RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201460001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 24, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE _-_- qS~C~
DOC No GrM Y~ - aoaao
OIR
P &PD
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 September 1986
GI M 86-20220/a
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
Chief,
International Security Issues Division
Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Recent Trends in Soviet Arms Transfers
1. The attached memorandum responds to a request for
information on recent trends in Soviet arms transfers to the
Third World. Overall, the the value of Soviet arms transfers has
been declining in recent years, even though the needs of Moscow's
clients fighting wars are increasing.
2. A review of the methodology for estimating trade values
of Soviet arms exports is almost finished. We believe this
review will cause a rise of two-thirds or more in the values
presented in this paper but will not alter the trends discussed.
3. Your comments and suggestions are welcome and may be
F__ I
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25X1
Attachment:
Recent Trends in Soviet Arms Tra
GIM 86-20220, 24 September 1986,
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25X1
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SUBJECT: Recent Trends in Soviet Arms Transfers
DDI/OGI/AT/JP :as
(24 September 36)
Distribution:
Robert Ashdown, State
SA/DDCI
Exec. Director
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 September 1986
Recent Trends in Soviet Arms Transfers
SUMMARY
Moscow remains the largest exporter of arms to the Third World, but overall Soviet arms
transfers to these countries have dropped recently. The needs of Moscow's Marxist-Leninist
clients fighting insurgencies have grown, and the trend in deliveries to these countries has been
up over the last several years. This trend has been overmatched, however, by the depressed,
competitive, world arms market which is driving down Moscow's arms sales to key
hard-currency paying customers in the Middle East. Soviet arms transfers probably will pick up
in a year or two. The Soviets will continue to rely on arms exports because they have little else
to use in pursuit of influence in the Third World, need the hard currency, and will not want to
see their clients defeated in war. An increase in deliveries, however, probably will not gain
Moscow much. Most transfers will serve to protect already established positions, and Moscow
will have to offer financial concessions to garner additional sales.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of Global Issues. Information available as
25X1
of September 24, 1986 has been used in its preparation. Comments may be directed to the
Chief, Arms Transfers Branch, International Security Issues Division,
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25X1
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Overview: The 80s
Moscow is the largest arms exporter to the Third World. Since 1981 Moscow has shipped
over twice as many tanks, jet-fighter aircraft, and warships to LDCs as has the United States, the
Third World's second largest supplier. Moscow also leads in the value of military equipment and
materiel delivered.* 25X1
We have grouped Moscow's 30 or so Third World arms recipients into several broad
categories:
o Favored Customers--Algeria, India, Iraq, Libya, and
Syria are the most favored recipients and have received
almost 60% of Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World in
the last five years. They receive the best arms Moscow
exports and are the first recipients of new types of
weapons. Their favored treatment stems from their payment
in hard currency (except India), from their ability to
court Western suppliers, and from Moscow's desire to gain
influence in politically important regions.
o Marxist-Leninist Clients--Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia,
Cuba, Ethiopia, Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
South Yemen, and Vietnam receive close to 40% of Moscow's
arms deliveries to the Third World. They generally receive
less advanced arms than the favored countries but, except
for Angola, pay little or no money for arms. (Even Angola
is paying for a decreasing share of its military imports.)
Moscow instead gains politically by having and supporting
allies in the Third World and often gains access to
military facilities as well. In addition, the USSR avoids
political losses by providing arms to help many of these
countries avoid military defeat.
*A review of our methodology for assessing Soviet arms transfers is almost finished; when
this review is completed we believe the dollar value of our estimates will rise by about
two-thirds in 1983 and 1984 and by over 80% in 1985. We lack data to accurately calculate
changes for previous years. The changes reflect a better estimate of the values of ammunition
and support equipment and a more systematic incorporation of all military tonnage into our
estimates.
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o Minor Recipients receive less than a tenth of Soviet arms
exports altogether. A few--notably Jordan and
Kuwait--receive some relatively advanced arms and can
bargain on terms because they pay in hard currency or offer
the Soviets an opportunity to increase their presence in
politically important regions.
Trends: The Recent Decline--And Why
We believe two--in part offsetting--external factors have been largely responsible for the
pace of Soviet arms transfers. Moscow's support for Marxist-Leninist clients fighting
insurgencies has grown over the last few years. Overall, however, the depressed and
competitive World arms market is driving down Soviet arms sales. The key has been a drop in
The needs of Marxist-Leninist clients fighting insurgencies fluctuate, but despite a lull in
1986, the trend has been upward over the last few years. Most of these clients are fighting
insurgencies (and South Yemen may join them soon), and some face external military threats as
well. Measured in value, deliveries to these countries dropped in 1985 from 1984's level, but
measured in tonnage (which more accurately tracks deliveries of the basic consumables and
small equipment needed for low intensity conflict) deliveries remained constant. Deliveries of
helicopters, a prime counterinsurgency weapon, also remained strong. Trends so far in 1986
illustrate the gearing of deliveries to need. Angola, Nicaragua and perhaps
Afghanistan--countries facing "hot" wars or which appear to be preparing for s offensives--have
each already received more arms than in all of 1985. By contrast, Ethiopia, where the fighting
has declined, has received fewer transfers.
The world arms market has both declined and become more competitive in recent years.
Third World countries which actually buy arms have less money because of the drop in oil prices
and the debt problem. Many have also recently completed weapon modernization cycles and
thus their demands have been low. At the same time competition is growing as new vendors,
notably Brazil and China, enter the market and established suppliers such as France aggressively
push exports.
Outlook
In our view, Soviet arms transfers to the Third World will pick up in the next year or two.
We believe that the USSR will continue to press arms transfers because of their value as a
means of seeking political influence in the Third World, because it does not want to see its
Marxist-Leninist clients defeated, and because it needs the hard currency it earns from the sales.
Middle-Eastern countries such as Algeria, Libya, and Syria are trying to arrange large new arms
deals despite the squeeze on their finances. In addition, Soviet clients fighting insurgencies will
continue to need large quantities of arms to sustain their war efforts, as will Iraq.
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An upturn in deliveries, however, probably will yield fewer gains for the USSR than in the
past. A large majority of transfers to clients fighting insurgencies serve to defend established
Third World positions rather than to bring new gains. (There is, however, some gain to Moscow
in acting as a reliable ally.) We believe Moscow will have to make economic concessions in
sales to its favored customers both because these customers have less money and because of
stiff Western sales competition. If need be, we believe Moscow will deliver arms to these
countries regardless of their ability to pay in order to protect its position. For example, Soviet
deliveries to Iraq are on an upswing even though Baghdad cannot afford all the arms it is
importing.
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Appendix: Tabular Data on Soviet Arms Transfers
Notes on the Tables
Value Estimates measure the trade value of Soviet arms transfers to the Third World, based
on prices the Soviets actually quote. Our prices are based in rubles and converted to dollars at
the official rate annually. The values in the tables are in current dollars, but because of changes
in the dollar-ruble exchange rate inflation has been minimal in dollar prices--only 10% since
1980. (The drop in the dollar's value in 1986 will probably cause a 15% leap in rinIInr values.) F
Tonnage Estimates measure the gross weight of all Soviet military deliveries to the Third
World. This measure is particularly useful for assessing arms transfers to countries fighting
wars because it best tracks the fluctuations in deliveries of the munitions, spare parts, and
support equipment needed in wars.
Equipment Number Estimates track actual numbers of weapons and other military items
delivered. They provide the best measure of the quality of deliveries, of numbers of major
weapons sent, and provide a third measure of magnitude as well.
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TABLE ONE
VALUE OF SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD: 1981-86
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986*
Total
10.2
11.0
9.4
9.3
7.1
3.4
Favored Cust.
6.4
6.9
5.1
5.0
3.9
2.0
Marxist Clients
1.9
2.0
2.4
3.0
1.9
1.2
Fighting Insur.
Other Marxist
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.8
0.6
0.1
Other Recipients
0.9
1.0
0.8
0.5
0.7
0.1
Values in $US Billion
*First eight months
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TABLE TWO
VALUE OF SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO MAJOR RECIPIENTS: 1982-1986
Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986*
Total
Country
Third World
11000
9400
9300
7100
3400
40200
Afghanistan**
380
300
300
310
350
1640
Algeria
1115
395
350
215
60
2135
Angola
340
675
960
390
500
2865
Cuba
950
695
680
350
100
2775
Ethiopia
250
525
550
375
75
1775
India
1070
700
625
1180
900
4475
Iraq
1735
1435
1870
1110
800
6950
Jordan
230
70
NEGL
200
30
530
Libya
990
690
1005
575
275
3535
Mozambique
120
240
250
175
30
815
Syria
2030
1370
1185
750
150
5985
Vietnam
800
730
620
680
350
3180
Yemen (Aden)
30
405
90
205
25
755
Yemen (Sana)
175
310
55
75
50
665
Values in $US Million
*1986--first eight months
**Afghanistan values uncertain 1983,
1985. Actual identified deliveries
of less than $150 million each year.
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TABLE THREE
TONNAGE OF SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD
Year
1983
1984
1985
Total
590
555
527
Favored Customers
285
261
220
Marxist CLients
Fighting Insurg.
187
200
Other Marxist CLient
87
79
67
Other Recipients
31
15
43
Figures in 000s metric Tons
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TABLE FOUR
SOVIET TANK DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD: 1981-1985
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Total
1257
1444
712
600
711
Fav. Cust.
T-72
788
454
284
230
386
Other
238
236
61
23
0
All Marxist Clients
95
730
367
347
291
Other Recipients
136
24
0
0
34
"Other" Inlcudes T-54/55, T-62, PT-76
Only Favored Customers have received
the T-72.
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TABLE FIVE
SOVIET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD: 1981-1985
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Total
425
334
359
570
162
Favored Cust.
OLD
196
108
79
170
48
NEW
146
113
121
144
35
Marxist Cl.
OLD
69
84
104
210
29
NEW
4
19
28
32
12
Other
OLD
10
10
27
14
12
NEW
0
0
0
0
26
NEW includes MIG-23, 25, 27, SU-25
OLD includes all other
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TABLE SIX
SOVIET HELICOPTER DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD: 1981-1986*
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Total
MI-8
141
100
96
57
37
8
MI-17
0
0
37
41
86
43
MI-25
40
67
40
62
56
6
MI-26
0
0
0
0
0
2
Favored
MI-8
Customers
81
58
41
19
19
7
MI-17
0
0
21
11
43
12
MI-25
40
36
7
36
20
0
MI-26
0
0
0
0
0
2
Marxist
MI-8
CLients
55
29
52
37
15
1
MI-17
0
0
16
30
43
31
MI-25
0
31
21
26
33
6
Other Recipients
MI-8
5
13
3
1
3
0
MI-25
0
0
12
0
3
0
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