STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500040010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 8, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Chile Loses UN Elections--Even When Running
Against Itself . 5
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West German Raassess Their Policy on
Troop Reductions 8
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Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers Will Meet . 13
May 8, 1975
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Chile Loses UN Election--Even When Running
Against Itself
The Soviet campaign to isolate and embar-
rass Chile in international forums has been
raised to new heights of absurdity at the UN.
In an election yesterday in one of the Econ-
omic and Social Council's subsidiary commis-
sions, Chile lost its bid for a seat--even
though it was the only candidate.
Elective positions in UN organs are
usually divided among the five regional
groups (Latin America, Asia, Africa, East
Europe, West Europe and Others). Only when
the regional group concerned cannot agree
on a slate of candidates for its allocated
positions is the entire UN membership called
upon to settle the deadlock by vote. In yester-
day's action, Uruguay withdrew its candidacy for
the Human Rights Commission, leaving Chile the
uncontested--and regionally supported--candi-
date for the seat.
The Soviets, however, deiitanded a secret
vote and with the help of their East European
allies voted Uruguay into the position. The
chairman of the meeting subsequently upheld
this Soviet procedural finagling and despite
objections by a number of delegations, Uruguay
will keep the position on the commission.
The Brazilian judgment on yesterday's
electior--"the rules are an ass"--reflects
the frustration of many UN members with the
almost constant political manipulations that go
on in UN meetings. But when given their own
25X1 opportunities to manipulate, such criticism of
procedural violations is usually muted.
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West Germans Reassess Their Policy on
Troop Reductions
As prospects improve for some progress
later this year in the Vienna troop reduction
negotiations, West German cfficials are
increasingly concerned that any future agreement
may be disadvantageous to the Federal Republic.
The Germans believe that strong domestic
factors preclude any major alteration o:`
Bonn's basically conservative policy in
the negot-.ations.
Three factors lie behind the revived
West German concern:
--the prospect that the momentum of
the negotiations will pick up
if the European security conference
is concluded this summer or fall.
--Washington's desire to generate
movement in Vienna by introducing
a proposal to reduce US tactical
nuclear weapons in Western Europe,
in return for substantial reductions
in Soviet armored forces in Eastern
Europe.
--recent comments by US Senators suggc sting
that Congress might pass resolutions
to reduce US troops in Europe if there
is no progress in Vienna in the next
year or so.
For the past year, most officials in Bonn
have viewed the talks with considerable
skepticism, doubting that reductions in
conventional arms would work to West Germany's
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advantage in the long run. Bonn's primary
interest in continuing the MBFR negotiations,
despite the lack of progress, stems from
the fear that other NATO allies might succumb
to domestic pressures and make unilateral
force reductions should the multilateral
talks collapse.
Bonn agrees in principle to introducing
the nuclear package in the negotiations
but has bargained hard with London and
Washington on the details. The West Germans
hope that the nuclear package will help
secure Soviet agreement to reduce NP_TO
and Pact ground forces to a common ceiling.
Bonn and the other West Europear. governments
may still have to face Soviet demands for
cuts in indigenous forces in the first
stage of troop reductions. Officially,
the West Germans endorse NATO's goal of
limiting first-stage reductions to Soviet
and American ground forces.
However, working-level officials have
in the past suggested that Bundeswehr reductions
in the first stage might be acceptable
under certain circumstances, particularly
if such reductions could be accomplished
without setting a national sub-'ceiling.
In B.,nn's view, the Soviet desire to establish
sub-ceilings on national forces is a clear
attempt to interfere in the West European
defense structure.
The Schmidt government will have to
weigh carefully -.ny move in this direction.
West Germany, unlike its fellow Western
participants in the negotiations, is under
no financial or political pressure to reduce
its military forces. The opposition Christian
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Democrats would be likely to attack such
a decision, claiming that the Sociel Democrats
are making unwarranted concessions to the
Soviets.
Should the Soviets react negatively
to the nuclear package or demand the inclusion
of West European nuclear elements, Bonn
would probably call. for a general review
of the Alliance's negotiating position rather
than agreeing to raise the nuclear ante.
The West German negotiators might
advocate sma... reductions in ground forces
by NATO and the P,,,ct. Chancellor Schmidt
reportedly believes that the present Allied
position on asymmetrical reductions to
achieve a common ceiling is not realistic
in the final analysis, mainly because the
Soviets ?;annot be expected to go along.
The West Germans would hope that this
fall-back position would keep the negotia-
tions going and help forestall additional.
pressures in the West for unilateral reduc-
May 8, 1975
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Greek and Turkish Prime ministers will meet
The foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey
are scheduled to meet in Geneva on May
18 to discuss their rival claims to the
Aegean and other points of friction. Their
meeting will probably set the stage for
talks later this month between Greek Prime
Minister Karamanlis and the Turkish Prime
Minister at the NATO summit in Brussels,
although the Greeks are still saying that
Karamanlis has not decided whether or not
he will attend.
Despite mutual suspicion of the other's
intentions, both sides appear ready to
negotiate the issues which divide them.
Although these matters are too complex
to be easily or rapidly resolved, the talks
should improve the overall tone of Greek-
Turkish relations, in itself not a minor
accomplishment.
The two foreign ministers will reportedly
discuss the text of a document which will be
submitted to the International Court of
Justice on their conflicting claims to
mineral rights on the Aegean continental
shelf. Athens and Ankara agreed last February
to take i?heir case to The Hague but the
Turks had asked for a preliminary meeting
between the foreign ministers.
Although Foreign Minister Bitsios is
also prepared to discuss the Cyprus issue,
he told the US embassy that he was not
officially empowered to negotiate for the
Greek side and had no intention of substituting
May 8, 1975
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himself for Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides.
Bitsios also expressed concern that his
meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglay angel
could be adversely affected by the Turkish
Cypriot referendum on the new Turkish Cypriot
constitution, which will be held on the
same day he is due to meet the Turkish
foreign minister.
The Turks will probably hope to discuss
other outstanding issues such as air rights
in the Aegean, territorial waters, treatment
of Turkish minorities living in Greece,
and Greek militarization of the Dodecanese
and other islands.
Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios has
told US officials, however, that he does
not want to have the conversation burdened
with too many issues other than the continental
shelf. He was particularly sensitive about
the Aegean Islands and repea&~ed the position
Athens took last spring that matters relating
to Greek sovereignty were "non-neaotiahla_"
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