LAW OF THE SEA COUNTRY STUDY MOROCCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600110002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975
• Content Type: STUDY

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No Foreign Dissent
Law of the Sea Country Study
Morocco
BGI LOS 75-5
March 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 019641
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1)1 (2), and (3)
Aulomallca y declassified on:
date impossible to dolermine
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No l%urcl/n UM,wrm
The Law of the Sea Country Studies are prepared to support
the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea. The
countries to be included in the series are selected on the
basis of priorities suggested by the chairman of the Task
Force.
Each study has two parts. Part I is an analysis of the
primary geographic, economic, and political factors that
might influence the country's law of the sea policy, the
public and private expressions of that policy, and a brief
biography of the key personalities involved. Part II provides
basic data and information bearing on law of the sea matters.
This study was prepared by the Office of Geographic
and Cartographic Research. Biographic support was provided by
the Central Reference Service. The study was coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence and with the Depart-
ment of State. Comments and questions may be directed to the
LOS Country Studies Working Group, Code 143, Extension 2257.
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No Fnrei;,n I)i.+,wrIII
Part I - Law of the Sea Ana Isis
Summary ....... .. .... ................................ 1
Factors Influencing LOS Policy ............................. 2
Law of the Sea Policy ...................................... 7
Key Policy Makers, LOS Negotiators and Advisers ............ 14
Biographic Sketches ........................................ 18
Part II - Background Information
Basic Data ............................. ................... 20
Conventions ................................................ 21
Present Ocean Claims ....................................... 22
Action on Significant UN Resolutions ....................... 23
Membership in Organizations Related to LOS Interests ....... 24
UN LOS draft articles submitted by Mo%,occo
Maps: Regional map
Theoretical Division of the World Seabed
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No Fore!(rn Ulssrni
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
A. SUMMARY
conflicting influences in terms of various .J
A' 1
in its LOS policies as it seeks to evaluate
In the aftermath of the 1974 Caracas - -~ .
Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference Morocco Sty
appears to retain considerable flexibility
such factors as its geographic location on
tributing to the complexity and importance
military aid -- the United States and France being the principal
order to diversify its sources of economic, technical, and
has accepted limited assistance from various Communist nations in
States, and its hopes to attract foreign aid for economic develop-
ment. Following a policy of nonalignment, Morocco in recent years
traditional friendship with the United
states and other African neighbors, its
to maintain good relations with fellow Arab
the vital Strait if Gilbraltar, its desire
powers, wha are accused of pushing their strategic objectives
among Moroccan officials to blame lack of progress on the large
a successful outcome of the LOS undertaking. A tendency remains
considerably, however, and it now exhibits a strong interest in
confusion and uncertainty. Morocco's thinking has .,harpened
successful LOS treaty, and its own views reflected considerable
As late as 1973 Morocco was pessimistic about chances for a
Western suppliers.
while ignoring the needs of developing countries.
Morocco's relationship with Spain is particularly important
in the LOS context. Morocco shares with Spain strategic interest
in the Strait of Gibraltar, and it publicly endorses Spain's
support for the principle of innocent passage to apply to straits
transit. At the same time, Morocco t=s shown some willingness to
moderate its LOS positions that are not in harmony with U.S. views.
Moreover, resentment over vestiges of Spanish colonialism -- two
small enclaves on Morocco's northern coast and the large territory
of Spanish Sahara to the south which Morocco also claims -- could
possibly provide some motivation for Morocco to alter its views
on straits transit.
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The related LOS issues of fisheries and the economic zone
are also 3f major interest to Morocco. One of the world's richest
fisheries is located off Morocco's Atlantic coast. After a long
period of neglect, "orocco is now taking steps to expand its
fishing industry and to modernize its zntiquated fishing fleet.
In 1973 Morocco took unilateral action to gain control over
foreign-flag fishing in its coastal waters by extending its
exclusive fishing zone to 70 miles.* Provision was made for
continued foreign fishing in this zone under bilateral arrange-
ments; a move designed to acquire outside capital for development.
Although it has had some success with this approach, Morocco has
found it difficult to enforce its fishing regulations because of
limited patrol resources. For this and other reasons., Morocco
supports the concept of an economic zone of no more than 200 miles
in which the coastal state would have exclusive rights to exploit
both living and nonliving resources. Although Morocco subscribes
to the principle of full utilization of fishing resources, it feels
that this should be accomplished only on the basis of bilateral or
regional arrangements entered into by the coastal state. Morocco
also feels that the coastal state should control and regulate
pollution and scientific research in the economic zone.
Morocco wants the international Authority for the deep seabed
to have broad powers, including that of direct exploitation. It
believes that a balance of control in the Authority's organiza-
tional structure will be necessary to prevent domination by the
advanced nations. On the other hand, Morocco realizes the impor-
tance of maintaining a profit motive and feels that provision for
compulsory dispute settlement is essential to protect the interests
of the technologically advanced countries. Reflecting its concern
over possible adverse economic effects on its own mineral produc-
tion, Morocco argues for tight control over deep seabed mining
from the outset and for close coordination with land-based
production.
B. FACTORS INFLUENCING LOS POLICY
Special Geographic Features
Morocco is a maritime and continental country with access both
to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Located in the
extreme northwestern part of Africa at a crossroad of sea and air
communications, Morocco occupies the southern flank of the vital
Strait of Gibraltar. Morocco's long coastline includes about
* Distances and areas throughout this study are in nautical miles
unless specified otherwise.
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800 statute miles on the Atlantic and about 300 statute miles
bordering the Mediterranean. Morocco lies adjacent to one of the
world's richest oceanic fishing grounds. Its continental margin
extends well beyond 200 miles in the Atlantic region, but its
continental shelf overall is narrow, averaging only about 30 miles.
Uses of the Sea
Mineral Resources -- Morocco has no known offshore petroleum
or natural gas resources, although geological studies indicate
considerable promise. Several international oil companies,
including U.S. firms, hold offshore concessions; and exploratory
drilling has taken place along much of the coastline. Oil traces
have been found in several of the offshore test wells, but nothing
of a commercial nature as yet. The recent high cost of oil has
given new impetus to the exploration efforts that are being
encouraged by the Moroccan Government under its five-year
development plan.
Besides being the world's leading exporter of phosphates,
Morocco is also a land producer of significant amounts of
manganese and cobalt -- minerals also contained in the nodules
found in the deep seabed area. In 1973 Morocco produced 146,000
metric tons of manganese and 1,200 metric tons of cobalt.
Living Resources -- The fishing grounds lying off Morocco's
Atlantic coast are one of the world's richest. Such commercial
species as sardine, hake, and sea bream are particularly plentiful.
Even though the fishing fleet is antiquated and possesses no
distant-water capability, regionally Morocco is third in landings
bt,,.,. South Africa and Angola. Fish products represent about
8% of the total value of Morocco's exports; the sardine is the
most important species, accounting for about 40% of the gross
value of the total catch.
Although the industry could best be described as stagnant only
a few years ago, the government has taken steps recently to
stimulate its growth. In 1969 a National Fishery Office was
created and charged with drawing up a long-range expansion pro-
gram to cover all aspects of the industry. Concurrent efforts
to bring in foreign investments in the industry were given a
boost in March 1973 when Morocco extended its exclusive fishing
zone to 70 miles, while making allowance for the operation
therein of joint companies. Morocco has provided guarantees to
protect foreign investments and has made provisions for profit
withdrawal. Bilateral fishing arrangements have been concluded,
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or are being negotiated, with several nations, including the
United States, Canada, the U.S.S.R., Japan, Spain, France, Belgium,
South Korea, and Kuwait.
With the gradual acquisition of modern fishing vessels and
processing plants thrcugh its own efforts and by means of joint f
ventures, Morocco's fish production is increasing; and there is
tremendous potential for further growth. At present, however,
most of the approximately 3,600 units comprising the commercial
fishing fleet are small wooden craft of less than two tons; only
about 15% of the total number is motorized. The greater part of
the fish catch is by some 320 purse seiners and 120 trawlers.
Plans call for increasing the number of these larger craft and
also for the acquisition of some distant-water trawlers and
refrigerator ships. The main fishing effort takes place from
Atlantic coast ports, principally Agadir, Safi, Essaouira, and
Casablanca.
Deep Seabed Capabilities and Interests -- Morocco has no
capability as regards exploitat,ion of deep seabed resources.
Although it supports the concept of an international regime to
undertake such exploitation, Morocco is concerned about the
possible economic consequences of deep seabed mining on its own
production of cobalt and manganese.
Marine Transportation -- Morocco's merchant fleet carries
only a small portion of the c untry's total volume of inter-
national seaborne trade. Mo::i. of the seaborne exports and imports
are transported by foreign shipping largely under Moroccan charter.
As of 1974 the merchant fleet consisted of 15 ships of 1,000 gross
register tons (GRT) and over, totaling some 41,600 GRT. Morocco's
merchant fleet is employed in both scheduled and tramp service in
the general areas of the east and west coasts of Africa, Medi-
terranean Sea, Western Europe, Baltic, east coast of Canada, east
coast of South America, south and east coasts of Asia, and
Australia.
Morocco has 8 major and 11 minor ports. the largest,
Casablanca, and four of the other major ports -- Agadir, Safi,
Mohammedia, and Kenitra -- are on the Atlantic coast; another
major port, Tangier, is on the Strait of Gibraltar; and the
remaining two major ports, Ceuta and Melilla, are on the Medi-
terranean and are under Spanish control. Port development has
been difficult because of the regularity of the coastline; in
almost all instances costly breakwaters have been needed to
provide adequate shelter.
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Naval and Air Transportation Considerations -- Morocco's
naval and air forces are small and underdeveloped and have
virtually no combat capabilities. The Royal Moroccan Navy is a
coast guard-type organization whose mission is to protect the
national coastline and territorial waters, prevent illegal entry
and smuggling by sea, and enforce maritime and fishing regula-
tions. The navy is totally dependent on foreign assistance
(principally French) for ships and associated equipment and for
officer and technical training. As of 1974 the navy had some
1,300 personnel and 17 ships (15 patrol, 1 amphibious, and
1 service); the air force comprised about 3,100 men and 136
aircraft, including 49 jets. Morocco's principal scheduled
airline, Royal Air Maroc, flies to over twenty cities in Europe
and northwest Africa. Domestic flights are handled largely by
another company, Royal Air Inter. Approximately 145 civil
aircraft are registered in Morocco; many ere small planes
operated by various governmental agencies, businesses, and
private individuals.
Political and Other Factors
Although officially pursuing a policy of nonalignment since
independence in 1956, Morocco has maintained close ties with
Western countries, particularly the United States and France,
its major sources of economic, technical, and military aid. In
recent years, however, Morocco's autocratic ruler, King Hassan,
has acted to reduce this dependency by accepting limited assis-
tance from various Communist nations -- despite his awareness of
Soviet aspirations in the Mediterranean region. Another of
Morocco's aims has been to improve relations with its Arab
neighbors and with other African countries; in 1972 and 1973
Morocco hosted Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Arab
summit meetings, respectively. As regards the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Morocco has followed a generally moderate line.
Morocco's relations with Spain are of special importance in
the LOS context. Morocco shares with Spain strategic interest
in the Strait of Gibraltar, and Spain's strong views on the
concept of innocent passage in straits have had a bearing on
Moroccan thinking. At the same time, Moroccan resentment over
vestiges of Spanish colonialism -- the small enclaves of Ceuta
and Melilla on the northern coast and the large territory of
Spanish Sahara to the south* which Morocco also claims -- could
possibly provide some motivation for Morocco to alter its
* See map on following page.
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present stand on innocent passage. This was hinted at by a
Moroccan official in discussions with U.S. officials score months
after the 1974 Caracas LOS Conference. Moreover, a few years
ago, a Moroccan cabinet officer explained that Morocco's support
for Spain's claim to Gibraltar had the ulterior motive of
undermining the rationale for continued Spanish presence in
Ceuta and Melilla.
Another factor affecting the final shaping of Morocco's LOS
stands is Moroccan resentment over past maritime policies of the
advanced nations and suspicion concerning their present inten-
tions. There is a strong tendency on the part of Moroccan LOS
officials to accuse the big powers of pushing their strategic
maritime and overflight objectives at the cost of ignoring the
aspirations and needs of the developing countries. In general,
these officials tend to blame the slow progress in the LOS
Conference to date on the rigidity of the established powers
against modifications in existing maritime doctrine.
Morocco's interest in attracting foreign investment in the
development of industry and mining is another important con-
sideration in its approach to various LOS issues. It has also
expressed strong support for the transfer of marine technology
from the advanced nations to the developing countries.
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Territorial Sea
Morocco favors a maximum 12-mile territorial sea, the same
limit it supported at the 1958 Geneva Convention. Its own
territorial sea claim was officially set at 12 miles by the
March 1973 Decree that extended Morocco's fishery jurisdiction
to 70 miles. Since 1962 Morocco had claimed a 12-mile exclusive
fishing zone except in the Strait of Gibraltar where the zone
was only 6 miles, subject to reciprocal rights with Spain. In
addition, a 1969 fishing convention with Spain (abrogated in 1972)
had allowed nationals of each country to fish in the other's
territorial waters -- defined for the purpose of that convention
as extending to 12 miles. The March i973 Decree clarified Morocco's
territorial sea claim and ended alarm abroad that had been generated
by Moroccan officials' imprecise statements indicating an intent
to declare a 70-mile "territorial sea." Morocco also claims a
20-mile customs zone.
Straits
The strategic location of Morocco on the southern flank of
the Strait of Gibraltar makes the government's attitude on the
issue of straits transit especially important. Morocco's public
stance thus far has consistently mirrored Spain's advocacy of the
principle of innocent passage, but privately there have been
indications of more flexibility than meets the eye. The evolu-
tion of Morocco's stand on the straits issue is interesting.
In 1971, before Morocco seriously began to formulate its LOS
positions, King Hassan told U.S. officials that he subscribed to
the principle of free transit in straits. There is considerable
question, however, whether he or other Moroccan officials who
spoke in a similar vein really understood all of the implications
involved. This view is supported by Moroccan statements made at
the time that such "friends" as the United States need not worry
in any case because bilateral arrangements could easily be
reached. By 1972 Moroccan officials at all levels began to
exhibit a negative attitude toward free transit. Then Foreign
Minister Filali expressed the thought that free passage through
straits was a carryover from the time when major powers roamed
the globe at will. That time had passed, he asserted, and there
was now a requirement for the full exercise of the rights of
coastal and straits states. He said that such nations, for
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example, should have the right to decide against submerged
passage of submarines through their bordering waters and, in
any event, should be consulted about such passage. In the case
of the Strait of Gibraltar, Filali thought that it would be easy
under the doctrine of innocent passage for Morocco to work out
transit arrangements with Spain that would meet U.S. objectives.
In March 1973 Morocco joined with Spain and several other
countries in the UN Seabed Committee in sponsoring draft articles
upholding the application of innocent passage in straits (see
Annex). The same 1973 Moroccan decree that extended Morocco's
fishing jurisdiction to 70 miles also included a reference
to the right of transit and overflight of Moroccan territorial
waters (12 miles) in accordance with conditions stipulated in
international conventions, to which Morocco was a party, and
"conforming to the principle of innocent passage as recognized
and defined by international law." Soon after the decree's
promulgation, then Foreign Minister Benhima told a U.S. official
that Morocco's position on straits transit was still not "firm."
He discounted the decree's reference to innocent passage,
asserting that the language used in reference to the Strait of
Gibraltar had no "legislative authority." Once again, he raised
the possibility of Morocco making bilateral arrangements with
friendly nations concerning passage through Gibraltar. He
said that in any event it was in Morocco's interest that the
Mediterranean Sea be frequented waters.
At the 1974 Caracas session of the Third LOS Conference,
Morocco, as a member of the OAU, expressed its support of
that organization's endorsement of the principle of innocent
passage in straits used for international navigation. Referring
to innocent passage as the traditional basis for navigation in
territorial waters, the Moroccan representative said that the
principle had worked eminently well and had passed the test of
time. He saw no reason, therefore, to change to some other
concept, particularly at a time when maritime traffic had
increased and the risks of accidents had become greater.
Speaking privately with U.S. officials, the leader of the
Moroccan delegation, Gharbi, elaborated on the reasons for
Morocco's stand on straits. He said that it was essential to
recognize that Morocco's position was the result of the political
realities of the country's relations with its neighbors and
friends, particularly the Arab world. At the same time, Gharbi
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broached the matter of Moroccan resentment over the two Spanish
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's northern coast. The
territorial issue is complex and in the nature of a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, Morocco has been supporting Spain's
straits position and territorial claims to Gibraltar in order to
gain leverage for its own position on Ceuta and Melilla. On the
other hand, a few months after the 1974 Caracas session of the
LOS Conference, a Moroccan official privately hinted that Morocco
could be accommodating to U.S. straits interests if the United
States threw its weight behind Morocco's efforts to remove Spanish
colonialism from Africa, including the large territory of Spanish
Sahara, which is also claimed by Morocco. The U.S. Embassy
evaluates this gambit as a trial balloon and not necessarily an
indication of a definitive policy change. Nevertheless, it adds
a new dimension to Morocco's straits position.
Regime of Islands
Although Morocco has not commented extensively on the
issue of islands, it did join with several other countries in
sponsoring at the 1974 Caracas Conference draft articles on
the regime of islands (see Annex). The articles call for a
comr,rehensive classification of world islands -- excepting
insular and archipelagic states -- for Vie purpose of providing
a scientific basis for assigning varying maritime spaces and
other rights.
Coastal State Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial Sea
Morocco favors an exclusive economic zone of no more than
200 miles. While subscribing to freedom of navigation and
overflight in this zone, as well as the right to lay submarine
cables and pipelines, Morocco feels that the coastal state
should have the exclusive right to explore and exploit both
the living and mineral resources. The coastal state should
also have the right to control and regulate pollution and
scientific research in the economic zone. At the same time,
Morocco is prepared to enter into appropriate bilateral and
regional arrangements for joint exploration and exploitation
in the zone. Morocco's views on these matters are detailed
in draft articles of 26 August 1974 that it cosponsored at
the Caracas Conference (see Annex). These articles also note
the right of landlocked or otherwise geographically disadvantaged
states to exploit the living resources of the economic zones
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of neighboring coastal states. Bilateral, subregional, or
regional arrangements are to be reached spelling out such rights
as well as accompanying obligations of the disadvantaged states.
Morocco is not keen on the issue of revenue sharing from
offshore oil wells in the economic zone. Although Morocco as
yet has no producing offshore wells, intensive exploration
efforts are underway and preliminary findings are promising.
In November 1974 Morocco's LOS expert Gharbi confided to
U.S. officials that Morocco would only agree to such revenue
sharing as a last resort if this seemed necessary to the
conclusion of an LOS Treaty.
Fisheries
After a long period of neglect, the Moroccan Government
has embarked on an apparently serious effort to upgrade its
fishing industry and increase production. This desire and
the growing frustration over its inability to control intensive
fishing off its Atlantic coast by foreign-flag vessels led
Morocco in March 1973 to extend its exclusive fishing zone from
12 to 70 miles, except in the Strait of Gibraltar and in the
Mediterranean Sea where the zone was set at the equidistant
line between the Moroccan and Spanish coast. Morocco previously
had sought to gain the cooperation of the foreign states
involved to prevent overfishing of its coastal species, particu-
larly sardine, but acted unilaterally when its efforts were
unsuccessful. At the time, Moroccan officials defended the
action on economic grounds and said that Morocco was influenced
by similar steps taken earlier by Peru and other states.
Under the 1973 law, fishing in the first 12 miles off the
coast is reserved exclusively for Moroccan vessels; foreign-
flag vessels may fish in the outer 58 miles of the 70-mile
zone provided a government-to-government agreement exists.
The 1973 law also designated Morocco's territorial sea limit
as 12 miles. In the context of Morocco's economic motives,
this was important because earlier bilateral arrangements had
given Spanish ships special rights to fish within that distance
of the Moroccan coast. Specifically, a 1969 agreement with
Spain (abrogated in December 1972) had been along such
lines. Furthermore, Spanish fishermen over the centuries had
been granted permission for close-in fishing by various
Moroccan sultans. An additional factor that motivated Morocco
to unilaterally extend its fishing zone in 1973 was a belief
that the LOS negotiations "were going nowhere."
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Spain was particularly upset by Morocco's action. There
followed months of inconclusive talks between the two countries
on a new fishing agreement, accompanied by Spanish press
tirades and some mutterings of possible military action directed
at Morocco. The normally cordial relationship between the two
countries was further strained during this interval by stepped-
up seizures of Spanish fishing boats in the affected zone by
Moroccan patrol craft. Cooler heads prevailed, and in December
1973 a settlement was reached between Spanish and Moroccan
commercial interests. It was agreed that an existing joint
Moroccan-Spanish fishing company called Maro-peche was to
license up to 200 Spanish vessels to fish in the outer 58 miles
of Morocco's fishing zone. Official notes were exchanged between
Morocco and Spain on 2 January 1974. Since then the fishing
controversy has subsided publicly, but irregularities have
continued. Many Spanish boats still fish illegally, protected
by involved clandestine financial arrangements and the fact
that Morocco's few patrol craft are inadequate to police the
long coastline. As a matter of principle, Spain officially
does not recognize Morocco's exclusive fishing zone.
Despite the difficulty in enforcing its fishing regulations,
the extension of the exclusive fishing zone to 70 miles
apparently has been a factor in subsequent larger catches by
Morocco; fish landings in 1973 were up 30% from the previous
year. Studies made by Morocco prior to the extension of its
fishing zone had revealed that 70% of the total catch from
Moroccan offshore waters was by foreign-flag vessels. In
addition to feeling confident that the joint venture approach
with Spain and other countries will increase its production and
help prevent overfishing, Morocco also sees this as a means to
acquire foreign capital participation in the expansion of
its fishing industry.' In 1973 a Foreign Ministry official told
the U.S. Embassy that Morocco welcomed assistance from all
sources for development of its fishery resources but did not
wish to become overly dependent on any one source of economic
aid or investment. Bilateral fishing arrangements have now
been concluded or are being negotiated with several nations,
including the United States, Canada, the U.S.S.R., Japan, Spain,
France, Belgium, South Korea, and Kuwait.
At the 1974 Caracas Conference, Morocco took pains to declare
that its exclusive fishing zone was without prejudice to the
principle of international cooperation. Moroccan representatives
explained that their government permitted foreign ships to fish in
Moroccan waters on reasonable terms, either by special arrange-
ment or by association in mixed companies. It was also
emphasized that while Morocco accepted the principle of full
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utilization of a nation's fishing resources, Morocco strongly
opposed any concept of de jure fishing rights by foreign states
to achieve that end. The government insists that coastal states
should have the right to say who may fish in their economic zone
and on what terms. Full utilization should be based on bilateral
or regional arrangements entered into by the coastal states.
Morocco, however, supports the OAU position that landlocked
states should har,.: preferential fishing rights in the economic
zones of neighboring states. With respect to highly migratory
species, Morocco agrees with the necessity of setting up an
international regulatory organization. Morocco also shares the
views of the United States on the question of anadromous species.
Deep Seabed
Morocco believes that the proposed international Authority
for the deep seabed should have broad powers, including that of
direct exploitation. The Authority should have financial
autonomy and wide representation. To preclude domination by
the developed countries, Morocco believes that it will be
necessary to establish a balance of control in the executive
organ of the Authority between the technologically advanced
nations, developing countries, and Socialist states. On the
other hand, Morocco feels that the interests of the advanced
nations can also be protected by explicitly stating in the
treaty the powers of the Authority and by including provisions
for compulsory dispute settlement. In a discussion with U.S.
officials some months after the 1974 Caracas Conference, the
head of the Moroccan LOS delegation stated that he realized
that the profit motive must be maintained while providing a
framework for the first supranational entity.
In any event, Morocco sees it as the responsibility of
the international Authority to ensure that the increasing
search in the sea for needed resources is conducted in an
orderly and equitable fashion, with special consideration
given to the interests of the poorer countries. The proposed
machinery must help eliminate the growing gap between the
developed and developing countries. Toward this end, Morocco
cosponsored draft articles at the 1974 Caracas Conference
calling for the transfer of marine technology from advanced
nations to the developing countries under the auspices of
the international Authority (see Annex).
Pending completion of a treaty, Morocco favors a mora-
torium on both private and national exploitation activities in
the deep seabed area. Aside from ideological considerations
this stand ties in with Morocco's concern over adverse economic
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effects that deep seabed mining might have on mineral-producing
developing countries. In its own case, Morocco is thinking
about cobalt and manganese production. The Moroccan delegation
at the 1974 Caracas Conference took note of the reassuring
statements that the economic consequences on the earnings
of the developing countries would be minimal because of pro-
jected increases in world demand but, nevertheless, felt that it
was only prudent to take precautions for the future. Accordingly,
Morocco believes that it is imperative that seabed development
be tightly controlled from the outset. It expressed its
readiness at Caracas, however, to collaborate in devising a
method that would accommodate the legitimate interests of both
consuming and producing nations. Morocco feels that answers
must be found to the questions of appropriate regulations to
be imposed on seabed exploitation as well as the extent of the
powers of the international Authority, since the institutional
and regulatory aspects are closely linked. Morocco suggests
that the Authority should provide for a committee to be in
charge of planning and stabilizing prices and having the
following powers: to plan nodule exploitation in accordance
with forecasts of land-based production; to distribute quotas
among the companies with which the Authority has service
contracts; to establish buffer stocks where necessary; and
to modify unilaterally service contracts, with indemnification
provided under the supervision of a tribunal.
Pollution
Morocco feels that its geographical location at the heavily
traveled gateway to the Mediterranean Sea makes it particularly
~. .. -able to marine pollution. At the 1974 Caracas Conference,
the Moroccan delegation noted that some countries had already
adopted unilateral measures to protect their coasts because
existing international conventions were insufficient. Morocco
spoke in support of the right of coastal states to police their
own shores and to establish their own pollution standards until
such time as a competent international organization is estab-
lished to end the existing "anarchic" situation. The delegation
did not elaborate on the nature of such an organization. In a
discussion with U.S. officials in November 1974, Morocco's LOS
expert, Gharbi, said that coastal states had to have some
means of protecting themselves against pollution in the economic
zone. He was emphatic, however, in stating that Morocco had no
intention of interfering with the freedom of navigation, the
laying of submarine cables, or other traditional high seas free-
doms in the economic zone.
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Research
Morocco believes that a coastal state should have the right
to control all scientific research conducted within the economic
zone. Its 1973 decree, which extended Morocco's exclusive
fishing zone to 70 miles, stipu'ates that governmental approval
is required for all foreign scientific research or exploration
within that zone. Morocco also feels that it is incumbent- upon
the developed nations to help promote the scientific and
technological capacity of developing countries as regards
marine resources. Toward this end, Morocco joined several other
countries in sponsoring at the 1974 Caracas Conference draft
articles on the development and transfer of technology (see
Annex).
D. KE' POLICY MAKERS, LOS NEGOTIATORS AND ADVISERS
Morocco theoretically is a constitutional monarchy with a
modern administrative apparatus, but King Hassan II still rules
in the style of a traditional potentate and enjoys sweeping
executive powers. The King makes all important decisions and
takes part in many routine matters as well. As a result,
officials at all levels are loath to take the initiative on
even elementary matters, and programs that do not capture
royal attention usually languish or receive only scant
consideration by the bureaucracy. Moreover, in addition
to the regular cabinet appointed by the King and comprising
mainly technicians, there is a so-called Royal Cabinet
consisting of trusted advisers who provide the King with
technical advice and evaluations of ministerial proposals.
The lack of a clear distinction between the Royal Cabinet
and the regular ministries is a major stumbling block to
efficient governmental operations. These considerations help
to explain the early uncertainty, confusion, and inexactitude
that characterized Morocco's attitude toward the various LOS
issues.
Morocco's position on LOS matters initially was developed
by an interministerial committee composed of elements
principally from the Ministry of Commerce, which is concerned
with fishing and minerals policies. More recently there has
been evidence of broader considerations represented by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Morocco's leading LOS expert
is Mustapha el Gharbi, head of the Legal and Treaty Division
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gharbi headed Morocco's
delegation at the 1974 Caracas Conference and is expected
to have the same function at the 1975 Geneva Conference. He
is a senior official with considerable experience at inter-
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national conferences, speaks good English, and has been
reasonably forthcoming with U.S. officials. Mohamed Taoufik
KabbaJ, another Moroccan official versed in LOS affairs and
presently Ambassador to Senegal, did not attend the Caracas
session but may still retain an LOS advisory capacity. In
addition, Morocco drew upon officials from a wide range of
ministries and agencies, including Commerce, Justice, Finance,
Education, and the Fisheries Office, to act as advisers at the
1974 Caracas Conference.
The following listing includes those Moroccan officials
who attended the 1974 Caraca> session of the Third LOS
Conference, the organizational session of the Conference in
New York in December 1973, ~.nd/or one or more of the pre-
paratory sessions for the Conference.
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Mohamed AL-ARBI
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission to the U.N.
Ali BENBOUCHTA
Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Mission to the U.N.
Driss DAHAK
Judge at the Court of Appeals
Layachi DAHMAN
Director General of the National
Office of Fishing
Abdallah ELHONSALI
Administrator of the Merchant
Marine
Chief of the Legal Service for
the Management of the Merchant
Marine
*Mohamed Mustapha el GHARBI
Chief cf the Legal and Treaties
Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Abdellah HONSALI
Department of Merchant Marine
and Maritime Fishing
Taoufik KABBAJ
Chief of Legal Service
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Seabed Committee Session
Third
_
LOS Conf.
Mar
71
Jul
Aug
71
Feb
Mar
72
X
Jul
Aug
72
Mar
Apr
73
Jul
Aug
73
Dec
73
Jun-
Aug
74
X
X
x
X
X
X
X
x
x
x
X
X
x
X
X
* See following pages for biographic sketch.
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*M'IIamed el KOHEN
Plenipotentiary Minister to
the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Abdelkader LAHLOU
Civil Administrator
Mr. MAJID
Ministry of Commerce
Mohamed MCHACHTI
Assistant Director General of
the National Office of Fishing
Noureddine SEFIANI
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission to the U.N.
Mohammed TAZI
Assistant Director General of the
Merchant Marine
Mohamed Salah ZAIMI
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the U.N.
Mehdi Mrani ZENTAP
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to
the U.N.
Third
Seabed_ Committee Session LOS Conf.
Jul Feb Jul Mar Jul Jun-
Mar Aug Mar Aug Apr Aug Dec Aug
71 71 72 72 73 73 73 74
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
* See following pages for biographic sketch.
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MOROCCO
Part II - Background Information
Geography
World region: Africa
Category: coastal
Bordering states: Algeria, Spanish Sahara
Bordering bodies of water: Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean,
Strait of Gibraltar
Bordering semienclosed sea: Mediterranean Sea
Bordering straits: Strait of Gibraltar (7.6 mi.)
Area of continental shelf: 18,100 sq. mi., shared with Spain
Area to 200 mi. limit: 81,100 sq. mi., shared with Spain
Area to edge of continental margin: 42,100 sq. mi.
Coastline: 1,140 statute mi.
Land: 158,100 sq. statute mi.
Population: 17,029,000
Industry and Trade
GNP: $5 billion (1973 est.); $310 per capita
Major sectors: mining and mineral processing (phosphates, smaller
quantities of iron, manganese, lead, zinc, and other minerals),
food processing, textiles, construction, and tourism
Exports: $911 million (f.o.b., 1973); agricultural goods 56%,
phosphates 23%, other 21%
Imports: $1,015 million (f.o.b., 1973); food 24%, raw materials
and semifinished goods 42%, equipment 20%, consumer goods 14%
Major trade partners: (1972) exports -- France 32%, West Germany
8%, Italy 8%, Benelux 7%, U.K. 2%; imports -- France 31%, U.S. 8%,
West Germany 7%, Italy 6%
Merchant marine: 15 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 41,600 GRT;
includes 14 cargo, 1 specialized carrier
Catch: 246,500 metric tons, valued at $20,986,000 (1972)
Economic importance: nationally significant, comprises about 8%
of the total value of exports
Ranking: third largest fish producer in Africa
Nature: coastal, predominantly in Atlantic Ocean
Species: sardine, tuna, squid, hake, sea bream
Marine fisheries techniques; primarily artisanal, limited modern
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Petroleum Resources
Petroleum: production -- 0.2 million 42-gal. bbl. onshore; proved
recoverable reserves -- 1.2 million 42-gal. bbl. (0.2 million
metric tons) onshore (1972)
Natural gas: production -- 2.2 billion cubic feet onshore; proved
recoverable reserves -- 17 billion cubic feet (0.4 billion cubic
meters) onshore (1972)
Navy
Ships: 17; includes 15 patrol, 1 amphibious, and 1 service craft
Government Leaders
Head of State: King Hassan II
Prime Minister: Ahmed Osman
Foreign Minister: Dr. Ahmed Laraki
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, February 29, 1968
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
November 28, 1962; 1966 Amendments to the Convention, June 28, 1968
Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions of Vessels at Sea,
June 28, 1965
International Convention on Load Lines, January 19, 1968
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas,
September 26, 1970
Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Council for
the Mediterranean, September 17, 1956
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, February 1, 1966
Seabed Arms Limitation Treaty, August 5, 1971
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization Convention,
July 30, 1962
Bilateral Conventions
Morocco-Spain. Fisheries Convention. Signed January 2, 1973.
Morocco-South Korea. Fisheries Convention. Signed June 15, 1974.
Morocco-France. Fisheries Convention. Signed January, 1973.
Morocco-U.S.S.R. Fisheries Convention. Signed June, 1973.
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Type
Date
Territorial
Sea
1968
1969
Continental
Shelf
1958
Exclusive
Fishing
1919
1962
1973
Present Ocean Claims*
Terms
Source, Notes
3 mi. Reported
12 mi. Morocco/Spain Convention
of Jan. 4, 1969, allows
nationals to fish in
Territorial Sea of other for that Convention defined
as 12 mi.
Continental Dahir No. 1-58-277 July 21,
Convention 1958
Definition
6 ml.
12/6 (Strait Dahir No 1-59-964 June 30, 1962
Gibraltar)
70 mi. Dahir, Jan. 29, 1973
Except for Strait of
Gibraltar foreign ships
between 12 and 70 if
special arrangements
exist.
* Principle Source: Limits of the Seas, National Claims to
Maritime Jurisdictions, 2d Revision, State Dept./INR, April 1974
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0
Action on Significant UN Resolutions
Moratorium Resolution
(A/RES/2574 D, XXIV, 12/15/69)
lending establishment of international regime,
States and persons are bound to refrain from
exploiting resources of or laying claim to any
part- of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
LOS Conference
(A/RES/2750 C, XXV, 12/17/70)
Convene in 1973 a Conference on Law of the Sea
to deal with establishment of international
regime for the seabed and ocean floor, and
enlarge Seabed Committee by 44 members and
instruct it. to prepare for the conference draft
treaty articles embodying international regime.
LOS Conference, Timing and Site Adopted w/o vote
(A/RES/3029 A, XXVII, 12/18/72)
0
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
(A/RES/2992, XXVII, 12/15/72)
Called upon littoral and hinterland states of
Indian Ocean area, permanent members of the
Security Council and other major maritime users
of Indian Ocean to support concept that Indian
Ocean should be zone of peace.
Landlocked/Shelf-Locked Study Resolution
(A/RES/3029 B, XXVII, 12/18/72)
Called for study of extent and economic signifi-
cance in terms of resources, of international
area resulting from each proposal of limits of
national jurisdiction presented to Seabed Committee.
Peruvian Coastal State Study Resolution
(A/RES/3029 C, XXVII, 12/18/72)
Called for study of potential
cance for riparian states, in
economic si gni fi -
terms of resources,
of each of the proposals on limits of national
jurisdiction presented to Seabed Committee.
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(A/RES/3016 XXVII, 12/18/72)
Reaffirmed right of states to permanent sovereignty
over all their natural resources, wherever found.
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Membership in Organizations Related to LOS Interentf;
Arab League
EC (association until. 1974)
FAO ........................... Food and Agriculture Organization
IAEA .......................... International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD .......................... International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank)
ICAO .......................... International Civil Aviation
Organization
IDA ........................... International Development Association
(IBRD Affiliate)
ILO ........................... International Labor Organization
IMCO .......................... Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization
IMF ........................... International Monetary Fund
ITU ........................... International Telecommunication Union
OAU ........................... Organization of African Unity
Seabed Committee .............. United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor
beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction
UN ............................ United Nations
UNESCO ........................ United Nations Educational., Scientific,
and Cultural Organization
UPU ........................... Universal Postal Union
WHO World Health Organization
WMO World Meteorological Organization
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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Distr.
LIMITED
.1/AC.13?/SC.II/L.18
a_7 March 1973
CONJ4I'1FEE ON TIIE PEACEFUL USES OF THE
SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE
LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION
SUB-COMMITTEE II
Cyprus, Greece. Indcnesin,
t;alevsia,
Morocco, Philippine.. Spain
Yeran: draft article' en
navir;ntion
through the
territorial
nea
including straits used for international
navigation
and
The question of navigation through the territorial sea including straits used
for international navigation is one of the problems facing the Cor_nittee in its task
to comply with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2750 C (XXV) and
3029 A (XXVII).
The delegations co-sponsoring the present document wish to contribute to the
progress of the Cormittee's work at this new and important stage of its proceedings
and they consider that an appropriate means to achieve this aim is to submit. draft
articles on items, 2.4 and 4.1 of the list of subjects and issues concerning
navigation through the territorial sea and through straits used for international
navigation, independently of the solutions that item 2.5 may receive in due course.
Although presented as separate articles, this draft is not intended to
prejudge its eventual location within the convention or conventions which may be
adopted by the future conference.
In drafting this document the following basic considerations have been taken
into account:
(1) Elavieation through the territorial sea and through straits used for
international navigation should be dealt with as an entity since the straits in
question ar!? or form part of territorial seas.
(2) Regulation of navigation should establish a satisfactory balance between
the particular interests of coastal States and the general interests of international
maritir^e navigation. This is best achieved through the principle of innocent
passace whic). is the basis of the traditional rEgime for navigation through the
territorial sea.
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n/Gt:, t A,/: t. i I/ i,. 11,
1:ngliuh
Page 2
(3) The regulation uhould contribute both to the security of conntnl SLntVa
and to the nnfety of international maritime- navigation. 'thin can be uchicved by
the reanonable and adequate exercise by the coruttrt] ante of itn right. to regulate
navi.~Ution through its territoriall nen. Since the purpose of the regulation in
not to prevent or hamper passage but to fucilitaLe it without crwnin,r, any udvcrse
effects to the conntnl ;Lute.
(11) The regulation should take flue account of the economic realities and
scientific and technological developments which have occurred in recent yearn;
this requires the adoption of appropriate rules to regulate navif;ution of certain
ahipr; with "r;pccinl characteristics".
(5) The regulation should, finally, meet the deficiencies of the 1958 Geneva
Convention, especially those concerning the passage of warships through the
territorial non, including ntraits.
Section I. Rules applicable to all ships
Subsection A Ri(ht of innocent passage
Article 1
Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether
coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial
Bea.
Article 2
1. Passag^ means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose
either of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding
to internal waters, or of making for the high seas from internal waters.
2. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same
are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by "force majeure"
or by distress.
Article 3
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in
conformity with these articles and with other rules of international law.
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. Passing ships shall refrain
from manoeuvring unnecessarily; hovering, or engaging in any activity other than
mere passage.
3. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with
the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity with these
articles and other rules of international law.
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n/AC.1 311/SC. I 1 /1,.111
Eng1
Page
;r. 1':uuuil,r of torrir,u f.ivc'nt;c'In :;hail riot. I)(.- conni.dcrecl innocent if,
they (k) not oh:;vrvc such 1 rrwn cold '(1 .rtt i onn nn 1 he coaritnl. "Ante may make and
puh.l.i!;It in order to prevent, them vr:nnclH from Vi ;ring in the territorinl sett.
5. ",nbn:urineu and other underwater vchi.clen are rechuirecl to navigate on
the :urr face find to :;how their t'] n11.
The coastal Strrte rr,u::t not Irniripcr innocent pusua ,c through the territorial
!Jeri. In particular, it shn1.l not impede the innocent passage of It forcif;n nl,il.
flying the 1111!, of' It particular ",Late or ccrrying goods owned by it particular
State, proceedint, from the territory of or cocrnigncd to such a State.
1. The coastal fltnte finny take the necessary steps in its territorial sea
to prevent pnssagc which is not innocent.
0
2. In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters, the coastal State
shall also have the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of
the conditions to which admission of those strips to those waters is subject.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph Ir, the coastal State may, without
discrimination amongst foreign ships, suspend temporarily and in specified areas
of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension
is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take
effect only after having been duly published.
4. Subject to the provisions of articles 8, 22, paragraph 3 and 23, there
shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits
used for international navigation which form part of the territorial sea.
Subsection B. Regulation of nassapc
Article 6
The coastal State may enact regulations relating to navigation in its
territorial sea. Such regulations may relate, inter alia, to the following:
(a) Maritime safety and traffic and, in particular, the establishment of
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes;
(b) Installation and utilization of facilities and systems of aids to
navigation and the protection thereof;
(c) Installation and utilization of facilities to explore and exploit
marine resources and the protection thereof;
?
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1, .
1 11 l/.'IC.11/1,.Ift
l;nf~ ~ i nlr
1'u~~c h
(d) Nnritini trnnnport;
(e) Tannage of nhips with upeinl charncterintics;
(f) Pre;&'rvation of marine and coantal en vironmc:nt and prevention of all
fora:; of' pollution-
(;) 1 'nr:arch of the marine unvironment.
Article
In exerci:;inr the right of innocent I.ai;nge through the territorial sea,
foreign ships will not be allowed to perform activities such as
(a) Iingagin,n, in tiny act of espionage or collecting of information affecting
the occurit,y of the coastal State;
(b) Enguf;inr in any act of propaganda against the coastal State or of
interference with its c;y!;tcmn of communication!;;
(c) Embarking or disembarking troops, crew members, frogmen or any other
person or device without the authorization of the coastal State;
(d) Engaging in illicit trade;
(e) Destroying or damaging submarine or aerial cables, tubes, pipe-lines
or all forms of installations and constructions;
(f) Exploring or exploiting marine and subsoil resources without the
authorization of the coastal State.
The coastal State may designate in its territorial sea sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes, taking into account those recommended by competent
international organizations, and prescribe the use of such sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes as compulsory for pas ing ships.
Article 9
1. The coastal State is required to give appropriate publicity to any
dangers of navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea.
2. The coastal State is required to give appropriate publicity to the
existence in its territorial sea of any facilities or systems of aid to navigation
and of any facilities to explore and exploit marine resources which could be an
obstacle to navigation, and to install in a permanent way the. necessary marks to
warn navigation of the existence of such facilities and systems.
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Englinh
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Article 10
The corcnt.nl 1;(.ate msy require tiny foreign Whip that does not; comply with the
provis.ionn conrrr?ning ret,ulrctton of tr,canagc to lcuve its territorial nca.
Section IT. Itul(W aUU).Licab.l.e to ecrtain t,yprn of nhitut
Subnection A. t'crchnnt nhipn
Article 11
1. No charge Witty be lcvicd upon foreign nhips by reason only of their
passage through the territorial]. sea.
2. Charges rnuy be levied upon a foreign Whip passim through the territorial
rca its payment ?nl,y for specific services. These charges shall be levied without
discrimination.
3. The coustul State shu11 have the right to be compensated for works
undertaken to facilitate passage.
Article 12
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised
on board a foreign ship r,assing throu(h the territorial sea to arrest any person
or to conduct any investigation in connexion with any crime committed on board
the ship during its passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; or
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country of the
gooa rder of the territorial son; or
(c) If the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the
captain of the ship or by the consul of the country whose flag the ship flies; or
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs.
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State to
take any steps authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation
on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal
waters.
3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, the
coastal State shall, if the captain so requests, advise the consular authority of
the country whose flag the ship flies, before taking any steps, and shall
facilitate contact between such authority and the ship's crew. In cases of
emergency this notification may be communicated while the measures are being taken.
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h, In conri.dcrinf; whether or how nn nrrct,t should be mrulc, the local
nuLhoritic'n rlta'll pay due regard to Lhc I Lerentn of navigation.
5. The cnant