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_tc PR-310 Social Trans ormation in the rab orld, Morocco: e Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Research Study Social Transformation in the Arab World Morocco: A Case of Undirected Change OPR-310 June 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 009438 Exempt from GenerA ueciassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: ?5B(2) Automatically declassified on: data Impossible to determine Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH June 1975 MOROCCO: A CASE OF UNDIRECTED CHANGE Part I of the Series SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAB WORLD In the preparation of this study, the Office of Political Research con- sulted other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Depart- ment of State. Their comments and suggestions were appreciated and used, but no attempt at formal coordination was undertaken. Further comments will be welcomed by the author, Code 143, x5492). 25X1A9a SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET FOREWORD This study is the first in a series on social transformation in the Arab world, undertaken through ease studies of selected Arab countries and societies. The Office of Political Research begins this series with the aims of identifying the factors which have inhibited or promoted change in the Arab world and gauging the present abilities of those societies to re- spond effectively to their needs and problems. The studies will also help to determine the degree of likelihood that further change will come in the form of stable, evolutionary development or through turbulence and revolution. The emphases of the country studies will vary, ranging from analyses of elite groups and developing new classes to acsessments of the gaps between national goals and actual accomplishments. Such variation is dictated by the nature of the societies and by the availability of source material which yields data useful for intelligence purposes. While the series will lay the groundwork for comparisions of the Arab countries, differences among them may be as revealing as their similarities. Morocco was selected as the first of these country studies because change is taking place there within the confines of the traditional order. This study, in essence, shows: the slow adaptation of that order; the in- teraction between education and other aspects G,f ..hange, particularly the importance of qualitative educational reform; the emergence of the bureaucracy as an instrument of change; and the social reper- cussions?ai: well as the likely political effects?of these developments. Approved For Release 2001/08/24EPM-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET CONTENTS Page Objectives and Findings of the Study 1 The Examination of Change 5 I. Introduction 5 II. The Absence of Systematic Direction 6 A. Causal Factoks 6 1. The Divisiveness of the Society 7 2. The Monarchy 10 a. Consolidation and Use of Power 10 b. Hassan's Leadership Style 11 3. Contenders for Power and Status 14 a. The Elite 14 b. The Military 15 c. The Political Parties 16 d. Labor 19 B. Indecision on Key Issues 20 1. Economic Planning 20 2. The Language of Education 21 III. The Dynamics of Change 22 A. Education as an Object and Agent of Change 22 B. The Emergence of the Professionals and Managers 25 IV. Evidence of Change 27 A. The Improved Performance in 27 1. The Economy 27 2. Land Reform 28 3. The Promotion Nationale Program 28 4. Coping with Unemployment and Urbanization 29 B. Social Trends 32 V. Implications for the Future 33 A. Further Social Change 33 B. Economic Determinants 34 C. Political Alternatives 36 1. The Status Quo 36 2. A "Semi-Liberal Regime" 36 3. A Coup 37 Chronology of Significant Events 39 III SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : gEtAIDP86T00608R000600170025-2 FIGURES Page Areas of Berber concentration (map) 8 Duration of Cabinet appointments (chart) 13 Political party developments (chart) 18 School enrollment (table) 23 Labor force by occupational cOegory (table) 26 Selected economic indicators (table) 27 Land distribution (table) 28 Work-days provided by the Promotion Nationale (table) 29 Growth of the cities (map) '31 Government revenues and expenditures (chart) '31 Iv SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS OF THE STUDY Since the two coup attempts of 1971-72, Western attention to Morocco has focused on the likely staying power of King Hassan's regime. Many observers have charged that the King's mode of leadership contributed to the creation of a situation conducive to coups. They have pointed out that he rules through manipulating and balanc- ing political forces and interest groups and that he has not concentrated his efforts on the social and economic betterment of his people. Nonetheless, social and economic change for the better is underway in Morocco. Examination of this change, under conditions of Hassan's style of governing, thus serves as a case study of a development process lack- ing in strong, top-level direction and uncomplicated by revolution. In undertaking such an examination, this study is specifically directed toward: 1) identifying the factors which have impeded more rapid change, as measured in economic development and efforts to improve the material conditions of the people and strengthen their participatory rule; 2) locating?by such means as comparing census results?the areas where change is occurring; and 3) gauging the likely effects of Hassan's regime and of possible successor regimes on the future pace of change. The approach to the examination of change is empirical, with no attempt made to adhere to a particular model of development for- mulated by social scientists. Instead, important sectors in which change might take place?including the educational system, the economy, and land reform?have been briefly surveyed and found to yield evidence of improved ability to cope with national problems. These surveys have also provided data on the pace of change, indicating that trends toward professionalism and realism did not begin to emerge in the operations of the Moroccan government until roughly 12 to 14 years after the country won its independence in 1956. The change which is taking place in Morocco reflects the emergence of the technocrats, i.e., the professionals, managers, and technicians, and the added authority given them by the King, who displays little in- terest in domestic administration. With the technocrats in the bureaucracy thus relatively free to design and implement development programs. the economy has been achieving an average annual, growth rate of about 7 percent since 1972, in contrast to the average of under 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET percent of the early and mid-1960's. Distribution of land taken from foreign owners is benefitting increasing numbers of previously landless farmers. The bureaucracy's efforts have kept a high unemployment rate from getting worse, at least in terms of percentage of the labor force. And the educational system is slowly but systematically improving in quality and turning out the trained specialists the development of the nation requzws. Taken together, these upward trends give Morocco a considerable potential for social transformation. Change in Morocco does not imply the initiation of a comprehensive, dynamic program for domestic betterment or a new style of leadership on the part of Hassan, who continues to rule by an admit mix of force, cajolery, and political manipulation. The King sets general guidelines but gives little specific direction to development efforts. This lack of direction, over the !ong term, may be beneficial to the country. An undirected society is also an unregimented one. And for a country controlled by an autocratic regime such as 1-itan's, Morocco has some unusual features. Opposition political parties are functioning; the major tru'le union has, with partial exceptions, successfully resisted subordination to governmental authority; and a relatively free press criticizes the regime. All operate within limits circumscribed by Hassan, but segments of the population have acquired a political or group iden- tity and have the freedom to articulate their demands. Should Hassan eventually risk the dispersion of power, the political and other interest groups might then be ready to share positions of trust and responsibility. Over the long term, they could establish a government that offers greater potential for future stability than the present system of one-man rule. Speculation on Hassan's staying power is not a major purpose of this study The topic is treated, however, because the King's tenure on the throne tiakes Morocco a test case in the efforts tr.: determine the extent to which the developmental process necessarily entails political and social disruption. The cdds?if they are set by the number of fallen monarchies since World War ll?are against his continued reign. Moreover, Morocco shares the problems of many nations whose leaders have fallen and, in fact, of most developing countries: the population is growing rapidly and gaps between city and countryside and between rich and poor are wide. Yet the fortunes of Hassan's regime have improved since the attempts to topple him in 1971 and IC2. In the worldwide explosion of com- modity prices, Morocco faces shortages but it has fared better than most countries because it is the leading exporter of phosphates, which are 2 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET used in the fertilizers essential to modern agriculture and whose price quadrupled between 1972 and 1975. In world f fa rs, the closer align- ment with the Arabs Hassan has sought, formalized by sending troops into the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, has been domestically popular and is paying off in terms of aid from the oil-rich states. Although Hassan has ruled alone for most of his reign, and the two parliaments that were elected were virtually powerless, he is again making overtures to the politicians about their participation in the Cabinet, and he has talked about holding elections. 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 IRI-TRDP86T00608R000600170025-2 25X6 25X6 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET THE EXAMINATION OF CHANGE I. INTRODUCTION Change is easier to measure in Morocco than in many countries, It is a curious fact of history that, despite the nation's proximity to Lurope, continuity of the traditional order prevails there as in no Arab land outside the Arabian peninsula. The beginnings of chwlge are thus more clearly apparent, and its slow pace and limited scope simplify the following of its course. Officially the nation is called the Sharifian Empire of Morocco, meaning that it is ruled by a SharifIan family, i.e., one whose members claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Hassan thus draws his legitimacy from Islam, and he combines religious and temporal authority. His Alaouite dynasty dates from the 17th century, and the throne itself goes back to the 8th century. When the Ottomans held the rest of North Africa and most of the Middle East in the 1600-1800's, the tribes within Morocco managed to stave them off, using as a counterweight Spanish and Portuguese influence in the coastal areas. The country in consequence preserved its separateness and royal succession. The French in this century held Morocco I r almost 50 years (see chronology), but their occupatkn was far shorter than the periods of foreign domination in most Arab countries. Moreover, the French left the existing social and political orders surprisingly intact, They took the land they wanted but beyond that they did not disturb the interests of the tribes, the merchant famiiies, and the religious dignitaries; and they main- tained the pretense of ruling through the Moroccan menarch. Nor did the monarchy suffer from being associated with the French. Mohammed V, Hassan's father, supported the nationalist movement, which had been organized by traditional elite groups. When he was exiled by the French in 1953, he became the rallying symbol for Moroccan independence. Then resistance groups began to tie down troops which the French could ill afford to spare because of their preoc- cupation with Algeria. In the end, France capitulated, restored Mohammed to the throne in 1955, and granted Morocco's independence six months later. The traditional order thus survived the colonial period without the usual fate of being either disrupted by the occupying power or discredited by association with it. Another reason Morocco lends itself to a study of change is the availability of material. The society?with the exception of the royal establishment and the military (and this latter exception dates only from the wraps put on the army following the 1971-72 coup attempts)?has been more open and accessible to, Western scholars and observers in the last two decades than has that of almost any other Arab country, Social scientists, historians, etc., have swarmed over Morocco, studying the dichotomy so often posited between "traditional- and "modern- societies and tending to concentrate on the relationships among the tribes and other family-oriental groups of the cid order. The result is a rich body of literature on which to draw In understanding the problems of effecting change in Morocco,' This literature has also contributed to a negative in- terpretation of Moroccan events. Hassan's method of playing off political leaders and important families against one another has been rightly found to be a hold-over from past centuries. The activities of e gov- ernment he dominates have been variously desrxibed as haphazard, hesitant, fanciful, and ineffective.' Much criticism has focused on the government's poor record in formulating and implementing economic 'Outstanding among the scholan who have explored thc tribal components of Moroccan society are Ernest Gentler and David Ni. Hart. Their findings are available in numerous articles and monographs, two of which were incorporated in the recent collection Arabs mid Berbers, ed. by Gaiter and Charles Micaud, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass., 1972. The culmination of these and other studies, which emphasize the "segmented" nature of traditional NIorocco, is John ?Vaterbury's The Commander of the Faithful A Study of Segmented Politics, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1970. In his interpretative and perceptive histqry of the first decade of Morocco's independence (1956-66), he analyzes the political conduct of the elite as a manifestation of traditional patterns of behavior. Even if the causal relationshir he hypothesizes concerning behtivior is denied (and certainly the Moroccan elite svould be the first to reject the concept that their actions are anachronistic), the parallels he points betw..en the near and distant past are ant argument for continuity in the society. 'See, for example. Charles Gallagher, The Moroccan Economy in Perspective, American Universities Field Staff, 1966, and Rabat, A-13, 6 March 1971, 5 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 25X6 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET plans, on the cautious land-reform measures, and on taxation practices that leav , most of the national in- come in the hands of a small percentage of the people. Morocco's development efforts have often been com- pared unfp-vorably witii those of Tunisia, which ac- complished more with fewer resources. Preoccupation with top-level government activities and with political ups-and-downs has obscured the more fundamental developments in Morocco. Fact-finding studies on the changes that are taking place in the society, and in particular on the evoluiion of modern professional classes, have been neglected. Insufficient attention has been given to the socio-economic effect of these technocrats and the in- creased efficiency they are bringing to the bureaucracy, thcugh there has been no fundamental change in the nature or scope of palace operations. A new look at Morocco, factoring in the trends toward professionalism and improved bureaucratic mance, is thus in order. It is called for by the ad- . . . it is high time to do away with the outdated image of an unstable and unserious Morocco, an image which still haunts many of the world's government offices, including some located in Washington."' IL THE ABSENCE OF SYSTEMATIC DIRECTION A. Causal Factors Morocco had a number of advantages when it became an independent state in 1956. The struggle to force the French to give up their protectorate had been won with relative ease, and in the course of it the peo- ple had demonstrated strong national feeling and an ability to unite for a common cause. Political leaders had emerged, and Molthmmed V was a popular head of state. Why did neither the King nor the political leaders initiate a dynamic program of economic and social reform and mobilize the nation for development ef- forts? Why were such efforts allowed to lag? Morocco is not one of the have-not nations. While one of the most populous of the Arab states,4 it has far more 7 January 1975. 25X1A2g 'Morocco, with an estimated population of 17 million, follows Egypt and the Sudan as the third most populous of the Arab countries. usable agricultural land than most of them. Once a net exporter of grain, it could become one again if it utilized new methods for increasing yields, and it has other resources as well, notably phosphates. Yet the economy stagnated, rural conditions worsened, slums proliferated, and government efforts to cope with these problems?or even to formulate them?were half-hearted and vacillating. Economic policies con- tinued to be?and still are?far more laissez faire than those which most developing countries espouse, although the public sector has expanded. In general, projects for economic and social betterment before about 1968 were often announced but rarely im- plemented. Top-level direction of development efforts is still lacking. Official initiative on the part of the King's Cabinet members, if any has been taken, has not been recorded. The King sets the guidelines in a rhetorical way, but he does not concentrate his energies on bring- ing about his proclaimed goal of a modernized Mo- rocco. He seeks to preserve fundamental patterns of the present system, and he has neither enunciated an ideology of reform nor instituted a program of planned change. In this, he differs from the many national leaders of North Africa and the Middle East who have pushed for social change--although the implementa- tion of their programs has varied widely and the type of change desired has ranged from the "Cultural Revolution" of Libya's Qaddafi?which took its name from the Chinese and its inspiration from Islamic fun- damentalism?to the "White Revolution" of the Iran- ian Shah. It is with Iran that Morocco contrasts most obviously. There change is being imposed from the top, in the form of the Shah's revolution, while in Morocco change is coming from below the high levels of government. ihe answer to the question of why top-level direc- tion has been lacking in Morocco must be sought in a combination of historic, political, and economic cir- cumstances. The reasons are basically threefold: 6 an economic system which derives much of its strength. from the control of the elite over land and business and which is thus not easily adaptable to the development process; and the divisiveness of the society, both in pre-colonial times and today. This divisiveness is characteristic of many Arab countries. In Morocco it renders united action 25X6 25X6 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET difficult and deters the dcvelopment of credible alter- natives to the King's rule. 1. The Divisiveness of the Society Morocco has no tradition of a strong ruler. The sul- tans relied historically on the support of often con- tending tribes and, though the country's independence was thus maintained, internal conditions of near anarchy prevailed. Before the establishment of the French protectorate, the main division of the country was between the bled al makhzen,6 or lands of govern- ment, and the bled al siba, or lands of dissidence. The latter was free of makhzen taxes and military levies, and the tribes that composed it maintained that status as long as they could repel the forces of the sultan. Usually the makhzen comprised the towns and the lowlands and the siba was a phe- nomenon of the mountains and the desert, but the distinction between the two was sharp neither in time nor in geography. The makhzen and the siba were bound together by adherence to Sunni Islam and recognition of the religious authority of the sultan. In Morocco the designation of the ruler followed?and follows today?a variation of Islamic tradition in that it provides not for primogeniture but rather for selection by religious dignitaries (the ulema), who were in fact usually practical enough to accept the reigning monarch's preference. Yet as the sultans' authority was based on Islam, which was considered the sole source of law and wisdom, most of them were either dis- interested in or opposed to social change. The rulers, in any case, had no more than a limited capability to enforce an initiative or bring about change, for they had no monopoly of coercive pow.m. The support of the tribes that composed the maklaen was always necessary to back up the rulers' small in- dependent army. Thus each sultan constructed alliances and maneuvered to keep any one tribal grouping from becoming strong enough to challenge him. When he was not successful, the result was a change of dynasty?five of which preceded the Alaouites' coming to power. Basically, the system the rulers maintained was a balance-of-power arrangement. &Literally the word makhzen means storehouse in Arabic. Its application to government points to the fact that the main purPose of the administration of the sultan (the title used by Mohammed V's predecessors) was the collection of taxes. Within the tribes infinite numbers of smaller balance-of-power arrangements prevailed. Recent studies have refuted the historic simplification of the tribal order in Morocco, finding that the control ac- tually exercised by any group over its component parts was a complex and changing matter.' Many of the tribes consisted of heterogeneous clans who formed alliances on the basis of pasturage rights, use of water, or other benefits to be derived from the association. Leadership often shifted according to the strength of the family or clan, and in general it was exercised only during feuds and wars. Failure to understand the fragmentary nature of this society has led on occasion to Western misjodg- ment of its problems. The Arab-Berber antagonism, for example, first stressed by the French at the time of their protectorate to further their divide-and-rule policies, continues to be overemphasized. The bases for this concern are various. Estimates of the number of Moroccans who speak a Berber dialect as a first language range from 25 percent to almost 50 percent of the population, and language is an important dividing line in most societies. (Berbers were indig- enous to the land and, as Arab immigration from the Middle East was never great, the population today consists essentially of the Arabized Berber majority, i.e., those who adopted the Arabic language and consider themselves Arabs, and the Berber minority.) Moreover, many of those who speak a Berber dialect live in mountainous areas and hold to tribal ways. Perhaps because they thus resemble the Kurds in some respects, Westerners have tended to forecast separatist movements among them; and the fact that the Moroccan government is today silent on the Berber component of the population leads to the suspicion that it is attempting to gloss over a potentially, threatening situation. The Berbers, however, have never displayed a strong sense of solidarity among themselves. In Morocco they are concentrated in areas which shade into one another (see map), but language does not supply a bond. Berber is not a written tongue and, according to most investigators, it is divided in Morocco into three separate dialects which are mutually intelligible only with difficulty. For the most part, group intercom- munication has been found to take place in Arabic. Moreover, the range of interaction between Arabs and aCellner and Hart, op. cit. See also CeIlner's "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa," French-Speaking Africa; The Search for Identity, ed. by W. H. Lewis, Walker and Co., New York, 1965. 7 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET AREAS OF BERBER CONCENTRATION AND THE MAJOR DIALECTS SPOKEN POW/ ? rilriftALTAr4 Tangier. - :god \ MEDITERRANEAN SEA Nadd? ATLANTIC L1=.? Rabat Casabiance OCEAN .Marrtakabi 004 Agadl? ? SHLEUH cj,/xc ALGERIA Irk! Aaiun SPANISH SAHARA Speakers of : Tachelhit dialect Tamazirt dialect 7,1..raa Zanatiya dialect 0 MILE/ 100 SOUSI Well-known Berber grouping 566061 8.76 8 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET Berbers Is great. All cities arid towns contain both Arabs and Berbers, arid intermarriage is not uncom- mon.' In fact, King Flassan's principal wife within the harem and also his mother come from families who re- tain their Berber identity. Ethnicity is, to be sure, one means of identity, but in Moroce,:, there have been many other: of equal or greater importance. Patterns for establishing social cohesion, or even for determining friend or foe, were historically complex and intricate, involving such attributes as blood relationship, family origin, residence, geographic proximity of other families, per- sonal bonds between other family members, shared trade or craft, and allegiance to a local saintly figure, living or dead (one of the marabouts). Largely for this reason, no drive for ethnic affirmation developed among the Berbers; the society was too fragmented to lend itself to such a movement. The basic divisions of the society were not greatly affected by the French occupation. Geographic faccors inhibited penetration and left rurals areas?where over 80 percent of the people lived in the early I900's and about 65 percent still do?largely untouched by modern life. The tribes lost their power of military resistance rind their administrative functions were altered, but they continued to divide the country into diverse social units, Moreover, some new dividing lines were drawn by the French. They educated small numbers in Western ways, thus effecting an overlay of French culture and adding another dimension to the gulf separating the urban elite from the masses. They introduced the French-Arabic language dichotomy, which troubles the nation to this day (see below, under the Language of Education), and they created the nucleus of a modern economy, which had the results of further separating town from countryside and of es- tablishing another division among the members of the Moroccan elite. Traditionally the Moroccan elite was composed of vr.Falthy merchants, regional chieftains, religious dignitaries, and those who had illustrious ancestry or had been favored by the monarch. Educated members of this group were historically concentrated in Fs, long a center of Islamic learning and the pace-setter in Moroccan culture. They held the initial 7According to a survey made in 1960 in the city of Sefrou (whose population then was slightly over 20,000), one out of eight marriages was mixed Arab-Berber. See Lawrence Rosen, "The Social and Conceptual Framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Mo- rocco," Arabs and Bthers, op. cit., pp. 155-174. 9 edge in acceding to privileged pesitions in the market economy opened up by the French, and they have managed to retain them, largely because independent Morocco has held to laissez-faire economic policies. For some members of the elite, the source of power thus shifted from its traditional base to the more modern one of monetary wealth, and they educated their sons in France. For others, however, such was not the case. The divisions in the elite became manifest during the independence struggle when its members formed the nationalist movement. Leadership was in the hands of the Istiqlal party, which was conservative and religious in origin. Its founders were intellectuals in Fes who had come together in the 1930's, under the leadership of the religious scholar Allal al-Fassi, to promote the reform of Islam. As the group gradually became a party espousing nationalist goals, its membership came to include younger,Western- educated partisans of a liberal bent. It was sup- ported by rural lenders and tribal chiefs, who formed the Army of Liberation to fight the French in the countryside, and also by members of the urban resistance, who looked to labor leaders for their direct guidance and thus bestowed upon them, in terms of authority, a semi-elite status. The solidarity this movement displayed during the independence struggle was the old Moroccan ability to unite at time of crisis and against a common foe. It was unity lacking in concepts of nationhood and of the principles of peacetime leadership, which include acceptance of subordinate roles and of guidance and direction. Once independence was won, rural leaders in particular began to assert separatist tendencies. In Tifilalt they openly defied authority, and in the Rif mountains they rebelled. Their aims were not autonomy. Instead, their sentiments seemed to derive from the traditional tribal opposition to central con- trol. They objected mainly to centrally appointed of- ficials, especially those associated with the old-guard of the Istiqlal, who came to serve in their areas as judges and administrators. Regional animosities played a part in this opposition to the Istiqlal. The dominant position of party members from the prestigious families of Fes was resented by the rest of the country. As the livelihood of these families often depended on commerce or real es- tate, they were called the Fassi bourgeoisie, and that term has become much used to apply to the upper levels of the whole of the Moroccan business corn- SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET triunity, centered though it now is in Casablanca and Rabat, Connections with Fes may be remote or even non-existent; the appellation connotes membership in what is considered to be the clique at the apex of Moroccan society, Concepts of Fassi domination persist largely because regional identities remain strong throughout the society. Inhabitants of the Rif mountains, for example, refer to themselves as the Riffi, suggesting in- dividualism and independence. Even many long-time city dwellers retain a pride in their regional back- ground; and some?such as the Berber migrants to Casablanca from the Sous River valley?form loosely knit, mutual-help groups to assist one rtnother in business. Through such means, for example, the Sousi have triiablishecl a near monopoly of the retail !rocery trade in Casablanca and in other Moroccan cities as well. Voting patterns illustrate these regional divisions of the society. Although elections have been too few and too closely controlled by the government to supply much information, those held for parliament in 1963 and for the Casablanca Chamber of Commerce and Industry throughout the mid-1960's yield some data. They were surprising in that Casablanca businessmen and tradesmen supported a party avowedly socialist and revolutionary, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), as opposed to the more conservative and better established Istiqlal. Plainly many of the tradesmen, particularly the Sousi, were voting not for the UNFP but against the Istiqlal because it was associated with the Fassi bourgeoisie. Party doctrines were less relevant than the commercial and cultural rivalries Subsequent UNFP attempts to transfer the party's success tc, the home territory of the Sousi, however, did not succeed. Politicians sought out in particular members of the Ammiln tribe, who had helped them in Casablanca, but they found that clan and village rivalries within that tribe were too strong to permit unity at the polls.8 To a greater extent than in many societies, this prevalence of regional, tribal, and family identities in Morocco limits loyalties to wider groups. Increased communication and urbanization are of zourse break- ing down old barriers, and there is a trend toward the ?This account of local politics is drawn In part from a biography of one of the Sousi merchants: John Waterbury's North for the Trade, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972. development of national consciousness. Yet suspicion and distrust, bred of past divisiveness, continue to be characteristic of the culture. 2. The Monarchy a. Consolidation and Usa of Power Consolidation of monarchical control was a slow process in Morocco. Mohammed V returned from exile as the symbol of Moroccan independence, but the political elite had attained it; and for the first three years after independence the King shared power with the politicians. Allal al-Fassi of the Istiqlal was the itn (leader) of the independence movement, and his party members asserted their leadership. They com- promised with the King by forming Cabinets which contained some independents but which were dominated by the Istiglal, and their aim was to es- tablish a constitutional monarchy and hold parliamen- tary elections, The King, instead of working through the Istiglal to build a strong party, sought to weaken it by encouraging a rural-based party, the Popular Movement. With this move Mohammed set the pattern for the divide-and-rule policies to which his son continues to adhere. Perhaps because of this traditionalist background, Mohammed did not view a political par- ty as an instrument to refashion the society. He did not want to be subservient to the Istiqlal, and he did not try to dominate it?as he might have succeeded in doing. Like the sultans of old, who arbitrated among the tribes and manipulated them to gain support, he saw his role as that of moderator or arbiter' among contending forces; and he worked to prevent any group from becoming strong enough to exercise power in its own right. At the same time, he attempted to re- main aloof from politics and to act as a spiritual patriarch rather than as a directing force, He was an admired king but net a strong one. The monarchy, in the end, won the levers of power almost by default. Two occurrences over which Mohammed himself had little control were decisive. Fi;?, the Istiqi failed to establish dominance over the army. The stage was set when the Army of Liberation, which was largely a guerrilla force, de- nounced the party's appeal to join the French-trained ?Hassan also refers to himself as an arbiter (see Le Maroc en Marche, The Ministry of Information, Rabat. 1965, p. 206). and the word is much used to describe the role of Moroccan monarchs. 10 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET officers in a national army. Later the guerrilla groups responded to the King, and for some years the army was under the dual leadership of an 'saglal Minister of Defense and Hassan, then a young prince, as Chief of Staff. Not until the Rif rebellion in 1958-59?when Hassan led the army in putting down tribal insurrection and protest ?did he take ac- tual control, and the Istiqhd, then weakened by inter- nal divisions, surrendered the Defense Ministry. The second event which gave the King his power was the schism ln the Istiglal. Although he had abetted factionalism, the party basically broke of its own weight. The younger, more forward-looking members opposed the conservative orientation of their elders and they formed the National Union of Popular Forces in 1959, Thereafter the King did not have to bargain with a strong party. He held the right to appoint and dismiss his ministers, who were responsible solely to him. Hassan has retained this right throughout most of his reign. For a brief period after 1961, however, when he came to the throne?without the prestige of his father?he allowed the politicians increased leverage, acquiescing in their demands for a constitution and a parliament. Elections were held in 1963, but no single party won a majority and the assembly bogged down in ineffectual debates. It was disbanded by Hassan, in the wake of serious riots in Casablanca in 1965, on charges that it paralyzed government action. The second elections Hassan permitted were in 1970. They were aimed at providing a facade of parliamentary rule and at demonstrating that he had matters well in hand. Candidates were not allowed to run under party labels, and most of the parties boycotted the election. The rubber-stamp assembly of independents that resulted was dissolved after the 1971 COUP attempt. For most of the time, Hassan has thus ruled alone. And he has emphasized and refined the divide-and-rule technique of his father, allowing groups overtly opposed to him to continue to exist and consulting with them on occasion. He has not allowed any of them to become a directing force, or even any single person to dominate, say, economic affairs. Instead, he has weakened all who sought such authority. At the same time he has not sought to be a reformer himself. b. Hassan's Leadership Style Hassan is a unique combination of the traditional and the modern monarch. His household is shrouded in mystery, and his wives are not seen by Westerners, He dons a white jellaba and rides a white horse to religious observances,w and he moves his court to his numerous palaces throughout the country in an aura of privilege arid majesty perhaps expected by the mass of his countrymen, whose religious leader he is. He is also a graduate of Bordeaux University. He confers with politicians and labor leaders. He holds press con- ferences and fends reporters' questions in the Western mariner. And he is a golf enthusiast, although his devo- tion to the game has diminished (or at least has been less publicized) since the attempts on his life in 1971 and 1972 inclined him to pay more attention to "the business of kingship.'' His ma or accmnp is unents lave ieen in the ancient art of statecraft. While actually close to the West, and benefitting from its aid, he preserved the nominal non- alignment of his country between East and West, and he worked successfully to improve its standing in the Arab world when events behooved him to do so. Ile has found the tackling of domestic problems less con- genial than his traditional role as guardian of the national integrity; arid on these issues he has procrastinated, arbitrating among the interests of both traditional and new elite groups, the politicians, urban labor, and the army. Basically his rule combines manipulation, cajolery, and force. The techniques of manipulation, of divide- and rule, that Hassan employs are dictated not by necessity but by choice, for lie could be tougher if he wanted to be, The security forces under Col. Ahmed Dlimi are efficient, and they demonstrated their competency most recently in protecting visiting dignitaries during the October 1974 Arab summit meeting in Rabat. Hassan's style of leadership is, in part, adherence to the old modes of behavior which perhaps come naturally to a Moroccan king, but there arc practical reasons behind it as well. Certain aspects of the manipulation technique, such as consultation with political parties, Hassan has found ?Since the 1971-72 attempts on his life. he has not appearrd publicly on horseback, presumably for security reasons. 11 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 25X6 25X6 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET useful in attempts to promote his image as an enlightened young monarch, worthy in particular of US aid, Finally, his dealings with some groups overtly oppom,d to him?such as the Union Marocaine dr Travail (UMT), the most importani labor union in the country?have served the cause of maintaining stability. The UM'I' and sonic of the parties are probably useful in restraining or tempering the demands other groups in the society might make On the King. In the mid-1960's when the UMI was stronger than it is now I [assail may even have seen it as a counterpoise to the army, Today its critical press, joined with that of the UN FP and other liberal parties, undoubtedly reminds such entrepreneurial organizations as the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the other pressure groups in the society which must be mollified. Press criticism is sometimes focused on the King. (The Istiglal papers, for example, told Hassan the 1971-72 coup attempts were his own fault.) Such op- position, however, may serve Hassan well; it is, in a sen(', a harmless outlet for voicing discontont which might otherwise be concentrated on overthrowing him. The criticism is, in any case, circumscribed, Opposi- tion groups know the limits of the King's tolerance. and when they overstep it their papers are confiscated and their organizations suppressed. The repressive measures of the regime, however, are sporadic. UNIT stalwarts are imprisoned, then released, and allowed to resume their previous political roles. Student demonstrations are broken up, but their extremist, anti-monarchical union was only period- ically intoned before 1972, and demands are being voiced for the lifting of the current proscription. In- justices, such as preventive detention, are well pub- licized, and Moroccans do aot keep silent for fear of reprisals. Hassan plainly wants to keep his opponents weak, but he does not want to eliminate them. Ile thus gave the parties an opportunity to hold congresses and strengthen their organizations in 1974, when he made overtures to them about their participation in government. The apparent aim is to entice them into a coalititut Cabinet which would prepare for electitms, In be held on his terms. Individually, a number of important party leaders have held Cabinet posts at various times since 1 965 . Mien parliament was disbanded; but they have had only the authority the King chose to give them and they have acted without party ties. Individuals without political affiliation, drawn mainly from the 12 elite, constitute Ilassan's favorite clientele and his im- mediate entourage, Often (lie King rovards his supporters by mulling her to posts in goveromIlMit, many af which continue to be direct or indirect sources of profit in the form of concessions, licenses, authorization, etc. Sonic of these appointments are to the Cabinet, tual because it has been used in this way its members have not played an effective directing role, 1 ItISSIIII hits not permitted consolidation of control on the part of his ministers, or even the routtnization of ministerial functions, Thus the frequency and fq)- parently capricious nature of his Cabinet reshuffles have become legend. Of the approximately 230 Cabinet 'appointments made since independence," almost half have lasted only about a year and man), for six months or under (see chart). Only those respon- sible for the King's safety, such as Maj. Cen. tvlolutunned ()takir, the long-time Interior Minister and then 1)efense Minister who turrecl traitor in 1972, find those holding portfolios of lesser concern, such as Public Health, have been permitted long tenure in their posts. Changes have been most frequent in the mittistries dealing with economic affairs. ;Ind un- doubtedly the King has used them as an inwortant part of what John Waterbury calls his "patronage system," '2 i.e., showing royal favor and manipu- lating access to various kinds of prebends and kid:- backs. '" 'The number eafftifft he precisely &shooed because of the ihr in)rtfidlin and tincrttainty Li% to 11 11111111 'MOW tIOIMOIt111111IN JO' 11'1'14 "11'fileriniry. Thr (:ornnuitarr u/ihe Faithful, n "Mitch Iliac been ..411(1 shaitit onnintion In NI woven, the 11111',111011iii %%Mild Ilf. cciii (Or at Irml ivainha IwIlt.r) if Ihr king lakr ringrin fin?.isisri.% Ili eliminate It (:ctl.ilnk It rlicic (tom liar laaccuct tic el. cc burr alsolact atac hind of &camp-tat tccorti lac loyal t? il.krIc I,, irtialitr a fur, In liar ?klierr lienclit%ic tl,,., .111111111g Iii NtOlikIt? i.E rifidO(T. Officials from thrir nitim,ing gaac miliarial claim% for torilltor air toattatitotc Art 1)"1111"1 vmtir lii tion?qjnitliar (4.44i-titan% rffrtic tottoptiaao. porticalhatIc hi de%i?Inning unirtici Some, his fact, Ihicr drowd liii torroption pottootrc national Into:ration, uataital for. motion, anti atfotinIcltatic-r rfficirocy (Ser N401,1,11,1 "Fmnniint I)r%1-10nnictit thrmigh Iturraticr.dic? Afitcrit urn fichar omit St-fru/tit, VII. Nmembrt 1961. and ) S 5', r. .1 .atrsijitiou, .1111(1 Decrlopiornt A Com?Ilrorfit Aivak 'ha. AM. tO Of, 1.1,h its al St fro( r iirtfru pliar 144,7 1 Ns, mull 11.111 OI,Ide !Or N.fmn4-1?? Yet .11 liar caslur Him% r%itIrsim ac tint calf ? Iskirtit I,, Iwouurt thr th.if ..nrrunfInti bern i4 Icitultator to iirculoptortat fflotIc Soffor it to asia 111.41. clrcrattr hatchet itorasiiti, !Aril I, I1.1o..111 in 1471, wriliption tritwint aictof,troc. ptialcalalc OK/racingliar ta tticion of liar popolatv laniard king anti Kocrtnownt SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET DURATION OF CAOINET APPOINTMENTS, 1957-74 (Approximately 230 eppoIntments made to Cablne0 0 months and under Appointees who hold Oilleo 0 months tot yesr JJ 24 months Ind over 40% 18 to 24 months Name, 8.70 lila 18 months Percentages do not add to WO because of mundina. As it naturally behooves the Xing to bestow his favor rather widely, his Cabinet reshuffles?and other ap- pointments too?have come to resemble a game of musical rht,tlrs, %%Ali some members of the government moving InPl-. post to post, then p,rhaps dropped for years, ;111(1 rehabilitated in another go-round. Fess' of the prominent men disappear completely from the ranks oh Moroccan officialdom, for put-dosslis are seldom permanent. Ilachir Bel Abbe% Taarji, for e,.? ample, \dui %vas named Minister of Justice in a 1971 Cabinet, bad held no official post since die early 19(10's, ss ben he had served as Minister of Labor Sometimes die Rabid rumor mill tries to supply a reason for a temporary ecli(,se. Tilos 1)riss Slaititi left the government fithloss ing the 1971 v,i*nip attempt. :If trt C.ItallVt-It'Vt'l pOstS, iiiiiI rumors that lie bad liven either implicated in or offended b) the cor? ruption that had been disclosed hi connection %%Ali the cunt) In 147.1 wav rehabilitated and named permanent representative to the Nation% A place in the Cabinet 1. probably best assured Its marrsing into the rov family, for both prime Minister .hinted Mittati and former Foreign Minister Mohammed Clierkatiiii Aft' Illittited to ilavkaii.% sisters lint tics to the monesrd families arr also helpful 'fu- ss& of the present Foreign %finistrr?Almird !Amid, is Itathia Sebti, ss hose family Matte it for 1 flair in Casablancarral (-stale% anti his predecessor but (hr sob, Ahmed Talbi lienhinia, is ...atirrIed to the daughter of Morocco's svealthiest businessman iind financier, Mohammed high/mold, Ilk/tildes and the jousting for position often pil family against 1110111), in the royal court, and intrigue and rumors abound. As the King Is Infltienceil by this goy,ip, the atmosphere Is often such that efficient func- tioning al the top-level of the Inireaucritc), is simply smothered, The dismissal of Prime Minister Moham- med flenhima in liffi() took place under such condi- tions, !tumors to the effect that be had pocketed money on public works contracts were circulated by, among others, All lienjelloim, who thought that had been instrumental in his losing the Justice MinistrY post. A relative of lienjellotin was at that time the I)irector General of the !loyal (;abinet, sylio controls access to die King. As it result, Ilenbitita was for months cut off from contact with Hassan and thus lost his capacity to act long before his final ouster, Disputes or disagreements but the Cabinet center on t?omprlition for die King's favor or attention and rarely have ideological content. No minister has been knossn to argot. policy with the King or to sly no to Decisions emanate from I lassan, and If lily of his asst, ',ales figure in the process of making flies, ;;;;-; has ..1)1 been identified. Those closest to hint over the years have been his sectirity men: first. Nliaj. Gen. Ntoliammed thifkir. until be turned against the King iii 1972, and now Col. Ahmed svlio has acceded. in large measure, ()ufkir's rude but not to his ministerial posts. The degree of influence or authority they have had, !losses er, is qiirstionable. The King matte tivcrs lo (awl misrule in his rn !mirage ss liii lir 1 hulks is gaining, too much pins er, and there is some suspicion lir 111.1y 1141% n beers acting to iiii? (kola atithorits??thus perhaps prompting the coup attempt I1,1%%.iti is iinssilliuig to share pil?? rt. tin' tr?Illt is thrift and indirection at the top unless lit? feels obliged to act Ili% prrMilt.11 irlditiatilM% and the demand% oti his lime thus figure in the satiation to fact. the criticism made of him his air long-time opposition leader nos% in role. \toliammed itasri, has some truth in it tie vscels in .itials 'Mg This % hint from being thorouglils familiar ss oh ob. comlition% and from producing vomit! and solutions to problems "Ii ;MA CR trt sincerr "i. 1*.If 0 :I I 1,)71 RH% 1..ititi.stimi CPYRGHT 13 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 ICPY GHT Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 ntCRET 3. Contenders for Power and Status Tim task of the King in winning and holding poNical control has been simplified by the nature of tI e gnmps operatIngitt Moroccan society: sonw have limited alms, and those ambitious for real power reveal I nherent flaws at crucial MM.% These ell rneterlstles are apitarent in each of the following: cs. The Elite The Kir.g is the patron and the protector of the elite. Landlords, merchants. and businessmen look to hlm to protect them from expropriation, natioualization, and land reform, and lw does so. Although taxation In Minorco has bec(ntle increasingly pro), essiye, tin in- heritance tax has been instituted; and so far only Inreign-owned estates have been taken over filr dis- tribution to poor farmers. This is not to say that great fortunes, in the Western sense, litiVe been amassed, hist only that the interests of the fairly well-to-do have I een looked after. In part because of this protection, the elite is still basically drawn from among dune who had mi lney. and education at the time of independence. hotlines who were prominent then and in pre-colonial days?stsell as the Benjellouns. the Balminis, the Boutalebs, the Ouazzanis, and the Debbaghs?con- thole to play important roles, with their members represented in all facets of official and commercial life it Entry into the elite is not and never has been dosed, however, and its nntni)rn air gtowing as appointments are increasingly made on the basis of ci onpetence instead of family connection and us op, port unit it's for making money are opening up, Acconling to an estimate made by john ?Vaterintry," the elite in the decade after Independence numbered only about 1,000 nirn: 100 army officers, 730 high-ranking government officials and rural notables and administrators; 130 prominent politicians and lot- ion leaders, and 100 others. including businessmen and rdigious dignitaries (the rairma)." In the past 10 hr I ,iii h Iw.iii In kreP mruttit ul Important lamilim at alratt the torn rrf the century Sc,' Aniltr Adam, Catablanra Euia no la itato.fornhanim dr ha 'twirl.- Afattxttifir OH roma, 1 dr roeurdrro. crute- N.rtinnai de Ia Recherche Scientafirine. Pans. Itoor Cwattantder the Vatittftd, oSli "the inliKaar, !twain traittilitir the urakett dement nf the ehlr Thew uomlinur In he 1-crit it gird ii, the trn familt.. lanatnet. Ia "filet Otrogliorn petpulAt tuppod, 14 years, the elite Itas probably doubled in flit', Its it has come to include far more entwpreneurs, working either In private business or In the government- conlndled sector of the economy, and also jut 11111 IIC at educators and Journalists. The elite thus includes the King's malts constituency 1111(1 also die main opposition to him," Both groups are affected by Ilassan's manipulative techniques, for those outside the immediate government coterie are os vulnerahle 0 OW Cabinet ministers to royal put-downs and rehabilitations. Ahmad Bettkirane, a Casablanca businmman and director oi die pro-UNIT paper Maroc- Informations in the mid-1900's, wa, without an influ- ential position for vvrral years after his newspaper WaS SIISMIded; but then he was suddenly !UMW) to a post in the government-controlled sector of the economy. Often these rehabilitations are connected with Ow King's political concerns of Ihir moment. In late 197.1 he was interested In reviving the UNIT Its part of the restoration of political life, and a number of t he party's stillWath. WII0 had been Of rested tin charges of anti-government plotting. Were felt aced front prison. 'Eltry Ito:hided Omar Benlellotm, an old-time UNIT revolutionary and former editor of the party's newspaper. Economic reprisals an' another means by which the King makes his power felt. Government contracts can I e directed away (non offending bosinessmeti, aml personal favors can be revoked For example, villas used by the Moroccan elder statesman and former Prime Minister Ahmed Balafrej were taken over by the government in 1972 after his son Anis, a young engineer, had been charged with (and was later sentenced for) alleged nivolvement in revolutionary schemes." Granting the right to use property or land is rwc way the King shows his pleasure. but often the grant is temporary and it may be withdrawn for no lip- feilMItl. When that happens the erowhilr red pleat ha % no recoulM, for he It has pa. t icipat ed in the spoils system. These ups-and-downs in Moroccan society are cer- tainly sufficient to give rise to personal insecurity. They may lead as well to what Waterbury calls -alliance-Imilding- among the elite"?a tendency to t,br. (Frank 14.i tin, The Bole of the Intrlhgentsla in Alikkrfauaton The ( of Afonrcco. Urthrri!ty at Train Ph 1) clittertatinn, I 7 It riamistrt the -oppontitin hich hargaint for pth &Kr% c It the gin tumult no'rrn? art about RIO men-Oren "CS.311, 017(17, 27 Jith 11)72 "Op s1l.0 75 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :1'iilDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : plATRDP86T00608R000600170025-2 hedge. kis hy forming vontireflons svilli business intrtysls and lies %Yid, members of govern- filen! c. IIiit III(' 114111111RP 11'%WlIngII(Mr.% 110'4111111 10/111111"1 11141111P Ilikr111111 Mr' ?Vily 111 iutIiIiti1101' etidfrt promoting one's liderests, and il is a method much vitip'-led in Morocco hittilly llrc 4,1101 rtriiil 411111 1.11111111elcitll (1111111111111111,.. 1111101All'11 liv Illr' 111111111111111% Cif Ahmed Ilttlithri. Ille 1141)1011011 gmcrtittir /41 4)1110441 Ind ftillirr 411 Illr yoting "revolutionary sYris raised Ity tin mirk Mohammed (;11essolls, \s,1141.4, 1i,,iils 111111Irc% 1111111(11' sl lIrr 1111:11011111.1111r411 (1)1111?111 $1/111 1VIllitf? Mt) 1121% \CRT(' a1. 11114111V, iL1i4lIlrJ 111:11114'll 11011 !MUG. 1.1.11141.4' 111CM1141% llf'141 1.11411 1114' Navigollmi ( 'ottipaity and Vh.e Cos emir ill the Haul; of Morocco and 411(1 Illi%1` %COT(' 417, ?.11111MC?ii(Itlit, 41110 111%611011N ltlaffird Ntoliattimed %slime posts have In- Ilii' litiative Ministry. (glen famils lies (loss partisan lines 'Ulm% III,. portant offluial of Illy I %1I, AltdrIkrim II"' "1 !wa(1 eif Ihr pahace?stipported ( ;ow %Motional and Democratic l'optilar Most-mild. ,11)414'l1(illii k114111l1. m441 thr 14,44144-1?111?I2it1. iif \1 I lot ailed lioncetta, 1.'. Iii, lirails Ihr . 111V VIICC1i. 1111 1 1Ir 41111111ly Ill chIll iillrf.11-1.11iuM111In. ?1,111411 all", 3.11 ill ?IlitlAII) 1114 per ?c 11111 tallier became of their corm and timi? ple?its They ;ire striking largely !treatise the elite is 4.111.111 ill %ite, .11111 1113tly It.. 111rIllbet% 4111(111111 TIltiiill.:11?111 Ilir tIppyr Irtric (if tim %twirl Prl,411131 C1111,11,11 the edges ill isolitital differences and Min the sense of itleologival uttrintillment, riliaps promoting .4 trittlenev to or.. tfitirsce III the status tpio If this is the case. it Inas be :4 1,141414 III the reltittante to OA(' Ilia rim% pat tr) litrk., for twig') r14...isj4)44% 4444 fitiittrr. .45 1.11111 11411011. 01111 III 11r1.isr, iii tic to effect AI 1111Ill? diCtriblIti()11 (11 to pursue des-elop, mew goals, b. The Military Aftlly and air forcr elemen(s hare tried twice lo king down Hassan and take control. In July 1971 a g;ittip iii Itigh?rartkini,! officers Intl 1,5(X) cadets of the I oncommissioned of ficerl' %dux), in art attack or) thr palace at tikhiraf. %% herr the King. his senior ads isers. and the diplomatic corps Were celebrating his 15 1)1411.,4144s. Jti:1 1.1 ti14)11111: 1400, 441r 144tcr IinI tttr I lit kly44,1 11444%. 11 till. lloving 727 that ssos bringing king home loan halite. All evidem r king 111:111, Mai 011_ N1t1112011111t11 ( bait, this attempted trio( ifle The specific motives of tlit. whets?of thr 40o111nm Iii %chid; they %souk, have soilir.lit to mos(' the cittoil/%, had flies succeeded never Iv, limos ry Ii,' of. ers invoked in the rather medic( rssfol conp either Virle :11111111V, llir *dully 100 prictmc 1.(111111 iliitii,g 1)411414-4, 4I4 1.', ('(4't'Sl'lilll'Ii 1.11414) llirtrAlur )1111kit 111 11:11.4- (41111- ,11111rd 11114f1 111:11111 utrt ()ttlri% '1 11r r?lr.144:41iii4it1. 114414114r1.t. III 114411 llor% 11,11 llr{ 11111111. MU thing abotit the poten- tials of dir officers Iii (144(111(1. (though it mo. indl(atisr) %lot.' significant is die In t thy% (lid 'nit 11.1vt? Akin- IIIpm?rt thr 1.414111 414 ciuiiu 0(1%;1111,10. ;it III?fil :1.4111). 1:14444 4)1 110:4 1.41r1r mid limitirNAffirti trpt/rtrilk tratIcil 141 Ilit? molt ittlruipt: cc 4114 frAr .44141 trrpitlAllmt. 4o1114444104 144, t 44411) Ir.4410: ??411' ItwIllirr(c the elite (()nt. of them. Anialurn 11:stiltnnn. %sac ill 1.11-1 11.;?,..nt indit.11111 aftrt Iliv 1971 altrww.I pinnting nnt Itn? 11.11.t tin ii.iol granted die traitors, flit.s had pariii ipated ill the spoils ss stem 1.011,0". oserlap kisser,' die chit- and the of wer corps of almost 2oxi command, flir appro?iniatels t1hl,000? armed flours 1 are sit:tido-ant 4.)41r fit lhr ItiglirAr ranking offteres. lirig ( Alideldmii ScIfitilAj. %%1111 cc .1% !WWII Insp.-rio( of Inlantrs iii 1975 .11111 %Olt) 14:-%4414-41 Illr (.1)444 14grtil cc Int 14 (4)114:141 itt tlir 197:1 .11.1hisrarli through Ihe tii,i1ol,ir Ill 1115 cislcr, 1(4 lir influctili,i1 1.111111 1 of 1 halm ()uiattani. a prominent Loss,' %slat has 'wen associated ssith seseral partirs and held .4 titindser lu (:altinct posts, and also 1.111.11ffid sk.111. all 1111141/L011 elthiplylirlIf 115% lirr lit Tangier Through Sclootii's to% it marriage into the iimisellham hinds, he is related to Mr-ssatitid (:logner. .4 fotmet Caltmet minister ssho ssas among the carl Istitilal leaders '1'11r most important %High- 111.1 II ill Or 1111111:11!. ?and peal:Wk. v.1111 1111' It) time con:Ors?is the wcurits 1)1inti, His e.,:er presents an intelligent sotmng man 4,11 ((fir .1.1,4) has liren amaringly successf til SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 nalfie-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 e410141411111g, sl smog:lotion with tlsittsiii god alto firs to 111r elite 1)liftil martird the titter of General Srfrioul't wily tool flint moves In high political and commetrial rircIrt addition, hit teal rotate (.411144;4 hose lafinglst 111,11 drop to the Tail family, impottant III trttilr otatistfactuting and ()flirt lottiortty; ?I Now Its hit ffild-10';, 1/11mi has fl hit catert forht ern the army and policy (fowl, hot Iiis meteoric tit,' wag ill (lie 10101 ticlrosry well lover been con. fir( trd with hit offering Idiots-4f op In I at g tf-opegoot in ihr holt trial for the kidnaping, and minder of the Moony:in oppotiliffis. leaflet, !strIsdi Bets Barka " ifs 1470 lir writ opp;srently whittling anus at the arlIsisrits. of hit Irost, Grrirtal ()tair. lot lir %vat flowed to head the StIfile NntIHtltlie. whilst, Wat tell1M ell Itylt11 the intioliclion (Nair.% N1initIty 5)1 Intrtiot 11 ??.10,0 ()011(if fell. Mini tom; begot) ftPIgkr hit plifur ifs the I.:itsg't faVnt TSIgeillet ttith, Ihr 'remits terYitrt. Ihr military re-emerging at the instrument allt1 !Ile I%IJIptsIt (SI the palace. followin s lajr)r softer 1971-72 coop attempt% At thol IIe Ilsitton f-ottigford thr isrokr if) 'mitt op, and ttripiwil them of their otto monition. lett the% altaill hit life Yet he wefts) tts hr sour risme thr potrofs cii the military lir it pet? tellmslitibly fist Ilsr modernirotion IttOgrAtil 4011 i) wc1.itsg thy rgillitallytIl hit officers want. despite Illy fit hilistelf inherent in Ilse kollship smI thr mcd fort,) In Ilse ffirofitittsr. thr comitotition of the mmy c011., !snort tis hofsgr It it no lotiget the prellsonifoodls Itcrlsrr, flair f waled by the French Standoff!), of the Ilor ri Rcitlo Academyill!strifort r beim raketi. w ids the troth of fos wins; Ow hoter szlocated forhaf) And Afol) %sadist Tie% with the elite ofc undoubted!),, morcos rt. for the %OW, fit the prettigimo fomilirt teem ill Isp snore oltrocted to gos eminent and 1)11010-so dos!, It) the militort The formalise esperirrort of the )(stinger officers differ, from tlogr of their elders !staffs of the hitter g,tew isp doting the intlepristlencr Ottiggle The former ?err Niinth, durum the 191-so's and remember 1 hr "I Root 11: (soros) II ?1,, isi74 nisi fisis tsss.*, tiLif ti)s- t 0-ti, fith.0tra G-0.-041 (Mika, ii40.40 rt fmril 1.1 r II tAiittr isis,, wn41 '0.1,4 an?hrist Is trLillitni 4. 4 utvi via/Aril bq tonlyht tit, It nt t. .1.itt.1 Ittal Ofinf ttus Ittirtnittrifilt "NifIli$ 51,111K Iltfhll$C1111.1$ bast' brell 4144114 It; Instant ();1(14 3g.Is5I+1 ka,c p-cull 1(511 ditsent of that lime The lieutenant% and the captains vscfr iff crtill114115. atIlllttl in 19t3), when litotes, dettionutallotri us Rutile/us and wodieo tesultril In srvrtal hundred dead and Ird to the tlivuilit, nun of parliament ',idle itijotte,ation it available now on the ttolitical attitude.% of 11;( otilitaty, hut many of II* viiinget members nuts well %s SIC the distatidat don of the oppolition ion% and illIllallet1(T the flow pair of f !wow' in the (moths. A (imp it alwast pottible Morocco but. if if happent. it doffs not fief rttatily mean new difectiors flu thr 00111t1' 1 W0 liatic fat tort thous' doubt firkin de iittny's ahilit.; to play the deschitimental tale lwurt !Ilan I Iacci,41) cit with the tiocett toilitaty tpgitort have had It) tflIlle 'the liftt it tilt' cow, mon it) 111411% de% eloping IsalllItirs, (II dtak*ItIg tut! time Illilitat? Its +staff the trt usli s errs icrt he second it this' pact gittnt Jilt it'll of Iltr rt cisIfLI %%1111 the I- troth independence, 1hr Motocf at) attllV 141Itir frOttlime fighters, Init limit of its officers hail terrised their training,. tanic, and haute espetient-r. till der the Firtich nag, basins; terse(' mainlY in Inds). china .!Nottir of them. toll) at Crtirtal SeItimaj. site 'till SItI l il, 'Mint' base relitell, the siftrt,rffef ft (4 !brit sstinuitilcsti siliIuPtt elltriV linget off t, terittirs sit VW es000,1 ism sitiii comer% Aim) iii. Isetfted from thr Multi 41.11$11111 ((it Ow tionstrtrit in leflitt coupes ond contempt for irs?iirg-.41 nwilamis terrotril is, EMI ilstsmKIT fur 1711 it'eT thsrjls 11;j1 (1)tp:. in NM. 144(10+ the prritigr ist Iroderdsip it) Ow ill. tlepelislt cite ttrujrJc. anti it' ifisos:c Isot not berm in). poised Iss thr Infite tevellI attiscialion %% if hi time :rots-wise mrottort of IIoon.% Kos-MI MI-1d No) oftionre flamed its the aftertnoth of 011111) II111% 1111Iikell'. and %it lmu! It ofl utlity?Ii;..?11 regime 'ss sunlit %orris- be Mute tfiltr?the 01411 11Ie eltld tills, ? 9.1.?1.,e?af %al Ill pro)iding dorction for tile cisimtrs c. 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IIJ ( (1141,11 491431)1114 ,14,1 11,4411,1. ;.11 if .111utt 11.34; III 111111)11W 44111C 411111' )1)11 pcntIrtl; 4-243411 .444 III tIijt 'Rid III IA!, itftw; \lJill' I r 44114411 31,4 4-1.14(41 14.4411 ?1,11! 1314144- f11.11 111 1114- I 14441-41 tr.d 11011 flt ini11,11 /141,0,1111 I .1111114: rul4111$111% 114-1111$,,, 1,11j, C/44 rtillortil, :1 1 41111/1111r1 I 1 1itii1i114 ,31111 11.114- 44, 11.11, 14,14 11-,,J) ditrtrti. 11131 till (4.311% 11,4 11.1t.44ord 132 1114. .11111 V.1,4114111 ?11.111,1r 1' 1! 1.1144 M11144(42 14,411111 hi 1474 still; tfir 11,414,0 (.14 )11111 133f tuttly. fIr 1.3110 1't1i,,,t3 Ill 14-11141.3t f "11 It 1143 4(110 ?rj),dr; 11.411% 113u3431 It1 I,J144 .111/1 II11/111-1 11_144 1411121 1114-if 1.114111 443(5 141111, 11 1114 11 1,111.11114 44 1111 14141 I \ I I'n 444244 44-il4u41ntf /11 ( .41.1111.111i .1 .11111 1...1.11 1,7(1 ly% Ow I A1 I Ir.itirt 1,311. 424101 Itcn '4 11411k )1114t, ills ;1111.404111 34-1.4131 12,4741- hr \fmrIttritt, wictri,dh 1 It? till' )%)71 III cotintrt .4%.43 Ittlkil.d. it 4)3144 (11%:(14-il 431111 !yin f4'"11". 64114) 141 11111:1 rt%rtitialk ilintrt? On 'lir .444' incrting. Art pc1114(1 "f 141" 111411th \r?Cf 111 414111114.1114`r III `411,1114V11. 141 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Gr_Critt 1043 POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTS U ii an (0.04.wn,ttrytv 10f,9 1070 1072 044 ? 1 1 r,,,, .114,4st.rva 11?4 /Nfli el P,1. ,t ImpooftP 4P NotabAst r?toeffol.: (Mit In 0?0?10." r.r,l,t 0.40p.opo jun Ormottor Clootootool Petty (rpti 'reel lat the (Wont, al Ca.thfoornol Inthire,ott ODIC) Crft01.14.111 8.4 Dir..tvet.c rtrOto idovartom 1 woo' Covekleftes utilr Pilot 18 1 MP Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIAfieff386T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 DECIICT part because the UN II' drew off potential supporters, they tire prIlltips hoping to fare better under the new 1101111' Party of Progress and Socialism. And In the meantime new parties, sucli as the !Abend Progressive Part y organized by ( A4)11)611(1) busioessmen, Proliferate. 011e of them, Itif-brised Action Party, Mile)) appeared to offer the potential of bringing rural poops into politics, Is already rent by dissension among its founders. Notie of the parties, for over H decade. has ;dile to mobilize NufficIrlit support to back up the demands it makes on thr King. They have only the power 1 lassit? chooses to give them, but 'r hey remain hopeful still of a meaningful role While reluctant to perpetuate the status quo. they responded to the overtures he began to make In them In 197,1 about participation In the governmort, arid they any willing to open a dialogue with him, apparently on the grounds that they have nothing to lose On the issue of reviving the claim to the Spanish Sahara, which the King is using '11 114rt I') heal divisions, the parties have rallied around him, and their leaders undertook missions to explain the Ninrticemi position to foreign governments. The r'sfrIII of the parties' popular appeal is questionable. Some of them, including the UNIT. .velcomed I la \%itti't (ircitiOn (I) pliftpliiV lary 1"111.111)11% beyond 1975 became it will allow them (flue to iiuuijtl ILp their strength. Party organizations in the corintr)side are vestigial or non-existent, end urban membership has fallen during the years without eke- ;loos. III Sir's% of 1116( past rSprilellCr. IllaIly pOlitkally ass ar' NIMotTalls are piOhably SkeptiCal of the vague- ly socialist goals that most of the parties proclaim. intl thry probably doubt that repartition of the national wealth or similar moves would benefit them directly. The programs of the parties ore not specific, offering Iii) strategies for Orr betterment of !simmer). Although III the long term the performance of the politicians might improve. especial's' as thr generation gap in the pa:tie: narrows in the next I() to 15 years, at this stage the parties do not have the capacity to act as a catalyst for popular discontent or as a viable force for progressive change. They are fighting defensively against a strong regime and also among themselves. d. Labor The largest and most important trade union in Morocco. the 1.1MT, flas not sought a directing role, Its 19 lorig?tline leader, Mahlon') Ben Seddik, IS closely tied to the UNIT, and union members probably constitute the backbone of dial party, but Ilse UMT Is not for- mally affiliated with it. ?Vhile Ben Seddik talks is radical political line and Is prominent in lotermitional labor affairs, he has, for the most part, confined UNIT actions to those that bring direct benefits to the workers. Unlike labor unions in most developing countries, which are ancillary instruments of control under the authorities, the tIMT exists its a separate entity with a base its urban labor. It hits, with partial exceptions, resisted subordination to governmental authority and preserved 11s orgimizational integrity. It has also accepted ii limited role and conceotrated its activity oll ?Inead-and-butter" trade unionism. For this MISCH', It Ilas as II 'MIMI. ESTII though UNIT strength has dwindled, hugely because of un- employment, to about half the 6()0,(XX) members it claimed in the mid -1960's, the union has and uses the right to strike. having organized an average of fie strikes 01 walk-outs a year between 1970 and 1973, with an mutual losS of nmghly 80,000 mirk-clays. Thoniphout the past decade, the union bas won for its members benefits disproportionate to the general economic situation. Sometimes it has blocked such measures as cuts in the work-sverk, which might have helped the grivernment to share lobs and ease the unemployment situation. %V.hy (foes Hassan permit the contimwd existence of a disciplined poss.vr group that is not under hi5 control? The answer lies in the fact that the UNIT is essentially middle class. Union members, for the most part, have steady jobs and see themselves far better off than many around them. They thus share the King's interest in maintaining stability. Moreover, the (INIT.% local af- filiates have inobably experienced the tough actions taken by provincial governors?many of whom were in the past seconded foun the or labor militants, arid the union as it whole sees reason to fear a military takeover of the government. 1 lassao's regime harasses the UNIT and punishes its sometimes overly zealous criticism of him. (Ben Seddik was imprisoned most recently for anti-govermnent speeches made during the disturbances after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, but there was mane suspicion then that the regime bacl taken action to help him refurbish his revolutionary image and improve his standing with the more militant factions of his union,) For the most part, however. the UNIT manages not to offend the SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET King, perhaps 115 II result Of the negotiations 13en Sed- (Ilk has in the past vonducted with him, both p('rsonal- !), and through intermediaries, The operations ()I the union are thus circumscribed; it avoids association with student disorders 1111d its strikes rarely have politival overtones, III short, the UM'!' knows the limits of its power, und it knows that efforts to acquire more would be met with force, B. Indecision on Key Issues The existence of the various lunver blocs and/or pressure groups in Moroccan society has deterred the kind of decisive action that would have meant overriding established interests and tightening govern- ment authority. Hassan, with his propensity for ar- hitrating among contending forces, has attempted to appease them when convenient to do so; and he has been disinclined by temperament to make hard decisions on developmental matters. The result has LI Va cii la t lug a ppronh to domestic problems and an emphasis on the public relations aspects of issues and pu)jects, These characteristics have lwen apparent Iii tin. government's economic planning and in its approach to education, 1. Economic Planning The hindaniental defects in Morocco's early development efforts were best defined by a survey teat!) of the International Bank for Reconstruction and .Development (IBM)) in 196.1-66.25 While recognizing that the decline in the econorny2? (hiring the first decade of independence reflected the departure of large numbers of French settlers and the resultant out- flow of capital. the mission stressed as an important contributing factor the faulty planning machinery that had been established. This machinery, the mission found, was cumbersome with regard to decision- making and virtually nonexistent for purposes of implementation. Morocco's planning mechanism was devised soon after independence by the politicians then serving in the government. It was the Superior Planning Council, "The Economic Development of Morocco, published for 113111) by the Joh n% I lOpkillti University Press, Halt inion', Md., 1966. "In the first decade of Independence, Morocco's national output grew by an annual average of only 1.6 percent and thus declined on a per capita basis. 20 composed of all the members of a large Cabinet and iii 1k' other representatives; three speaking for agriculture and selected by the Union of Moroccan Agriculture, which Is essentially a pressure group of the big landowners; three for labor, named by the UMT; and three for business, selected by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The design of this council was aimed largely at placating diverse views and interests. Its deliberations wsulted in the 1960-64 plan, which divided its emphasis between agriculture and industry and tried to give something to everyone. The high level of public investment that it called for (14 percent of the gross domestic product), while never fully achieved, was suf- ficient to bring on inflation, balance of payments deficits, and declining foreign exchange reserves, The economy was growing at a rate of under 3 percent a year instead of the projected 6 percent, and the plan was simply abandoned about 1963, By the tnicl-1960'; iassan had succeeded in under- cutting the authority of the politicians, and respon- sibijity for economic planning fell more directly on him. Ile did not improve the planning mechanism. Instead of sharpening the focus of the council which had drawn up the 1960-64 plan, he increased its size. Ile renamed it the Superior Council for National Development and Planning, and he included in its membership the governors and other officials of the 19 provinces and the 2 prefectures into which the country was then divided. Planning efforts, still little more than vague suggestions for public investment, reflected the King's preoccupation with political objectives. Aid to small farmers was sacrificed to more impressive proj- ects, such as dam construction, which were usually announced with considerable fanfare. Most of the dams, moreover, were in areas where they benefitted the already relatively prosperous modern sector of agriculture and the influential landowners. As the 1965-67 plan was allegedly prepared under the personal direction of the King, members of the Superior Council may well have feared that fun- damental criticism would be considered an affront. Goals were again unrealistic, although spending had been reduced to conserve remaining foreign exchange, and a drought had further lowered the rate of economic growth. This plan fared no better than the earlier effort, and the greatest lags were in the priority sectors, with spending on agriculture amounting tc, only two-thirds of the planned investment. Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :sEqAtTIDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET In none of these efforts was any kind of a coordi- nating or supervisory authority empowered to over- see plan fulfillment." Some agencies, such as the Division for Economic Coordination, were established but not used, and provincial governors complained on occasion that they had not been informed of proj- ects that were underway in their areas.28 IBRD, at one point, threatened to suspend its assistance because of the Moroccans' poor administration." Foreign aid did little to dispel the economic stagna- tion. In the early and mid-1960's Morocco was receiv- ing roughly $150 million a year from over 20 countries and several international agencies. These resources, however, ?vere dissipated in a multitude of projects, many of which had only token effect. Donor nations complained that they were given no clear-cut plan of priorities or requirements.'tm Although the economy, with its emphasis on the impressive, long-gestation projects, was gradually providing the means for future improvement, indecision and lack of direction con- tinued to characterize its management until the late 1960's. 2. The Language of Education Similar indecisiveness is apparent in Morocco's failure to define the aims of national education. The dispute, when the nation won its independence, centered on the Arabization of the educational system, '17The comparisons often made between Tunisia and Morocco, to the detriment of the latter, are instructive in connection with economic planning. Bourguiba too had problems of overcoming vested interests when he came to power. He did not begin to em- phasize economic planning until he had established the control of the Neo-Destour Party (now the 1Destourian Socialist l'arty) throughout the country, replacing locally elected officials with centrally appointed ones. The party, working through such means as its agricultund and commercial cooperatives, then implemented the changes sought by the planners. The government thus came to dominate most aspects of the economy, and Ahmed Ben Salah was a virtual economic czar. (See Douglas Ashford, Morocco Tunisia; Politics and Planning, Syracuse University Press, N.Y., 1965.) 'rime, however, has not been kind to these comparisons. Despite early successes in achieving its goals, the Tunisian system has not proved more efficacious than the more haphazard Mo- roccan approach. Dissension in the Tunsian countryside and de- clining agricultural output led to abandonment of collectiviza- tion policies and decentralization of control. The 1969-72 plan was abandoned, and Ben Salah is in exile in Paris. "Ashford, op. cit., p, 35. 291NR, Research Memorandum RAF-18, 8 August 1968. 391abat, A-06, 22 January 1971. and it pitted those who wanted education to promote the traditional culture against those who wanted priority given to social reform and therefore urged technical education and a flexible approach to the language issue. The former, urging instant Arabization of the curricula, tended to slight reality: the system Morocco had inherited upon independence was almost entirely French, and teachers and textbooks in Arabic were few in number. The opponents of Arabization favored working toward a bilingual system and main- tained that practical possibilities must determine doctrine. Two national conferences were held on education, one in 1964 and one in 1970, attended by educators, members of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and regional representatives. The 1964 conference rejected the principle of bilingualism. A more vacil- lating approach was taken in the 1970 meeting, which gave greater weight to the problems inherent in Arab- ization. The King catered to various interests on the matter, Despite the decision of the 1964 conference, he ap- pointed Mohammed Benhima as Education Minister and supported him in the retention of French as the primary teaching language. In 1967, however, in an apparent overture to the traditionalist old-guard of the Istiglal, Benhima was replaced by Abdelhadi Boutaleb, a graduate of the Islamic Qarawiyin University and a proponent of rapid Arabization. For a while, it was a formal requirermnt that all primary in- struction be in Arabic, despite the fact that most secon- dary school subjects were taught in French. In practice, Arabic was taught where there were teachers and books and ignored where programs could not be changed. Given no clear mandate, the professional educators attempted to show progress toward Arabization to satisfy political demands. At the same time; they tried to avoid interference from public groups, continued to employ French teachers because qualified Moroccans were very few in number, and worked toward the retention of French in secondary schools. A workable system has gradurilly evolved. Arabic is taught in the first several years of primary school, French is then introduced as a subject, and on the secondary level students are given the choice of a monolingual (Arabic or French) or a bilingual program. The system, in fact, is similar to one Tunisia adlopted in the late 1950's and Morocco denounced at 21 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET the time as a denial of the Arab heritage. Arablzation of the entire system remains the official goal, but it is a very distant one. Bilingualism is encouraged through- out the school system, anci government publications point with pride to the increasing numbers of bi- lingual st udents. III. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE The disinclination or inability of other institutions and forces in the society to guide development efforts produced a vacuum which is gradually being filled by the bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, by the business community. The Actions of both groups are having the effect of propelling the nation along the path of change. As they are essentially task-oriented, the first result of their efforts is increased efficiency in the ad- ministration of the country, but social repercussions are becoming evident. TWO factors underlie this development. First, such matters as the language of education have been slowly dropping from the arena of public debate, and the elaboration and implementation of various policies and projects have been increasingly left to the specialists concerned with them, Second, these specialists work not as individuals but rather as cogs of organizations or institutions. As such, they are winning the confidence of the King. For example, the civil serv- ants who drew up .the 1971i-77 development plan and gave form and meaning to Hassan's vague suggestions concerning the public good pose no .competition to him and no challenge to his style of leadership, and he accordingly endorses their proposals. The prerequisite for tlx coufse the bureaucrats and the -,ntrepreneurs have been pursuing has been the evolution of an educational system responsive to the needs of the nation and of a corps of trained and ex- perienced personnel. Deficiencies in both education and experience were great when Morocco became in- dependent, and they are being overcome only gradual- ly. Yet as the educational system improves and as com- petency increases throughout the society, other aspects of change are going forward. The Moroccan case thus illustrates . the potency of education and its in- ."r-relationship with other aspects and phases of the cumulative process of change. ? ? a'For example, The Organization and Evolution of Modern Morocco, The Ministry of Information, Rabat, 1973, p. 283, reports that the percentage of students receiving "bilingual diplomas" rose from 37 percent of the total in 1.965 to 78 percent in 1971. A. Education as an Object and Agent of Change As an object of change, education has been treated haphazardly, i.e,, it has not been consistently shaped in accord with a plan designed to meet national needs. At the time of independence, the goal of Arabization was combined with the aim of rapid expansion of the system. Based understandably on emotional and cultural concerns, these twin goals resulted in a con- siderable lowering of academic standards. They slighted the needs for trained manpower and ignored the lesson that national development correlates more closely with higher education than with the numbers educated. Emphasis in educational programs did not begin to shift until the 1968-72 plan was formulated. That plan began the gradual diversion of resources away from primary education and toward the forms of more direct assistance in meeting manpower needs; e.g., secondary schooling and, in particular, vocational training. Even then the allocation for secondary schools was low and, in fact, did not reach 40 percent of the educational budget until 1973. The number of vocational programs, however, was increased at the end of the 1960's and scholarship preference was given to scientifically and technically specialized students. To formalize the -now look" in education the Ministry for Higher, Secondary, and Technical Education and Cadre Training was established in 1968. Despite this slow evolution of a more practical educational doctrine, the Moroccan system's short- comings are still manifold. It remains an uneasy mix of secular and religious, public and private. and Arab and French elements. About 12% of all primary students?and 28% of the 530,000 pupils in rural areas?in the 1971/72 school years were attending Koranic schools, Although these schools were placed under the Ministry of Education in 1968 and increased weight in the curriculum has been given to reading and writing, the emphasis continues to be on mem- orizing religious texts. The best schools are still the private ones, and they are attended by about 10% of all students, These pupils are, of course, from the families of the well-to-do, and the vehools that they prefer are those operated by the French University and Cu;tural Mission (Mission universitaire et culturelle francaise?MUCF). Most children in Morocco still do not attend school. Of the approximately 3.2 million between the ages of 8 22 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 SECRET and 14, at the time of the hist census in 1971, only 42% were in school. Of that total, slightly over 68% were boys and almost 70% lived in urban areas. The percent- age of the 3-14 year-olds attending school rose to 44% in 1973/74, thus barely keeping up with the popula- tion increase, The Moroccan school system provides for five years of primary education; one year of so-called secondary observation, which is devoted largely to iriisive study of French; and six years of secondary school. divided into two three-year cycles. The first of these cycles provides general academic studies, and the sec- ond offers the option of continuing academic courses (Arabic or modurn letters, experimental science, economics, and mathematics) or undertaking agricultural, industrial, commercial, or hold training. Higher education is provided mainly by the Mohammed V University in Rabat, which has branches in Casablanca, Fes, Marrakech, and Tetouan, and whose total enrollment was just under 18,000 in 1972/73. Advanced studies are also pursued at the Islamic Qarawiyin University in Fes, where only about 800 students art enrolled, arid at various specialized institutions. The quality of Moroccan education remains poor. Many graduates of primary schools are little more than functionally literate (only about a third of them pass the examination required for continuance of their studies), and few of the secondary school students qualify for a diploma. The ripper Secondary School Certificate (referred to as the baccalaurcat) has been awarded to somewhat fewer than 5,000 a year in the 1970's and the Technical Diploma to only about 1,000, Attrition rates at all levels are high. Shortage of instructors is a ma;or obstacle to progress, and only an estimated 30% of those teaching have completed the regular three-year course at one of the teacher-training institutes. Many teachers circumvent the supposed requirements by working as assistants or trainees. In secondary education, where recent efforts have been made to upgrade the level of instruction, about half the teachers are foreign, Most of them French. Education is nonetheless having a significant im- pact on Moroccan society; it is an important agent of change. The reasons for this are threefold: great numbers have been educated; a stress on higher educa- tion ? has emerged and an educated elite, still com- posed largely of those schooled abroad, has been in- creasing in. numbers and ? slowly gaining authority in many fields, including teaching and the administra- tion of education, In the monumental task of providing basic learning to a rapidly increasing population the Moroccan achievement in less than two decades of independence should not In' underestimated, During their protec- torate, the French had disciairaged even the concept of mass education, and ninny of the Moroccans at that time saw schooling largely as a medium for perpetuating Islamic values, When the protectorate ended, only about 400,000 were attending schools of any kind, most of them religious. Some 300 to 400 svent to school each year in France, but It has been reported that only 100 of those educated in Morocco held the baccalaureat . Against this background, Moroccan gains are impressive, By the 1960/61 school year, students numbered almost one million and roughly one-tenth of them were in secondary school. The literacy rate at that tiine had reached 17% of those over 5 years of age, and it had grown to 24% when the 1971 census was taken. The momentum in primary edtica;'-?:1 began to slow about the mid-1960's, probably reflecting a public realization that a few years of schooling provided no panacea and a concomitant decline in parental desire to send their children to school. Subsequently, public expent.',--:,!e on primary education declined as a Proportion of the budget, and in the past decade enrollment in the lower schools has increased at an an- nual average rate of about 40,000 (see (able), in con- trast to yearly increases of over 100,000 in the late 1950's, i.e., from 230,000 in 1955 to 735,000 in 1960. As the expansion of primary schooling slowed, enroll- ment in secondary schools and in institutions of higher learning more than doubled, and the ratio of primary to secondary students has fallen from six to one to un- der four to one. School Enrollment Institutions of School Year Primary Secondary Higher Learning 1964/65 1,105,182 176,957 e9000 1968/69 1,135,865 287,438 11,911 1969/70 1,142,810 293,193 12,770 1970/71 1,175,227 328,880 16,009 1971/72 1,231,936 313,414 17,025 1972/73 1,275,857 334,952 21,829 1973/74 1,337,931 361,636 *Statistics not available. Sources: Annuaire Statistique du Maroc. Direction de Is Statisti- que, Rabat; La Situation Economique du Maroc. Secretariat d'Etat ati Plan, Rabat; and the Organi:ation and Evolution of Modern Morocco, op. cit. 23 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : 91-114P86T00608R000600170025-2 From the secondary school students, a rote Of 41141(41 Is Slowly developing, Although students have proved tell:child to pursue the technical programs, efforts have been made to upgrade the courses rind the number eel students receiving, some vocational training Iii l't 'Hilary schools Is How e (Highly 20?,7, of total enrollment, ()tilers subsequently rect Ivo, training at such special schools as the ItuiIuit Centel for Professional Training, which offers instruc lion in industrial arts and office work and which rt'- (hurt's for ridinksion two or three years of secondary school, The grossing numbers of those technically trained is (widener, of a more poictical approach to education, brought on by the serious unemployment among the unskilled and the concomitant demand for skilled workers. At higher levels of education too, scientific and other specialized studies are gaining on the old-time favorites of Ikerature and law, At Mohammed V thilversitY enrollment iii the faculties of science, medicine, and engineering tripled between 1967/68 and 1971;72. to reach .3,500 In the latter year, whereas the faculties of law, letters, and sociology did not quite double in size. Enrollment in those studies was nonetheless three times the number of those pur- suing a scientific discipline, so that the predilections 111 St Ca WMt said to conform with the prefenlices of the authrtrities, The third reason education is significant as lin agent of change ill Morocco stems, in a sense. from negative action on the part of the government: it did far less than most newly independent countries to cur- tail the influence of the former colonizer, In educatioe the French imprint has meant that, while the (vinlit. of Moroccan schooling is poor, there is a small core of the truly well educated. These include the some (3.0(X) secondary school students who attend the French-ooeraied !stlit:E institutions. Many of this group an. ,!livit among the approximately 5,000 who abroad each year for higher education, Most of those who have studied abroad return loom,. Among Montcrati stodents, iiicontrast to those of many countries, no particular "brain-drain" is rvi? dent, The reason they return is presumably related to their social origin: most are from the wel!-to-do families and, though they may be critical of Ilassan's regime, they probably see for themselves a secure, and perhaps promising, future in Morocco." "The return of the 4'50al hundred students recent. each sear gosernment scholarships ha ands. abroad Is es ItIent4iPPPI I' problematic In most caws, parents are requited to pint a bond, %filch Is returned ss hen 11w student (-vanes Inane A% education has worked as an agent of change, It has been increasingly an object of c1444tr. !Intl Is. SlIalwrl to satisfy rervtiremeols for trained manpower, Thus th:- emphasis oil higher education and MI vocational training that began to emerge irt the hit., 1960's is being strengthened, Throughout the years middle?level educators hove pressed for these developments, and those trained abroad hove been In the front ranks of tile movemen(. 1)Ivisioris In dip ministries of education have been beaded by such graduate% of the Sorhootte 41S Nacer ril-Fazzi and Ahmed Salmi, who in the early 1960's argued against Arabi/intim and urged that the educational system la, adapted to enable the young Nforoccan to earn a liv- ing and "to have a wide opening into the modern world."'" Many of these di visit elders are cecmlliglY better qualified for their Jobs than are the utioisters, AbdrIkritti I tahiti,. who %rived recently as !%.finister of Higher Education, for example, went no higher than secondary school. Our movement in Mild: these middle?level persoll? nel have liven itistrintirtibil is the establishment of %pedal schools to meet labor market needs Most of diem?such as the School of Mines and the I lascon II Institute of Agronomy?ate operated by the govern- ment but they are not integral parts of the school system. The most prestigious of these institutes is the Nloroccrin School of Administration Organiled to traiti itersormel for the Moroccan civil service, it offers a duce-year program for official% who hove lord four or more sears of grivernment 'i sic.' Enrollment averages only about 1.-.50, but the program is reportedly of high quaI ity. These special schools, iii some measure, substitute Ion a revamping of die rroilar sorsti implynirntittlim of comprehensive change requites decisions from the top, and on this level the (muse is still unsteadv. The forwent reorganization of the educational ministries (the higher tsortfolio, for example, has appeared and reappeared ill the Cabinet. sometimes cr Int In fled v. 1111 vocal Irma 1 training and sometimes not) and the shifting of ministers &fro. the development of consistent and firm leadership Yet increasing tin whets of profr.sionals are working in the educational field, and their sometimes improsised solutions to prublerm give evidence that they a rr working to rued national nerds. tie l'rr?rnin:oott thm yurnquennut- ?lintars 4.1 hluta? tint, 1);(st, quoted In I %%Alia+++ /,.Irtinigml, rttobirms (4 Neer AA; et a. ithrfloci Ness Visrk. 196-1. p 24 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2 nt cm- t 13, The Emergence of the Profetsionols and the Managers Al ttpper ;ma tliiiltlfr irvrl% Iiir Nbiriti ? grovertiriirlif H inerittrunicy is and Ike Initerinctiacv as a whole it irim Ir4titlgs tlIltjrt1 III tall/mid criteria went, 'mid training It it billowing sill intim:lard intIttittirill Oh( ling change thriniglinirt the 41,11,0. %Viten 11tirepern became indrilerident lit government %tat %ever+ limited iii ttliiit if t tiiiII tin by Illy mialify and Humbert imi it% tisil tertrintt 40,000 overrintroit half ril thr total, tvere lirld bv Frenchmen, 'Alio nett, ditirmitted Nbirricvati imificialt arid hail herr' Ili:credited ltefilir Illy I.:MI*111aq: :lac tIlt I (alb Anal rat itcl ata!rittt (h" inil)!Iv lutrrlater hint, there wrie._.acciiiiliint lii iii time \litiiatra ut halr,jn, tadmia ion.); it( III) 14 1111 earls' 'lime Mumbler- -1,000 .1lie ;aim ca mid aaaattlial:Itr !lir 8Itala VII thr tt'at, in r (jliHIiIlrd?littim-i-ati% ()%rt 11-r %rift., 1hr %florite? Ilijilithrirs 11111+1411'ml 11.)f-u mi1111% 1 licit t'i/iini in! thy %%-%tril% 143% Ivry,' iii (fit !brit kilt: arid 1lir stats i, stiaju Ii tfirs 1.;Itr% littgr path. suitI lit- rad,: 11170t iiir tiimihrt ut mit auir nuImmith rw,tr irtipqatatit than 11% fltr tal riftplatIcrc, rtiukti% r teacher'. tAiis chits,, 111 pririni,111tT. 41 a,trtin1W1)l, fly! about S.000 1hr% au- %iiIita11% Itar nmtaIs trptcsrlitatisrs it) am 01511 ntifai I tt Olt 11ir it/till:dim) lit" dr-T.1re ),1 rbrit tlItt t III al!fra IUIrdr% r1,11111,111 jttjrt ts and pr;1:11lt ttipir,,rl it dif fit milt ftp detr1111111r, k.11 tratilli: flillutu 14 fir Iltru, to! el% r Mal training bar their jn.tae !lir frirrnm,Kt 4 haat', (rat that pataltattr Odra' 44 tittatl sat krillta.,. taa hi( 11 tiller,. 114-rbur .1)41,4 It ..11.1 Iii ;rilministratisr llatairt It II) 1471 Altattal !if Oar Ailrtt+Iim;i1ef% "411) r,thil 11.;41 rep,-tIrdk :Mended Ike kruidt,4 t.4.lualif a' I titsttf-? i!! ;4.3- 1,a; 14-it rte./um/1f 4111P,Pp: the T.?et (flinta and ri Cart rf 'Marla Itat:14 I hit al if it in f lir ( al.inrf rain. u)f) in flre rintrirrit-..artrnIlr.1 srt.fra thr it tio 1.- liar r%141111:11.--1l lira% Nur-. 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'mac it Ow !Haw 'all at high ranking nth( r-rt Cr( miffed (Waal Ilif atal111 Mill tiuuuIal.nimn,IIt Ilir twit, Kiri, rt. tinrt liat r 11;ida 1).1( Li:tumid Iii Ihe triditatt 14 ii the jinch r IIE;'. hint et r, 11AttAii iiipnirded 1.1 ttrva Katt rtImtc. 41111 miry had at Crc mivji FitI lain if r 1,1/1"1//),1 MITA haiti Irrrt) nfli) titian. MI ;v.. Mhos. nut halt !iris, anil muir tSt ai pd. afr, 1:41% S yr Hie% Stiff' Itlilitytd III 11%61 1,i+1011, right fif dirtii 14 inv. micro t S1111thrigrc JuTSitt. 111:1i111% tl:r middle les rls, litil persimilel an. lieutrining int rriAtinitit available, and tland.init and ref-nutriment criteria iirr thing acciit(h.tigly. AdtAnurifIrlit 0111114J, rime ratilit it In) longer timistial, arri a fess sitting Pa 1)1.'4 rait--mull titlii,lasts Ircrut ssork, Mg hi es...mimic planning situp 1961) ;Ind st as named Secret:Iry tat Stale fit, Planning in 197,1?atr. 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