POLITICIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TECH. ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170032-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: RS

App... For Reiease
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Research Study
Politicization of International
Technical Organizations
For Official Use Only
For Official Use Only
OPR 405
August 1975
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
August 1975
POLITICIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL
ORGANIZATIONS
STATINTL
by
NOTE: This study was reviewed by representatives
of other offices in the CIA and of other govern-
mental agencies, but no attempt at formal coordina-
tion was made. For further information about this
study, please call
code 143, x5441.
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I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
STATINTL
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CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION AND KEY JUDGMENTS 1
A NOTE OF METHODOLOGY 4
DISCUSSION 6
POLITICIZATION: THE PERCEPTION AND THE REALITY . 6
RHETORICAL POLITICIZATION 7
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICIZATION 11
THE POLITICS OF TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS 13
APPENDIX
GLOSSARY A-1
CHARTS
PERCEPTION OF POLITICIZATION IN TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS
DERIVED FROM INTERVIEWS follows page 3
UN-ASSOCIATED INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, follows page A-1
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTRODUCTION AND KEY JUDGMENTS
The United States has experienced varying degrees of
success and difficulty in achieving its goals within the
United Nations system over the years. There is a growing
perception, however, that during the past two years the
actions of a coalition of the world's small states has
made the maintenance of US interests in that body more
difficult than ever. Politicization has become the stan-
dard term used by bureaucrats, journalists, congressmen,
and academics to describe the wide spectrum of difficuli.Las
which the US now faces in intelmational institutions.
There as been particular concern that politicization 'as
now spread from the General Assembly to the international
technical and specialized organizations which the US 11,-s
long valued as assemblies where the technical bases for
broader international cooperation could be somewhat
dispassionately established.
This study attempts to measure whether, and what
forms, politicization is increasing in these technical
organizations, and what the consequences could be for US
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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interests. Particular attention is given to establishing
whether political issues have altered or interfered with
the chartered mission and work of these agencies, and to
sorting out any rising trends of political debate from
the standard "noise level" of politics which is found in
all international gatherings. This study also examines
the meaning of politicization as seen by many of the US
officials who must deal most directly with its manifesta-
tions and consequences.
This study finds that despite a high level of political
rhetoric, e,,..ternal political issues appear to have cau-ed
only minor damage to the substantive effectiveness of
these organizations. The dichotomy between rhetorical and
substantive politicization is rooted in the character and
operating environment of the technical organizations as
well as in the contradictory interests of the member-
states. Thus, while the LDCs may find political speeches
essential to a particular occasion, they are often either
unwilling or unable to disrupt the functioning of these
groups. This reflects in some cases their anticipation of
benefits from the organizations, and in other cases their
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lack of specific interest or technical competence in the
matters at hand.
The low level of actual damage from politicization
thus far also reflects the strong US position in these
organizations -- especially the high caliber of its
expertise and its good standing with the professional
secretariats. Prospects are good that, by pursuing these
advantages, the US can act to maintain the dichotomy and
prevent any progression beyond rhetorical political activity
in the technicaJ organizations.
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PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIZATION
IN TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS
DERIVED FROM INTERVIEWS
TYPE OF POLIT ICI Z.1TION
Rhetorical
Substant ivy
Z
?
t--
Low or None
WHO
\V MO
I.1E.1
\VIM
\V\1()
1.1EA
ITU
1 NW()
IC.10
IN 1)1'
I\ I DO
F.1(1
-".
,
-,
ITU
I NICO
IA DP
ILO ,
high
IL()
UN I DO
FAO
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A Note on Methodology
Because of the difficulty in obtaining current data on the UN
system -- and the international technical agencies in particular --
the authors of this paper employed a variety of approaches toneasure
the existence and effects of politicization. Ten organ_zations
believed to be representative of the highly diverse "UN family of
organizations" were selected as the sample for this study:*
-- International Atomic Energy N:ency (IAEA)
-- International Labour Organisation (ILO)
-- Food & Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO)
- World Health Organization NO
-- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
-- Universal Postal Union (UPU)
-- International rIlecorrmunications Union (ITU)
- World Meteorological Organization N40)
-- Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMOD)
-- United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO)
The major eI:lusion from the study sample has been the financial
organizations. Their processes and functions were judged too
diffe vnt from the other bodies to permit a valid comparison of
evidence concerning politicization.
See the appendix for a descriptive chart of 17 technical
organizations.
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Both factual and impressionistic information about these
organizations were gathered in a lengthy series of interviews with
those officials in the various US governnent agencies who deal most
directly with the major technical bodies. Generous contributions
of time and expertise -- both in interviews and in commenting on a
draft vorsion of this paper -- were made by officials in the Bureau
of Internaticnal Organization Affairs of the Department of State;
the departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Health, Education and
Welfare; the Coast Guard; the Federal Aviation Administration; and
the Energy Research and Development Administration.
The distinction made in this paper between rhetorical and
substantive politicization was, in fact, a product of apparent
contradictions which arose in the course of many of these interviews.
Although many officials offered an initial impression that politici-
zation was a serious prbtlem in the organization with which they
dealt, they were often unable, in follow-up questioning, to provide
examples of changes in programming or budgeting which would indicate
major disruption of the organization. This dichotomy -- relatively
effective levels of substantive performance despite bitter rhetoric --
was confirmed .1-1 searches of the New York Times Data Bank and other
reportorial archives for the public record of the meetings and
programs of these bodies.
STATINTL
The authors wish to express appreciation to
an OPR summer intern, for his contribution to the design and execution
of the methodological approach to this study.
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DISCUSSION
POLITICIZATION: THE PERCEPTION AND THE REALITY
All definitions tend to be self-serving, and the
purposes of a study such as this make it inevitable that
the use of the term --)oliticization will be somewhat
interpretive. The term derives from an assumption of the
functionalist school among international relations special-
ists that the handling of "technical" matters among the
world's disparate states can (and should) be carried out
in isolation from discussion of contentious political
issues which may exist among them. This appears, in fact,
to have been part of the shared mind set of many of the
representatives of the western powers who established the
UN system. In this view -- allowing for some acceptab:le
standard "noise level" of corridor politics -- any intro-
duction or imposition of items extraneous to the purely
technical matters on the agenda or program of an organiza-
tion is politicization. In its most significant form, this
phenomenon would involve the hindrance of an organization's
normal functioning (and by extension the damaging of what
the US perceives to be its interests and policies in a
particular body). Thus the current interests of the US or
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any other country will shape its view of what is "political"
and what is properly technical.
RHETORICAL POLITICIZATION
By any measure, it is clear that both the political
noise level and US awareness of it have risen markedly in
international forums since the late 1960s. This is so
because the number of participants has increased and because
the US has become a principal target of the verbiage. In
addition, the content of political debate in the UN system
has changed: the somewhat familiar ideological differences
of the old East-West confrontation have been replaced (or
perhaps outshouted) by persistent and often shrill economic
and social demands from an aggregation of small states.
Many journalists have, somewhat hastily, described th,-?.
verbal exchange between LDCs and the developed nations as
the "new cold war."
In contrast, the pattern of expert opinion and other data
gathered in this study points clearly to the conclusion that --
except for a few issue areas* -- the increasing imposition
" For example, in the ITU the developing countries are demanding
that radio frequencies be allocated to all nations as a shared
natural resource, regardless of any single nation's ability to
utilize them. In many of the organizations the demand for an
expanded executive group is resull-,ng in greater LDC participaon
and influence in the inner councils 9f these groups.
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of political demands has had lit-le or no effect on the
continued substantive functioning of the international
technical bcdiet-,. Thus the politicization process in these
bodies has so far been largely a rhetorical one. Nevertheless,
the distinction between this and those fewer instances of
substantive disruption of the organizations is worth making
tecause of the widely-held belief that rhetoric is a precursor
of concrete political action. In international (and especially
UN) politics, the unchallenged repetition of certain qemands
or behavior can lead to their legitimization. But there are
factors which indicate that the dynamics of the current
political rhetoric do not fit past patterns. This and the
nature of the organizations themselves would indicate a
need to refrain from categorizing all instances of political
rhetoric in the ITN system as part of a uniformly threatening
situation.
It is quite easy to impose a political or otherwise
unconventional question upon the established routine of ar
international organization, since any member usually is
granted the right of submitting an item for discussion.
And given the sometimes dry and technical nature of routine
discussion in these bodies, a political dispute is guaranteed
to be a highly visible and audible affair for the participants.
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Such action can take many fcrms: extraneous declarations
of condemnations are urged for passage; questionable groups
are sponsored for member or observer status; attempts mi it
be made to expel or -uspend a member. In large part because
of the eas'-! with which it can be undertaken, the rising
frequency of political rhetoric gives no real measure of
its impact.
It should also be recognized that the new states of
the international system generally do not share the attitude
of the UN's founding members toward technical bodies. They
tend tp view all multinational forums as potential platforms
which can place them and their interests before a worldwide
audience. Also, the segregation of technical from political
matters is not yet part of the pattern of conducting domestic
affairs in many LDCs; their political and economic systems
often have not achieved a sufficiently high degree of adminis-
trative specificity to require such distinctions. In this
respect, their behavior in international bodies should be
seen as more natural than calculated.
Bloc politics -- the most visible tactical aspect of
the current ,)oliticization -- is not the same phenomenon in
this case that the US has faced in the past with the USSR
and other Communist countries. In general, the LDCs are a bloc
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by default of other power sour_les, and should not neces-
sarily be vi- ,ea as "ganging up" by design on the developed
nations. It is often simply their way of pursuing indivi-
dual interests and certainly makes the rhetoric more
visible that it would be if practiced piecemeal. Furt1-:r-
more, most of the new LDCs entered the internatioral system
with no tradition of the sovereign conduct of foreign
relations, and quickly found group participation to be the
most natural way of articulating the obviously share
of power they held. This has often been disconcerting to
those states which have ordered their diplomatic relations
primarily on a bilateral basis.
Finally, it must be emphasized that carrying out
protracted political debate in a technical organization
is generally a different and far less fruitful undertaking
than is the case in other international gatherings. Each
of these bodies has a charter which sets its functional
limits, and thus a full constitutional change would be
required to alter its mission to respond to any suiv7tantially
different needs and wants on the part of LDCs. Represen-
tatives from developed nations to the meetings of many
organizations are frequently technical experts -- often
uninstructed in diplomacy or their government's official
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policy -- who are simply not inclined to discuss what they
consider extraneous issues. In contrast, most LDCs cannot
afford to staff a delegation to each agency, so their rep-
resentative is often a diplc-natic official who though
politically sophisticated is over his head in substantive
discussion. Furthermore, procedural controls over debate
and the agenda itself, by bcth the professional secretariat
staff and the older member-states, can channel discussion
and preclude uncontrolled debate. In addition, most agencies
have a tradition of consensual decisionmaking, which is
inimical to the confrontation of up-or-down voting usually
demanded on political issues.
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICIZATION
Much of the concern over rising levels of rhetorical
politicization has been based on an assumption that where
words are hostile, so are actions. It is often assumed that
under such conditions, these organizations would be either
less able or less willing to serve US needs. This has been
the case in the UN General Assembly where increasing verbal
abuse has, in fact, been associated with mountin9 defeats
when matters come to a vote. Information collected in these
interviews and from the organizations' records suggest this
association has not been carried over into the specialized
agencies.
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With only one exception (the ILO), substantive
politicization appears to have remained low regardless of
the level of rhetorical politicization.* While ineffec-
tiveness and conflicts with US policies certainly do exist,
they are not directly attributable in any significant degree
to politicization. In response to questions concerning
agendas, budaets, programs, technical coordination, and
information collection, US representatives' answers
indicated no significant reduction of those services
valuable to US interests.** Most of those interviewed
recalled only occasional incidents where rhetorical
politicization had seriously impeded technical work and
noted that verbal hostilities generally did not affect
substance. These observations were confirmed by the
records of the organizations. Little change has been
noted in programs important to the US during the past
* See chart following p.3.
** The rhetorical and substantive politicization distinction was
developed from this apparent discrepancy -- interviewees' initial
assessment of advanced politicization in their organization compared
with later assertions that substantive output had not changed. The
discrepancy seemed best explained by dividing politicization into
two sub-categories. As discussed above, this distinction not only
seemed necessary to understand the results of the interviews but was
also supported by objective data drawn froli records and press reports.
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several years of increasing rhetorical attacks. Some
organizations, such as IMCO, have slightly enlarged their
services, which are valuable primarily to industrialized
states. Where technical assistance programs for LDCs have
been added or increased, they have been financed through
aiditional funds and have not displaced basic services.
Both sets of evidence indicate that these organizations are
performing their technical functions and serving US
interests at normal levels -- which vary widely among
organizations --
politicization.
Levels of substantive politicization have also
remained low despite the varying lengths of time that
regardless of levels of rhetorical
these
organizations have been subject to rhetorical politiciza-
tion. Although this does not mean that the distinction
between rhetorical and substantive politicization will
necessarily continue, it does suggest that substantive
politicization is not a simple product of rhetorical
politicization. The linkage seems equally tenuous in
reverEe: in the few cases where rhetorical excesses were
perceived to have diminished in recent years (the ITU and
WHO), there was no noted regression in whatever low levels
of substantive politicization existed. It is also
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interesting to note that the one case of substantive
politicization, the International Labour Organisation --
where both State Department and Labor Department officials
perceived a moderate degree of substantive politicization --
was not attributed to developed countries/less developed
countries animosi....des, but to tensions between democratic
and socialist ideologies.*
Most of those interviewed noted that increasing levels
of rhetorical friction did consume valuable conference time
allotted to substantive business. Even for those organiza-
tions where rhetorical politicization was characterized as
moderate (ITU, IMCO, ICAO, and UNDP) or high (UNIDO, FAO),
however, the officers did not see this displacement as a
serious impediment to the work of the organization. Agenda
planning and adherence have clearly become more difficult;
but those interviewed felt that they -- with the assistance
of sympathetic secretariat officials and chairmen -- could
still exert sufficient influence to insure that business
in which the US has interests is completed.
* Since US substantive interests and goals in this organization are
quite diffuse, assessment of impediments to those interests and goals
is, at best, tenuous. The ILO is interesting, however, as an organiza-
tion in which LDCs have taken few strong stand and US proposals (both
formal and informal) have met opposition largely from Soviet members
and from West European socialists.
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In many cases, rhetorical assaults have become
institutionalized: the same speech is made by the
same dele(_ate year after year and time is duly alloted
for the expected interruptions. In WHO, conference speeches
on Israeli intransigence by Arab members and on the status
of Puerto Rico by Cuban representatives are an expected
annual event. In one conference, where debates on political
issues such as Israeli/Arab affairs were predictable, the
last two conference days -- after substantive business had
been completed -- were reserved for this discussion. This
insured that uninterrupted time would be available for
technical business and helped to insulate technical decision-
making from political tensions. The effectiveness of such
maneuvers led most of the interviewees to conclude that the
time factor of politicization is at present far more an
inconvenience than a threat to substantive work.
Other explanations for continued US influence in the
substantive work of these agencies are strong US relations
with secretariat officers. the technical expertise of
delegations, and the comparative lack of LDC involvement in
technical substance of most of these organizations.
Perhaps the most important aid to insuring the
uninterrupted conduct of these organizations' substantive
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business is the quality of US relations with key members
of the secretariat. In most organizations the secretariat
is the originating point for agenda planning; if the US is
to exercise influence towards minimizing time lost to
rhetorical
tions from
are vital.
assaults and insulating
such disruptions, close
substantive considera-
ties with the secretariat
As with the weight of US expertise in conference
delegations, able and long-term US appointees in agency
secretariats greatly increase US substantive influence.
In those organizations which are primarily conduits of
aid and assistance, self-interests are a major restraint
upon LDCs' moving from rhetorical battles into substantive
battles. UNDP, FAO, UNIDO have
extended substantive disruption
clearly prefer that business be
executed.*
all been protected from
"oecause LDC majorities
completed and their programs
* UNIDO may become the first exception to this generality if its
structural changes and conversion to independent organization and
Specialized Agency status -- which is a result of LDC pressures for
institutional reforms that they believe will give them greater control --
diminishes its capacity to execute assistance programs through loss of
financial support from developed countries. The results of its re-
organization will not be apparent, however, for tw9 or three years.
This principle of LDC restraint by direct self-interest also
applies to various bodies within organizations. Several interviewees
noted, for example, that LDCs intercede with political speeches far
less frequently in committees concerned directly with assistance
programs than those concerned with matters such as statistics collection.
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Other technical organizations, however, serve
primarily the major developed powers which have global
communications and transport industries. Although ICAO,
IMCO, ITU, and WMO have acquired technical assistance
programs, the main burden of their activities is still
regulation, coordination, and collection of information
which chiefly is of value to states with large commercial
interests in these fields. In these cases the complexity
of these technical subjects and the weight of US expertise
insulates the substantive from the rhetorical. LDCs lack
the staffing and information to oppose positions on topics
such as the fine points of new shipping and air transpo/t
regulations. Federal regulations devised ii the US to
coordinate interstate commerce and communication have
served worldwide as models for international regulations
in these fields. Compared to industrialized states, LDCs
have relatively small interests in the details of these
regulatory agreements and little motivation for opposing
US policies on these issues. Most of the opposition the
US meets in such organizations is, in fact, from other
developed countries and derived from substantive rather
than political differences.
Within the narrow confines of the substantive
deliberations of these technical organizations, then, the
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US enjoys not only technical advantages, but also a
surprising capacity to insulate them from its mounting
ideological liabilities. This insulation is, however,
the product of these organizations' particular atmosphere
and subject matter. It does not appear to be the case in
other international bodies. Just ; the assumption that
the General Assembly's pattern of substantive losses
following close upon rhetorical losses has been found not to
apply to these specialized organizations, so their separation
of rhetorical and substantive matters is not feasible to the
same degree in other UN entities.
THE POLITICS OF TECHNICAL. ORGANIZATIONS
The reality of politicization in the technical
organizations has remained uniquely low, but its perception
has not.
The apparent impact of politicization has
been
greatly magnified beyond its real dimensions by two primary
factors: the suddenness and consistency with which the US
lately has found itself in a minority position; and the
contrast with a brief preceding period cf unusually low
politicization in the mid and late 1960s.
During the immediate post-World War II period, the
rhetorical politicization accompanying the Cold War was far
more pronounced than at present. Substantive politicization
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also seems to have reached a higher level, with much greater
paralysis of international '.:echnical work, during those
East-West confrontations. Yet few western representatives,
scholars, and journalists expressed concern then over the
political nature of these battles which the US, with its
majority backing, often won. Current concern is at least
as much a result of the US minority position as of the
intrusion of politics upon technical bodies.
The current period was preceded by a phase of unusually
low political controversy in these organizations. Between
the de-emphasis of Cold War competition in multilateral
forums and the rise in numbers and consciousness of non-
aligned states (which came slightly later here than in the
General Assembly), there was a short period during the
1960s when these agencies came closer than ever before to
approximating the functionalist idea:. of apolitical delibera-
tions. This period was an aberration, not a norm. The
current acceleration of political controversies in these
forams, thus, is perhaps best seen as a return to normal
conditions. It seems more natural tlat the tensions of
"high politics" seep down to these technical bodies than
that coop2rat.Lon born of technical coordination will carry
over into those bodies dealing primarily with foreign policy
matters.
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There appears, however, to be sufficient room in
these bodies for both political controversy and technical
functions -- as long as sufficient distinction is made
between the rhetorical and substantive ..7anifestions of
politics. It seems clear that these organizations
do not have to be essentially apolitical -- and they
are not likaly to be -- in order to achieve their prescribed
work and to serve US technical needs and interests.
Under present conditions, the only foreseeable threat
to US technical needs and interests would be a conscious
and concerted effort by LDCs to break down this rhetorical/
substantive distinction and to hold substantive decision-
making hostage to political goals. Such a strategy --
especially in those organizations which primarily serve
industrial powers -- could be quite effective given LDCs'
conference majorities and their increasing representation
on governing bodies. It would also be coLsistent with non-
aligned ideology which has recently turned from demanding
a greater share of the world's wealth to demanding a new
system of allocating that wealth. A campaign to gain
approval in these organizations ror a point of non-aligned
dogma, such as the New International Economic Order, could
challenge the US subs cantive advantages.
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Thus far, however, the LDCs have not tended to use
votes on techPical subjects as leverage for unrelated
political concessions. Until such developments emerge,
the strength of US positions on substantive issues --
compared to its liabilies in rhetorical battles -- warrants
encouragement of continued separation of rhetorical and
substantive contests.
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APPENDIX
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GLOSSARY OF
ORGANIZATION ABBREVIATIONS
FAO- Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GATT- General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade
IAEA- International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD- International Bank for Reco:,:ruction & Development
(generally called the Wcrld Bank)
ICAO- International Civil ilviation Organization
IDA- International Development Association
IFC- International Finance Corporation
ILO- International Labour Organisation
IMCO- Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
IMF- International Monetary Fund
ITU- International Telecommunications Union
UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific &
Cultural Organization
UNIDO- United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UPU Universal Postal Union
WHO- World Health Organization
WIPO- World Intellectual Property Organization
WM0- World Meteorological Organization
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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170032-4