STRATEGIC RESEARCH MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700160002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Strategic Research
Monthly Review
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DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
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 Approved For Relo
Strategic Research
Monthly Review
August 1975
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This publication of the Office of Strategic Research contains
substantive findings and analytical judgments that are preliminary in
nature and have not been formally coordinated with other CIA and
intelligence community components.
Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcomed. They
may be directed to the person named following each item.
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and almost entirely negative, The Soviets have been
most immediately concerned about adverse politi-
cal implications for US-Soviet detente, They also
fear that this policy could encourage now US
weapons programs and express serious skepticism
that any nuclear conflict could be kept limited,
Nevertheless, representatives of Soviet foreign
policy institutes have suggested that the Soviets are
developing plans for their own limited nuclear op.
tions,
Contents
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Brozhnev: First in P9ace,
First in War 14
In time of war Brezhnev will become the Su-
preme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armod
Forces, according to a Soviet military officer on the
SALT Standing Consultative Commission, This in-
formation helps clarify conflicting evidence about
Brezhnev's wartime role.
Soviet Commentary on Sn ategy of Limited
? Nuclear Options-The "Schl singer Doctrine" 11
Deliveries of SA-9 Proceeding 25X1
at Brisk Rate 16
The SA-9 is being introduced into Soviet and
East European forces at a faster rate than any other
vehicle-mounted SAM system currently being
deployed. Most Soviet divisions in East Germany
and the western USSR have received the system
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Soviet commentary on the US policy of limited
nuclear options, announced by Defense Secretary
Schlesinger in January 1974, has been infrequent
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the surplus in the civilian economy could mean that
Soviet military personnel will be used lass it, zigi I.
cultural work.
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Ruble Cost Estimates for Soviet
Naval Ships Revised Upward 20
.i', rinothodology devu!nped over the past year for
eu ri,ating the ruble- oum of Soviet naval ships
ire;-: satos that previous estimates were substantially
irnd+rstated. It also indicates ti ,-it the Soviet ship-
f;;:i!ding industry is not nearly as efficient relative
t, that of the US as was implied by the earlier ruble
? ast estimates.
Soviet Conscripts Offered
Alternative Service 22
Alternatives to military service in the form of
work on collective farms or at motor transport
enterprises are reportedly being offered to Soviet
conscripts. 1 he armed forces may be unable to
absorb the large number of 18-year-olds becoming
eligible for military service each year, and use of
Portuguese Military Effectiveness
Impaired by Political Shocks
The efforts of the Armed Forces Movement
since April 1974 to remake Portugal's armed forces
in a revolutionary mold have undoubtedly been
aimed at providing a reliable arm of support for the
policies of the government. The u!.imate effect
may be, however, to degrade the effectiveness of
the armed services for any military purpose, foreign
or domestic.
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Soviet Commentary on Strategy of Limited Nuclear
Options-The "Schlesinger Doctrine"
Soviet commentary on the US policy of limited nuclear options, announced by
Defense Secretary Schlesinger in January 1974, has been infrequent and almost
entirely negative. The Soviets have been most immediately concerned with the
potentially adverse political implications for US-Soviet detente that they read into.
high-level public treatment of this subject in the US. They also fear that this policy
could encourage new US weapons programs and express serious skepticism that any
nuclear conflict could be kept limited. Despite their apparent hostility to what they
call the "Schlesinger Doctrine" or "retargeting," representatives of Soviet foreign
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policy institutes have suggested that the Soviets are developing plans for their own
limited nuclear options.
First Reactions, Soviet commentators publicly and privately have cited the
Secretary's statements as evidence of persisting opposition to detente in the US.
Neither t!le political nor the military leadership, however, has made any detailed
public comment. Military writers have criticized Secretary Schlesinger, but have
made only oblique reference to the new nuclear weapons employment policy. They
have implied that the proposed "creation of a new generation of nuclear missile
weapons" and the "urge on the part of the militarists to make nuclear war
acceptable" are adequate justifications for strengthening the Soviet milliary
potential. Chief of the General Staff V. Kulikov, the only senior military official to
have commented publicly thus far, echoed this some line.
At the SALT II negotiations in Geneva, Soviet delegates have barely touched
upon what was widely labeled the "retargeting issue." In late September 1974,
Ambassador Semenov explained that "under instruction" from his government, he
had to inform the US delegation that the new strategic weapons policy was viewed
by Moscow with "distrust and concern."
The only -aector of the Soviet hierarchy to have commented extensively on this
issue has been the Institute of the USA and Canada, one of the foreign policy "think
tanks" of the Academy of Sciences. IUSAC analysts routinely assert that the
"Schlesinger doctrine" contradicts the trend toward detente and is contrary to the
spirit of the Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear War, signed in 1973.
Soviet commentators such as G. A. Arbatov, director of IUSAC, argue that
attempts by certain segments of the American polity to draw up rules and
limitations "by agreements" are illusory and inadequate. They contend that limited
nuclear war, once begun, will probably grow into a universal war.
These same analysts have attacked the new US policy as a destabilizing move
signaling US abandonment of mutual assured destruction in favor of an attempt to
reacquire a nuclear war-fighting capability. They have noted the resemblance of the
revised targeting doctrine to former Defense Secretary McNamara's city-avoidance
policy of the early 1960s, and point out that attempts are now being made to
"legitimize limited nuclear strikes against targets actually located on the national
territory of the two major nuclear powers."
The "Schlesinger doct: ine" is also described as a "counterforce strategy with
first-strike options" which can only fuel the action-reaction cycle of the arms race.
Specifically, it is cited as a rationale for further modernization of US strategic
nuclear weapons through qualitative improvements, which IUSAC analysts contend
will have to be matched by the USSR.
G. A. Trofimenko, chief of a foreign policy department of the IUSAC, differed
somewhat from his colleagues when he argued that "retavgeting" was "specifically
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designed , , , to exert psychological pressure on the USSR." The only other
deviation from the routine criticism of the "Schlesinger doctrine" prior to the
Vladivostok Summit was the comments offered by Col. V. Kulish, a former member
of the General Staff, who now holds a position with one of the foreign policy
Institutes. Kulish told US Embassy officiok that he found nothing now in the
targeting doctrine described by Schlesinger and would have been surprised had the
US not been following such a policy.
Post-Vladivostok Treatment. Shortly after Vladivostok, Trofimonko told
Embassy officials that from the Soviet point of view, the main danger in the
"Schlesinger doctrine" had been that it established the need for more targets and
would therefore create a need for more warheads "on both the US side and the So.
viet sid,1," He claimed that the large numbers of warheads allotted both sides under
the terms of the Vladivostok accord served to diminish this concern. Ho added that
the Soviet side could now begin moving towards a similar strategy, even though
public commentary would "continue to be negative." Soviet public and private
commentary after Trofimenko made his remarks was even more infrequent than in
1974.
Recent Comments. Soviet criticism of the now policy stresses the continuity in
the development of US doctrine and' uses many of the epithets used by Soviet
publicists throughout the sixticr, but lacks the frequency and intensity of that
earlier period. This may be due, in part, to Soviet consideration of US sensitivities in
an era of detente. It probably also reflects developments in Soviet tactical and
strategic nuclear capabilities and military doctrine. The Soviets have begun to
exr) ore the concepts of limited nuclear employment for European conflict and may
have already begun to incorporate there concepts into their plans and doctrine for
theater warfare.
Memb9rs of the US delegation to the Third Soviet-American Symposium
(SRI-IUSAC-IMEMO) held 9 to 13 June 1975 in California noted that there was less
discussion of the "Schlesinger doctrine" than at the previous symposium in September
1974. Col. D. M. Proyektor, of the Institute for World Economy and International
Relations (IMEMO), claimed that the "Schlesinger doctrine" enhances the legitimacy
of nuclear war and is consequently a dangerous political element. V. V. Zhurkin,
deputy director of IUSAC, claimed that retargeting "does not change the situation
militarily "but is nevertheless a "destabilizing political element" because it "makes
the Soviet Union think of increasing its own capabilities." Both men intimated,
however, that the Soviets have "plans for escalation," are seriously studying limited
intercontinental strikes, and would not necessarily respond to a limited nuclear
attack with a total strike.
Some of the US delegates gained the impression that the Soviet Union
is taking steps for the implementation of limited nuclear options ranging "from one
through the whole spectrum of nuclear weapons." Nevertheless, the Soviets remain
extremely skeptical that strikes on home territories could be limited for more than a
short time.
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On 4 July 1976, shortly after a widely publicized Interview in which Secretary
Schlesinger contemplated ai, Initial use of nuclear weapons against Soviet tai Jots,
Soviet media began to focus on the Secretary and, to a lessor extent, on the now US
nuclear employment policy. Pravda (12 July) and othur commentaries have stressed
that the "Schlesinger doctrine" is contrary to the prevailing spirit of detente but,
significantly, have not called for Increased Soviet military preparedness as a counter
to the "Schlesinner doctrine."
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Brezhnev: First In Peace, First in War
In time of war Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Brozh;,ev will
become the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, according to
a Soviet military officer on the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).
The Soviet officer recently told a US adviser to the SCC that Defense Minister
Grechko is now commander in chief and would remain so as long as the Soviet
Union is not at war. He wont on to say that in the event of war Brezhnev would
follow Stalin's example and assume command of the armed forces, becoming
6'iairman of the Stavka, the wartime organization of military and political leaders
which constitutes the Supreme High Command.
This new information is consistent with statements by high-ranking Soviet
officers in the mid-1960s, shortly after Khrushchev's ouster, when Brezhnev was
identified as the wartime commander. In 1966 and 1967, however, a number of
articles appea,ed that
seemed to conflict wit this description o rez nev s wartime roe.
The articles reflected the military high command's concern about a lack of
command authority in the ivent of an emernency. The military apparently wanted a
predesignated supreme commander in chief, a source of political-military authority
to whom they could turn in emergencies, and expressed the need for an
institutionalized supreme command in peacetime, capable of timely response in
military crisis situations. Brezhnev, however, was emphasizing collectivity in
leadership matters, as he still does to some degree. Unlike Khrushchev and Stalin
before him, he seemed to shun public identification as "supreme commander in
chief." In tact, a remark identifying the General Secretary as supreme commander in
chief designate in the 1963 and 1964 editions of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy was
delei?d from the 1968 edition. Even now, when Brezhnev is clearly in a position of
political preeminance, his identification as supreme commander in chief only in
wartime highlights the political sensitivity of the position.
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The consistency of the new explanation with earlier information indicates that
Orozhnev has been designated as wartime commander since at least 1966.
Apparently the central Issue of the controversy in 1966.67 was not the need for a
supremo commander in chief, but rather the need for an institutionalized supra no
command even in peacetime, Th,ry Swint SCC officer's reference to the Stavka is one
of many from a variety of sources; which have appeared in this context since 1967,
This may indicate that a Stayka-liko supreme command was formally established by
Into 1967.
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Deliveries of SA-9 Proceeding at Brisk Rate
The SA-9 Is being introduced into Soviet and East European forces at a fastar
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rate than any other vehicle-mounted SAM system currently being deployed.I
J11`10 Soviets probably intend to supply this system to
most of their divisions and to export its extensively.
The SA-9 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) consists of a missile launcher
mounted on a wheeled, amphibious BRDM-2 out car, which is capable of speeds
up to 60 miles per hour over paved roads. The system can be airlifted more easily
and offers more flexibility in various combat roles than other vehicle- mounted
S^.Ms. The TEL carries four heat-seeking missiles-NATO codename Gaskin-which
are similar to the SA?7 Grail but larger, with better capabilities, particularly against
fixed-wing aircraft.
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Combat Roles and Capabilities. The Soviets initially deployed the SA-9 to
provide battlefield air defense for rapidly moving combat units. They are aware of
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It is also able of
engaging fixed-wing aircraft flying at speeds of up to bUU nots.
The antiaircraft batteries of most Soviet regiments have ;our SA-9 TELs, along
with four ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA guns and associated support vehicles. The
ZSU-23/4 and SA-9 work in combination like the US Vulcan-Chaparral systems, in
which a rapid-fire AAA gun complements a low-altitude missile.
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antiaircraft battery-four SA?9 TELs and four ZSU?23/4s.
The composition of a naval infantry
antiaircraft a ery will pro -a y 1e similar to that of a ground force regiment's
Deployment. The Soviets are supplying the SA-9 to theii, divisions in large
numbers. Most Soviet divisions in East Germany and the western USSR now have
the system. In the past year, deployment of the SA?9 has proceeded faster than that
of the SA?4, SA-6, or S/`,-8. There are currently about 500 SA?9 TELs in Soviet units
and about 100 in national units in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. The SA-9
was first introduced 'o Soviet forces in 1968, but extensive deployment to East
European countries did not occur until the early 1970s. To dote, the system has
been delivered to the national forces of three East European countries-Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.
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Ruble Cost Estimates for Soviet Naval Ships
Revised Upward
A methodology developed over the past year for estimating the ruble costs of
Soviet naval ships indicates that the USSR has spent more than twice as much on its
surface combatants as previously estimated. The methodology is based on Soviet
maritime cust planning factors that appeared in recent unclassified Soviet
publications. Analysis has shown that these factors may be applied to naval surface
combatants for estimating the construction cost for the basic ship-total cost less
weapons and electronics. (As yet, the factors cannot be used for generating subma-
rine costs.) The published information provides a basis for calculating directly and
individually the costs of the hull, propulsion, mechanical equipment, and construc-
tion services for several types of merchant ships. New estimates based on this
information are believed to be more reliable than previous estimates of Soviet ship
construction expenditures which w're developed by converting estimated dollar
costs into rubles using -7 ruble-to-dollar ratio.
Applying Cost Planning Factors. Each of the four component groups
considered in calculating basic ship costs-which are comparable to the component
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groups used in US No'y cost planning-contains riiony different items. Each
component group is subject to some principal cost drivers:
? The cost of the hull, with the 3hip's general equipment, is a function of
the purpose of the ship and its light displacement.
? The cost of the main propulsion is based on the number and typo of
engines, power, rpm, and typo of transmission.
? The cost of mechanical equipment is dependent on the purpose of the
ship, the type and power of the main engine, and the number of shafts.
? The cost of construction services depends on the purpose of the ship and
its light displacement.
Merchant Ships 1;3 Surrogates. The cost planning factors published by the
Soviets are intended for use in estimating the costs of merchant ships. Construction
practices in Soviet shipyards, however, are the some for naval ships and merchant
ships. In addition, analysis of US ship costs has shown that cost-estimating relation-
ships developed from merchant ship experience can be used to reliably estimate
naval basic ship construction costs. Studies show there is little difference betw.-en
the basic ship costs of US naval ships and merchant ships of similar size; the higher
complete cost of naval ships is almost all attributable to costs of outfitting,
armament, electrical and electronic equipment, and auxiliary machinery.
In estimating the costs for Soviet naval ships, a merchant ship analog is chO:Pn
whose hull design and ship configuration most nearly match those of the naval ship.
Adjustments to the estimated costs are made to take account of special
characteristics built into the naval ships-for example, ice reinforcement,
high-strength steel, or reduction gear. The derived cost is also modified to reflect the
larger crew required for a given naval ship than for the analogous commercial ship.
The final step is the determination of the average cost of each ship in a class of
naval ships. This is dependent upon the number of ship units, the number of
shipyards engaged, and the distribution of units among the yards. This method takes
into account th. ! effects of economies of scale on the production cost.
Effects of New Methodology. Using this direct cost methodology, the costs in
rubles of most Soviet naval surface combatants have been estimated. Compared to
previous estimates the new estimates, over all, are more than twice as high for the
basic ship. When matched against present estimated dollar costs of Soviet ships, the
substantially higher ruble cost estimates for procurement of ships imply that Soviet
shipbuilding is not nearly as efficient relative to that of the US as implied by earlier
analysis.
Direct cost estimates in rubles provide, in addition, the basis for deriving a new
ratio for cooverting into rubles those categories of naval expenditures that must be
estimated initially in dollars.
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Soviet Conscripts Offered Alternative Service
I there is now an alternative to military
service into form of work on collective farms or at motor transport enterprises.
This Is the first indication that a draft?oligiblo male might avoid military service by
performing other state-approved service.
Legal Obligation. The Universal Military Service Law of 1967 grants deferments
of induction into military service for reasons relating to educational, medical, and
family circumstances. There are no other legal means of avoiding military service in
the USSR. To make the obligation as universal as possible, the Soviets go to great
lengths to correct physical defects that would keep youths out of the service,
including surgery and hospital treatment on a priority basis beginning as early as age
16. Deferments for the continuation of education and for family hardship cases are
revlowed periodically. With the loss of a deferment through a change in situation,
the individual is subject to conscription until age 27.
Rationale. The reason alternative service is offered
may be that the growing number of youths eligible for conscription in the
USSR now exceeds the needs of the military. Approximately 2.5 million youths will
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reach draft ago this year. The number has grown from a low of 970,000 In 1963 and
probably will peak in 1978 at 2.6 million. The sizable surplus Implied by this growth
suggests that the Soviets could develop a widespread program of ilternativo service.
Although the law on universal military service states that all male citizens must
perform active military service In the ranks of the armed forces, alternative vervica
fulfills the spirit of the law and allows for the placement of what may well be a
surplus of conscripts in areas where their services may be more profitably used. Each
year the Soviet military supplies thousands of personnel and vehicles to help with
the harvesting of crops, particularly grain and sugar beets. By directing youths to
participate in agricultural or motor transport work in lieu of military service the
Soviets may eventually be able to eliminate this practice or at least substantial)
reduce the military's involvement, F
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Portuguese Military Effectiveness impaired by
Political Shocks
The shocks suffered by the Portuguese armed forces since April 1974 raise the
question whether the countr 's armed services can be depended upon to fulfill any
traditional military task.
Fa num er o developments since then
appear to have seriously degraded tee ectiveness of all of the services.
Political Orientation. A series of purges has removed from the military
leadership a number of capable senior officers, who were replaced by men younge,
and less experienced. Many of the general officers now holding positions of
command were majors or captains only a few months ago. Most have had no training
for senior command positions. The emphasis in selection for promotion and retention
is on correct political orientation-support for the policies of the ruling Armed
Forces Movement (AFM)-rather than on professional capability. At least two of the
counti y'~ six cavalry regiments have been disbanded and reorganized, and some
Portuguese suspect that the entire cavalry arm of the army is being dismantled
because of its past association with moderate elements.
The situation is complicated by the fact that Portugal, as the end of its colonial
involvement draws near, is reducing its military forces from more than 200,000 men
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to fewer than 00,000. AFM leaders are carrying out this restructuring and reduction
with various-somutirry conflicting-objectives in mind. They Intend to correct the
political orientatinn of the services, to open up leadership positions to frustrated
junior officers, to thhnnge the mission of the armed forcus, and to neutralize, if
possible, the negative efinct of disaffected soldiers returning from the colonies,
Internal vs Defnnso Missions. Substantial numburs of personnel and many
resources are biting committed by all throe services to their "dynamizrtion"
programs-the political education of troops and ei'ifians and civic action projects
designed to promote solidarity between the Art-.ad Forces Movement and the
Portuguese people. Direction of these programs is centralized in the General Staff's
Fifth Division. The leadership of this organization is strongly leftist, and moderate
observers have been concerned that the ultimate objective of dynamiration is to
build support for a Communist takeover.
The increasing politicization of the military has contributed to a growing
confusion as to what sort c.f external mission the armed forces ought to have,
Clearly the current AFM leadership sees advancemdnt of the revolution es the
fundamental mission of the military. All three services will be concentrating on such
projects as improving medical and sanitation services, road and bridge building,
cartography, and forest fire detection and control. An infantry division and four
destroyer escorts remain technically committed to NATO; and the government has
reiterated its intent to honor that commitment, but Portuguese military leaders are
frank to admit that their capability to resist an invasion would be minimal. In this
situation, professionally Oriented officers are hard pressed to inspire commitment to
the traditional defense mission.
Effect on Discipline, Reliability. The effect of AFM policies on normal military
discipline has been disastrous. In its efforts to democratize the services, the AFWI has
instituted procedures requiring commanding officers to obtain the assent of junior
and noncommissioned officers for any action they wish to take. AFM elements
within units are able to use their separate chain of communicat;con and influence to
have decisions overruled.
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While a large number of moderate officers would apparently like to see a
"return to the barracks," the feeling is widespread that resistance to the current of
developments in the armed forces is fatal. The former air force chief of staff, Mendes
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Dias, was dismissed In May because, it Is thought, he advocated a return to
professionalism and discipline.
7 !.use trends, if they continue, will have serious effects on Portugal's mili.
tary capabilities. The lock of seasoned leadership, low morale, poor discipline,
and this bypassing of the traditional chain of commend are clearly of deep concern
to Portugal's leaders. A now law promulgated on 27 Juno allows expulsion of
military personnel guilty of disrespect toward superiors or broach of discipline-on
apparent attempt to Improve the situation.
The ruling Revolutionary Council has attempted through its policies to ensure
that the armed forces will be a reliable arm of support for the revolution. Yet the
ultimate effect of its actions over the past 16 months may be the impairment of the
armed services for any effective military use, foreign or domestic.
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