KOREAN FISHING AREAS IN THE YELLOW SEA-SPAWNING GROUND FOR MARITIME CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600140005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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WUHNIUVOIALIal
Korean Fishing Area' in the Yellow Sea-
Spawning Ground for Alaritime Conflict
GCR.RP 75-20
May 1975
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NATIONAL SECLIRITY INFORMATION
Unauthorir.ed Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Ctaulfled by 014641
Exempt from General Dedu:.elflcallon Schedule
of e 0. 11657, exemption cateporyr
It 313(7), and (3)
Automatic Iyy declarelfled ont
data trnpouiLle to del rmine
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CONFIDENTIAL
KOREAN FrSHING AREAS IN THE YELLOW SEA --
SPAWNING GRON'iJD FOR MARITIME CONFLICT
25X1A
Introduction
Maritime incidents in the Yellow Sea anr-laily involve th-,
fishing fleets and naval forces of North and South lcorea, particu-
larily durir,;, the peak May-September fishing season. Tension
has increased markedly since Octoucr 1973 when North Korea
claimed and periodically began to patrol parts of South Korea's
claimed territorial waters. In the latest incident on 26 February
1975, the South's sinki,,y of a North Koree.n fishing boat in
international waters (see Map 1) caused the scrambling of air-
craft from the two countries, and including U.S. aircraft as well ,
The underlying causes of these incidents are varied but are
prim.cri ly related to disagreements over maritime:. bol..rdaries that
prevent: access to coastal and offshore fishing ,funds. (C)
Fishing incidents are (y,n'rally of tw; types -- coastal and
offshore. The coastal inch::nts o"i r'=thin sight of land in
she coastal fishing grounds west of the Military Demarcation I..i,.e
(MDL) (see Map 1) and involve the seizure of the South's small
coastal fishing vessels by North Korean patrol boats. This kind
if incident is a frequent oc, urren.. ; boats and crews are
generally detained and, after the crews are given a thorounh
propaganda treatment, bot,r are released without ,i-arm. Mort
serious clashes tak place in fishing grounds farther offshcrc
in the intcrnation:l waters of the Yellow Sea. Boti, countries
have had boats -- ger,~ra)ly I+odern nrrotor- :riven trrwlers from
their o;?rshore fishing fleets -- sunk in these waters. (U)
Coastpal Incidents
South Korea's fleet of small, wooden, unpowered or under-
powered vessels based along the coast west of Seoul and on the
coastal islands provoke most incidents in coastal waters. Fishing
MOTE -- This paper i?ias produced by the Office of Geographic and
Carton raphic Resesrch. Comments ar.d questions may be directed to
Corte 143, Extonsion 3057. For a detailed examination
of Lhn 'err tor' ~1 issues, see The West Coast Korean Islands, LJGI
RP 74-9, January _1974, Confidential/Control Disscm.
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methods employed are primitive and navigation gear crude or
nonexistent. Attempts to fish in traditional fishing grounds,
now bisected 'yr political boundary lines, have brought the
fleet into constant conflict with North Korean patrol boats and
with its own government. (U)
Discounting the aggravating effects of fishing, the immediate
coastal waters west of the Han River Estuary would probably
remain a source of friction because of conflicting territorial
seas claims (see Map 2).* The territorial seas problem arose with
the signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice which left five island
groups, all located near the North Korean mainland, under tilt.
jurisdiction of the United Nation's Command (UNC). (U)
Since October 1973 North Korea has claimed that the islands
lie within its 12-mile territorial sea.** Complicating the issue
is South Korea's own claim of a 3-mile territorial sea around the
islands and the probable overlapping of this claim into North
Korean inland waters. An additional jurisdictional problem is
the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the antecedent of which was
unilaterally established by the UNC in 1961, whose intent was
to prevent maritime incidents by barring South Korean military
and commercial vessels from sailing north into "hostile waters."
The NLL, however, lies completely within North Korea's claimed
territorial sea and intrudes into inland waters in at least three
places. Although the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government claims
the NLL is a seaward extension of the MDL, and hence a de facto
boundary between North and South, the NLL has no basis in inter-
national law and has never been recognized by Pyongyang. (C)
This complex of overlapping maritime boundaries forms the
geopolitical framework for the area's coastal fishing activities;
but the fleet's traditional fishing grounds and its fishing
methods, developed before the political division of the peninsula
and in harmony with the somewhat distinctive temperature and
* All baselines and territorial seas limits referred to in this
report and shown on the accompanying maps are hypothetical since
neither nation has officially delineated its claim. They have
been constructed in order to maximize the probable claims of both
nations.
** Territorial seas, measured seaward from a baseline, form territory
over which a nation has exclusive sovereignty conditioned only by
innocent passage, a ri!-ht often restricted by special regulations
promulgated by the coastal nation. Inland waters, landward from
a baseline, are those waters over which a nation exercises the same
sovereignty it exercises over its land territory. Distances through-
out this study are in nautical miles.
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tidal condit:icns of the Yellow Sea, also figure prominently in
causing maritime incidents. The large seasonal fluctuations in
water temperature generally govern the broadscale migratory patterns
of the important species of fish. Warnvate r-loving species spend
the winter in the warmer East China Sec off the youth coast of
Korea (see Map 3). The rapid warming of the shallow coastal
waters during spring encourages the fish to migrate northward
along the west coast of Korea where they stop to spawn, particularly
in the Han River Estuary. As fall arrives and water temperatures
cool, the fish move away from the coast and migrate south for the
winter. The Yellow Sea's tremendous tidal range -- averaging 19
feet in the estuary -- creates powerful tidal currents that control
local fishing methods and other maritime activities. (U)
The Korean coastal fishing fleet operates under the simple
principle of "follow the fish," and thousands of fishing boats
follow these fish migrations north along the west coast during
spring. The shallower spawning grounds are particularly attractive
to coastal fishermen using small boats and primitive fishing
techniques. In May these boats move into the area around Inch'on
for the corvina spawning season, remaining through September to
fish for anchovy, saber fish, mackerel, lobster, shrimp, and other
species. (U)
The most lucrative corvina fishing grounds are located in shallow
waters around the ROK.-controlled islands of Yonp'yong-do and U-do,
an area termed the "Golden Fishing Site" by ROK fishermen. This
fishing ground is bisected by the NLL and almost certainly lies
completely within North Korea's 12-mile territorial sea. The
South's coastal fishing vessels, following the corvina and
positioning their boats to take advantage of the tidal currents,
regularly ignore existing political boundaries. This is an
understandable maneuver as a boatload of corvina may bring up to
$1,500 on the market. The fleet often shows the same disdain
for political boundaries in fishing for the other important
species during the remainder of the summer fishing season. (U)
Stow net fishing, the most successful fishing technique
developed by area fishermen to adapt to the tidal conditions, also
helps cause territorial violations. In stow net fishing, the boat
is anchored and a net is propped open on the sea bottom facing into
the prevailing tidal current, which carries fish into the net.
This technique is most effective in fishing for corvina and saber
fish in the shallow coastal waters from Inch'on west along the
south coast of North Korea. (U)
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Seoul has been ineffectual in its attempts to control this
independent, market-oriented fleet. In the 1950s a Fishery Con-
trol Line (FCL) was established south of the NLL to create a
buffer zone free, of ROK fishing vessels (see Map 4). By some
estimates, this r,:,,triction was costing area fishermen some
$36 million per year in lost revenue in addition to being a
psychologically bitter pill to swallow. In the past few years,
the line has been adjusted northward for 2 months effective
1 May in order to permit corvina fishing even further north in
North Korean claimed territorial waters. The South also regularly
assigns naval boats to patrol the area in an often futile attempt
to keep their fishing boats south of the FCL. This means, however,
that ROK patrol boats are frequently inside waters claimed by
the North. The increased tension between the two countries,
resulting from North Korean actions of October 1973, caused
Seoul in April 1974 to move the FCL even further to the south
to increase the distance between its fleet and the North. (C)
No strategy is likely to be completely successful because
of the economics of the situation and the fishing crew's knowledge
that they will be returned unharmed if captured by the North.
In contrast, the North has had much more success in controlling
its own coastal fishing fleet. They do less fishing in the
sector of coastline near the NLL, their boats are under tighter
governmental control, and the best fishing is often nearer their
own coastline. (U)
Offshore Incidents
Offshore incidents are also caused by fishing patterns in
corflict with political boundaries. The fishing boats normally
operating in offshore areas of the Yellow Sea are from North
and South Korea's fleets of trawlers and purse seiners. These
are motorized vessels in the medium-sized range, usually from 20
to 100 gross tons, and capable of fishing in the Yellow Sea on
a year-round basis. (U)
The offshore territorial problems are less complex than in
the coastal waters nearer the Demilitarized Zone. The boundary
line responsible for most offshore incidents is the NLL which
at its western terminus is 12 miles off the North Korean coast
and about 100 miles northwest of the ROK mainland. Until
October 1973, mutual observance by both North and South Korea
of the NLL -- and its de facto extension westward -- effectively
divided the Yellow Sea fishing grounds and separated the fishing
fleets. (U)
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The occasional offshore violations of the NLL usually are
caused by individual boats in overzealous pursuit of scheois of
fish. The northwestern sector of the NLL cuts across the migratory
paths of the many species of fish as they move with the seasonal
variations in water temperature (see Map 3). In late summer
and early fall, corvina, anchovies, saber fish, mackerel, arid
mazy less important species move parallel to the NLL and out to
sea before heading south to winter. Each fall boats from both
countries fish these moving schools in the vicinity of the NLL,
and the opportunity for maritime incidents is thus increased.
During winter most of the ROY, fleet turns south to follow the
southward movement of fish. The North Korean fleet, though,
remains concentrated off their southwest coast because winter
fishing is better there than off their icy northern ports. Con-
sequently, winter incidents are more likely to be caused by an errant
North Korean boat:. (U)
Both countries use a combination of fishery control lines and
naval boats to protect their offshore fleets. Fishery Coatrol
lines are easier to enforce in the offshore area because tidal
currents are weaker and fewer fishing boats are involved. But
often the solution is part of the problem. By aggressive
patrolling or overreacting, the naval ships may turn a simple
problem of straying fishing boats into a major maritime incident.
(U)
Potential Trouble Spots
Map 5 shows the specific areas and times where fishing
incidents are likely to occur.
... Near the Yellow Sea coastline during the May-
September spawning season, and especially during the May-
June corvina season in the "Golden Fishing Site."
... In the offshore fishing grounds near the nor;.hwest
sector of the NLL, especially during the fall-winter fishing
season.
... In an area around the NLL between the ROY.-controlled
island groups.
This latter area is located in an open stretch of the sea in which
Seoul has no territorial ::ea claims and where the F1LL lies completely
within the limits of North Korea's torritcria, seas. This sector
of the NLL has kept the North Korean fishing fleet from passing
through its oiin territorial sea into international waters, and
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barred the fleet from the west coast's best fishing ground (see
Map 3). The economic situation, plus f='yongyang's legitimate
claim to its ofvn territorial seas, make it an area of year-round
concern. (U)
Since October 1973 the North has been trying to assert a
claim to waters within its 12-mile territorial sea and call world
attention to the fact that its vessels are being denied passage
through international waters. Evidence indicates that North
Korea is intent on gaining a greater share of Yellow Sea fishery
resources and better access to its growing naval, connercial,
and fishing port of Haeju. After the sinking of its fishing
boat in international waters south of the NLL on 26 February 1975,
the North stated at the 350th meeting of the Military Armistice
Commission that its fleet had a right to fish there. Recent
North Korean naval and air operations also presage a future
forceful assertion of fishing privileges and other economic
claims to waters south of the NLL. (C)
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 ApprQQved Fore9J/99fBR,-TOA6II8R00 4010405_Z Map 1
KOREA u.
I pu (H) IA !! !
U pn !i 0 nd.,,o,I
C,A F IIIi tJ I IAI
Chl~a
I''vrrnro;;~;p
(H.ty j
Off, shore Fi::hinq Are,l
con rr,/
Fishinr7 Tone
r ', i.. ` X-
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of(,,I
r+;? y
P'y6npyonp
North
Korea
Map 2
Korea
Ch'o-do
nr 5i.e,i. ~y~
10
Hypothetical Maritime jurisdictions
%/
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Glunn
North
Korea
Anchovy
South
Korea
Map 3
Migratory Patterns
of Selected Fish Species
Spawning aroo
Wintoring aroa
A1Ul Military Domarcation Lino
N// Northorn Limit Lino
Arrows and months show general locations. Any
unsoosonol variations in water temperature will
cause migratory patterns to change.
China
China
China
,Sra ~
Mar.
Sept.-act
June Sept l Apr S Uth
Chinn
North
Korea
Nll
North
Korea
North
Korea
Nll
r..._. septa' Aug
octI .l may-Jul
y,
China
Shrimp
N. -d n mrlur irnn.rnupen
South
Korea
r
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Korea
Bay
Fishery Control Lines
Map 4
North
Korea
Soch'ing-do
Esfimaled location of
ac.ess lane for island
fishing heirs entering
the 1914 fishing zone
Yellow
0 10 70 Nnuucnl m,len
0 10 '!0 Slnlulo miles
502501 5-75 CIA
Ramps and boundary roprenenl.lum
are not nncnnnaule aulh .,.In we
Korea
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Potential Trouble Areas Map 5
P'yOnpy$nq
Yarch'dnp-
do
6n' p ! u'hifq .~
R1a, Jun",
Dom II Itarized6 -
Zone J j
Nan 111rer r.tuery
Nuutrol Zone
Inch'On
n 111 20 Nutn I miln?
o 10 70.`Ilatut. -lw?
Narnnv and boundary mprrsrrtnnbun
urr nnl nnrr.~na nlr putt, nrilal~vr
South
Korea
North
Korea
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