INTELLIGENCE REPORT - DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: December 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

STAT
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Intelligence Report
Develop.,d Countries: Short-Term Economic Prospects
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ER IR 75-22
December 1975
Copy N2
1 1
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The forecasts of economic developments in the major foreign developed
countries presented in this report are based primarily on judgments of country
experts. The judgments are derived from detailed analysis of indicators of economic
activity, examination of other assessments, and extrapolation of recent trends and
changes in trend.
All forecasts are checked for accounting consistency, either by the analyst
or by the project coordinators. The checks help uncover potential conflicts within
the forecasts and insure the logical accuracy of the forecasts. They do not, of
course, prevent forecast errors resulting from inaccurate exogenous assumptions.
The major relationships that are cross-checked include
? changes in production, demand, and inventories;
? changes in disposable incomes, consumption, and savings;
? changes in real GNP, prices, money supply, and velocity;
? growth - on a trade-weighted basis - of each country's export markets
and its exports;
? growth - on a trade-weighted basis - of supplier export prices and each
country's import prices;
? changes in industrial production, GNP, and implied production of
non-industrial goods and services; and
? the relationship that requires the trade balance, and changes in the trade
balance, of he world to equal zero.
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Developed Countries:
Short-Tenn Economic
Prospects
STAT
STAT
Recovery in the Big Six foreign economies* will be slow and halting at least
through June 1976, the cud Of our current forecast period. Although the longest
and deepest recession of the postwar era appears to be over in at least half of
these countries, almost all indicators continue to point to flaccid demand. In all
countries, utilization of industrial capacity is low, discouraging investment in plant
and equipment. Inventories remain relatively high, hclding down investment in
stocks. Most important, Consumers seem likely to Continue high saving rates, limiting
gains in household consumption spending. A resurgence in consumer confidence -
a particularly nebulous factor to predict - would of course lead to stronger GNP
growth than we now anticipate, particularly in West Germany and Japan.
For the current hall' year, we expect combined real GNP in the Six to grc?,v
at an annual rate of V /o; in first half 1976, we expect a 3% rise. This 12-month
increment of' No is exceptionally small for the first year of recovery from a
recession.
We expect Japan, France, and Canada to turn in the best performances.
Japanese GNP should rise by more than 3.57., comparing first half 1976 with first
half 1975. Although this rate will be well below previous Japanese recoveries, it
will be the best of' the Six. France may run a close second to Japan, chiefly because
of a reduction in the unprecedented inventory drawdowns of early 1975. Canadian
GNP in first half 1976 should be 3;a above first half 1975 as the result of' a
strong upturn iu housing and the budding recovery of' US demand.
Using the same first-half comparison, we foresee less than a 17% rise in GNP
in West Germany, stagnant output in Italy, and a continuing decline in the United
Note: Comments and queries regarding this report are welcomed. They may be
directed to I lot' the Office of' Economic Research,
:7ccembcr 1975
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Kingdom. The contraction in real government spending expected early next year
is the key to our pessimistic estimate of West German performance. Declining
investment in plant and equipment will be the chief depressant in Italy and the
United Kingdom.
Inflation, having fallen to a combined rate of' 9% for the Big Six, is unlikely
to change much through the middle of next year. In recent months, sluggish demand
has brought down raw material prices, forced businesses to shave profit margins,
and in some cases induced labor to hold down wage demands. Our predicted rise
in consumer prices for the Six - 9%% annual rate in first half 1976 -- is nevertheless
far above historic rates. In first half 1976, West Germany will post the best inflation
record, at 6`%amilially, while Britain Will continue to turn in the worst performance.
At this time, Japan and Italy are having the most success in cutting back inflation.
We expect the combined current account balance of the Six to deteriorate
sharply in the year ending June 1976. This worsening from a small deficit in first
half 1975 to a $6.5 billion deficit in second half 1975 and a $7.3 billion deficit
in first half 1976 stems largely from a weakening of the trade accounts.
In most countries, swings in merchandise trade positions will be affected more
by volume than by price changes. Even though recovery will be sluggish, import
volume should pick up considerably in the current half as producers restock
deplenished inventories, particularly of' oil; the rate of increase in import volume
is expected to slow in first half 1976 Export volume should turn no loss rapidly
than imports because of weaker growth expected in the demand of' smaller
countries.
The West German current account surplus should decline considerably in
coining months. We expect Canada - a deficit country with a strong credit rating -
to post the largest deficit, $4.6 billion in the 12 months to mid-1976. We believe
that the other Big Six countries - which should register deficits in the $ 1-$4 billion
range - also will face 1'ew problems in financing their current account deficits.
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Recent Developirents
1. The current firming in real economic activity in the Big Six foreign
economies had its origins in first half' 1975, when producers held production below
demand to induce substantial inventory reductions. This adjustment - which was
much stronger than we avid other forecasters had anticipated - helped shear
aggregate GNP of the Six by more than 4'/o in the first half. In absolute terms,
Big Six inventories were cut $12 billion (annual rate). Other private investment
components - investment in plant and equipment and housing construction -
contributed to the drop in GNP. Mild growth in private consumption, government
purchases, and exports to countries outside th: Six softened the fall. The sharp
decline in GNP in the first half' followed a meager gain of 0.5'% (annual rate)
in second half' 1974.
2. The rampant inflation of 1973-74 su',sided to 9% in second half 1975,
from a peak combined rate of 19% in first half 1974. Dampened demand, the
comparatively restrictive stance of monetary authorities in second half 1974, and
the sobered attitude of some trade unions contributed to the slowdown. Cost
pressures or, producers were partly relieved by the drop in world raw material
prices; international commodity prices fell at a 60% annual rate between mid-1974
and early 1975.
3. Reflecting the sharp curtailment of industrial production and the working
down of inventories, import volume plunged at a 13'%- annual rate in first half
1975. Although tight linkages among the Big Six - 45;') of their trade is with
one another - meant that export vnllume fell also, more buoyant sales to coup tries
outside the group held the export decline to 10% (annual These divergent
trends in trade volume, combined with favorable movements in terms of trade
with the Third World, brought the combined current account deficit down to only
$0.6 billion. The small deficit contrasts with the $6.7 billion deficit incurred in
second hall' 1974, when the major Countries were still staggering from large oil
price hikes.
Weak Upturn in Prospect
4. For second half 1975, we expect the combined GNP of the Big Six to
grow at an annual rate of 1'/0; for first half' 19716. we expect a 3% rise. The
near-completion of inventory drawdowns earlier this year is removing a big source
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of economic drag. Yet we see no demand component strong enough to undergird
rapid recovery through mid-1976. We believe that an increase in private consumer
demand averaging only 2% annually in first half 1976 will give the upturn most
of its impetus. Indicators such as capacity utilization rates and orders for capital
goods point toward depressed investment at least through June. Government fiscal
efforts are expected to taper off, as officials fret over inflation and budgetary
deficits.
5. Although its recovery rate will be slow by past standards, Japan will
lead the Big Six (see Figure 1). We expect Japanese GNP to grow at an annual
rate of 3% in second half 1975 and 4-1 /2% in first half 1976. France should run
a close second, with GNP changes fractionally below changes in Japan. A
continuation of heavy government spending and a surge in housing demand underlie
the anticipated pickup in Japan. The gradual phasing out of massive inventory
reductions will case the drag on French growth starting in second half 1975;
confidence imparted by Paris' well-publicized stimulative program should help spark
an upturn early next year. Growth in Canadian output also is expected to accelerate
in early 1976, aided by spillover from US recovery.
6. West Germany, the second largest producer and the largest importer
among the Six, is expected to recover only slowly. German output should grow
at an annual rate of 1/2% this half and 1% next half. A contraction in real
government spending expected early next year is key to our pessimistic estimate
f'or West Germany. Prospects remain poorest for Italy and the United Kingdom
through mid-I97(;. Declining investment in plant and equipment will contribute
to the stagnation of' Italian output and to the continued slide in British GNP.
7. Industrial production in the Six should grow at nearly 4% in the 12
months through mid-1976 after plummeting 13%, (annual .ate) in first half 1975.
Producers have been keeping industrial output below demand levels to reduce
stocks. Even if we did not expect some strengthening in demand in coming months,
industrial production probably would rise slightly as inventory adjustments near
an end. In most countries, we expect industrial production to follow closely the
pattern of GNP. In Japan, where there has been little statistical relationship between
changes in GNP and industrial production in recent half-year periods, we expect
that industrial output will initially rise at a much faster pace than final demand.
Government Policy and Purchases: Parsimonious i::.su/atiou
8. A key factor in our prediction of slow recovery is the expectation that
fiscal policy will become much less stimulative in 1976. We base this judgment
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DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Big Six
Percent Changes in Real GNP1
Italy Japan
1974 19752 74 11 751 75112 7612
SEMIANNUAL
I ^.haoge over previous erriod, seasonally adjusted, at an annua/rite.
i ?rojected
568036 11.75
inn
1974 19752 4 11 751 75112 7612
SEMIANNUAL
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on indications that the impact of most reflationary programs will be concentrated
in the current year and will be diluted in the succeeding period. Several governments
intend to add little or nothing to expenditures in real terms next year.
9. Big S;x governments rationalize their conservative spending plans for 1976
on the hope; that stimulation from various fiscal programs this year and renewed
export growth will generate a self-sustaining expansion. Many governments believe
that continued rapid growth in outlays in 1976 would constitute an overdose of
economic stimulation and would reaccelerate inflation. Our survey of various
economic indicators makes us skeptical that the private components of spending
will take off vigorously; we feel this governmental strategy will result in
disappointing growth.
10. The tapering off in public spending will be most pronounced in West
Germany. Real government purchases are expected to grow at an annual rate of
1-1/2`7 in the current half year, then fall at more than 3-1/2`h (annual rate) in
first half 1976 as Bonn attempts to reduce its huge budget deficit. Similar patterns
are emerging in all of the countries except Italy. For the Six as a group, the expected
slowdown in growth of government purchases between second half 1975 and first
half 1976 will directly cut half a percentage point from overall GNP growth;
multiplier effects will add to the total impact.
11. Monetary factors will partly compensate for the shift toward less
expansionary fiscal policy. Growth of the nominal money supply accelerated from
11% annually in second half' 1974 to 14% in first half 1975 and should continue
near that rate through 1976. This will permit governments to finance their massive
budget deficits and to increase the availability of credit to the private sector.
Because of waning inflation, the increase in nominal money supply will constitute
a stronger impact on the real eror.-)nay than in early 1975. In fact, we expect
the combin,?tion of speeded up nomiMat money supply growth and slowing inflation
in second half 1975 to yield the first half-yearly increase in real money balances
in two years (see Table I ).
The Private Sect or: Mixed Prospects
12. We expect private consumption to be the major source of growth in
the Big Six, rising at 2% annually in first half 1976. In fact, private spending
has the potential to become an even stronger stimulus. As unemployment stabilizes
and large wage gains are realized, real incomes are rising more rapidly. With saving
rates near all-time highs for more than a year (see Table 2), consumers in the
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Major Developed Countries: Changes in Real Money Supply'
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
Total
2.0
-1.1
-1.8
-3.5
4.G
2.9
Canada
6.5
7.3
10.3
8.6
2.2
2.3
France
3.3
3.0
2.7
1.9
5.9
4.8
Italy
1.5
-1.6
-0.4
-6.73
8.0
7.0
Japan
-9.8
0.8
-7.3
3.2
4.8
2.6
United Kingdom
2.2
-12.9
-3.2
-20.6
-5.8
-5.4
West Germany
1.0
-3.4
-2.2
-9.7
9.2
4.0
1. Real money supply is defined as the sum of currency, checking accounts, and time deposits deflated by
consumer prices.
2. Change from preceding period at an annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
3. Estimated.
Major Deyeloped Countries: Recent Trends in Saving Rates'
1975
1973 Total 1st Half 2d Half 1st Half
Canada 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.6 9.4
France2 13.3 12.1 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Italy 22.7 18.8 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Japan 22.5 24.3 24.9 23.7 23.7
United Kingdom 11.3 12.1 11.3 12.8 12.6
West Germany 14.1 14.8 13.8 15.8 16.8
1. Personal savings as a percent of disposable personal incomes.
2. OECD estimate.
Big Six have considerable pent-up spending power. A surge in consumer confidence
now would lead to a spurt in private Consumption. We nevertheless judge that
high unemployment and depressed real money balances will continue to make
consumers cautious and to limit spending through mid-1976. At an annual rate
of only 3-1/2%I%, private consumption will be most buoyant in Japan; it will perform
worst in Britain, falling a like amount.
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13. The outlook for investment in plant and equipment is particularly dismal.
With substantial spare capacity in industry (see Figure 2) and slow growth expected
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Capacity Utilization'
PERCENT PERCENT
70
Ii III IV I II
1974 1975
r 1 1
II III IV I II
1974 1975
1. We have es(imotml the hem/ in produc five capacity by linear :v n trapplahun thruuyh tvu pus twat cychcol pea As at i uhistf a/pmductrorr.
This pmcedum gelds it consorvative estimate at capacity levels hecatse sonic brafiches v'ero tut pruducvey at hrlll. 'tenhal ivluvr
1/m industrial sectar as it whole reached its peak.
567'07 1~ 7!,
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in consumption, we do not expect much pickup in fixed investment over the
forecast period. We foresee combined plant and equipment investment for the Six
rising at an annual rate of only 1/2% in first half 1976, after three consecutive
half years of decline (see Table 3). Prospects appear best in France, where business
Major Developed Countries: Changes in Composite GNP and Components
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
GNP
0.8
-1.8
0.5
-4.3
1.1
2.8
Private consumption
1.7
1.5
2.0
1.5
1.1
2.0
Government purchases
0.8
3.9
3.2
5.0
2.6
1.1
Consumption
3.8
2.6
4.1
1.5
3.2
2.4
Investment
-3.8
6.2
1.6
11.0
1.5
-1.1
Gross private fixed
investment
-4.0
-7.0
-4.7
-10.7
-1.8
3.4
Plant and equip-
ment
-3.4
-8.0
-4.9
-10.8
-5.7
0.3
Ho-.:sing
-5.1
-5.4
-4.4
-10.7
4.8
8.5
Final domestic
demand
0.3
0.1
0.8
-0.4
0.8
2.1
Exports of goods
and services
11.5
-4.2
2.7
-10.0
1.3
4.6
Imports of goods
and services
7.1
-5.2
-1.7
-12.0
6.2
4.8
Net foreign
balance2
0.8
0.1
0.9
0.4
-0.9
....
Stockbui,ding2
-0.3
-2.2
-1.2
-4.2
1.3
0.6
Billion US $
Actual change
at annual rate
1. Change from preceding period at an annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
2. Change is expressed as percent of GNP in previous period.
surveys point to a strong investment rebound next year; this reflects exceptionally
tight capacity before the recession and spinoff from the 10% federal tax credit
on investment orders placed before the end of 1975.
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Developed Countries: Deviation of Inventory
Accumulations from Long-Term Trend
(as a percent of GNP)
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I-L ,I , , , I, .
100211 05
2e
I"
I?
Because data on total stock levels are not available for most countries, direct examination of stockidemand
relationships over several business cycles is not possible. To provide a rough intercyclical comparison, we have
calculated the deviation of actual stock accumulation from the trend sine 1955 (1962 for West Germany). The
trend was derived by a least squares regression of cumulative stock changes on cumulative final demand changes
from the base period to the present. The deviation of actual cumulative stock changes from the trend meaoures
the extent to which there has been surplus or deficit accumulation of stocks in ?vlation to demand since
the base period. The deviations are expressed as shares of GNP in each quarter.
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14. In contrast, prospect:; for housing investment are moderately good. For
the Six as a group, we expect a 5% increase (annual rate) in housing construction
in the current half, followed by a 9% rate in first half' 1976. Sharp gains ;:n real
income, slowed increases in new home prices, and some loosening in credit are
the prime factors underlying the anticipated rebound. Japan, with its nerennial
housing shortage, should again lead the way - with a 28% annual rate of increase
in the current half and perhaps 18% in first half' 1976. The United Kingdom, where
housing prices have fallen by 1811o re!ative to disposable incomes since early 1974,
will show a similarly rapid gain, the sole bright spot in this troubled economy.
15. We expect the remaining investment component - stockbuilding - to
remain depressed during the forecast period. After falling sharply in first half' 1975,
we expect Big Six inventories to drop less steeply in the current half, then to
rise at an annual rate of only $0.6 bil:ion in early 1976. The high ratio of actual
to desired stocks in most countries (see Figure 3) underlies the sluggish forecast.
Despite the bleak outlook, stockbuilding. will contribute an average of 1 to GNP
growth in each half, as the rate of liquidation decreases in the current half and
stockbuilding actually becomes positive in early 1976.
16. Little impetus to recovery is likely from exports of goods and services.
For the Big Six, the volume of foreign sales is expected to rise at an annual rate
of only 1-1/2% this half year and 4-1/2`/, next. Increased exports will stein largely
from sales to vne another -- Big Six imports should be up 5%/% to 6`/% each half.
On a net basis, the foreign sector will actually dampen growth in second half 1975
somewhat as the rise in imports exceeds export growth. In first half 1976, the
net balance is expected to add nothing to GNP growth.
Comparisons of Growth Projections
17. C., uarison of our growth forecasts with those of the OECD and Chase
Econometrics ~,i leading US private forecasting group which relies heavily on
computer models) shows that we Join OECD -- and disagree with Chase - in
foreseeing relatively slow economic growth through mid-1976 (see Table 4). For
the Big Six, we expect a GNP rise of 2% from first half 1975 to first half 1976
as does the OECD. While Chase does not make semi-annual forecasts for Italy,
its growth expectations for the other five countries are three-fourths of a percentage
point higher than ft3e of the OECD and one point higher than ours.
18. Tile differences among the three forecasts are greater on a
country-by-country basis. In particular, Chase and the OECD are substantially more
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Major Developed Countries:
Comparison of CIA, OECD, and Chase Fconometric
Forecasts of GNI' Changes
Total
1.8
2.2
N.A.
Canada
3.0
4.2
4.4
France
3.5
2.5
2.2
Italy
....
0.5
N.A.
Japan
3.7
4.1
6.8
United Kingdom
-2.0
-1.5
-2.7
West Germany
0.7
1.6
19
Total (excluding Italy)
2.1
2.4
3.1
optimistic than we for Canada and West Germany. Both OECD and Chase foresee
Canadian private consumption growing at double our projection of 2.5'/o from first
half 1975 to first half 1976. Chase apparently sees West German GNP being boosted
by a drop in saving rates in first half 1976, while the OECD envisions a continued
rise in government purchases -- both of which we regard as possible but improbable.
On Japan, we join the OECD in limning a relatively grim recovery picture, while
Chase expects a Much stronger upturn. Both of the others are less optimistic than
we on French prospects; OECD is in close agreement with its on stagnant Italian
output. All three agree on a bleak economic outlook for the United Kingdom.
Inflat;on: Steady Rate
19. Inflation, having declined to a combined rate of 9%, is unlikely to change
much through the middle of next year (see Table 5). In recent months, sluggish
demand has cut raw material prices, forced businesses to accept narrowed profit
margins, and in some cases induced labor to hold down wage demands. Authorities
have exercised restraint in expanding the money supply. Our predicted rise in
consumer prices for the Six -- a 9`% annual rate in first half 1976 - nonetheless
is far above historic rates. Over the longer pull, food supply problems, additional
oil price hikes, structural adjustments resulting from high energy costs, and stronger
political pressures to boost incomes could complicate the battle against inflation.
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Table 5
Major Developed Countries: Changes in Consumer Prices
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
Total
15.6
12.0
13.7
12.7
8.9
8.9
Guuida
111.9
10.0
11.0
9.7
9.6
8.0
France
13.7
11.7
14.4
11.5
9.2
9.2
Italy
19.4
16.7
28.0
16.0
8.5
9.0
Japan
24.4
11.3
17.6
11.1
6.0
8.0
United Kingdom
16.0
24.3
16.2
28.7
23.8
16.6
West Germany
7.0
5.9
4.9
7.2
4.4
6.1
20. In first half 1976, West Germany will continue its enviable price
performance; the acceleration from 4-1/21/o in second half 1975 to it 6% inflation
rate mainly reflects seasonal factors. Britain again will post the worst record, even
though the 17`/o rate forecast represents a marked improvement from the 24/o
average of 1975. The remaining countries should manage to stay within the
single-dil,it range, thanks to the continued weakness of demand anti to government
controls. In Canada, newly instituted government wage-price controls probably will
slow the inflation rate from 10`/, in 1975 to 8% in first half 1976.
21. We expect the combined current account balance of the Big Six to
deteriorate sharply in the year ending June 1976. This worsening from a small
deficit in first half' 1975 to a $6.5 billion deficit in second half 1975 and a $7.3
billion deficit in first half 1976 stems largely from weakening in the trade accounts
(see Table 6).
22. In most countries, swings in merchandise trade positions will be affected
more by volume than by price changes. After an abrupt decline, we expect import
volume to expand at a 7.5`% annual rate in the current half year and at a 6%
rate in first half 1976. Oil imports are rising substantially from the depressed level
of early 1975, when stocks were being drawn down, and the revival of production
is pulling in raw materials from abroad.
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1'rojevlvd
V!_74_
1'ra ecled 1975
1974 2d half
1975 1st Half
1975 2d Half
1976 Io hull
'
('urrenl
'
Current
Current
Current
Current
Current
Twill
1
rade
2.5
Account
-19.3
trade
19.1
Account
.7.1
'Prude
2,9
Accotmt
-6
7
'trade
11
8
Account
-0
6
'T'rade
6
2
Accottul
-6
5
Trade
53)
Account
7
3
(luiada
1.5
?1.7
-1.2
S.0
11'
.
?1.5
.
(1,7
.
-6
.
'0.5
.
2.4
-(1'
?
.
France
-3.,1
-5.8
1.5
-1.5
-1.7
-2.9
1.5
(1.1
d1.1
-I.6
-0.8
2
Igi11'
-8.11
.7.8
....
?0.6
-3.7
2.9
O'
-0,2
-0.2
?0.?1
-0A
-0,6
Jap,n1
1.(.
-4.0
5,5
.0.5
2,8
0.3
3.9
0.8
I,)
?1.3
I!)
?13
IIt!ited Ringdum
-12.3
.8.8
-7.2
4.2
6.2
.4.1
-3.8
2.1
-3:)
-2.0
-3.5
West Gctm:uav
23.11
9.8
19,_3
4.6
11.5
4.6
10.7
3A
N.5
1.2
8)
IS
23. We believe France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany will follow similar
import patterns, with volume increas(r.g at a 10'/, annual rate in second half 1975
and somewhat less rapidly in early 1976. In Canada, which is less dependent on
foreign supplies of raw materials and oil, imports will grow much more slowly.
British imports will show only moderate change as economic recovery lags behind
other countries.
24. The volume of exports, which consist in large part of finished
manufactured goods, will recover more slowly than imports. We expect annual
growth in export volume for the Six to measure less than 3'/o in second half 1975
and 4.5% in first half 1976. Export performance will vary considerably among
coun tries.
25. Britain will suffer a further declin : in export volume this half. British
inflation has more than offset depreciation of the pound. We expect French export
volume to stagnate in the coming months. Firming world demand should begin
to stimulate export volume in Canada, Italy, West Germany, and Japan in second
half 1975 -- a trend we expect will accelerate in 1976.
26. Price adjustments are expected to be particularly important factors
determining changes in the West German and British trade positions (see Table 7).
An adverse movement in terms of trade, together with the decline in the dollar
value of the Deutschemark, should account for 70% of the $2.2 billion decline
in the West German trade surplus in second half 1975. Only a small part of this
deterioration will be recouped in first half 1976. An improvement in Britain's terms
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
curtent
Curfew
Total
Vole
Tenor of
Trade
SCn4ces
Balance
Account
1Hdaatce
Total
Volume
Terms
of Trade
Service
llalauce
Account
llalauce
Total
-5.6
-5.5
-0.1
.03
-5.9
-0.3
-0.3
....
-0.5
41).1)
Canada
0.2
0.3
-0.1
....
0.2
0.3
0.3
4(1
0.2
Prance
-L6
-1.2
-0.4
-0.1
.1.7
?((v
.0!)
0.2
(I.1
4).(.
Italy
-0.4
..
-0.?1
11.2
?0.2
-0.2
?0?
....
4).2
Japan
-2.0
2.1
0.1
41.1
2.1
....
;!.I
0.1
4).3
0.3
United Kingdom
0.1
-1.2
I.6
-0.3
((.1
-0.1
0.3
-((.4
-0.1
4).2
West Gennany
.2.2
-1.3
-0!)
....
-2.2
0.4
O.1
0.3
4).1
03
of trade accounts for all of the strengthening in its trade balance in second half
1975; we expect it slight worsening in the British terms of trade in early 1 976.
Worsened Payments with OPEC
27. About one-third of the $5.9 billion drop in the combined current account
balance of the Six in second half 1975 will be due to a deterioration in their
payments position with OPEC. The pickup in oil imports at slightly higher prices,
coupled with increased interest payments, will add $4.4 billion to payments to
OPEC; increased exports to OPEC will total about $2 billion. We also expect the
trade balance with the non-oil LDCs to deteriorate markedly in second half 1975
as the volume of raw material imports increases and exports to the LDCs slow.
Big Six trade with the smaller OECD countries will deteriorate somewhat in second
half 1975 as growth in some of these countries slows. In first half 1976, a further
$0.8 billion deterioration in the current account balance of the Six is expected,
primarily because of higher oil payments.
14
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
l%lfunlcing the Deficit
28. We believe that the Big Six will have little difficulty financing the
expected increase in their current account deficits. Japan and France will be able
to borrow in the Eurodollar market to cover their financing needs. Because of
its large resource base ;,nd small debt service payments, Canada retains an excellent
credit rating in the face of what is now the largest current account deficit among
major developed countries. It will continue to meet much of its requirements
through public borrowing in New York and on the Eurodollar market.
29. Italy will continue to lean heavily on the IMF to cover its payments
deficit. In March, Rome drew down $400 million of its standby credit and recently
drew an additional $900 million from the special IMF Oil Facility. Next year,
it is expected to tap the Oil Facility for another $400 million and possibly draw
on the liC oil borrowing arrangement, if it is activated, for another $750 million.
Any residual needs can be handled by reserve drawdowns.
30. After increasing their investments in first quarter 1975, OPEC countries
began to pull out of sterling in the second quarter. Prospects are for continued
outflows until British inflation is clearly under control. London should still be
able to borrow enough to cover the current account deficit thrrvgh mid-1976
without great difficulty. In recent weeks, it drew down $400 million of a
longstanding credit line with Iran and has the option to draw a further $400 million
next year. Oil comp;,;,y investments in the Nortll Sea also will proiide a sizable
capital inflow over (tie 12 months to mid-1976.
31. In order to buttress its position, London has applied to the IMF for
a loan of approximately $2 billion. More than half' of the loan -- $1.2 billion --
will come from the Oil Facility; the remaining $0.8 billion will come from Britain's
normal credit rights in the IMF. With its anti-inflation program -low firmly in place,
Britain should have no trouble meeting the conditions the IMF is !ike,y to require
in granting the loan.
Major Uncertainties
32. In contrast to our past forecasting efforts, we believe that the risk
of underestimating trowth prospects is greater than chances of overestimating in
at least halt' the Big Six. In particular, a return to more normal saving rates wouid
mean that our estimate of' domestic demand was too low. The timing of' the
inevitable turnaround in saving rates is difficult to gauge, depending as it (foes
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
on consumer perceptions of employment opportunities and on other even more
nebulous factors that determine confidence levels. Our estimates for West Germany
and Japan are particularly vulncrable on this score.
33. If recent progre.,s in fighting inflation substantially scales clown
expectations of' future price changes, consumer price increases could slow in first
half' 1976. A belief that the back of' inflation had been broken Might induce labor
unions to be more moderate in wage demands, producers to restrain price }likes,
and 1c,,ders to cut back interest rates.
34. Exchange rate movements are the major uncertainty in our current
account estimates. We have a..., .:ned that exchange rate changes will be small, mainly
reflecting differences in inflation rates. Larger, short-run swings in currency rates
due to interest-sensitive capital flows are possible; these would distort our estimates
of' export and import flows, particularly as measured in dollars.
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Canada: Changes in (eat GNI', Components, and Selected
Keay Domestic Indicators
Percent a
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
Ist Half
2d Half
1st Half
GNP
2.8
-1.0
-0.5
-2.7
I.'1
4.2
Private consumption
4.2
1.4
1.0
1.3
2.2
3.0
Government purchases
7.9
4.2
6.0
4.9
1.3
1.3
Consumption
8.0
3.1
4.2
3.6
1.0
1.0
Investment
7.5
10.1
15.6
11.3
3.0
3.0
Gross fixed private
investment
5.1
-0.3
-7.2
1.8
2.8
3.0
Plant and equipment
7.9
5.5
0.1
10.0
2.0
....
Housing
-2.6
-17.4
-26.0
-22.6
6.0
14.5
Final domestic demand
5.2
1.7
0.5
2.2
2.1
2.6
Fxl,orls of goods
and services
-3.9
-7.0
-0.4
-14.6
3.0
6.1
Imports of goods
and services
8.6
-3.4
7.3
-10.7
1.8
2.8
Net foreign balance2
-3.1
-0.7
-2.0
-0.5
0.3
0.7
Stockbuilding2
0.5
-2.1
0.5
-4.2
-0.5
0.8
Actual chautge in stocks,
annual rate (billion
1973 US $)
2.3
-0.3
2.5
-0.1
-0.5
0.
Industrial production
2.6
-4.4
-4.6
-7.3
2.0
3.0
Consumer prices3
10.9
10.0
11.0
9.7
9.6
s.0
Wholesale industrial
prices3
21.5
9.5
11.7
10.2
6.0
6.0
Money supply (M 1)
9.8
11.4
2.2
16.0
12.0
8.2
Wage rates
13.5
16.2
19.6
15.9
13.5
10.0
1. Unless otherwise indicated, change from preceding period at an annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
2. Change is expressed as a percent of GNP in previous period.
3. Not seasonally adjusted.
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
Is( Half
2d Half
Is( Half
Exports (f.o.b.)
33.0
32.8
17.2
16.0
16.8
18.2
Imports (f,o.b.)
31.5
34.0
I1.0
16.7
17.3
18.4
Trade balance
I .5
-1.2
0.2
-0.7
-0.5
-0.2
Net services and transfers
-3.2
-3.8
-1.7
-I .9
-1.9
-2.0
Cutient account balance
-1.7
-5.0
-1.5
-2.6
-2.4
-2.2
Percent Change from Previous Period
flalf-Year Data at an Annual Rate
Export volume
-5.0
-7.4
1.1
-16.5
4.5
7.2
Export prices in tears
of US dollars
37.9
6.9
15.3
3.3
6.1
10.2
Import volurno
10.3
-5.8
7.7
-14.7
0.6
3.0
Import prices in terms
of US dollars
29.9
14.4
25.6
12.9
7,2
10.3
1. IIalf-year data, seasonally adjusted.
2. Canadian dollar values were converted at the following exchange rates: 0.9726 Canadian dollar to the US
dollar in first half 1974, 0.9834 in second half 1974, 1.0101 in first half' 1975, 1.0246 in sec and half' 1975, and
1.0152 in first half 1976.
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
France: Changes in Real GNP, Components, and Selected
Key Domestic Indicators
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
Ist Half
2d Half
IA Half
GN1'
3.9
-3.7
-0.2
-8.7
2.7
4.3
Private consumption
4.3
1.8
2.0
1.8
1.6
2.7
Government purchases
2.6
2.5
1.9
2.0
4.3
4.4
Consumption
3.5
1.8
3.6
0.4
2.8
3.6
Investment
0.5
4.1
-1.6
5.5
7.3
6.1
Gross fixed private
investment
3.9
-9.3
0.1
-16.2
-3.6
3.8
Plant and equipment
3.8
-10.1
....
-I6.6
-6.1
4.3
Housing
4.2
-7.8
0.3
-15.5
1.0
3.0
Final domestic demand
3.9
-0.2
1.6
-2.0
1.1.
3.6
Exports of goods
and services
1.8
-4.5
-2.4
-6.9
-1.5
1.2
Imports o, goods
and service,
8.9
-10.1
-9.7
-16.8
4.7
6.3
Net foreign balances2
0.6
0.9
1.5
2.0
-1.6
-1.0
Stockbuilding2
0.6
-4.3
-3.3
-8.7
3.6
2.0
Actual change in stocks,
annual rate (billion
1973 U.S $)
4.6
-7.8
2.4
-8.0
-3.4
-1.4
Industrial production
2.8
-9.2
-4.2
-15.0
-2.0
6.0
Consumer prices3
13.7
11.7
14.4
11.5
9.2
9.2
Wholesale industrial
prices3
29.1
4.5
22.4
2.0
-6.0
2.9
Money supply (MI)
10.7
15.0
15.3
14.5
15.6
14.5
Wage rata
18.8
17.3
23.0
16.0
14.7
13.4
I. Unless otherwise indicated, change from preceding period at an annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
2. Change is expressed as a percent of GNP in previous period.
3. Not seasonally adjusted.
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Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
Exports (f.o.b.)
46.6
53.5
24.5
27.4
26.1
26.0
Imports (f.o.b.)
49.9
52.0
26.2
25.9
26.2
26.8
Trade balance
-3.3
1.5
-1.7
1.5
-0.1
-0.8
Net services and transfers
-2.5
-3.0
-1.1
-1.4
-1.5
-1.4
Current account balance
-5.8
-1.5
-2.8
0.1
-1.6
-2.2
Percent Change from Previous Period
Half-Year Data at an Annual Rate
Export volume
9.6
-5.9
-8.1
-7.5
....
1.2
Export prices in terms
of US dollars
15.7
18.9
33.9
28.5
-8.8
-1.3
Import volume
6.8
-8.7
-2.9
-19.3
9.8
7.7
Import prices in terms
of US dollars
37.6
14.7
40.1
14.5
-6.2
-2.2
1. Flalf-year data, seasonally adjusted.
2. French franc values were converted at the following exchange rates: 4.89 French francs to the US dollar in
first half 1974, 4.71 in second half 1974, 4.13 in first half 1975, 4.35 in second half 1975, and 4.50 in first half
1976.
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
Italy: Changes in Real GNP, Components, and Selected
Key Domestic Indicators
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
GNP
3.4
-4.6
-6.7
-4.8
-2.1
2.0
Private consumption
2.3
-2.9
-6.5
-2.0
-1.0
1.0
Government purchases
-3.1
-1.7
-7.3
-0.3
1.3
2.5
Consumption
2.1
0.6
-0.6
1.0
1.0
2.0
Investment
-15.1
-8.1
-23.4
4.0
2.0
4.0
Gross fixed private
investment
13.4
-14.3
-3.9
-18.7
-15.2
-0.1
Plant and equipment
19.3
-23.1
-5.9
-29.4
-26.0
-2.0
Housing
5.1
-0.3
-0.6
-0.4
0.4
2.0
Final domestic demand
2.8
-4.5
-6.2
-4.5
-2.7
1.2
Exports of goods
and services
16.1
-5.8
1.4
-14.4
6.1
6.1
Imports of goods
and services
10.3
-11.7
-15.9
-19.0
10.3
4.0
Net foreign balance2
0.7
1.3
3.3
1.1
-0.8
0.3
Stockbuilding2
-0.3
-1.4
-3.8
-1.4
1.2
0.5
Actual change in stocks,
annual rate (billion
1973 US $)
1.4
-0.6
0.6
-1.0
-0.2
0.1
Industrial production
4.3
-9.7
-12.5
-10.5
-5.0
3.0
Consumer price S3
19.4
16.7
28.0
16.0
8.5
9.0
Wholesale industrial
prices3
45.5
7.5
27.9
1.8
1.6
2.4
Money supply (M1)
19.3
14.1
10.7
14.2
17.2
16.6
Wage rates
22.5
27.5
27.7
28.8
25.0
25.0
1. Unless otherwise indicated, change from preceding period at an annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
2. Change is expressed as a percent of GNP in previous period.
3. Not seasonally adjusted.
21
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Italy: Current Account Trends'
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Ha!`
2d Half
1st Half
Exports (f.o.b.)
30.0
33.3
16.4
17.0
16.3
16.9
Imports (f.o.b.)
38.0
33.3
20.1
16.8
16.5
17.3
Trade balance
-8.0
....
-3.7
0.2
-0.2
-0.4
Net services and transfers
0.2
-0.6
0.8
-0.4
-0.2
-0.2
Current account balance
-7.8
-0.6
-2.9
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
Percent Change from Previous Period
Half-Year Data at an Annual Rate
Export volume
7.3
-0.9
18.5
-13.8
10.0
5.8
Export prices in terms
of US dollars
25.5
9.1
30.3
14.5
-16.7
1.6
Import voiume
-5.5
-15.6
-5.8
-30.J
10.0
8.4
Import prices in terms
of US dollars
55.3
5.0
25.4
5.5
-12.7
1.6
I. Half-year data, not seasonally adjusted.
2. Italian lira values were converted at the following cxchanic rates: 642.1 Italian lira to the US dollar in first
half 1974, 658.6 in second half 1974, 633.23 in first half 1975. 675.0 in second half 1975, and 690 in first half
1976.
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Japan: Changes in Real GNP, Components, and Selected
Key Domestic Indicators
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
GNP
-1.7
1.5
3.2
-0.3
3.0
4.4
Private consumption
1.1
3.6
5.1
3.4
2.4
3.6
Government purchases
-4.9
9.2
6.1
13.2
4.9
3.5
Consumption
3.2
4.0
5.9
0.2
10.0
8.0
Investment
-12.5
15.0
6.3
28.4
????
-1.0
Gross fixed private
investment
-9.2
-4.8
-4.2
-8.7
2.8
7.2
Plant and equipment
-10.3
-8.6
-11.3
-9.4
-4.0
2.0
Housing
-6.5
3.3
13.0
-7.3
28.0
17.2
Final domestic demand
-3.0
2.4
2.7
2.0
3.0
4.5
Exports of goods
and services
20.7
6.7
25.4
-1.0
6.0
5.9
Imports of goods
and services
12.1
-7.3
-0.4
-16.5
6.5
6.9
Net foreign balance2
0.9
1.8
3.2
2.1
?...
-0.1
Stockbuilding2
0.3
-2.7
-2.6
-4.3
????
Actual change in stocks,
annual rate (billion
1973 US$)
13.9
2.5
11.3
2.5
2.5
2.5
Industrial production
-2.6
-9.9
-13.8
-17.6
12.7
9.0
Consumer prices3
24.4
11.3
17.6
l L1
6.0
8.0
Wholesale industrial
prices3
31.4
3.0
10.9
-0.3
2.3
0.7
Money supply (M1)
13.1
11.1
9.8
11.8
11.1
10.8
Wage rates
32.8
17.9
35.8
15.3
8.3
12.0
1. Unless otherwise indicate., change from preceding period at an annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
2. Change is expressed as a percent of GNP in previous period.
3. Not seasonally adjusted.
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Japan: Current Account Trends'
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
Exports (f.o.b.)
54.5
55.9
29.5
28.3
27.6
28.9
Imports (f.o.b.)
52.9
50.1
26.7
24.4
25.7
27.0
Trade balance
1.6
5.8
2.8
3.9
1.9
1.9
Net services and transfers
-5.6
.6.3
-2.5
-3.1
-3.2
-3.5
Current account balance
-4.0
-0.5
0.3
0.8
-1.3
-1.6
Percent Change from Previous Period
Half-Year Data at an Annual Rate
Export volume
16.1
1.0
22.4
-10.4
6.5
7.1
Export prices in terms
of US dollars
28.7
-1.1
15.2
-3.6
-10.7
2.4
Import volume
-0.5
-11.2
-13.5
-23.2
6.5
6.5
Import prices in terms
of US dollars
63.9
8.0
32.3
...?
4.0
3.6
1. Half-year data, seasonally adjusted.
2. Yen values were converted at the following exchange rates: 280.1 Japanese yen to the US dollar in first half
1974, 299.8 in second half 1974, 293.1 in first half 1975, and 300 in second half 1975 and first half 1976.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
United Kingdom: Changes in Real GNP, Components,
and Selected Key Domestic Indicators
Projected
l'ro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
Ist Half
GNP
0.4
-1.5
6.9
-4.5
-3.6
-0.5
Private consumption
-0.1
-0.3
4.8
-1.1
-3.8
-3.0
Government purchases
2.0
2.4
1.5
4.1
0.1
-0.7
Consumption
2.1
2.9
3.9
3.6
0.5
2.0
Investment
1.6
1.2
-4.5
5.3
-1.0
-7.5
Gross fixed private
investment
-4.4
-7.3
0.8
-10.2
-9.2
-8.1
Plant and equipment
-0.9
-10.2
3.9
-13.3
-17.0
-14.1
Housing
-19.2
7.9
-14.0
8.0
34.1
16.9
final domestic demand
????
-0.4
3.5
-0.8
-3.3
-2.9
Exports of goods
and services
5.9
-3.0
-1.1
-2.6
-5.9
4.0
Imports of goods
and services
0.8
-7.2
-3.0
-9.7
6.1
....
Net foreign balance2
1.2
0.3
0.5
1.8
-2.9
1.0
Stockbuilding2
-0.7
-1.4
3.0
-5.4
2.6
1.6
Actual change in stocks,
annual rate (billion
1973 US $)
0.9
-1.6
2.2
-2.8
-0.5
0.9
Industrial production
-2.3
-7.4
5.8
-14.1
-5.7
2.0
Consumer pricesa
16.0
24.3
16.2
28.7
23.8
16.6
Wholesale industrial
prices 3
29.1
25.0
24.9
27.3
20.7
12.4
Money supply (Ml)
3.5
14.8
8.2
17.1
16.6
10.3
Wage rates
16.2
24.4
29.5
26.4
16.5
10.3
1. Unless otherwise indicated. change from preceding period at an annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
2. Change is expressed as a PWe Gdnt of GNP in , revious period.
3. Not seasonally adjusted. NN
25
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
United Kingdom: Current Account Trends'
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st I1a1f
2d Half
1st Half
Exports (f.o,b.)
36.5
43.8
19.2
22.2
21.6
22.1
Imports (f.o.b.)
48.8
51.0
25.4
26.0
25.0
25.6
Trade balance
-12.3
-7.2
-6.2
-3.8
-3.4
-3.5
Net services and transfers
3.5
3.1
1.8
13
1.4
1.3
Current account balance
-8.8
-4.1
-4.4
-2.1
-2.0
-2.2
Percent Change from Previous Period
Half-Year Data at an Annual Rate
Export volume
7.1
....
-I.6
4.0
-5.9
6.1
Export prices in terms
of US dollars
21.7
16.3
23.7
22.0
....
0.8
Import volume
1.3
-7.1
-3.8
-13.7
4.0
3.0
Import prices in terms
of US dollars
13.2
7.3
21.1
11.4
-1 1.6
4.0
I. Half-year data, seasonally adjusted.
2. British pound values were converted at the following exchange rates: 0.428 British pound to the US dollar
in first halt' 1974, 0.427 in second half 1974, 0.424 in first half 1975, 0.472 in second half 1975, and 0.495 in
first half 1976.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
West Germany: Changes in Real GNP, Components,
and Selected Key Uoniestic Indicators
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
Ist Half
2d Half
Ist Half
GNP
0.4
-3.3
-1.8
-6.0
0.4
1.0
Private consumption
0.2
2.1
1.7
2.3
2.4
2.4
Government purchases
4.8
2.1
5.4
0.9
1.4
-3.7
Consumption
4.8
2.1
5.4
0.9
1.4
-3.7
Investment
4.8
2.1
5.4
0.9
1.4
-3.7
Gross fixed private
investment
-8.2
-9.0
-9.2
-11.9
-2.5
1.8
Plant and equipment
-8.0
-5.6
-I.7
-10.2
Housing
-8.3
-11.5
-14.4
-13.3
11.4
3.3
Final domestic demand
-I.1
-0.5
-0.3
-I.4
1.1
1.0
Exports of goods
and services
13.3
8.3
-3.2
]'/.8
2.5
5.1
Imports of goods
and services
4.9
0.5
5.8
-5.3
8.2
6.1
Net foreign balance2
2.3
-2.7
-2.2
-3.7
-1.2
-0.2
Stockbuilding2
-0.9
-0.2
0.7
-0.9
0.5
0.2
Actual change in stocks,
annual rate (billion
1973 US $)
0.5
-0.2
1.0
-0.5
0.2
0.5
Industrial production
-1.3
-7.5
-7.6
-10.4
-0.7
4.6
Consumer prices3
7.0
5.9
4.9
7.2
4.4
6.1
Wholesale industrial
prices3
13.4
1.8
4.1
1.6
....
2.0
Money supply (M1)
5.9
13.3
12.6
13.2
14.0
10.0
Wage rates
12.0
10.1
21.2
5.1
10.0
6.3
I. Unless otherwise indicated, change from preceding period at an annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
2. Change is expressed as a percent of GNP in previous 1 criod.
3. Not seasonally adjusted.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1
West Germany: Current Account Trendst
Projected
Pro-
jected
1974
1975
1975
1976
1974
1975
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
Exports (f.u.b.)
88.9
90.3
'16.3
46.3
44.0
47.3
Imports (f.o.b.)
65.9
71.1
34.8
35.6
35.5
38.4
'T'rade balance
23.0
19.2
11.5
10.7
8.5
8.9
Net services and transfers
-13.2
-14.6
-6.9
-7.3
-7.3
-7.4
Current account balance
9.8
4.6
4.6
3.4
1.2
1.5
Percent Change from Previous Period
Half-Year Data at an Annual Rate
Export volume
12.2
-11.3
-2.0
-21.5
2.4
5.0
Export prices in terms
of US dollars
18.6
12.9
20.1
24.3
-12.1
10.3
Import volume
-1.2
1.6
10.6
-6.6
10.5
6.0
Import prices in terms
of US dollars
29.1
4.8
12.8
9.2
-10.2
10.3
1. Ilalf-year data, seasonally adjusted.
2. German mark values were converted at the following exchange rates: 2.62 German marks to the US dollar in
first hall' 1974, 2.57 in second half 1974, 2.35 in first half 1975, 2.55 in second half 1975, and 2.50 in first half
1976.
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500200023-1