooperation
with him now may well prove a"peal i.n'1.
July 14, 1975
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