IRAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS: PERSISTENCE DESPITE MANPOWER PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201520001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DATE O
DOC NO GS M -doa34
OIR
P $ PDr
GI M 86-20230/a
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
Chief
International Security Issues Division
SUBJECT: Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: Persistence Despite
Manpower Problems
1. The attached memorandum points up Iran's determination
to breathe new life into its ambitious nuclear development
program, even in the face of major constraints. Looming large
among the constraints is a shortage of workers and a serious lack
of fully qualified specialists, across the board. The steps Iran
is taking to alleviate the manpower situation, along with other
moves, show Iran's determination and, we believe, indicate its
intention to position itself for faster nuclear progress, once it
is free of the constraints of war with Iraq.
2. Comments and questions are welcome and may be addressed
to Chief, Nuclear Proliferation Branch, Interna-
tional Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues
Attachment:
Iran's Nuclear Ambitions:
Persistence Despite Manpower Problems
GI M 86-20230 October 1986
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SUBJECT: Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: Persistence Despite
Manpower Problems
DDI/OGI/ISID/NP/
Orig - NP Chrono
1 - Richard J. K. Stratford
Executive Assistant to Ambassador at Large
(Non-Proliferation Policy), DoS
1 - Alan Sessoms, DoS
1 - Fred McGoldrick, DoS
1 - Robert Upchurch, DoS
1 - Carlton Thorne, DoS
1 - Norman Wulf, ACDA
1 - NSAgency
1 - James Shea, NRC
1 - Charles Boykin, DoE
1 - Peter Brush, DoE
1 - Gerald Oplinger, DoD
1 - Byron, Jackson, DoC
1 - Richard Eddy, DoE/LLNL/Div. Z
1 - NIO at Large
1 - A/NIO/AL (NP)
1 - O/DDCI
1 - Exec/Dir DDCI
1 - SA/DDCI
1 -
1 - Richard Kerr, DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - D/OGI, D D/OG I
1 - NIC
1 - OGI/PG/Ch
4 - OGI/PG
1 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - CPAS/IMC/CB (Sourced Copy)
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3 - CPAS/IMC/CB (OIR)
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2 - C/OGI/ISID
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
October 1986
Iran's Nuclear Ambitions:
Persistence Despite Manpower Problems
Summary
Iran is intensifying efforts to reinvigorate its stalled
nuclear energy program, despite major impediments. Tehran faces
major difficulties in acquiring badly needed foreign technology,
apportioning scarce financial resources, and managing significant
personnel deficiencies. In the manpower area, in particular,
they are pursuing efforts aimed at gradually improving indigenous
expertise and increasing the number of capable nuclear workers.
In our view, Tehran has few illusions that its efforts will yield
significant returns in the short run. But we believe the efforts
demonstrate the seriousness of Tehran's commitment to its
ambitious nuclear goals and that they may position Iran to make
faster nuclear progress once the financial and other constraints
of the war with Iraq have begun to recede.
This memorandum was prepared byl Nuclear
Proliferation Branch, Office of Global Issues. Information
available as of 1 October 1986 was used in its preparation.
Comments may be directed to Chief, International
Security Issues Division
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Iran's Nuclear Ambitions:
Persistence Despite Manpower Problems
Iran is trying hard to advance its ambitious nuclear energy
development goals. In the past year the Iranians have pushed
plans to complete their first power reactor, gain the ability to
produce fuel, and work toward indigenous construction of a
research reactor. The Iranians, however, are constrained by
resource limitations imposed by the war with Iraq and difficulty
in acquiring needed foreign technology. Quality and quantity of
manpower is also a major constraint, but one which is more
tractable for the Iranians, who are making a concerted effort to
upgrade their capabilities in this area.
Impact of Manpower Problems
A severe shortage of qualified personnel across the
professional spectrum--particularly applied scientists, managers
and technicians--has become a major worry for Iran's nuclear 25X1
decisionmakers. The existing nuclear establishment lacks
sufficient personnel to staff Tehran's ambitious development
program, and the quality of many employees is low.
Ithe lack of skilled manpower, by
itself, is serious enough to hamper Iran's nuclear development in
the short term even if the other major obstacles should be
overcome. 7~ -1
Progress on several major nuclear projects is stalled, and
in our judgment, the manpower problem has played an important
role in this situation. Iran's
indigenous effort to develop a natural uranium-fueled subcritical
assembly is bogged down, still unfinished eighteen months after
its scheduled completion date. Tehran may be obliged to bring in
an outside expert to head its reactor design effort, which
includes the development of the subcritical assembly and a zero-
power reactor planned as a follow-on project.
Moreover, existing AEOI personnel clearly do not have the
expertise to oversee final development or run the country's first
nuclear power plant, located at Bushehr. The original
contractor, Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West Germany, had completed
approximately 85 percent of power reactor Unit I and 55 percent
of Reactor II by the late 1970s. However, little progress has
been made on the project since 1979, when KWU suspended work due
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to the revolutionary government's failure to make contracted
payments. AEOI's numerous requests during the last two years for
training and assistance from abroad attest to the incountry lack
of the nuclear and non-nuclear engineering and quality assurance
expertise required to develop and run Bushehr. 25X1
AEOI engineers ZoA]
completed an additional ten percent of the work on Reactor I
sometime after 1979, but lacked the technological capability t
finish the final five percent. 25X1
in a subsequent assessment KWU stated that the added 25X1
work Iran had accomplished was of such poor quality that it would
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new agreement were reached with KWU and needed equipment were
quickly delivered, manpower problems would delay by five years
finishing construction and bringing the Bushehr facility
Nuclear officials have been forced to scramble for ways to
stretch the personnel that are available.
Origins of the Manpower Deficiencies
The severe manpower deficiencies stem from longstanding
problems. Foremost, in our view, was the departure from the AEOI
of nearly 6000 experienced personnel (at least two-thirds of whom
were' scientists and technicians) after the fall of the Shah,
according to US Embassy Although the
organization has built up again in the intervening years, its
staff now numbers only about 2,000,
Furthermore, the capabili of
is open to question, in our view.
most of the nuclear staff assigned since the
revolution were hired more for ideological than technical
suitability,
(nuclear engineers had left
that organization in recent years and that more than 85 percent
of the nuclear specialists trained in the West since the Shah's
fall had not returned to Iran,
Finally, Iran has never had a training and education
infrastructure sufficient to graduate anywhere near the
professional cadre its nuclear ambitions would require. The
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upheaval that saw so many of the country's intelligentsia leave
the country or lose their positions has further degraded Iran's
training capacity.
Attacking the Manpower Problem
Iran is moving in three specific areas to deal with the
manpower problem. Though our information is incomplete, it is
clear that efforts are being made on various fronts and have been
underway for some time.
Recruiting Former Nuclear Officials
Tehran appears to be recruiting Iranians now living abroad
who had worked in the Shah's nuclear program. According to the
US Embassy in Ankara
the AEOI has begun seeking out non -
affiliated Iranian scientists working and studying abroad.
Presumably, the AEOI is also tapping specialists who had worked
in the nuclear energy program before the revolution but had
remained in Iran. We do not have information on numbers and
kinds of specialists sought nor on the response to date.
Upgrading Indigenous Training
The Iranians are also seeking to improve indigenous nuclear
training capabilities. Late last year, for example, press
reporting from Tehran indicated the establishment of a doctoral
program in nuclear science and technology at Amir Kabir Technical
University. The program's purpose, ultimately, is to staff
AEOI's research and administrative departments. According to
further press reporting, some 100 students applied for the
program. We also believe Iran is working to upgrade research and
training efforts at other institutions.
The new educational initiatives are highly modest efforts
when compared with Iran's ambitious goals, and even these efforts
face major impediments. The weakness of Iran's educational
infrastructure means that such specialized, advanced programs
will have relatively few qualified students upon which to draw.
Moreover, the lack of qualified specialists to run the nuclear
establishment implies, in our view, a similar lack of qualified
instructors to teach in the nuclear fields. Most importantly,
Iran suffers from a dearth of facilities and equipment by which
students can acquire research and operational experience. For
example, to the best of our knowledge there is no research
reactor or simulator at Amir Kabir Technical University from
which practical nuclear physics and engineering knowledge can be
acquired. Researchers and technicians at the Tehran Nuclear
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I
Research Center, Iran's largest nuclear training facility,
complain about how infrequently they can utilize their research
reactor given the need to preserve scarce fuel, according to the
US Embassy in Doha. These specialists claim that, given the
constraints they face, their level of experimentation does not
even match that of undergraduate work at a US university.
Finally, although in 1978 the AEOI contracted for a training
simulator for the planned control room at Bushehr, to the best of
our knowledge it still remains in the FRG awaiting an export
license that the West German government has not granted despite
repeated demands from Iran.
Looking Abroad for Training
Iran is also seeking training assistance from other
countries to upgrade its pool of nuclear personnel. Throughout
the last two and one-half years, Iran has approached official
nuclear organizations or private firms
with inquiries or requests concerning
training for its nuclear personnel,
Primarily, the AEOI has sought mechanical, civil,
electrical, and nuclear engineering skills and quality assurance
techniques, although there have been some inquiries concerning
generic fuel cycle training. The assistance requested includes
both instruction within Iran by foreign specialists as well as
training abroad for AEOI personnel.
To date, the response to Iran's inquiries has been mixed.
Although few of the known requests have been refused outright,
little country-to-country training has actually occurred. Iran
does get some help from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) of which it is a member. Of the few confirmed, non-IAEA
activities West German entities have been predominantly
involved, no doubt due to
associations arising from KWU's original Bushehr contracts.
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Looking Ahead
situation in Iran.
On the manpower front, in particular, we believe efforts set
in motion will continue, especially since this is the one
constraint Tehran can most readily address. We doubt, however,
that these initiatives will improve the situation more than
marginally in the next year or two. The lack of facilities,
equipment and faculty for nuclear studies suggests little growth
in the short term for indigenous training programs. Furthermore,
we judge that although there may be increases in foreign training
assistance, particularly from Argentina, such help is unlikely to
solve the problem, at least in the short term. Moreover, Western
supplier restrictions on sales to countries such as Iran, even
though eroding somewhat, still have an inhibiting effect on some
countries in a position to help the Tehran government.
Additionally, in our estimation it is highly unlikely that large
numbers of scientists who worked in the Shah's nuclear program
would return to the AEOI, given their treatment at the time of
the purges, the war with Iraq, and the unsettled political
position themselves for faster progress in years to come.
We believe the Iranians will continue their efforts to
accelerate their nuclear energy program. The fact that they are
now moving on several fronts, despite the serious constraints
posed by the war with Iraq, demonstrates the depth of their
commitment. We also believe they have few illusions about making
short-term, dramatic gains. Rather, we judge they are seeking to
assistance abroad.
Iran will also continue aggressively to seek technological
Tehran recently concluded three agreements with Argentina
training.
Tehran research reactor. Additionally, China and Iran are
discussing cooperation in areas including medical research,
isotope separation, and unspecified technology transfer and
for nuclear engineering consulting services and fuel for the
When and if these and other agreements for cooperation
materialize, we judge that Iran will seek to exploit them in ways
that improve not only its technological status but its manpower
situation as well. To the extent that such assistance means the
involvement of foreign personnel, it would provide mechanisms for
eventually easing Iran's manpower problems. Over time, advice
and consulting by foreign experts would provide, in effect,
"hands on" training experiences for AEOI personnel. Direct
substitution of foreign skilled personnel to perform specific
functions is also a possibility, and one that we judge Iran will
continue to pursue.
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As Iran persists in manpower-related efforts, it may make
some limited, short-term headway in training more staff and
upgrading existing expertise. Such marginal gains, along with
any progress Tehran may make in the acquisition of foreign
technical assistance, would place Iran in a better position to
make faster nuclear progress overall, once the war w ends
and it can devote greater resources to the program.
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