READINESS POSTURE OF SOVIET MAJOR WARSHIPS: OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

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Approved For Release 2001/03/06 :CIA-RDP86T00608R00~070~080010-7
c ~
Intelligence Report
Readiness Posture of Soviet Major iYlarships:
O~ierational I mp-lications
SR I R 75.7-S
July 1975
Copy ~~
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMAilON
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 014359
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652 38 (3ption category:
Aulomatica ly decllassified on:
Dafo Impossible to Determine
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ReadinFSS Posture of Soviet
Majar Warships: Operational Implications
Key Findings
On the average, 75 to 80 percent of the Soviet Navy's major surface warships
are ready far combat operations or a~uld be brought to such a state within a 60-day
? warning ~+eriod.
- About half the force could be ready for combat operations within a day
or two.
- Another 25 to 30 percent could be ready for combat operations within
60 days.
- The rest of the force-those units in shipyards for long-term overhaul or
modernization-probably could not be ready for combat operations even
with several months' warning.
The Sovie*_s keep most of their combat-ready ships in home waters rather than
having large numbers routinely deployed at sea. This policy is in accord with Soviet
views that:
A war with the West would most likely begin only after a period of
heightened tensions, which would allow Soviet forces time to deploy.
Soviet naval surface forces would be employed primarily in waters near
the USSR.
The chief advantage of this policy in the Soviet persp active is that it would be
possible to have more ships ready for combat after a short period of warring than if
large forces were kept at sea on a routine basis. This puts a premium, however, on
the proper timing of the deployment of forces prior to hostilities. Thus, the Soviet
posture is designed to maximize the readiness of these forces after mobilization, at
some expense to their ability to respond to an unexpected crisis or surprise attack.
The pattern and levels of activity reached by Soviet naval forces in the early
seventies evidently represent what the Soviets consider a reasonable balance be-
tween the tasks of defending the homeland and supporting state interests abroad.
The Navy could sustain increased routine deployments in some areas without undue
strain, but it has not developed the major overseas bases and main~enance facilities
or the logistir. capabilities that would be necessary to support substantial increases in
deployments to areas more distant from the USSR.
The Soviet Navy is unlikely to change its current patterns and levels of
operation;' unless there is a radical change in Soviet views on how a war with the
West would develop and where major surface forces should be employed. The
present policy allows flexibility for using ships to support peacetime roles while
maintaining a large reserve of ships that would be qui.:;kly available in the event of
war.
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SECRET SR IR 75-7s
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1975
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Readiness Posture of Scviet
Major Warshi s: Operational Implications
The fleet of major surface combatants--warships
~f ocean escort size or larger--is one of the main
elements of Soviet naval power. It is the principal
instrument for projecting military power to distant
areas in peacetime, and it complements the combat ca-
pabilit~.es of the Navy's submarine and aviation c~m-
ponents, which the Soviets consider their main naval
strike forces for wartime.
The USSR has maintained z~ lar_?ge fleet of surface
ships for many years, but until the mid-sixties these
ships rarely ve,ltured far from Soviet shores. Since
that time, the level of Soviet naval activity in dis-
tant areas has risen and major surface forces have
begu~~z to carry out missions in areas where they could
more easily come into contact, and perhaps conflict,
with western naval forces.
The major surface fleet currently includes about
220 ships based in four separate and distinct fleet
areas. (see map, next page.) These ships vary widely
in size and combat capability. Many of the newer
ships appear to be well equipped for distant opera-
tions. About half the ships in the current inventory
were designed ar_d built primarily for operations in
Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome.
Tlley may be directed to of the Soviet Strategic
Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research, code 143, exten-
sion 4203.
25X1 Aga
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SF,CRET
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Disposition of the Soviet Major Surtace Force
as of Midyear 1975
mil; `y~.r'~' ;j NorthernFloet 1?~
I~'T'? ~ ~~. _ i' Cruisers -?SO-~ .,, .I .
T
"~ ~ ~~ Destroyr/o {~~..? 17 ~ f ,J ~ ~
h
~ ~ ~;~? ~ ,Escortn
r a0
lc Floet ` ~ 7-' ~ (/(f
I9ere ~ ~''
troyer 10
Ball
CN
Des
Escorts 22
~~ ~=. Black Sea Fleet
Crulsero 11
Destroyers 25
~~Eseorts 24
Soviet coastal waters, however, and these ships have
a limited capability for sustained operations in dis-
tant areas. Althouyl~ a few are used regularly to sup-
plement operations