STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500030008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
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Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
State Department review(s) completed.
Secret
No. 0310-75
November 20, 1975
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51,UKh'1'
WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Portuguese Government Suspends Functions
Over Split in Military . . . . . . . .
Madrid Explains Spanish Withdrawal from
Spanish Sahara . .
Italy's Christian Democrats Schedule Key
Leadership Meeting . .
State Department review(s) completed.
November 20, 1975
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Portuguese Government Suspends Functions Over.
Split in Military
Portuguese Prime Minister Azevedo's two-month-
old government suspended its functions early this
morning, saying that a split in the military made it
impossible to govern.
The announcement, following a six-hour emergency
cabinet meeting, said the government would remain
suspended until President Costa Gomes guarantees
conditions vital to its functions and authority.
The Azevedo government apparently has taken this
action in an effort to force Costa Gomes, who is also
the armed forces chief of staff, to resolve the split
in the military between the anti-Communist ruling
faction led by Foreign Minister Antunes and the
faction backed by the far left and the Communists.
The split has led to a breakdown in military
discipline which has crippled Azevedo's efforts to
maintain public order and concentrate on governing
the country.
According to authoritative reports yesterday,
a key leader of the leftist faction, General Otelo
de Carvalho, was about to be removed from his sensi-
tive post as commander of the Lisbon Military Region.
Leftist commanders of both the military police and
an important artillery regiment outside of Lisbon
reportedly would also be replaced.
The government, according to the same source,
planned to reduce leftist influence in the media
drastically by nationalzing radio and television.
November 20, 1975
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it now appears that Communist and far left op-
position got word of these changes and rallied its
forces in support of Carvalho and in defiance of the
government. This led to the appeal to Costa Gomes to
put down the leftist opposition and thus enable the
government to resume its activities.
November 20, 1975
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LW v.L' ? ? .L
Madrid Explains Spanish Withdrawal From Spanish Sahara
Spain took the first official step in its planned
withdrawal from the Spanish Sahara yesterday when the
Spanish parliament approved by an overwhelming majority
a bill formally "decolonizing" the territory. The
new law will take effect as soon as it is published--
a formality that will probably be carried out today.
Full details of the agreement worked out last
week by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania have yet to be
revealed, but during the past few days Spanish officials
have privately emphasized that the'Spanish withdrawal
will not affect the sovereignty of the area "which
belongs to the Saharans." Foreign Minister Cortina
told Ambassador Stabler that Spain would simply be
turning over administration of the country to Morocco
and Mauritania. The question of sovereignty, he main-
tained, was one the UN must revolve. Another high
official of the foreign office added that the UN alone
had the authority to prescribe a referendum on self-
determination.
In practice, the distinction between "administration"
and "sovereignty" is likely to be a semantic one.
Madrid will probably publicize this rationalization 25X1
of Spain's rather abrupt departure in order to save
face and to blunt criticism which might be leveled at
Juan Carlos for his role in the settlement.
November 20, 1975
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Italy's Christian Democrats Schedule Key
Leadership Meeting
The principal deliberative body of Italy's
Christian Democratic Party--the 207-member national
council--meets this Sunday for the first time
since the ouster of former party chief Fanfani
last July. His removal was inspired mainly by
the sharp gains made by the Communists in nationwide
local elections, but the Christian Democrats are
still far from agreement on how to prevent the
Communists from repeating their success in another
round of local elections this spring and in the
1977 parliamentary race.
Although the council's first order of business
will be to set a date and begin preparations for
a party congress, the Communist issue will dominate
debate. The question of how to reverse the trend
toward the Communists has polarized the Christian
Democrats and two groups are now vying for control
of the party.
One group centers around Prime Minter Moro
and interim party chief Zaccagnini. It includes
most of the party left as well as some centrists,
like Foreign Minister Rumor, who have gravitated
toward the left since the last elections. These
Christian Democrats share the conviction that
their party will have to change its image by s::ifting
leftward and drawing the Communists into a "competitive
dialogue" in order to compete with them at the
polls.
While the "dialogue" proposal is vaguely
formulated, its proponents apparently aim to:
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--put more emphasis on tangible issues than
ideology in defining the differences between
t`ie Christian Democrats and the Communists,
on the assumption that anti-communism per
se has declining appeal for the Italian
voter.
--limit the Communists' ability to exploit
their opposition status by forcing them
into an open discussion of legislative
proposals with the governing parties.
The opposing group which draws most of its
support from the party center and right has a
iajority in the national council. Its leaders--
including Fanfani, Budget Minister Andreotti,
and Defense Minister Forlani--believe that shifting
the emphasis to a policy of open "dialogue" with
the Communists would run the risk of slipping
gradually into broader collaboration with them.
This group maintains that the party's image and
policies should continue to center on the unqualified
"opposition" to the Communists expressed by the
Christian Democrats at their last party congress
in 1973.
The center-right forces have been increasingly
disturbed that advocates of the "dialogue" thesis
now hold the top posts in both the party and the
government. No one is prepared to provoke a government
crisis by challenging Moro now, but the group
is determined to substitute one of its own--Defense
Minister Forlani is the frontrunner--for Zaccagnini
as party leader. The latter was never a major
contender for the top party spot, but he &.reed
to occupy it on an interim basis after the Christian
Democrats failed to agree on a successor to Fanfani.
r'orlani is trying to widen his majority and
does not want to force the issue until the party
congress. Some of his supporters have urged him
to move this weekend in order to stop what they
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see as a drift toward the left under Zaccagnini.
But that argument will seem less persuasive now
that Zaccagnini has backed away from his earlier
insistence on postponing the party congress as long
as possible. Under a compromise reached last
week, it was reportedly agreed that the congress
will take place in late February or early March.
If the center-right captures the party leadership,
either before or during the congress, one of its
most serious problems will be how to avoid an
internal party split like the one that plagued
the Christian Democrats in their preparations
for the June elections. Unless Forlani broadens
his base, the Christian Democratic leadership
and policies could draw the opposition of the
party's own left-wing, at a time when the Christian
Democrats' major task is to win back voters who
have been drifting leftward.
Downgrading the role of the party left
could seriously hinder efforts by the next Christian
Democratic leader to rejuvenate the party's grass
roots organization. To compete successfully with
the Communists and Socialists, for example, the
Christian Democrats must revive their ties with
the industrial working class. One hopeful sign
in this respect is the renewed interest in party
affairs shown recently by the leader of the Christian
Democratic-oriented labor confederation--Italy's
second largest. He is a supporter of the Moro-
Zaccagnini line, however, and if that is shunted
aside, Christian Democratic labor leaders could
turn their backs on the party and concentrate
on labor affairs.
The Christian Democrats' internal struggle
is being followed closely by the Socialists and
Communists. since neither can calibrate its strategy
until the outcome in known. For different reasons,
both the Socialists and Communists hope the Christian
Democratic left will retain an influential voice
in party affairs.
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In the Socialist view, the Christian Democrats
would then be more likely to adopt the kinds of
policies that the Socialists feel are necessary
to justify renewed participation in the government
to their own constituents and to Communist supporters
they are trying to capture. The Communists, on
the other hand, favor the "dialogue" idea, because
they see it as an opportunity to work toward a
modus vivendi with the Christian Democrats while
reinforcing the climate of acceptance that the
Communists feel is so essential to achieving their
oal of eventual membershi in the national government.
November 20, 1975
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