THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA, ETHIOPIA, AND THAILAND: REPORT ON A QUANTITATIVE ANALYTICAL MODEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Release 0 108121: CIQ- 06088000600170045.-tr',
~nr,'~~
1"he Potential ~.fo~r -PoI~.~ .Violence irk. Argentn~i
Ethc~`pi; T`hailar~c!
 Approved For Release 2t$01108121 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
Research Project
The Potential for Political Violence in
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand:
Report on a Quantitat a Analytical Model
Progress Report No. 3
OPR-502/3
March 1975
proved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Subject to General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Downgraded at
Two Year Interval; and Declassified on
March 1992
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
CONFIDENTIAL
Progress Report No. 3 March 1975
The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia,
and Thailand: Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
This is the third in a series of reports on the testing of an analytical mo: l
')f political violence adapted from Ted Robert Gurr's frustration-aggression theory
(Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970). The Gurr theory is based
on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frustrations
reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability to turn
the resulting politicized anger into collective aggression. The form of the ensuing
violence-turmoil (riots or demonstrations), insurgency (terrorist acts or small-
scale guerrilla operations), conspiracy (attempted coups), or internal war (large-
scale revolutionary actions or civil war)-will depend upon the kinds of relation-
ships which are found to exist among various types of groups in tl:e country under
examination. A complete description of the theory and of the procedures devised
to operationalize it as an analytical tool is contained in an earlier OPR report of
an experimental, ex post facto test of the model in the Chilean situation of mid-
1973 (OPR 502, Revised, November 1974).
The purpose of this second phase of the project is to test the value of the
Gurr model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for political
viole.ce in societies of varying stages of development and with quite different
cultural heritages a.td political institutions. The three countries chosen-Argen-
tina, Ethiopia, and Thailand-seem to meet our requirements: Each represents
a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is con-
fronted with domestic unrest or political conflict.
For each of the three countries, a panel of five CIA analysts assigns numerical
evaluations at regular intervals to the model's key variables-relative deprivation
or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence, coercive force, and
institutionalized support. The evaluations are made for each group or "actor"
which, in the panel's judgment, represents a significant political force in the
country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their identification with
four basic actor-categories: Pro-regime, mass-oriented (PR-MO); pro-regime,
elite-oriented (PR-EO); anti-regime, mass-oriented (AR-MO); and anti-regime,
elite-oriented (AR-EO). At each point of assessment during the test period, the
panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using computerized procedures
devised in the Office of Political Research, to produce overall evaluations of the
Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditions conducive to particu-
NOTE: Comments or questions on this project will be welcomed by its author
25X1A9a -Office of Political Research, code 143, ext. 4091.
I
Approved For Release 2001 f1'Pgh MALRDP86T00608R000600170045-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
CONFIDENTIAL
lar types of violence in the country under observation. The three panels' evalua-
tions are made on a monthly schedule, and the entire test series is expected to
run until mid-1975.
The summary below presents the principal findings from the fourth set of
assessments made by the country panels in mid-March 1975. The graphs on suc-
ceeding pages display trends based on the four sets of assessments made to date.
Subequent monthly progress reports, baser' in each case on mid-month evalua-
tions, will indicate trend changes in the panels' scoring patterns. in this way, t,:e
model's projections of the potential and form of political violence can be tested
against actual developments in each country during the test period.
Summary of Principal Findings
(NOTE: The data cited below and in the following graphs are keyed to
each country 's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as reflected by the
median PPV score of each five-member country panel. Th-, figures should
not be regarded as representing either probabilities or absolute quanti-
ties; they should be interpreted merely as indicating relative status or
strength, compared to other variables in the model assessed by the same
country panel or to corresponding variables assessed by the other two
country panels.)
General:
1. The mid-March assessments of the three country panels confirmed the
sharp contrast between Ethiopia on the one hand and Argentina and Thailand
on the other. While the potential for political violence in Ethiopia continued to
grow, reaching a level about double that of the other two countries, the potential
in Argentina and Thailand remained relatively low and stable.
2. Conditions defined by the model as conducive to part{cuear types of vio-
lence varied among the three countries. Within the limits of their relatively low
potential for violence, Argentina showed a slight tendency toward insurgency,
while Thailand displayed a tendency toward turmoil. On the other hand, Ethiopia.
within the limits of a much greater potential for violence, showed a clear tilt
toward internal war.
3. In Ethiopia, anti-regime actors far outweighed pro-regime actors in po-
tential for political violence. In the ether two countries, actor groups were more
evenly matched: in Thailand, pro-regime elite actors had somewh'it more po-
tential than the other three types of actors, while in Argentina pro-regime elite
and anti-regime elite actors had a slight ed: a in potential for violence.
4. Following the same general pattern, actor groups in Ethiopia we-e jue; ;ed
to be more than twice as politically frustrated as actor groups in either Arger tina
or Thailand. The capability (coercive force and institutionalized support) to turn
this fru.tration into political violence, however, remained a!Jout the same for all
three countries.
5. The range of variation in assessments among the participating analysts
was greatest for the Argentina panel, slightly less for the Ethiopian panel, and
least for the Thai panel.
2
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
CONFIDENTII L
Argentina:
The potential for political violence in Argentina showed a slight decline in
the February-March period (a drop in PPV score from 42 to 37). Within limits
defined by that reduced potential, conditions appeared slightly more favorable
for insurgency (10) than for the other three types of political violence (each 9).
Following the January-February trend, conditions favorable to turmoil continued
to decline (down 3 from February). The potential for violence among pro-regime
elite actors dropped luring the period (from 14 to 10), but remained relatively
unchanged for the other three types of actors (8, 9, and 10). Politicized frustration
in Argentina continued to decline (from 25 to 21), while the capability to trans-
late that frustration into political violence remained essentially unchanged from
previous months (8 for coercive force, 8 for institutional support). Following
the January-February pattern, members of the Argentine panel showed a sharply
increased divergence in their assessments (a jump from a range of 23 around a
median PPV score of 42 in Febi nary to a range of 43 around a median PPV score
of 37 in March).
Ethiopia:
In Ethiopia the potential for political violence continued to climb (an in-
crease in PPV from 73 to 78). Within the limits of that growing potential, condi-
tions were most conducive to internal war (24), somewhat less so for conspiracy
(20), and insurgency (18), and least for turmoil (16). Conditions for conspiracy
showed a slight decline from February (down 3 from 23), while conditions for
tie other three types of violence all increased during the period (up 2 for internal
war, up 3 for insurgency, up 3 for tunooil). Though pro-regime elite actors
showed a slight gain in PPV during the period (an increase of 3 to 16), in general
anti-regime actors continued to show far more potential for violence than pro-
regime actors (anti-regime mass and elite groups showed a combined PPV of 53,
compared to only 25 for pro-regime mass and elite groi.ps). Following the Janu-
ary-February trend, politicized frustration continued to climb in Ethiopia (a rise
from 51 to 56), while the capability to fuel that frustration into violence remained
relatively stable (10 for coercive force, 12 for institutional support). Variation
among members of the Ethiopian panel decreased somewhat during the period
but remained relatively high (a range of 40 around the median PPV score of 78).
Thailand:
In the February-March period, the potential for political violence in Thailand
remained unchanged (a PPV score of 44). Within limits defined by that potential,
conditions remained most favorable for turmoil (an increase of 3 to 17), and
insurgency (a decline of 4 to 13), and least favorable to internal war (up 1 to 9)
and conspiracy (unchanged at 5). The degree of PPv among particular actor
groups remained relatively unchanged: pro-regime ^li.e actors (16) and anti-
regime ma,s actors (13) continued to have a larger potential for violence than
either anti-regime elite actors (8) or pro-regime mass actors (7). Politicized fnu-
tration declined somewhat (from 26 to 24), while the coercive force and institu-
tijnal support required to channel that frustration into violence remained rela-
tively unchanged (9 and 11, respectively). Variation among members of the Thai
panel widened in the February-March period (to a range of 34 around the March
median PPV score of 44).
3
Approved For Release 2001/6fIDt4J(?-*DP86T00608R000600170045-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/2troM*EMR$6TOO608ROO0600170045-0
Conditions Conducive to Particular types of ?olitical Violence
Ile
37
T9
-- iC9
0~-
nY9
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
ETHIOPIA
TI6
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb
Apr
113
-_C5
IW a !
Mar Apr
M:y
ARGENTINA
i
Jun
Shaded areas represent, withal the limits of each l untry's potential T - Turmoil
for political violence (PPV), the degree to which that country panel's I - Insurgency
median scores on key variables fulfill the conditions hypothesized by C - Conspiracy
the Gurr theory as conducive to each type of polif al violence. IW- Internal War
4
Approved For Release 2001/OgPAFI!NDP86TOO608ROO0600170045-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/N
21
The Potential for Political Violence (PPY) for Each Type of Actor
1001
j PR-E010
BAR-MO9
0 E I AR-E010
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Apr May Jun
44
PR-MO 7
i PR-E0 16
AR-M013
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb
ARGENTINA
ETHIOPIA
AH- O e
Mar Apr May Jun
Shaded areas represent each country PR-MO-Pro-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
panel's median scores for PPV for PR-EO- Pro-Regime, Este-Oriented Actors
each actor category. AR-MO-Anti-Regime. Mass-Oriented Actors
AR-EO- Anti-Regime, Elite-Priented Actors
QNp 5ENi~A~
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 is CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
C
 Approved For Release 2001/08/i?NF~?A !OP86T00608R000600170045-0
The Potential for Political Violence (PPY) in Terms of Key Variables in the Gurr Model
PH
100
80--
ARGENTINA
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
is
is
100 r
eon
44
IS H
CF I
I I PF 21
0
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Shaded areas represent sums of each country IS - tastltt tional support
panel's median scores for each key variabM for CF - Ceer;ke Forte
all actor categories. PF - Politicized Frustration
(flown fgdus.^ I
Nam aK warn)
6
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
CONFIDENTIAL
1ndiv lual Analysts' Atr-sessments of the Potential for Political Violence (PPY)
lyM~~ ~~ ?50
01
_
Dec 14 Jan 75
pad's moon =core for PPV.
Apr
May Jun
7
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170045-0
Colored Am represent the rape If I dhldrei
aaysb' uores for PPY around ach country