READINESS POSTURE OF SOVIET MAJOR WARSHIPS: OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
25
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 16, 1999
Sequence Number: 
10
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 1, 1975
Content Type: 
IR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7.pdf1.09 MB
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l Approved For Release 2001/03/06 :CIA-RDP86T00608R00~070~080010-7 c ~ Intelligence Report Readiness Posture of Soviet Major iYlarships: O~ierational I mp-lications SR I R 75.7-S July 1975 Copy ~~ Approved For Release 2001/03/06 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7 ~ ~ Approved For Release 2001/03/06 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMAilON Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 014359 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 38 (3ption category: Aulomatica ly decllassified on: Dafo Impossible to Determine Approved For Release 2001/03/06 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : C~~~DP86T00608R000700080010-7 ReadinFSS Posture of Soviet Majar Warships: Operational Implications Key Findings On the average, 75 to 80 percent of the Soviet Navy's major surface warships are ready far combat operations or a~uld be brought to such a state within a 60-day ? warning ~+eriod. - About half the force could be ready for combat operations within a day or two. - Another 25 to 30 percent could be ready for combat operations within 60 days. - The rest of the force-those units in shipyards for long-term overhaul or modernization-probably could not be ready for combat operations even with several months' warning. The Sovie*_s keep most of their combat-ready ships in home waters rather than having large numbers routinely deployed at sea. This policy is in accord with Soviet views that: A war with the West would most likely begin only after a period of heightened tensions, which would allow Soviet forces time to deploy. Soviet naval surface forces would be employed primarily in waters near the USSR. The chief advantage of this policy in the Soviet persp active is that it would be possible to have more ships ready for combat after a short period of warring than if large forces were kept at sea on a routine basis. This puts a premium, however, on the proper timing of the deployment of forces prior to hostilities. Thus, the Soviet posture is designed to maximize the readiness of these forces after mobilization, at some expense to their ability to respond to an unexpected crisis or surprise attack. The pattern and levels of activity reached by Soviet naval forces in the early seventies evidently represent what the Soviets consider a reasonable balance be- tween the tasks of defending the homeland and supporting state interests abroad. The Navy could sustain increased routine deployments in some areas without undue strain, but it has not developed the major overseas bases and main~enance facilities or the logistir. capabilities that would be necessary to support substantial increases in deployments to areas more distant from the USSR. The Soviet Navy is unlikely to change its current patterns and levels of operation;' unless there is a radical change in Soviet views on how a war with the West would develop and where major surface forces should be employed. The present policy allows flexibility for using ships to support peacetime roles while maintaining a large reserve of ships that would be qui.:;kly available in the event of war. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7 SECRET SR IR 75-7s Approved For Release 2001/03/06 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence July 1975 INTELLIGENCE REPORT Readiness Posture of Scviet Major Warshi s: Operational Implications The fleet of major surface combatants--warships ~f ocean escort size or larger--is one of the main elements of Soviet naval power. It is the principal instrument for projecting military power to distant areas in peacetime, and it complements the combat ca- pabilit~.es of the Navy's submarine and aviation c~m- ponents, which the Soviets consider their main naval strike forces for wartime. The USSR has maintained z~ lar_?ge fleet of surface ships for many years, but until the mid-sixties these ships rarely ve,ltured far from Soviet shores. Since that time, the level of Soviet naval activity in dis- tant areas has risen and major surface forces have begu~~z to carry out missions in areas where they could more easily come into contact, and perhaps conflict, with western naval forces. The major surface fleet currently includes about 220 ships based in four separate and distinct fleet areas. (see map, next page.) These ships vary widely in size and combat capability. Many of the newer ships appear to be well equipped for distant opera- tions. About half the ships in the current inventory were designed ar_d built primarily for operations in Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome. Tlley may be directed to of the Soviet Strategic Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research, code 143, exten- sion 4203. 25X1 Aga Approved For Release 2001/03/06 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7 SF,CRET Approved For Release 2001/03/0~~~~?P86T00608R000700080010-7 Disposition of the Soviet Major Surtace Force as of Midyear 1975 mil; `y~.r'~' ;j NorthernFloet 1?~ I~'T'? ~ ~~. _ i' Cruisers -?SO-~ .,, .I . T "~ ~ ~~ Destroyr/o {~~..? 17 ~ f ,J ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~;~? ~ ,Escortn r a0 lc Floet ` ~ 7-' ~ (/(f I9ere ~ ~'' troyer 10 Ball CN Des Escorts 22 ~~ ~=. Black Sea Fleet Crulsero 11 Destroyers 25 ~~Eseorts 24 Soviet coastal waters, however, and these ships have a limited capability for sustained operations in dis- tant areas. Althouyl~ a few are used regularly to sup- plement operations