SRI LANKA: SLIM CHANCES FOR A MILITARY SOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201730001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 3, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Slim Chances for a Military Solution
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Ms. Sandra Charles
Director, Near East South Asia Region, International Security Affairs
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Captain Edward Louis Christiansen, USN
Chief, South Asian Regional Plans and Policy Branch
Department of Defense, Room 2E973, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Dr. Stephen Cohen
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State, Room 7311, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. James P. Covey
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,
Near East and South Asia Affairs, National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building, Room 351, Washington, DC 20500
Mr. Philip S. Kaplan
Staff Director for Policy Planning Council
Department of State, Room 7316, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Political Military Affairs
Department of State, Room 7327, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Ron Lorton
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, South Asia Division
Department of State, Room 4636A, Washington, DC 20520
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Mr. Michael MacMurray
Special Assistant for South Asia, International Security Affairs
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Mr. Marc Palovitz
Special Assistant for South Asia, International Security Affairs,
Near Eastern-South Asian Region
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Mr. Robert A. Peck
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 6244, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Christopher Ross
Director, Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5254A, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Grant Smith
Director, INS, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5251, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Department of Defense, Room 4D840, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Dr. Dov S. Zackheim
Deputy Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy/Resources
Department of Defense, Room 3D777, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 January 1986
Sri Lanka: Slim Chances for a Military Solution
Summary
The Sri Lankan security forces are incapable of waging a successful
counterinsurgency campaign against Tamil separatists despite a military
buildup during the second half of 1985. Their basic shortcomings--poor
organization, training, leadership, and intelligence--remain unaddressed,
and they continue to suffer from the lack of a cohesive counterinsurgency
strategy. Moreover, the insurgents have grown in strength and capabilities
and are prepared to begin attacks against important economic targets in
the Sinhalese south if new fighting breaks out. A renewed government
offensive probably would not result in major gains against the insurgents,
although the government's extensive stockpiles promise a longer and
probably bloodier round of fighting.
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of Near East and South
Asian Affairs. Information available as of 3 January 1986 was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Subcontinent,
South Asia, NESA,
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The Current Situation
At the close of 1985, Tamil insurgent factions had solidified their hold
over Sri Lanka's Northern Province and strengthened their position in the
Eastern Province. Over the last months of the year, Colombo stepped up its
patrolling operations and clashes with the insurgents increased. Government
strategy was aimed largely at keeping the insurgents from gaining a stronger
position, especially in the east, rather than towards recouping lost ground.
Most clashes were confined to the fringes of rebel-held territory.
Beginning in November 1985, senior Sri Lankan officials started raising
the possibility--both publicly and privately--of calling off the
Indian-sponsored negotiations and ceasefire and of initiating new military
operations to erode, if not destroy, the insurgency. While these threats may
have been designed largely to press New Delhi to use more leverage on the Tamil
negotiators, steady military preparations since the June ceasefire strongly
suggest that Colombo believes it may now have the capability to undertake a
successful counterinsurgency campaign.
The Military Solution's Slim Chance of Success
In our judgment, the Sri Lankan security forces are incapable of pursuing
effective counterinsurgency operations. A successful campaign would require an
aggressively led, well trained, dedicated, mobile force supported by a flexible
logistics network and timely, accurate intelligence. This force must pursue a
strategy of cutting enemy supply lines, locating guerrflla concentrations,
gaining and maintaining contact with them, and running them to ground.
Colombo's military preparations over the last six months have augmented some of
the security forces' resources, such as ammunition stockpiles and fast patrol
boats, but do not address their fundamental weaknesses--lack of discipline,
poor training, and mediocre leadership.
The government continues to have no cohesive strategy for containin
less defeating, the insurgency.
The government's major defense initiative, a weapons modernization
program, has no coherent focus or supervision, and remains at the caprice of
corrupt government spending practices. The Navy ordered three types of patrol
boats last year,
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Recent news film shows an Army squad
equipped with four types of rifles o two different calibres.
Many of Sri Lanka's newly acquired weapons do not meet the requirements of
a counterinsurgency arsenal. The Army is buying anti-aircraft guns and
anti-tank missiles, which have little if any utility in a low-intensity
guerrilla war. The Air Force has been buying light attack aircraft, which
because of their need of landing strips will be difficult to deploy and support
in the field, and only recently began acquiring armed helicopters, which can
operate out of unprepared forward areas and maintain a longer time-over-target.
Too few transport aircraft have been purchased to support a mobile campaign.
Colombo has added to the confusion among the security forces regarding
their roles and missions by forming several new paramilitary organizations.
The Army and Police are currently augmented by the Special Task Force (STF),
raised by National Security Minister Athulathmudali as an elite
counterinsurgency unit, the Home Guard, an official paramilitary force, and a
National Auxiliary Force (NAF). The government has also currently proposed
creating a National Armed Reserve (NAR), although it is likely to remain mostly
on paper for the forseeable future because of serious problems in training and
equipment. Colombo has begun arming Sinhalese settlers in Tamil areas as a
grass roots level counterinsurgency force.
Unit Stre
ngth
Strength
ARMY 16 0
00 (a
ctive)
AIR FORCE
3,400 (active)
12,0
00 (V
olunteer F
orce)
1,500 (reserve)
2,0
00 (r
eserve)
POLICE
17,000
NAVY 2,9
00 (a
ctive)
5
00 (r
eserve)
STF
3,500
All security forces are expanding at a rapid pace, so the listed strengths
are estimates only. About one third of the Army Volunteer Force is on active
duty at any given time. The NAF is only now forming and is probably not even
at cadre strength for its proposed complement of 10,000.
The proliferation of security forces has had an increasingly deleterious
effect on the shaky ceasefire--armed Sinhalese settlers and Home Guardsmen are
being increasingly fingered, even by the government, in recent episodes of
Tamil shootings.
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Military training has received less emphasis than arms acquisitions in
Colombo's recent build-up--equipment purchases have commanded an estimated 96%
of a recently approved defense budget supplement. Also, training--both in Sri
Lanka and in other countries--has been sporadic and diffused.
Colombo's intelligence capabilities, while improving, are still, incapable.
of supporting an effective counterinsurgency campaign, in our view.
nature of government military operations indicates that accurate and timely
intelligence on the insurgency either is not reaching the security forces or
that they are not capitalizing on it.
Longstanding problems in the Sri Lankan security forces, such as poor
leadership and dedication to mission, remain unattended. The military suffers
from the entrenchment of Sinhalese senior officers chosen more for their
political reliability than for their military expertise. The junior officer
corps, composed largely of young Sinhalese with hardline views toward the
communal conflict, is among those groups pressing hardest for a military
solution. The rank and file are mostly Sinhalese peasants who often see the
conflict in racial rather than political terms. This poor leadership and
ethnic parochialism fuels the severe discipline problem in Colombo's forces..
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A Stronger Insurgency
While the Army remained mostly in garrison last year until the fall, the
insurgents gained time to ready themselves for renewed fighting. Because New
Delhi has cracked down on insurgent activities in and from India, many
insurgent factions have moved their training and command operations into Sri
Lanka and established new bases in the Northern and Eastern provinces. Despite
the Indian crackdown, press reports indicate small 25X1
arms, ammunition, and explosives continue to reach Sri Lanka from India. We
believe the insurgents have sufficient resources to support a guerrilla war for
a considerable period even if the Indians or, even less likely, Colombo's naval
patrols succeed in shutting down the Palk Straits supply line. 25X1
Increasing ties between the Tamil militant groups and radical Sinhalese
leftist elements in the south as well as reports of Tamil cells in Sinhalese
areas suggest the insurgency could take on broader proportions, which would
further complicate the government's military strategy.
According to press reports, at least
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ten members of a splinter group of an extreme left wing party are under 25X1
detention in Colombo and are expected to be charged with planning a joint
attack with Tamil separatists on key installations in the south.
Outlook
If Colombo initiates a major offensive, the security forces' improved 25X1
arsenal probably will allow them to achieve initial limited success, but the
lack of proper planning, preparation, and training, combined with improvements
in insurgent capabilities, likely will prevent them from achieving a lasting 25X1
'
solution. Colombo
s forces are capable of accomplishing little more than?
changing the borders of rebel-held territory slightly in the government's favor
and attaining a temporarily heightened presence in the north and east.
Should the government offensive falter quickly, which is likely, the
rebels probably will stand by their current strategy and try to keep the
security forces from making any gains in the Northern or even the Eastern
provinces. If government forces make headway in the field and guerrilla
resources become scarce, the more militant Tamil groups would likely turn to
terror attacks against the security forces and Sinhalese civilians. Sinhalese
villagers recently settled under a government program in eastern and northern
Tamil areas are the most likely targets, although spreading violence to Colombo
and other areas in the south previously untouched by the insurgency would, in
our view, be relatively easy for the guerrillas to accomplish. We believe the
security forces are unprepared for such a turn of events.
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