THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA, ETHIOPIA, AND THAILAND: REPORT ON A QUANTITATIVE ANALYTICAL MODEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170046-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: April 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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w~SiM~A~O~~AI
Research Project
The Potential for Political Violence in
Argentina, Ethiopia and Thailand:
Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
Progress Report No. 4
OPR-502/4
April 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminai Saacticrs
Subject to General Declassificahor. Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Downgraded at
Two Year Intervals and yeclossl9'd on
April 1982
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Progress Report No. 4 April 1975
The Potential for Political Vio!erce in Argentina, Ethiopia, and
Thailand: Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
This is the fourth in a series of reports on the testing of an analytical mode.
of political violence adapted from Ted Robert Gurr's frustration-aggression theory
(Why Men Rebel, Princeton Un ';ersity Press, 1970). The Gurr theory is based
on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frustrations
reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability to turn the
resulting politicized anger into collective aggression The form of the ensuing
violence-turmoil (riots or demonstrations), insurgency (terrorist acts or small-
scale guerrilla operations), conspiracy (attempted coups), or internal war (large-
scale :?evnlutionary actions or civil war)-will depend upon the kinds of relation-
ships which are found to exist among various types of groups in the country
under examination. A complete description of the theory ar .1 or the procedures
devised to operationalize it as an analytical tool is cor. tained in an earlier OPR
report of an experimental, ex post facto test of the model in the Chilean situ
ation of mid-1973 (OPR 502, Revised, Novembe - 1974).
The purpose of this second phase of the project is to test the value of the
Gurr model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for politival
violence in socikties of varying stages of development and with quite different
cultural heritages and political institutions. The three countries chosen-Argen-
tina, Ethiopia, 'and Thailand-seem to meet our requirements: Each represents
a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is con-
f:"nted with domestic unrest or pJitical ccnflirt.
For each of the three countries, x panel of five CIA analysts assigns numerical
evaluations at regular intervals to the mode 's key variables-relative depriva-
tion or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence, coercive
force, and institutional support. The evaluations are made for each group or
"actor" which, in the panel's judgment, represents a sigatficant political force in
the country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their identifica-
tion with four basic actor-categories: Pro-regme, mass-orLn'ed (PR-MO);
pro-regime, elite-oriented (PR-EO); anti-regime, mass-oriented (AR-MO); and
anti-regime, elite-oriented (AR-EO). At each , pint of assessment during the
test period, the panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using comput-
erized procedures devised in the Office of Political Resear"h, to produce over-
all evaluations of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditious
conducive to particu;ar types cf violence in the country under observation. The
three panels' evaluations are made on a monthly schedule, and the entire test
series is expected to run until mid-1075.
25X1A9a
NOTE: Comme&:ts or questions on this project will be welcomed by its author
- Office of t'olilcal Research, code 143, ext. 4091.
25X1A9a
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The summary below presents the principal findings from -:1 e fifth set of
assessments made by the country panels in mid-April 1975. The ;i aphs on suc-
ceeding pages display trends based on the five sets of assessment, made to date.
Subsequent monthly progress reports, based in each case on m d-m ,nth evalu-
ations, will indicate trend changes in the panels' scoring patter is. In this wav,
the model's projections of the potential and form of political violence can be
tested against actual developments in each country during the test period.
Summery zf Principal Findings
(NOTE: The data cited below and in the following grap}s are keyed to
each country's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as : eflected by the
median PPV score of each five-member country panel. Ti , figures should
not be regarded as representing either probabiliti, . or .bsolutc auanii-
tier; they should be interpreted merely as indicating -elative status or
strngth, compared to other variables in the :model assessed by the same
country panel or to corresponding variables ass-ssed iy the other two
country panels.)
General:
1. In mkcl-April, assessments of all three country panels produced shifts
in trends which contrasted sharply with nrevious months. For the first time
since mid-January, the potential for political violence in Ethiopia decreased,
though it remained the highest of the three countries. At the same time, the
potential in both Argentina and Thailand jumped sharply, ending downward
trends in those two countries over the past two months. At mid-April, Thailand
ranked somewhat below Ethiopia in potential fo- political violence, with
Argentina now a distant third.
2. Within the limits of Argentina's relatively lint ?er potential, the conditions
fur the four basic types of political violence were roughly equal. In contrast,
conditions in Ethiopia continued to show a strc r g tendency toward internal
war and conspiracy, with the emphasis shifting 'em the former to the latter.
In Thail- id, within the limits of its considerably 3nlarged potential, the condi-
tions for Turmoil clearly outweighed those for insurgenc1, conspiracy, and
internal war.
3. In Ethiopia, anti-regime actors, particularly anti-regime elite groups,
contir A to display the greatest potential for political violence. In the other
two cu..mtries, particularly in Thailand, anti-regime mass actors appeared to
have the strongest iiotential.
4. While in Ethiopia politicized frustration subsided somewhat as a moti-
vating force for violence, it rose markedly in both Argentina and Thailand. The
rise in Thai politicized frustration was particularly marked, reaching a level
60 percent above that of mid-March. Though Thailand displayed a perceptible
increase in institutional support and coercive force needed to turn politicized
frustration into violence, the capability to incite actual political violence re-
mained relatively stable in the three countries. In mil-April, Thailand displayed
the largest amount of institutional support and coercive force, Argentina the least.
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5. The range of variation in the assessments of the Argentine and Ethiopian
panel' remained relatively constant in the March-April perm;t , while that for
the Thai panel increased markedly. At mid-April, the range of variation was
approxirriate:y the same for all three panels.
Argentina:
The potential for political violence in Argentina showed a marked increas,
in the March-April period (a jump from 37 to 48 in median PPV score). With'a
the limits of that increased potential, conditions favorable to turmoil (J :),
conspiracy (12), and internal war (14) all increased during the period. Incr, sae
in PPV were evident among all types of actor groups, but the increase fo, anti-
regime mass actors was the largest (a gain of 0 to 15). Politicized fru cation
widened during the period (an increase from 21 to 30), while the capability
to charnel that frustration into actual political violence remained relatively
unchanged (a gain of 1 to a PPV score of 9 for both coercive force ? nd institu-
tional support). The range of variation in assessments among mer .hers of the
Argentine panel remained constant (a range of 43 around a medi n PPV score
of 37 in March. compared to a range of 42 around a median PT V score of 48
in April). The pattern of variation, however, showed a contir ling divergence
between analysts from OPR and DDO at th low end of the cale (Analyst A
from OPR at 23, Analyst B from DDO at 16) and those fro- i CRS, OER, and
CCI bunched at a considerably higher point (Analyst U from CRS at 52,
Analyst D from OER at 58, and Analyst E from GCI at 4)).
Ethiopia:
The potential for political violence in Ethiopia sho?'ed a slight decline from
March (from 78 to 73 in median PPV score), rev-sing the uptrend in PPV over
the past two months. While the conditions for turmoil and internal war declined
(a decrease from 18 to 13 for turmoil, a drop from 24 to 1.9 fog internal war),
the conditions for insurgency remained the same (at 18), and those for con-
spiracy increase:: (from 20 to 23). While in March conditions seemed most
favorable to internal war, conditions in. April appeared mast conducive to con-
spiracy. The potential for violence among the four types of actors remained
re1at+vely unchanged; anti-regime mass and elite actors (at 20 and 27, respec-
tivJy) continued to hold a strong edge in PPV over pro-regime mass and elite
actors (9 and 17, - !spectively). Politicized frustration in the country declined
,:,ightly in the March-April period (from. 56 to 52), while the capability to
turn that frustration into actual political violence remained stable (10 fo.
coercive force, 11 for institutional support). The range of variation among
Ethiopian panel members remained constant during the period (40 around a
median PPV score of 78 in March, 41 around a median PPV score of 73 in April).
Thailand:
In the March-April period the potential for political violence in Thailand
jumped sharply (frorr a median PPV score of 44 in March to one of 67 in April).
This is the largest monthly increase recorded for any of the three countries
since the present series of assessments began. Of the conditions conducive to
particular types of violence, those for turmoil showed the largest increase (from
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17 to K) ' iiie conditions for internal war and insurgency also grew (from 9 to
17 for internal war, from 13 to 16 for insurgency), while those for conspiracy
remained relatively low and stable (an increase from 5 to 6). The greatest
increase in PPV was seen among anti-regime mass actors (an increase from 13
to 28) ; smaller increases ware recorded for anti-regime elite actors (8 to 10),
pro-regime mass actors. 17 to 11), and pro-regime elite actors (18 to 18). Fueling
the relatively large increase in PPV, politicized frustration rose sharply in the
period (from 24 to 40), while the capability required to transform that frustra-
tion into actual political violence increased moderately (from 9 to 14 for
coercive force, from 11 to 13 for institutional support). Variation in assessments
among Thai panel members increased during the period (from a range of 34
around a median PPV score of 44 in March to a range of 41 around a median
PPV score of 67 in April).
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Conditions Conducive to Particuntr Types of Political Violence
I--
i
Jun
100 r-
I
i
0 f-I I I ~eiy -A
I
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
THAILAND
0 iw v
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Shaded areas represent, within the limits of each country's potential T - Turmoil
for political violence (PPV), the degree b which that country panel's I - Insurgency
median scores on key variables fulfill the conditions hypothesized by C - Con.pirecy
the Gurr theory as conducive to each type of political violence. Illy - Internal Wei
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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) for Each Type of Actor
100 --
0
20
AR4 O1S
AR-E012
Apr
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb
40
20
0l
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb
100 --
Mar Apr
ARGENTINA
'n- -
PR-E017
THAIUND
Shaded areas represent each country
panel's median scores for PPV for
each actor category.
PR-MO-Pro-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
PR-EO- Pro-Regime, Este-Oriented Actors
AR-MO-Anti-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
AR-EO- Anti-Regime, Efde-oriented Actors
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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) in Terms of Key Variables in the burr Model
48
ISO
CF9
PF 30
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
80 1 -
PPV
100 F
80
73
isl1
CF10
Apr May Jun
May Jun
Shaded areas represent sums of each country
panel's median scores for each key variable for
all actor categories.
IS - Institutional Support
CF - Coercivr Force
PF - "oliticized Frustration
(ngnn IgrirhNu t
118tutu" In niheq)
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Individual Analysts' Assessments of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV)
0
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb
Apr
May Jun
01
Dec 74 Jan 75
Apr
May
Jun
Colored Wes represent the range of individual
analysts'scores for PPV aroanJ each country
panel's median score for PPV.
Analyst-A
??????? Analyst-B
Analyst-C
- - - Analyst-D
....... Analyst-E
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